Latest news with #UNCLOS
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Malaysia quietly flying Turkish drones over South China Sea
In June 2025, Malaysia took a decisive yet understated step in fortifying its maritime domain awareness by confirming the deployment of three Turkish-made Anka‑S unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones will operate from Labuan, with the first sorties expected to commence later this year over the South China Sea. Yet the symbolism of such deployments—especially in a region as fraught and strategically sensitive as the South China Sea—must be carefully interpreted. This is not about picking sides between the United States and China. Nor is it a belligerent signal to any one power. Instead, Malaysia's choice reflects a doctrine of quiet diplomacy: one that prioritizes sovereignty without provocation, and preparedness without escalation. Whenever the South China Sea is invoked in regional headlines, it is often painted as a zero-sum contest between China and Southeast Asia. That portrayal misses the nuance of Malaysia's approach. For decades, Malaysia has pursued a policy of principled engagement—asserting its maritime rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while maintaining constructive, often warm, ties with China. Malaysia's procurement of surveillance drones does not undermine that tradition. Rather, it reinforces our commitment to defend our interests with clarity and calm—not capitulation, nor confrontation. The Anka‑S, designed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), was chosen through a transparent international tender that included bids from the United States' General Atomics (offering the MQ‑9 Reaper) and China's AVIC (offering the Wing Loong II). That Malaysia selected Turkey was not a rejection of the US or China per se—it was a choice based on strategic fit, affordability, reliability, and non-politicized defence procurement. The Anka‑S platform, with its 24–30 hours of endurance, encrypted satellite communications, synthetic aperture radar, EO/IR cameras, ground-moving target indicators (GMTI), and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, provides a vital capability in monitoring activity across Malaysia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without compromising our diplomatic equilibrium. It is also essential to note that these drones are unarmed. They are surveillance platforms, not strike systems. Malaysia is not militarizing its maritime space; it is strengthening maritime situational awareness in a region with complex and overlapping claims, illegal fishing, piracy, and growing commercial activity. The message is straightforward: Malaysia is watching—not menacing. Malaysia is asserting its rights, not staking new claims. More than a defense acquisition, the Anka‑S symbolizes a maturing partnership between Malaysia and Turkey. As a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN and NATO's second-largest military force, Turkey stands at a unique intersection of East and West. It maintains a robust relationship with both the United States and China and has earned a reputation for pursuing independent diplomacy. Turkey's strategic balance, reflected in its engagement with Russia, Europe, and the Muslim world, resonates with ASEAN's own non-aligned but active diplomacy. In many ways, Türkiye is a mirror of Malaysia's geopolitical posture: firm in its sovereignty, flexible in its partnerships. Turkey's defense industry also offers something often missing in dealings with traditional great powers—mutual respect and shared technological growth. The Anka‑S is a product of indigenous Turkish development, allowing greater room for customization, training, and potential co-production. In Malaysia's case, the infrastructure and training for the drones are being carried out in collaboration with local firm G7 Aerospace, enabling knowledge transfer and economic spillover benefits. Future upgrades, including weaponization (if Malaysia ever chooses that path), can be managed with full transparency and independence. So why Turkey and why now? The answer lies in both regional and global dynamics. ASEAN member states are becoming increasingly cautious in navigating the intensifying US-China rivalry. On one hand, the United States has urged allies and partners in Asia to increase defense spending and adopt its Indo-Pacific strategy, often with veiled suggestions of containment. On the other, China has expanded its military and coast guard presence in regional waters, testing the boundaries of maritime diplomacy. Yet Malaysia remains steadfastly neutral committed to peace, but not pacifism. The selection of Turkey is a clear signal that Malaysia can strengthen its defence posture without falling into the orbit of either superpower. The Anka‑S is not part of any military bloc or encirclement agenda. It is a tool of sovereign surveillance, rooted in international law and national interest. Türkiye also offers strategic reliability without overreach. It has forged strong defence ties with both NATO and non-NATO countries, including Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia. Its drones, including the Anka‑S and the famed Bayraktar TB2, have been combat-proven in multiple theatres—from Syria and Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. While Malaysia is not adopting these UAVs for combat, the reliability and endurance of the Anka‑S speaks volumes about its maturity as a platform. Moreover, Türkiye is not just a defence provider—it is a geopolitical partner. Its increasing engagement with Southeast Asia through trade, cultural exchange, and religious diplomacy—particularly as a Muslim-majority nation—makes it a natural fit for deeper strategic relations with Malaysia and ASEAN. Its presence offers a third way for countries seeking alternatives to the binary of Washington and Beijing. In this context, Malaysia's decision to field the Anka‑S is not merely a technical or tactical decision. It is a quiet yet profound statement of national resolve. Malaysia seeks not to provoke, but to protect. Not to align blindly, but to cooperate wisely. We remain firm in our rights under UNCLOS, especially in defending our maritime zones—but we will continue to engage China, the United States, and all partners through dialogue and diplomacy. Let there be no misreading: Malaysia's vision of the South China Sea is not as a flashpoint of rival empires, but as a shared space requiring shared responsibility. With the Anka‑S circling above, Malaysia does not signal hostility—but capability. This is what sovereign agency looks like in the 21st century—eyes wide open, posture firm, diplomacy intact. Malaysia's approach to the South China Sea is neither naive nor aggressive. It is rooted in quiet strength, strategic foresight, and a refusal to be drawn into great power theatrics. By working with Turkey, a bridge between the Atlantic and Asia, Malaysia is building more than defense capacity—it is shaping a future where ASEAN nations assert their own narratives, on their own terms. Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies, International Islamic University Malaysia . Luthfy Hamzah is senior research fellow, Strategic Pan Indo Pacific Arena, Kuala Lumpur .
The Sun
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Sun
UK strengthens ASEAN ties via FPDA, security cooperation in Malaysia
KUALA LUMPUR: The United Kingdom has reinforced its dedication to regional security and economic stability by deepening ties with ASEAN, particularly under Malaysia's leadership, through established defence agreements and international legal frameworks. UK High Commissioner to Malaysia Ajay Sharma highlighted the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) as a cornerstone of this cooperation. The FPDA, involving Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, was established in 1971 to ensure regional defence post-Britain's military withdrawal. Today, it addresses modern challenges like maritime security and counter-terrorism through joint exercises. Sharma emphasised the UK's adherence to global norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which supports maritime stability. 'Through agreements like UNCLOS and collaboration with Malaysia and regional partners, we aim to resolve differences diplomatically,' he said during an interview on Bernama TV's *The Diplomatic Dispatch*. ASEAN's role in fostering inclusive dialogue was also praised. 'ASEAN's centrality allows the UK to engage on critical issues, ensuring peaceful resolutions through strong international institutions,' Sharma noted. With Malaysia chairing ASEAN this year, the UK seeks to expand its partnership, focusing on ASEAN-led initiatives. 'Asia is the future, and we want to be part of it. Strengthening ties with ASEAN, especially under Malaysia's leadership, is a priority,' he added. The UK became ASEAN's Dialogue Partner in 2021, its first new partner in 25 years. The 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) and related sessions will take place in Kuala Lumpur from July 8 to 11, offering further opportunities for collaboration.
Barnama
3 days ago
- Politics
- Barnama
UK Reaffirms ASEAN Commitment Through FPDA, Security Cooperation
By Nur Atiq Maisarah Suhaimi KUALA LUMPUR, June 26 (Bernama) -- The United Kingdom (UK) has reaffirmed its commitment to regional peace and stability by strengthening cooperation with ASEAN member states under Malaysia's chairmanship, through international legal frameworks and long-standing defence arrangements. UK High Commissioner to Malaysia Ajay Sharma said this includes the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a security partnership involving Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as adherence to global norms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which underpins maritime stability in the region. bootstrap slideshow 'As part of our relationship with Malaysia, we are working bilaterally, regionally and internationally to promote stability and create the conditions for economic growth. 'Through agreements such as the law of the sea, and cooperation with Malaysia and other countries in the region, we aim to ensure that international agreements are respected and that any differences are resolved diplomatically and through dialogue,' Sharma told Bernama after appearing on the Bernama TV programme The Diplomatic Dispatch on Thursday. Established in 1971, the FPDA is a multilateral security arrangement formed in the context of Britain's military withdrawal from the 'East of Suez', to support the defence and stability of Malaysia and Singapore following their respective independence and separation. Since its establishment over 50 years ago, the FPDA has evolved to cover a broader range of security tasks, including air defence, maritime security, and counter-terrorism, as demonstrated in major annual exercises. Sharma noted that ASEAN plays an essential role in fostering inclusive dialogue and multilateral cooperation on regional and global challenges. 'ASEAN is great because it brings together, with ASEAN centrality and inclusivity at its heart, a group of countries that we in the UK can engage with on a range of important issues.
Malay Mail
3 days ago
- Politics
- Malay Mail
Navigating the Strait of Hormuz: Can Iran say no? — Mohd Hazmi Mohd Rusli
JUNE 26 — The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint that links the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and beyond to the high seas. It borders two coastal states, Iran and Oman. An estimated 20 percent of the world's crude oil supply is transported through this narrow waterway daily. It is therefore unsurprising that the Strait has become the focus of global geopolitical tensions. A key question that continues to arise is whether Iran may legally close the Strait of Hormuz to foreign vessels, particularly in times of heightened regional conflict. Transit passage and the law of the sea Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Strait of Hormuz is classified as a strait used for international navigation. As such, it is subject to the regime of transit passage under Articles 38 and 44 of the Convention. This regime grants all ships and aircraft, including warships, the right to transit continuously and expeditiously through the strait without requiring prior authorisation from the coastal states, provided that passage does not threaten their peace or security. Most importantly, this right of transit passage may not be suspended even during times of conflict. This is clearly stated in Article 44 of UNCLOS. This matter does not apply to Iran alone, but also applies to countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia which possess sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Strait of Malacca, and Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore which possess sovereignty over the Strait of Singapore. These littora States also cannot unilaterally close these straits to international navigation, as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are subjected to the same principle. A map showing the Strait of Hormuz and Iran is seen behind a 3D printed oil pipeline in this illustration taken June 22, 2025. — Reuters pic Iran and UNCLOS Although both Iran and Oman are coastal states bordering the Strait of Hormuz, only Oman is a party to UNCLOS. Iran has not ratified the Convention. Nevertheless, the principle of transit passage is widely recognised as part of customary international law. This means that Iran remains bound by this principle, despite not being a State-member to UNCLOS. When can Iran lawfully act Iran may only restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz if it is engaged in a legally recognised international armed conflict, for example, if it is officially at war. In such circumstances, international humanitarian law applies. This permits coastal states to take defensive military actions against enemy vessels, including interception. However, these actions must not be directed at vessels belonging to neutral states. As of now, Iran has not officially declared war against any country, although military tensions have escalated involving Israel and United States military bases in Qatar. Any unilateral move by Iran to close the Strait would be a violation of international law and could provoke military retaliation or economic sanctions from major world powers. Conclusion From the standpoint of international law, Iran does not possess the absolute right to unilaterally close the Strait of Hormuz to foreign shipping. Such action would not only breach the legal framework governing transit passage but could also threaten global maritime security and regional stability. Ultimately, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a legal issue. It highlights the ongoing intersection between sovereignty, geopolitics and the law of the sea that continues to shape global affairs today. Assoc Prof Dr Mohd Hazmi Mohd Rusli is the Head Researcher at the International Law Unit, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia and a Research Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Affairs and Diplomacy, Universiti Utara Malaysia. *Assoc Prof Dr Mohd Hazmi Mohd Rusli is the Head Researcher at the International Law Unit, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia and a Research Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Affairs and Diplomacy, Universiti Utara Malaysia. ** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
Newsweek
4 days ago
- General
- Newsweek
US Allies Challenge Beijing's Claims in Contested South China Sea
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. The British and Australian militaries have challenged China's claims over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea with a "freedom of navigation" operation. Newsweek reached out to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Australian Navy via email for comment outside of office hours. Why It Matters China asserts sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, an archipelago with competing claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. The United States, and increasingly its allies, have stepped up naval transits in disputed areas in recent years to push back against the restrictions on innocent passage imposed by claimant countries. What To Know On Monday, British River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey and Australian Hobart-class guided missile destroyer HMAS Sydney "conducted a freedom of navigation activity around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, in accordance with UNCLOS," the United Kingdom's Permanent Joint Headquarters wrote on X (formerly Twitter). China had not publicly commented on the operation as of press time, but it frequently criticizes military activities by "outside countries." A service member of the British Navy looks through binoculars during a "freedom of navigation activity" in the South China Sea's Spratly Islands on June 23, 2025. A service member of the British Navy looks through binoculars during a "freedom of navigation activity" in the South China Sea's Spratly Islands on June 23, 2025. Just days earlier, the Spey passed through another disputed waterway—the Taiwan Strait—amid ongoing tensions between China and the self-ruled democracy of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory. Taiwan's foreign ministry thanked the U.K. on X for "standing with Taiwan in support of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific." The Spey, along with its sister ship HMS Tamar, has been permanently based in the Pacific since 2021 as part of London's effort to play a larger role in the region. During U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy's visit to the Philippines in March, he condemned China's "dangerous and destabilizing activities" in the South China Sea. China's territorial dispute with the Philippines has been particularly fierce in recent years as Chinese maritime forces expand into the U.S. defense treaty ally's exclusive economic zone. In 2016, a Hague-based arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Manila and dismissed China's claims within the Philippines' maritime zone, citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing maintains the decision is invalid. The most recent U.S. Navy ship to pass near the Spratly Islands was the USS Dewey, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, on May 12. What People Are Saying China's embassy in the U.K. responded to U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy's remark in March: "As a country outside the region, the U.K. should respect China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, and the efforts of regional countries to maintain peace and stability. "We urge the U.K. to stop heightening antagonism and sowing discord, and stop any words and deeds that undermine regional peace and stability." What Happens Next The U.K. and Australia are likely to continue conducting periodic "freedom of navigation" activities in the South China Sea as well as the Taiwan Strait.
