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AllAfrica
4 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Carrier crunch leaves US unprepared for a China fight
The US Navy is running out of aircraft carriers—and time—as global threats multiply faster than it can build, launch or sustain its next-generation warships. USNI reported this month that delivery of the USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), the US Navy's second Ford-class aircraft carrier, has been delayed by two years due to ongoing challenges with integrating Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE). Originally scheduled for July 2025, the carrier is now expected to enter service by March 2027, according to the US Navy. That will reduce its fleet to 10 carriers, below the legally mandated 11 units, for nearly a year following the May 2026 retirement of USS Nimitz (CVN-68). The delay stems from the Navy's 2020 decision to shift from a dual-phase to a single-phase delivery plan, which was meant to enable earlier incorporation of the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. Lessons learned from CVN-78 were only partially applied to CVN-79, and retrofitting proved complex, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). The US Navy is now coordinating with stakeholders to explore preliminary acceptance prior to full delivery. Similar delays also affect the CVN-80 Enterprise, now projected for July 2030, due to supply chain and material availability issues, extending its timeline by 28 months. These setbacks highlight broader integration and sustainment challenges in the Ford-class program, with US Navy officials working to mitigate operational gaps and preserve readiness amid increasingly strained global commitments. Persistent delays, spiraling costs and unresolved technical flaws in the Ford-class program are undermining the US Navy's ability to field and sustain the kind of forward-deployed force needed to deter rising multi-theater threats from near-peer and regional adversaries like China. Summarizing key concerns, Brent Eastwood notes in a June 2025 National Security Journal article that the Ford-class's $13 billion per unit cost, $5 billion in R&D and 23% cost overrun have alarmed lawmakers. Chris Panella notes in a March 2025 Business Insider piece that delays in procuring CVN-82 threaten over 60,000 jobs across more than 2,000 firms. Without immediate action, he says 96% of sole-source suppliers could halt production by 2027, raising costs and risking the loss of skilled workers. Eastwood also warns that repeated construction delays—such as the USS Enterprise's slip to 2029—undermine fleet readiness, just as emerging threats like hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and cyberattacks raise serious doubts about carrier survivability in conflict scenarios. He adds that munitions and fuel resupply demands place additional pressure on logistics chains already stretched thin. Eastwood further notes that unproven technologies such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and AAG have contributed to deployment delays. A January 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that although both systems aboard the USS Gerald R Ford have shown improvement, they still fall well short of US Navy reliability goals—EMALS averaging just 614 cycles between failures against a target of 4,166, and AAG at 460 against 16,500. The CRS report says these persistent gaps have led the US Navy to enhance testing protocols and data collection for further refinement. At the operational level, Ford-class delays are straining the Navy's ability to meet global Carrier Strike Group (CSG) commitments. Steven Wills observes in a July 2024 article for the Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) that the US Navy's carrier force remains overstretched, operating with only 11 carriers in a world that demands at least 15 for sustained global presence. Wills writes that repeated crises, particularly in the Red Sea, have pushed deployments beyond readiness cycles, disrupting both maintenance and training. He points out that the US Navy's reliance on temporary solutions—like rushing Pacific-based carriers to relieve overburdened ships—reflects persistent gaps in force structure and planning. These shortfalls, Wills argues, are degrading air superiority in key theaters like the Indo-Pacific and the Levant and are the consequence of years of procurement underreach. He also criticizes the logic of 'cheating the math' by slashing carrier numbers without adjusting mission demands. Ishaan Anand, in a CMS article this month, further stresses that concurrent maritime crises in the Red Sea and Indo-Pacific reveal the US Navy's growing dual-theater challenge. He notes that the extended deployment of the Eisenhower CSG to counter Houthi threats in CENTCOM's area of responsibility has diverted assets from priority Indo-Pacific zones, enabling China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to ramp up exercises near Taiwan and the Luzon Strait. Anand writes that the absence of forward-deployed carriers like the USS Ronald Reagan has forced the US Navy to rely on destroyers and littoral combat ships with far less power projection capability. He argues this operational tradeoff—between Middle Eastern deterrence and Indo-Pacific stability—shows the US Navy's inability to maintain a carrier-led presence in two contested regions simultaneously. And yet a third front may already be forming. As Russia becomes more assertive in the Arctic and North Atlantic, US carrier strike groups have been forward-deployed to Northern Europe as part of NATO deterrence efforts. This signals a growing awareness in Washington that even while juggling crises in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, Europe cannot be neglected. The convergence of these crises has elevated the specter of a simultaneous three-front contingency in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, testing whether a US Navy built for peacetime presence can withstand wartime demands. Hal Brands warns in an October 2022 Bloomberg article that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's designs on Taiwan, and Iran's nuclear provocations expose fundamental US vulnerabilities under its current 'one-war' defense planning framework. He argues that while these adversaries are not formally aligned, their actions could generate overlapping crises that would force the US into unacceptable tradeoffs, fracturing its global posture. Mackenzie Eaglen underscores this point in an August 2024 National Security Journal article, stating that the 'one-war' force-sizing construct is increasingly seen as obsolete in the face of converging near-peer threats from China and Russia, alongside regional challengers such as Iran and North Korea. Eaglen cites the US Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which warns that the US lacks the capabilities and capacity to prevail across multiple theaters—a vulnerability that could embolden adversaries to test US resolve. She writes that despite calls for a 'Multiple Theater Force Construct,' the US military remains smaller, older, and less ready, with naval, ground, and air assets stretched across outdated global postures. Pivoting between regions, she argues, invites dangerous strategic gaps that erode deterrence and compromise leadership at a time when unity of effort is most crucial. The Ford class's technical limits, operational wear, and inability to meet multiple strategic demands suggest the US Navy's carrier-focused force isn't prepared to deter or fight future wars.
Forbes
09-07-2025
- Business
- Forbes
U.S. Navy To Make Do With 10 Flattops As Latest Carrier Running Late
The U.S. Navy's oldest aircraft carrier USS Nimitz is on what is likely her final deployment and her ... More replacement is now running two years behind schedule. (Photo by South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images) The future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) is now expected to join the fleet in March 2027, nearly two years later than the previously scheduled date. The second Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier was scheduled to have a delivery date of July 2025, but the handover was pushed back to March 2027. The delay is attributed to issues with the Advanced Arresting Gear and Advanced Weapons Elevator, two critical systems on the warship. The carrier's prime contractor, Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding, explained that there have been challenges in implementing improvements to those systems with USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). "Specifically, John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) construction was fairly advanced when many Ford lessons were realized, precluding timely implementation of lessons learned for Kennedy," HII spokesperson Todd Corillo said in a statement to the media. This is the most recent delay for CVN-79, as the carrier previously had an expected delivery date of June 2024, but that was pushed back two years ago. The only good news is that the most recent delays shouldn't further impact the next two Ford-class flattops. "In contrast, Enterprise (CVN-80) and Doris Miller (CVN-81) have been able to incorporate, leverage and capitalize on Ford lessons learned earlier in the construction process," Corillo added. That sugarcoats the fact that CVN-80 had seen its delivery date shifted from September 2029 to July 2030. This resulted from supply chain issues and limited material availability. The lead vessel of the new class of supercarriers, USS Gerald R. Ford, had run about two years behind schedule, but then faced further delays as numerous systems were far from combat-ready. That resulted in initial delays with the USS John F. Kennedy, but problems persist. One Fewer Flattop In Service In the long run, these delays may help HII and even the United States Navy streamline the construction process with this newest class of nuclear-powered supercarriers. Yet, the bigger issue is that the delay will cause some severe near-term headaches for the U.S. Navy. Its oldest nuclear-powered carrier, USS Nimitz (CVN-68), is scheduled to be retired next May. That will reduce the number of carriers in service on paper, but in practice, the situation may be even more dire. USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) is currently undergoing her Refueling and Complex Overhaul, which was initially scheduled to be completed next month. The RCOH is now running at least 14 months behind schedule, and although it will extend the service life of the carrier by 25 years, CVN-74 won't return to service until October 2026 at the earliest. Then there is the fact that the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) is preparing to begin the same process, which could mean that next year, two carriers are sidelined, while one is taken out of service entirely. "The news of yet another potential delay to the next Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier lands at a precarious moment for the U.S. Navy, and not simply because of a production timeline," explained geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of threat assessment firm Scarab Rising. She said it underscores a more profound strategic vulnerability, one of overreliance on aging leviathans and an industrial base increasingly outpaced by geopolitical necessity. "With the USS Nimitz approaching retirement and already deployed in a high-tension theater, the Navy faces a narrowing operational margin at precisely the wrong time," warned Tsukerman. Rotating Carriers To Multiple Hotspots USS Nimitz is now operating in the Red Sea to deter further aggression from Iran and its regional proxies. It isn't alone, as USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) has been in the Middle Eastern waters since early this spring, relieving CVN-75, which had been deployed to the region last November. The U.S. Navy has rotated multiple carriers to the region. Still, it has also left much of the Indo-Pacific without a carrier on station, even as China has continued to rattle sabers by deploying its two conventionally-powered flattops further into the Pacific. Tsukerman said that the U.S. Navy's growing dependency on a handful of nuclear-powered flattops reflects a kind of strategic inertia. "These ships project overwhelming force and remain indispensable to U.S. power projection, but they are also complex behemoths tethered to an industrial process that is slow, expensive, and prone to disruption," Tsukerman added. "A 20-month delay is not just a schedule slip. It is a signal flare for adversaries and an indictment of a procurement strategy that concentrates capability into a brittle few." She further compared the U.S. Navy's ability to juggle its limited carrier resources to a house of cards, as in it is "visually impressive but easily compromised." Every nuclear-powered supercarrier that is in maintenance following an extended deployment or undergoing a lengthier RCOH represents a void in the sea service's forward presence. That void is increasing measured in years, not weeks. "Operational tempo strains personnel and ships alike, while carrier availability often resembles a shell game: a high-stakes maneuver to maintain appearances without the necessary depth of capacity," Tsukerman noted. "This imbalance exposes critical seams in U.S. naval readiness, particularly in an era when pacing threats are growing more sophisticated and opportunistic." The Cost Of Power Projection It remains true that nothing can do what a carrier can do, notably in terms of moving a vast number of aircraft and personnel to hotspots. However, the most significant selling point of a nuclear-powered carrier is increasingly its greatest weakness. It may have unlimited range and endurance, but it is still dependent on a supply of food, water, and crucially, aviation fuel. Last September, that became crystal clear when the USNS Big Horn, a key oiler, ran aground and partially flooded off the coast of Oman. It briefly left the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group without its primary fuel source, exposing a significant vulnerability in the U.S. Navy's reliance on aging oilers. Moreover, China has put great effort into developing its so-called "Carrier Killer" intermediate-range ballistic missiles and, more ominously, hypersonic missiles. Such weapons raise questions about whether the U.S. should be building such massive carriers at all. "The cost-benefit calculation for these ships has shifted," said Tsukerman. "Once a cornerstone of deterrence, their price tag now invites hard questions. Are they still the most agile answer to modern threats? Or have they become gilded symbols of a bygone era, perpetually behind schedule and vulnerable to both budgetary politics and technological disruption?" It isn't just the missiles that could strike a carrier; surface and underwater drones could also pose another threat, while satellite targeting has significantly narrowed the operational sanctuary these vessels once enjoyed. "None of this renders carriers obsolete," suggested Tsukerman. "Rather, it demands a doctrinal recalibration. The U.S. Navy cannot afford to tether its global posture to a few slow-turning ships. Diversification, in platforms, propulsion, and deployment models, is no longer a theoretical consideration. It is a strategic imperative. Without it, America risks being outmaneuvered not by lack of will or ingenuity, but by its ponderous designs."
Yahoo
08-07-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Navy's carrier fleet faces temporary reduction through 2027 as new ships hit development snags
The U.S. Navy will drop from 11 to 10 aircraft carriers for about a year once the USS Nimitz is decommissioned next year, as recent budget documents show a new carrier will be delayed from its original delivery date. According to the Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 budget estimates, Newport News Shipbuilders was expected to deliver the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to the Navy by July 2025, but that has since shifted to March 2027. "The CVN 79 delivery date shifted from July 2025 to March 2027 (preliminary acceptance TBD) to support completion of Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) certification and continued Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) work," FY 2026 shipbuilding budget book reads. Both the Advanced Arresting Gear certification and Advanced Weapons Elevator work are systems that were incorporated into the Ford class carriers. Inside America's 6Th-gen Arsenal: B-21, F-47, And The Future Of Air Dominance HII's Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia told USNI News that it is taking lessons learned and applying them with the new ships in its class. Read On The Fox News App "Specifically, John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) construction was fairly advanced when many Ford lessons were realized, precluding timely implementation of lessons learned for Kennedy," Todd Corillo, HII company spokesperson, told the publication. "In contrast, Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller (CVN 81) have been able to incorporate, leverage and capitalize on Ford lessons learned earlier in the construction process." Also being shifted was the delivery of the USS Enterprise (CVN-80), which was expected to be delivered in September 2029, but has since been pushed back to July 2030. Uss Nimitz Carrier Strike Group Sailing Toward Middle East Ahead Of Schedule, Us Official Says "The CVN 80 delivery date shifted from September 2029 to July 203 due to delays in material availability and industry/supply chain performance," the document's footnotes read. USNI reported that the Navy originally planned to pursue a dual-phase delivery approach for the Kennedy but has since switched to a single-phase delivery, which added two additional years of work to the vessel's design and construction contract. Under the new plans, the Kennedy would be outfitted to handle the fifth-generation F-35C Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II and be outfitted with the new Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, USNI reported. Second Navy Fighter Jet Goes Overboard From Truman Aircraft Carrier, Pilots Ejected Officials originally thought the dual-phase approach would save the Navy money when it came to construction costs and by minimizing the downtime between the Nimitz decommissioning and Kennedy delivery. These delays come as the USS Nimitz prepares to be decommissioned. Commissioned on May 3, 1975, the Nimitz is the oldest active aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy. It is currently on its final sea voyage in the Middle East, as the Nimitz is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2026. The deployment is significant because the Nimitz was also deployed in 1980 when its helicopters were part of the failed U.S. effort known as Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the American hostages being held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The U.S. has been in a shadow war against Iran ever since. Fox News Digital's Danielle Wallace contributed to this article source: Navy's carrier fleet faces temporary reduction through 2027 as new ships hit development snags
Fox News
07-07-2025
- Business
- Fox News
Navy's carrier fleet faces temporary reduction through 2027 as new ships hit development snags
The U.S. Navy will drop from 11 to 10 aircraft carriers for about a year once the USS Nimitz is decommissioned next year, as recent budget documents show a new carrier will be delayed from its original delivery date. According to the Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 budget estimates, Newport News Shipbuilders was expected to deliver the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to the Navy by July 2025, but that has since shifted to March 2027. "The CVN 79 delivery date shifted from July 2025 to March 2027 (preliminary acceptance TBD) to support completion of Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) certification and continued Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) work," FY 2026 shipbuilding budget book reads. Both the Advanced Arresting Gear certification and Advanced Weapons Elevator work are systems that were incorporated into the Ford class carriers. HII's Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia told USNI News that it is taking lessons learned and applying them with the new ships in its class. "Specifically, John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) construction was fairly advanced when many Ford lessons were realized, precluding timely implementation of lessons learned for Kennedy," Todd Corillo, HII company spokesperson, told the publication. "In contrast, Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller (CVN 81) have been able to incorporate, leverage and capitalize on Ford lessons learned earlier in the construction process." Also being shifted was the delivery of the USS Enterprise (CVN-80), which was expected to be delivered in September 2029, but has since been pushed back to July 2030. "The CVN 80 delivery date shifted from September 2029 to July 203 due to delays in material availability and industry/supply chain performance," the document's footnotes read. USNI reported that the Navy originally planned to pursue a dual-phase delivery approach for the Kennedy but has since switched to a single-phase delivery, which added two additional years of work to the vessel's design and construction contract. Under the new plans, the Kennedy would be outfitted to handle the fifth-generation F-35C Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II and be outfitted with the new Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, USNI reported. Officials originally thought the dual-phase approach would save the Navy money when it came to construction costs and by minimizing the downtime between the Nimitz decommissioning and Kennedy delivery. These delays come as the USS Nimitz prepares to be decommissioned. Commissioned on May 3, 1975, the Nimitz is the oldest active aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy. It is currently on its final sea voyage in the Middle East, as the Nimitz is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2026. The deployment is significant because the Nimitz was also deployed in 1980 when its helicopters were part of the failed U.S. effort known as Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the American hostages being held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The U.S. has been in a shadow war against Iran ever since.
Bloomberg
07-07-2025
- Business
- Bloomberg
Newest US Navy Aircraft Carrier Faces 20-Month Delivery Delay
Delivery of the Navy's newest aircraft carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, is likely to be pushed to March 2027 from this month because of production challenges, according to a newly disclosed budget document. The carrier's builder, HII, is facing issues constructing and installing elevators designed to move munitions to the deck.
