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eNCA
24-07-2025
- Politics
- eNCA
Moose meat and antlers caused Alaska plane crash: report
Too much moose meat and a set of antlers strapped to a wing brought a small plane down in Alaska, killing its pilot, according to a crash report published this week. Eugene Peltola died hours after his aircraft -- carrying over 225kg of moose meat -- plunged into mountains near St Mary's in southwest Alaska in September 2023. A report released by the US National Transportation Safety Board found the hefty meat cargo meant the plane was more than 100 pounds over its takeoff weight when it left a remote airstrip in the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The presence of a pair of moose antlers on the right wing strut of the plane -- a common practice in Alaska -- would likely have made flight even trickier, the report said, because of their effect on aerodynamics. Clint Johnson, the Alaska Region Chief for NTSB, was cited by local media as saying there were three main factors that contributed to the crash of the Piper PA 18-150 Super Cub. "Number one was, obviously, the overweight condition -- no ifs, ands, or buts there," he said, according to the website "The parasitic drag from the antlers that were attached to the right wing, and then also the last thing would be the wind, the mechanical wind turbulence at the end of the takeoff area, which unfortunately, led to this accident. "If you would have been able to take one of those items out, we probably wouldn't be having this conversation. But those things all in combination led to this tragic accident." Peltola was the husband of former US Representative Mary Peltola, the first Alaska Native to sit in Congress. The Democrat beat former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin in a 2022 special election, but lost her re-election bid in November last year.
The Sun
24-07-2025
- General
- The Sun
Moose meat and antlers caused fatal Alaska plane crash: NTSB report
LOS ANGELES: A small plane crash in Alaska that killed its pilot in 2023 was caused by an overload of moose meat and antlers strapped to the wing, according to a US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report released this week. Eugene Peltola died after his Piper PA 18-150 Super Cub, carrying over 500 pounds (225 kilograms) of moose meat, crashed near St Mary's in southwest Alaska. The report found the aircraft was more than 100 pounds over its takeoff weight when departing a remote airstrip in the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. Additionally, moose antlers attached to the right wing strut worsened aerodynamics, making flight control difficult. Clint Johnson, NTSB Alaska Region Chief, cited three key factors: 'Number one was, obviously, the overweight condition -- no ifs, ands, or buts there. The parasitic drag from the antlers that were attached to the right wing, and then also the last thing would be the wind, the mechanical wind turbulence at the end of the takeoff area, which unfortunately, led to this accident.' Peltola was the husband of former US Representative Mary Peltola, the first Alaska Native in Congress. She won a 2022 special election against Sarah Palin but lost her re-election bid in 2024. - AFP
Indian Express
19-07-2025
- Science
- Indian Express
Why cockpit ergonomics matters
US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) chief Jennifer Homendy called recent US-media claims that deliberate pilot action caused the Air India flight AI 171 crash 'premature and speculative'. 'India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time,' she said. Since last week's preliminary report stated that the Boeing-787 crashed after its fuel control switches 'transitioned from 'RUN' to 'CUTOFF'' moments after take-off, there has been much speculation about the reason behind this. Suggestions of deliberate pilot action come from the fact that these switches are designed to only be intentionally moved, and are foolproof using a bracket and stop lock mechanisms. In fact, almost everything inside an aircraft cockpit — from the placement of control interfaces and instruments to the design of the pilots' seating — is well thought of with the ultimate aim of improving efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. This is called cockpit ergonomics. 'Science of work' Ergonomics, also referred to as 'human factors,' is defined by the International Ergonomics Association (IEA) as 'the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system and the profession that applies theory, principles, data, and methods to design in order to optimise human well-being and overall system performance.' The word 'ergonomics' comes from the Greek ergon (work) and nomos (laws), which scholars translate to 'the science of work'. The point of this discipline is to optimise the interaction between humans and systems. Ergonomics in cockpit design specifically focuses on creating a workspace for pilots that minimises their physical and cognitive workload, which in turn makes an aircraft easier and safer to fly. The early days of aircraft development did not centre ergonomic considerations. While the importance of human factors was recognised by many — the United States' National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in 1921 held that instruments aboard aircraft must be made for 'the easiest possible reading and manipulation' — this did not necessarily translate to conscious design decisions. In 'Investigations of aviation accidents and lessons to be drawn from them' (1924), pioneering French aviator Félix Devaluez noted 'pilot error' was the second most prevalent cause of plane crashes but attributed this to pilots' 'error of judgment or lack of reasoning ability'. He recommended improvement of training regimens and rigorous technical examinations to address the issue. It was near the outbreak of World War II that newly established aviation psychology units in both Britain and the US became 'the first to deal with the problem of pilot error as a design problem instead of a personnel or training problem,' Prof Steven J Landry wrote in 'Human Factors and Ergonomics in Aviation' published in the Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics (2021). In 1951, US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Paul Fitts edited a seminal US-government commissioned report that outlined key human factor challenges in aviation. Fitts wrote that 'machines should be made for men; not men forcibly adapted to machines' and that the 'disregard of physiological and sensory handicaps… [and] human limitations… led to the the production of mechanical monstrosities which tax the capabilities of human operators and hinder the integration of man and machine…' ('Human Engineering for an Effective Air Navigation and Traffic-Control System', 1951). This got the ball rolling vis-à-vis ergonomics in aviation: major developments, from the creation of modern air traffic control to subsequent revolutions in cockpit design can be traced to Fitts' report, and his groundbreaking work on ergonomics. A few key aspects of cockpit ergonomics are as follows. Layout of instrumentation: It is vital that pilots can quickly and accurately access vital information even in high-stress situations. For instance, beginning in the 1970s, the availability of cathode-ray and computing technology enabled the replacement of single-sensor, single instrument (SSSI) displays with electronic displays. Cockpits went digital: values were easier to read than on analogue instrumentation, more information could be packed in less unit space, and linked to computers, electronic displays could present information in novel, ergonomic ways such that the pilot focuses only on what matters the most at any given situation. The modern Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) comprises a primary flight display (PFD), a multi-function display (MFD), and engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) display. Human machine interface (HMI): HMI is a feature of a certain machine through which humans directly engage and interact with it. Inside a cockpit, this would refer to the design of specific knobs, touchscreens, buttons, and other control interfaces. HMI considerations in a cockpit are essentially geared towards making it simpler to operate any system — controls must be easy, intuitive to reach and use — while preventing accidental operation. For instance, the design of the Boeing 787's fuel control knob includes brackets (raised surfaces) which prevent them from being touched accidentally, and the knob itself has a stop-lock mechanism requiring deliberate action to change the switch's position. Even so, in the light of the Ahmedabad crash, some experts have suggested moving the switch from the busy thrust console, and introducing a cap to further improve safety. Pilot seating & visibility: Ergonomically-designed seating helps prevent discomfort and fatigue for pilots by ensuring they maintain optimal posture even while also having full control and situational awareness. Pilots should have as clear a view of their surroundings, both within and outside the aircraft, without having to unduly strain themselves. Over the years, the introduction of heads-up displays (a transparent display that shows data in a pilot's line of sight), and customisable seating have been major developments in this regard. The most cutting-edge aircraft seats also come with sensors which monitor pilots' vitals, and can send alerts about potential health issues & fatigue. Moreover, there have been numerous developments towards improving the visibility of displays and control surfaces under all lighting conditions, including the introduction of backlighting and anti-glare features. Apart from this, ergonomic considerations go into the design of alarm and warning systems (including the choice of audio signals), communications systems within and outside the aircraft, and standard protocols for coordination between pilot and co-pilot, which have evolved over the years to further define roles while also increasing redundancies. For instance, the protocol for cutting fuel off from a particular engine requires both pilots to concur and confirm before the action is carried out. Development in cockpit ergonomics is a 'cat and mouse game': past challenges drive improvement and innovation which throw up a different set of problems which then have to be dealt with. Catastrophic accidents are often crucial drivers of change. The most important trend to have emerged in cockpit ergonomics — and aviation ergonomics, in general — over the past century is the gradual shift towards automation. The earliest 'autopilot' system, essentially a gyroscopic stabiliser that kept the aircraft stable without pilots touching the controls, was conceptualised for aircraft as early as the 1910s. As flights became longer, and the aircraft grew in complexity, more and more functions began to be automated, especially with the introduction of modern computers aboard aircraft. The central thrust towards automation is to make the pilot's life easier, and reduce human-error. 'By performing mundane and repetitive tasks, automation has reduced crew workloads and attentional demands, allowing them to focus on tasks that are of higher priority,' Martin Brennan and Wen-Chin Li wrote in 'The Design Principles of Flight Deck Automation' published in 2017 in the Journal of Air Safety and Management. Today, all kinds of tasks aboard a cockpit are automated, and in normal circumstances, the plane pilots itself for most of the duration of a flight. But this automation also creates a certain dependence, which in the long run, has limited pilots' exposure to manual flying and reduced their ability to 'build and retain the competencies necessary to take control during emergent events,' Brennan and Li wrote. Moreover, as Boeing's faulty Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), designed to improve an aircraft's handling in certain situations showed, 'bad' automation can have deadly consequences. The flawed system was responsible for two crashes in 2018 and 2019 that claimed 346 lives in total. The debate around automation is perhaps best exemplified in the fundamental differences between the Boeing and Airbus cockpits. Airbus, which is far more automation-forward, in the 1980s introduced fly-by-wire (FBW) systems allowing for electronic handling of its aircraft with pilot inputs entered through a sidestick. The A320 flight deck was considered to be a 'revolution' in cockpit design, which significantly simplified pilot operations, and reduced fatigue and workload. While Boeing has introduced FBW in its modern aircraft, it still allows for far more manual 'freedom' for pilots. Notably, Boeing aircraft have retained the age-old yoke, which sits between the pilot's legs. Its philosophy, the American aviation giant claims, keeps the pilot central to all critical decisions, allows greater control during emergencies, or in case of computers failing to do their job.
New Straits Times
18-07-2025
- New Straits Times
NTSB chair says media reports on Air India crash are speculative, premature
BENGALURU: The US National Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy said on Friday that recent media reports on the crash of an Air India Boeing Dreamliner that killed 260 people were premature and speculative. A preliminary investigation released last week by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau found confusion in the cockpit shortly before the June 12 crash, and raised fresh questions over the position of the critical engine fuel cutoff switches. A cockpit recording of dialogue between the two pilots of the flight supports the view that the captain cut the flow of fuel to the plane's engines, Reuters reported on Thursday, citing a source familiar with US officials' early assessment of evidence. GE Aerospace, Boeing, Air India, India's Directorate General of Civil Aviation and AAIB did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Homendy said investigations of this magnitude take time, and that the NTSB will continue to support AAIB's ongoing probe.
Hindustan Times
13-07-2025
- General
- Hindustan Times
Too low, too late: When fuel emergencies become deadly
From the 'Gimli Glider' that ran out of fuel at 41,000 feet to general aviation pilots who selected empty tanks, a four-decade pattern of aviation accidents show that fuel management errors consistently prove fatal when altitude and time work against recovery efforts. Too low, too late: When fuel emergencies become deadly An analysis of the US National Transportation Safety Board reports suggests that 95% of fuel-related aviation accidents stem from human error rather than mechanical failure, with pilots repeatedly making critical mistakes in high-stress situations involving fuel controls, tank selectors and cut-off switches. The margin for error becomes razor-thin during the most demanding phases of flight. What separates survival from catastrophe often comes down to precious seconds and hundreds of feet of altitude — factors that determine whether crews have sufficient time to diagnose problems, execute recovery procedures and restart failed systems before impact. The deadly arithmetic was evident in Air India Flight 171 crash, where a preliminary investigation report revealed both engine fuel cut-off switches moved from 'RUN' to 'CUTOFF' position just one second apart during take-off. Despite crew attempts to restore fuel flow within 10-14 seconds, the Boeing 787 crashed 32 seconds after lift-off, killing 260 people. To be sure, the circumstances of why the cut-off was engaged is unclear. Cockpit voice recordings captured one pilot asking his colleague why he engaged that switch, to which the other pilot said he hadn't. In the moments that followed, the pilots attempted to fix the error and the engines appeared to be coming back online but there was simply not enough time. The 1983 case of Air Canada Flight 143 illustrates how altitude could have saved lives. When the Boeing 767 lost both engines after it ran out of fuel at cruising altitude, pilots had nearly 20 minutes to glide 65 miles to an emergency landing at Gimli, Manitoba. All 69 people survived. Contrast that with cases where fuel emergencies occur during take-off or approach phases. A recent Nashville crash killed five family members when a pilot of a small plane incorrectly positioned a fuel selector during approach, starving the engine of fuel, with insufficient altitude for recovery. An NTSB annual statistic compilation focussing on fuel-related issues in 2017 shows fuel management causes more than 50 general aviation (smaller plane) accidents yearly, with nearly half involving commercial or air transport-rated pilots — dispelling assumptions that experience prevents such errors. But these have reduced over the years, especially as planes themselves have become more sophisticated. Historical cases reveal recurring human factors: confusion under pressure, inadequate training on fuel systems, and design vulnerabilities in aircraft controls. The 1978 United Airlines Flight 173 crash — where crew focus on a landing gear problem led to fuel exhaustion — prompted development of modern crew resource management training used industry-wide. Switch and selector design has emerged as a persistent vulnerability. Multiple accidents involve pilots moving fuel controls to incorrect positions or failing to fully seat selectors between marked positions. The locking mechanism in fuel switches was thus a response to that. The NTSB continues to cite fuel management as the sixth leading cause of general aviation accidents, with investigators noting that proper training and procedural compliance could prevent the vast majority of these incidents.
