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AllAfrica
07-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's '100-year opportunity' could be Seoul's 100-year mistake
China seems to have a fondness for the number 100. It famously brands the years 1839–1949 as its 'century of national humiliation.' That narrative of imposed weakness still fuels nationalist rhetoric at home. It also finds resonance in Michael Pillsbury's The Hundred-Year Marathon , which argues that Beijing has spent the past century lying low, only to re-emerge with a plan for global hegemony. So when China's foreign ministry used that same phrase to salute Lee Jae Myung's presidential victory – as 'profound changes unseen in a century' – ears perked up in the international community. Lee was elected on June 3 promising 'pragmatism' and 'balanced diplomacy,' code words for equidistance between the United States and China. That might sound reasonable for a middle power squeezed between its main security guarantor and its largest trading partner. Yet Beijing's exuberance suggests it interprets Lee's promise less as equidistance and more as drift toward China. If Beijing truly believes Lee's rise represents a 'once-in-a-century chance' to reset the strategic chessboard in Northeast Asia, then his personnel choices matter a great deal. On July 3, barely a month after taking office, Lee appointed Kim Min-seok as prime minister. Even in politicized Seoul, these are fighting words – and not just because Lee bypassed several more senior candidates. Kim's biography reads like a cautionary tale for anyone who believes alliances are carved in stone. He was once denied a US visa over his alleged role in the violent 1985 occupation of the American Cultural Center in Seoul, a student-led protest widely viewed as anti-American. Although the US embassy later blamed an 'administrative error,' the episode lingers as shorthand for leftist suspicion of Washington – and for Washington's lingering distrust of certain Korean leftists. In the current climate, Lee's decision looks less like pragmatism and more like provocation. Washington's Korea watchers have taken note. Personnel, after all, is policy. Choosing Kim suggests that Lee values ideological affinity at least as much as alliance management – if not more. Nor is Kim the only eyebrow-raising pick in Lee's inner circle. A number of new aides built their reputations challenging the US-led bilateral alliance structure, and they now occupy portfolios that will shape trade, technology sharing, and security cooperation. Many critics of Lee's early moves – both conservative voices inside Korea and alliance stalwarts in Washington – point to a growing pattern: warmer words for Beijing, cooler ones for Washington; a cabinet peppered with figures who made their names by opposing US military or diplomatic initiatives; and renewed talk of''strategic ambiguity,' a term frequently used to describe Seoul's foreign policy posture during the late 2010s, particularly under Moon Jae-in. For those who believe the US-ROK alliance is the region's strategic backbone, Lee's pivot feels like a direct challenge. Beijing's reaction only amplifies the anxiety. When a congratulatory cable from the Chinese foreign ministry frames Lee's victory in century-long terms, it signals strategic intent. Beijing is not just welcoming a friendly neighbor – it is seizing what it sees as a historic opening created by political turnover in Seoul. Events in Washington have compounded the unease. On the same day Lee crowned Kim Min-seok, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio abruptly scrapped his visits to South Korea and Japan. The official explanation cited scheduling pressures and Middle East priorities, yet the symbolism resonated. Korean commentators wondered aloud whether Washington had lost patience with Lee's balancing act. Without Rubio's shuttle diplomacy, Lee's first face-to-face summit with President Trump is now on ice. That delay could stall negotiations over defense burden-sharing, extended deterrence, and joint supply chain safeguards – issues that cannot wait in a year of North Korean missile tests and intensifying US-China tech wars. Seoul suddenly looks isolated at precisely the moment when it hoped to triangulate deftly among great powers. Lee insists that strategic ambiguity is the only rational course for a mid-sized economy living next door to China and across the sea from Japan. Yet history suggests that hedging works best when all sides still trust your intentions. Since the Korean War, Washington's 'hub-and-spokes' alliance structure in Asia has been bilateral by design, giving the US tight control over alliances – and restraining regional partners from freelancing. The worry now is that Seoul's new leadership may freelance anyway, eroding the spoke that binds the whole wheel together. Beijing, for its part, understands the material limits of its leverage over Seoul. Yet it also sees opportunity whenever Washington's grip loosens. If Lee's South Korea decouples from US strategic priorities even modestly – on technology bans, chip supply chains, or security cost sharing – Beijing can claim progress in its long game of prying US allies closer to its own orbit. Balanced diplomacy is easier to sloganize than to operationalize. A single missile test from Pyongyang can force Seoul back under Washington's wing; a single punitive trade measure from Beijing can make Korean firms beg for American cover. Any short-term gains from hedging can evaporate if either great-power partner feels betrayed. Lee's challenge is therefore double-edged. He must show Beijing just enough good will to keep economic ties humming, while proving to Washington that Seoul remains a reliable ally. Kim Min-seok's appointment, read in Washington as a thumb in the eye, complicates that calculus. Rubio's canceled trip hints that the Trump administration – or any future US administration – could respond in kind, downgrading or delaying high-level engagement. Beijing may view Lee's presidency as a 'hundred-year opportunity,' but opportunities can sour into hangovers if mismanaged. Seoul's core national interest remains deterrence against North Korea and access to US markets and technology. China's interest in exploiting cracks in the alliance is explicit in its public diplomacy. That leaves Lee with a narrow path: leverage China's enthusiasm without alienating the ally whose security guarantee still underwrites South Korea's prosperity. Lee Jae Myung branded himself a pragmatic centrist who could glide between giants. His early personnel choices suggest something starker: a hidden tilt that Beijing welcomes and Washington distrusts. China's talk of century-scale opportunities might flatter Seoul's new leadership, but it also warns of the scale on which Beijing plays its games. If Seoul confuses that flattery with partnership, it risks learning – perhaps within this decade, not the next century – why hub-and-spoke alliances have endured, and why strategic ambiguity in a multipolar world can become strategic isolation. Hanjin Lew, a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs, is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.
AllAfrica
16-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Lee's election in S Korea: The time for wishful thinking has come
South Korea has a new President. President Lee Jae-myung is a lifelong leftist with an affinity for the People's Republic of China and North Korea, and has no great love for the United States. He has referred to American troops in South Korea as 'occupiers' and said China should do what it wants to Taiwan. Lee apparently likes North Korea enough to put money down. He currently faces charges for involvement in sending $8 million to North Korea while he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. His deputy has already been convicted. However, during the recent election campaign Lee talked up the US-ROK alliance and three-way US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. Thus, many American observers claim Lee is a pragmatist and a centrist, and will govern as such. Maybe. But as likely it reflects a tendency towards wishful thinking on the part of America's foreign policy class when a certain type of radical leader comes along. The same was said about Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Turkey's Recep Erdogan, Solomon Islands' Manasseh Sogavare, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and Cuba's Fidel Castro. Even Xi Jinping was mentioned as a reformer who just needed to solidify his position before liberalizing the PRC. But maybe these sort of men mean what they say beyond the soothing language intended for Western elites when on the verge of taking power. As for Lee, forget what he said on the campaign trial, and look at his new prime minister, Kim Min-seok. Kim was a Seoul National University radical student leader in the 1980s and joined the illegal occupation of the Seoul American Cultural Center in 1985. He was jailed for three years due to his anti-state and pro-North Korea activities. The Americans once refused to give him a visa, and he is said to have claimed the Americans were behind Covid. One recalls candidate Barack Obama who promised to 'unify' a divided United States. Once elected, he appointed Chicago political operative Rahm Emanuel as chief of staff. And America got Chicago politics at the national level. Rule #1 of Chicago politics: crush your opponents. Rule #2: do whatever it takes to keep power—forever. Don't expect centrist, conciliatory policies from Lee. Rather, we'll soon see Lee's pogrom against his opponents – to include anyone with the nerve to have called for honest elections. Lee's Democratic Party of Korea (DP) has an overwhelming majority in the national assembly – likely obtained by questionable means. He can do whatever he wants, and packing the Supreme Court appears on the menu. Lee's calls for 'restoring democracy' and unifying the nation in his inaugural speech give chutzpah a bad name. He and the DP spent the entire two years of Yoon's administration making it impossible for Yoon to govern and enact his policies. This went well beyond sharp-elbowed politics found in a normal country. Instead, it was intended to cause chaos. Nearly 30 impeachments of Yoon and his officials? Zeroing out Yoon's budget requests and more? Not exactly the behavior of a loyal opposition. Rather, Lee's election is one more episode in a years-long effort by South Korean radicals to establish single-party rule in South Korea – and align with the PRC, North Korea and even Russia. The original impeachment resolution against former president Yoon accused him of 'antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia' and 'adhering to a bizarre Japan-centered foreign policy.' Sometimes people tell you what they really think – if you'll listen. Is this the end of the US-ROK alliance? It won't collapse tomorrow, and still has resilience. But any relationship is on shaky ground when key figures on one side dislike the other side – and would rather hook up with their partner's main rivals. Everything will get more difficult for Washington in Northeast Asia, and easier for Beijing, which has been pressuring and insinuating itself into South Korea for years. Perhaps hoping to make the best of things, the White House said the US-ROK alliance is 'ironclad' – and declared the election 'free and fair.' It did express general concern over 'Chinese interference' in democracies. The State Department similarly offered congratulations to President Lee. Free and fair election? South Korean citizens facing intimidation and lawsuits uncovered substantial evidence of widespread electoral irregularities (as they did for elections in 2020, 2022, and 2024). Did anyone at the US Embassy, the State Department or the White House even examine the evidence? Or meet with the citizen's groups? Apparently not. The foreign press has been equally lazy. As have most analysts. Rather than investigating, just call it baseless conspiracy theories. This was a gut punch to pro-alliance South Koreans, already distressed that the Trump administration couldn't be bothered to make a favorable reference to consensual government and honest elections before the polling. So maybe the Trump administration is going to wish away the problem and pretend Lee isn't what he's been all his professional life, in hopes of keeping the alliance alive. But at some point a US administration is going to discover that Lee and South Korean leftists—just like Chavez, Erdogan, Ortega and others – mean what they say. And Washington may one day find that South Korea, once solidly with the US and democracies, is quite the opposite. And, furthermore, that a system has developed in the ROK so that even if the problematic 'leader' goes away, the country is stuck and cannot re-democratize. Washington still has cards to play if it wants to support consensual government in South Korea – and at the same time preserve the US-ROK alliance. Not least is that most South Koreans don't want to go where Lee and his 'jusapa' radicals want to take them. But having a good hand requires one to actually play it. Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He was the first Marine liaison officer to the Japan Self-Defense Forces and is a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of the book, When China Attacks: A Warning To America . This article was originally published by The Sunday Guardian. It is republished with permission.
AllAfrica
01-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Letter from Seoul: This isn't just another election
Sometimes when momentous things happen in a country, most people don't notice. That's normal. People focus on their lives – jobs, family, finances, and the like. I've been in Seoul, South Korea, for about a week, having been asked to come and see what's going on with the upcoming presidential election. You wouldn't know that an election that might determine South Korea's future is underway. The election was called three months ago after conservative president Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. He'd declared martial law out of frustration over the leftist-dominated National Assembly using its immense power to make governing impossible. Yoon called it a 'legislative dictatorship.' So now it's a race between Lee Jae-myung from the leftist Democratic Party of Korea (DP) and Kim Moon-soo – of the generally conservative People Power Party (PPP). The DPK contains some hard-core radicals who want to align with the People's Republic of China and North Korea and even end the US-ROK alliance. Lee himself has called the US forces 'occupiers' – and is charged with involvement in sending $8 million to North Korea when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. One of his lieutenants has already been convicted. Kim – a former labor activist is pro-US alliance. And he has no illusions about or love for South Korean leftists – having once been one of them – or the Chinese communists and North Korea. But there is another conservative candidate running. Lee Jun-seok of the small New Reform Party will siphon off votes from Kim. Polls, not always reliable, put the DPK in the lead. We will know soon enough. Two days of early voting are finished and election day is June 3d. A Kim victory would be better for the US-ROK alliance, although the DP-dominated National Assembly would still make life miserable for a conservative president. If Lee Jae-myung prevails, things could be very different. The leftists will have nearly every lever of power in South Korea. They just need the presidency. They already have the National Assembly (189 seats of 300), much of the judiciary and the police, the media, academia, labor unions and the all-powerful National Election Commission (NEC). Big business has been under attack, and even the ROK military has been put on notice. South Korean leftists have long wanted total and permanent control. But it started in earnest around 2017 when leftist, Moon Jae-in was elected president following the controversial removal of conservative president Park Chung-hee If Lee wins, he won't sever the US alliance or nestle up to the PRC and North Korea right away. US officialdom will tell itself the leftists are pragmatists and won't end the good thing they have with the United States. But bit by bit the US-ROK relationship will grow colder. Seoul's relationships with Beijing and Pyongyang will warm up. Ties with Japan – improved under President Yoon – will enter the walk-in freezer. The National Assembly and the leftist president will do whatever they want – and nobody can stop them. South Korea will effectively be a one-party state. Future elections won't matter. The National Election Commission will see to that. It has been stonewalling widespread and detailed citizen-produced evidence of electoral irregularities starting with the 2020 National Assembly election – which gave the DP a solid majority for the first time. Similar evidence was produced after the 2022 presidential election and the 2024 National Assembly election. Mention election integrit, however, and South Koreans can find the police at their doorstep and charges leveled. Being ridiculed as a conspiracy theorist is a given. But consider the fact that the NEC declared its system was unhackable – when citizens demanded transparency. Yet in 2023 the North Korean Lazarus Group repeatedly hacked the NEC network. Public outcry allowed the National Intelligence Service (not yet entirely under leftist domination) to run penetration tests. NIS ran wild and reported how the electoral system can be electronically manipulated. I came to Korea in 2020 to investigate allegations of rigging at the request of concerned citizens. I expected to find nothing much. In short order, it was obvious there were problems. Nothing has changed. It's still a system ripe for and apparently rife with manipulation. And authorities will not examine the evidence. Some South Koreans are trying to ensure honest elections. But they are beleaguered. They would sorely appreciate a kind word from President Trump. But the Trump administration stands by mute, with eyes primly averted. It declares the relationship 'rock solid' and 'forged in blood? And 'who are we to meddle in another country's politics?' But rather than electoral interference it would be providing oxygen to people who want to be free and are under pressure. There's nothing wrong with speaking up for consensual government, and civil liberties – and for your friends. And it puts the bad guys on notice. If they think America doesn't care or won't do anything at all they'll smother the opposition. Recall support for dissidents in Russia and Poland and elsewhere in the Cold War? It mattered. The US stayed quiet when Hugo Chavez came along in Venezuela in the early 1990's. The honest people just wanted something suggesting USA gave two hoots. They got nothing. And Venezuela is now in the China / Cuba camp. At least one big problem still remains for the leftists who see their goal in sight. That is the fact that most South Koreans don't want to be like China or North Korea – and support for the US alliance is strong, even among more than a few Democratic Party voters. And Koreans can be mercurial. They may not quietly go along with what South Korea's hard-core radicals have in mind. So this isn't just another election. If Washington hasn't paid proper attention to South Korea yet, it will have no choice but to do so before long.
Al Arabiya
20-03-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
South Korea, US wrap up annual military drills, stage joint river-crossing
South Korea and the United States wrapped up on Thursday 11 days of annual joint military drills known as Freedom Shield, which included staging a river-crossing exercise close to the heavily militarized border with North Korea. The militaries of the two countries reaffirmed their alliance and strengthened their defensive posture during the drills, US Forces Korea and South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said. The river-crossing exercise, which was held in Yeoncheon, an area near the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, involved some 600 troops, as well as 100 armored vehicles and aircraft, according to South Korea's defense ministry. 'This training provided an opportunity for the brigade soldiers to experience the importance of the ROK-US alliance and maximize the interoperability of river-crossing equipment,' Major Jung Byung-hyuk of the South Korean army said after the river-crossing exercise. ROK refers to the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name. South Korean and U.S troops had built a 180-metre (196.85 yards) floating bridge in order to allow armored vehicles to cross a river, according to the ministry. 'Regardless of politics, when asked the soldiers in these formations both US and ROK are standing side by side ready to support the US-ROK alliance,' Lieutenant Colonel Brent Kinney of the US Army said when asked about the current political situation in South Korea. South Korea has been suffering its worst political crisis in decades after President Yoon Suk Yeol briefly imposed martial law in December. The Constitutional Court is due to rule on whether to uphold his impeachment by parliament in coming days. Pyongyang has long demanded a halt to US-South Korea joint exercises, branding them a prelude to an invasion. North Korea fired multiple ballistic missiles earlier this month, hours after condemning the South Korean and US militaries for launching the drills that the North called a 'dangerous provocative act.'
AllAfrica
10-03-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
How S Korea would respond to Taiwan hostilities
Despite being a key US regional ally, questions are rising about whether South Korea would take proactive measures if China were to initiate hostile actions against Taiwan? Given its deep economic interdependence with China, South Korea finds itself strategically caught between Washington and Beijing. To examine this issue, this writer conducted interviews last year with South Korean military officials in which I classified China's potential hostile actions against Taiwan into three scenarios: (1) gray zone operations, which include actions such as deploying China's maritime militia and coast guard vessels to harass Taiwanese ships, thereby exerting pressure on Taiwan without directly provoking open conflict; (2) a naval blockade; and (3) a full-scale military invasion. There was a strong consensus among the officials on how South Korea should respond if China were to initiate (1) gray zone operations, (2) a naval blockade, or (3) a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. In all three scenarios, they agreed that South Korea should increase its alert level within the US-ROK Combined Forces and reinforce deterrence against potential North Korean provocations. This concern stems from the possibility that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whether acting in coordination with China or independently, might view a regional shift in US military focus toward the Taiwan Strait as an opportunity to exploit a potential power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula. To prevent such a miscalculation, it is essential to consistently signal to North Korean authorities that US-ROK contingency plans will function effectively as intended, eliminating any perception of nuclear decoupling between South Korea and the US. Regarding military capability, South Korea should prioritize acquiring additional ground-to-ground precision missiles capable of penetrating underground bunkers, which would serve as critical assets for South Korea's kill chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategies. Apart from strengthening deterrence, South Korea's response strategy varied across the three scenarios. In scenario one, where China engages in gray zone operations, most South Korean military officials recommended maintaining neutrality and avoiding actions that could unnecessarily provoke China, such as deploying naval vessels to the Taiwan Strait or providing logistical support to US forces in the region. This cautious approach stems from South Korea's economic interdependence with China and the expectation that any direct involvement could lead to significant economic retaliation, as evidenced by the backlash following the 2017 THAAD deployment. Additionally, it is important to note that the 1953 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty primarily emphasizes the defense of South Korean territory against external threats, but does not contain provisions obligating South Korea to participate in military operations beyond its borders. Meanwhile, in scenario two, where a Chinese naval blockade in the Taiwan Strait could disrupt South Korea's sea lines of communication (SLOC), some officials suggested that South Korea should deploy naval forces to secure these critical trade routes, which are essential for economic stability. To address this challenge, South Korea should acquire five to six Aegis-equipped naval vessels, each with a minimum capacity of 100 Battle Force Missiles (BFM)—a metric that represents the total number of missile cells on a naval vessel capable of launching both offensive and defensive missiles, serving as a standardized measure of a fleet's overall missile firepower. In this particular scenario, the focus would be on anti-ship missiles designed to target Chinese naval vessels. Under this framework, two to three ships could be stationed in the Taiwan Strait for extended periods, rotating between South Korean waters and the Taiwan Strait. To effectively implement this strategy, South Korea should focus on developing a Blue Water Navy, capable of sustaining extended operations far from its shores. This is particularly important because rerouting South Korea's SLOCs away from the Taiwan Strait—through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos or around Papua New Guinea via the Solomon Sea—would be both time-consuming and costly. In scenario three, some South Korean officials believed that, at a minimum, South Korea should provide logistical support to US forces in Korea deploying to the Taiwan Strait, such as access to South Korean airfields and fuel supplies for US Forces Korea (USFK). Beyond logistical support, South Korea should also pursue the acquisition of five to six Aegis-equipped naval vessels, along with expanded ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities and an increased arsenal of precision-guided missiles. However, this situation becomes significantly more complex if North Korea launches military aggression against South Korea at the same time that China invades Taiwan—indicating that deterrence against North Korea has failed. If a two-front war scenario were to materialize, many South Korean military officials suggested that their military assets, along with key US Forces Korea (USFK) assets, should not be deployed to the Taiwan Strait. This position is understandable, considering the response I received from Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) officials during my discussions in 2023. When asked about Japan's response in a two-front war scenario, JSDF officials stated that Japan would prioritize defending the Taiwan Strait, allocating approximately 60-70% of its air and naval assets to support US operations in the region, while only 30-40% would be reserved for Japan's own defense. This allocation would significantly impact Japan's ability to operate under OPLAN 5055, a joint US-Japan military strategy designed to address potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula in the event of a crisis involving North Korea. Such a shift in Japan's strategic focus could directly affect the joint US-ROK Operation Plan (OPLAN), which assumes that in the event of a North Korean invasion, South Korean and USFK would initially hold positions north of the Han River until reinforcements arrive from US Forces Japan (USFJ) within approximately two weeks. Under this plan, the JSDF plays a critical role in supporting US military operations through logistical and operational assistance. Given that the bulk of US reinforcements from the US mainland would take approximately 90 days to fully deploy—a timeline expected to overwhelm North Korean aggressors—the timely arrival of reinforcements from Japan is crucial in the early phase of the conflict. If USFJ and Japan's military assets are largely tied up in the Taiwan Strait, South Korea would have no choice but to allocate all of its own military resources to compensate for the reduced support from US forces in Japan, further complicating South Korea's ability to contribute to regional security in Taiwan. Overall, while it remains unclear whether the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) has addressed South Korea's specific action plans in a Taiwan contingency—as its detailed provisions remain classified—South Korea's response to Chinese aggression across all three scenarios is unlikely to be highly proactive. Instead, South Korea is expected to focus primarily on strengthening deterrence against potential North Korean military aggression rather than directly intervening in a Taiwan crisis. This approach reflects the slightly different strategic priorities between South Korea and the US and Japan, as well as the limited availability of military assets in the region that all three countries must carefully allocate. Given that these differences in strategic priorities could create challenges in a potential crisis—whether in a Taiwan contingency alone or a simultaneous Taiwan-Korean Peninsula conflict—it is crucial for the US, South Korea and Japan to develop a clear understanding of each country's likely responses during a crisis. By doing so, the three nations can work toward closing capability gaps and improving coordination before a major conflict arises. Dr Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, 'Japan's Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,' into a book.
