Latest news with #UnitedRussia
Russia Today
2 days ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Moscow supports Africa in struggle against neocolonialism
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has expressed strong support for African political parties engaged in the fight against neocolonialism and reaffirmed Russia's commitment to strengthening political dialogue and cooperation across the continent. The remarks were delivered on Saturday in a message to the Liberation Movements Summit in South Africa. Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and head of the United Russia party, stated his belief that African political parties, shaped by their longstanding struggle against imperialism, will continue to serve as a powerful political force, as well as 'a guarantor of stability and socio-economic progress in their countries for many years to come.' He emphasized that United Russia places a high priority on partnerships with African political parties, 'particularly on the issue of combating neocolonialism, whose ideologues – the former colonial powers – continue their attempts to subjugate the free peoples of Africa, whose representatives have gathered on South African soil.' According to Medvedev, United Russia remains fully committed to supporting initiatives that advance a multipolar world order built on the principles of equal partnership and national sovereignty. He highlighted that many of the organizations represented at the summit have maintained longstanding ties with his party and share a common vision of global development free from external domination. Speaking to RT on the sidelines of the summit, ANC Treasurer General Dr. Gwen Ramokgopa said that the movements must adapt to remain relevant and need to shift from political liberation to pursuing 'economic emancipation and shared prosperity.' The Liberation Movements Summit, which is being held over July 25-28, has gathered representatives from parties such as South Africa's ANC, Mozambique's FRELIMO, Namibia's SWAPO, Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, and Tanzania's Chama Cha Mapinduzi. In November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized Western economic practices in Africa as 'pure neocolonialism,' accusing Western companies of extracting resources while keeping the profits abroad. He noted a growing resolve among African nations to break free from economic dependence and reclaim control over value-added processes.
Memri
09-07-2025
- Business
- Memri
On Russia's 'Nationalization'
On July 2, 2025, the Russian bailiff service officers raided a private Bombardier Global 5000 business jet ready to take off from Chelyabinsk airport for Turkey,[1] preventing its owner, the billionaire politician Konstantin Strukov, from escaping the country. Strukov, the major stakeholder in one of Russia's largest gold producers, YuzhUralZoloto and a longtime member of the United Russia party, has been a deputy of Chelyabinsk regional legislature since 2000 and holds the position of deputy chairman of the body since 2020.[2] Earlier that day, the court in Chelyabinsk issued a ruling banning him from leaving Russia and seized his assets following an order from the office of from Russia's Prosecutor-General's Office.[3] Strukov is accused of amassing his fortune (he is listed in Russia's most recent Forbes list as No. 78 with assets valued at $1.9 billion)[4] via scam schemes that involved corruption and misuse of his administrative position. This looks like another case for confiscating the assets of a Russian businessman in favor of the state, which looks quite "normal" these days as more than 400 enterprises valued at at least 2.6 trillion rubles, formerly belonging to the Russian owners,[5] had already changed hands since 2022. I should mention from the outset that I am not talking about squeezing out investors from the so-called "unfriendly" countries, a process has been underway since the start of Russia's full-scale assault on Ukraine and which I had called "the robbery of the century" as it deprived Western companies of more than $100 billion in assets, handing them to Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin – the acquisition of Russian business of Société Générale by Vladimir Potatin, who himself had sold his Rosbank to the French financiers for $2 billion several years earlier, or appropriation of Danone's Russian factories by Ramzan Kadyrov's proxies are most notable examples of these confiscations.[6] Unlike these cases, the pressure on the Russian businesses that has been mounting since 2023 is, to my mind, less driven by the wish to "redistribute" valuable assets from one group of oligarchs to others – the underlying mechanics looks at least somewhat different this time. Confiscations Are Politically Motivated First, it should be noted that almost every single case of what I would call "nationalization" applies to companies that were at some time bought by their current owners from the Russian state or from regional authorities (therefore one may also use the term "de-privatization").[7] Even while Russian President Vladimir Putin has been saying for years that the Russian government has no intention of depriving "well-behaving" and "law-abiding" proprietors of their assets,[8] the prosecutor-general reiterated many times that his entity is doing a lot for "returning to the State what belongs to it." This looks like a serious claim since there are few cases of the confiscation of companies that were started and developed without any state-owned assets.[9] The most telling case was that of Lesta Games, a company that acquired a Russian subsidiary of the famous Wargaming, the developer of the realistic online game, World of Tanks.[10] The Russian owners were declared extremists for their alleged support for Ukraine and their holdings were confiscated.[11] In all other cases, the Russian prosecutors cite either irregularities with privatization or corruption and conflict of interest issues for claiming the property. To facilitate the process, Russian lawmakers eventually annulled the statutes of limitation on the "wrongdoings" linked to privatization deals (formally, they are still in place, but several court rulings, including one by the Constitutional Court, say that this term should now start not from the day of sell-off but from the one the prosecutors found out it was illegal).[12] Therefore, any privatization deal may now be disputed, as the company may have been merged with another, or sold, or transformed into limited liability companies and made public.[13] If one looks carefully at the ongoing confiscation processes, one can find out that they are initiated mostly against those who can be accused of privatizing the initial assets for pennies (but this applies to almost all of those who participated in the 1990s sell-off since the asset prices were then extremely low),[14] who are combining their business activities with administrative and elected positions (it seems to be linked to attempts to "fight corruption") and who used off-shore holdings for their business operations and/or hold foreign citizenships and foreign residence permits (this seems to be a continuation of the famous "nationalization of the elites" proclaimed by Putin as early as in 2013).[15] The latter issue has seemingly become one of the most crucial in recent months (both Konstantin Strukov and Dmitry Kamenshchik, the famous owner of the Domodedovo Airport, which was confiscated by the government this June, were called "influenced from abroad").[16] So there is no doubt that confiscations are politically motivated and therefore inspired more by the state itself, rather than by some oligarchic groups. It may be noted that for a long time both in the Russian independent media and in foreign sources a popular concept has been disseminated, linking this "new nationalization" to the Rotenberg brothers, Arkady and Boris, who are longtime friends of Putin.[17] The main rationale beyond it was the fact that, since 2020, the Kremlin has initiated several cases for stripping Russian businessmen of their assets – and some of the properties ended up in the Rotenbergs' hands. In August 2020, President Putin called the Prosecutor-General's Office to investigate the 1992 privatization of the Bashkir Caustic Company. In December of the same year a Russian court ordered its shares to be returned to the state and transferred to Rosimuschestvo, or the Federal Property Management Agency.[18] Four years later, the company was excluded from the strategic enterprises' list, and the majority stake was sold to a company called Roskhim, allegedly owned by the Rotenbergs.[19] The same, but a bit earlier, happened to Metafrax Chemicals, Russia's largest methanol manufacturer, which was also nationalized due to 1992 privatization irregularities and soon resold to Roskhim together with some other companies, including the Kuchuksulfat factory, based in the Altai region.[20] I would not exclude some influence that the Rotenbergs brothers may have on the current confiscations (many insiders claim that they were the people behind the long-lasting attacks on the Domodedovo airport), but to my mind one should take into consideration the changing nature of current Russian "nationalizations." This change seems to be manifested by the fact that – unlike the Western companies handed to new Russian owners in 2022-2023 – most of the assets currently retributed by the state either remain in the state's possession or are transferred to companies and banks that belong to the state. For example, in nine of the 12 largest cases recorded in 2023-2025, the assets were either transferred to the balance sheet of Rosimuschestvo, or went to corporations and banks that are in state ownership (for example, FESCO and the Solikamsk magnesium plant were granted to Rosatom, the Makfa pasta factory went to Rosselkhozbank, and the Pokrovsky meat holding to VTB).[21] In all these cases, it can hardly be said that the enterprises passed to some oligarchic companies on the basis of ownership – the maximum that can be asserted is that certain people close to the authorities may in the future benefit from their work, but this also needs to be proven. I would add that the concentration of industrial assets in state ownership might be accelerated also by the ongoing crisis in some industries – for example, coal production faces incredible pressures from the global market,[22] and the aviation industry might increase its operational losses, as the disruptions mount in the Russian air traffic caused by the ongoing drone war with Ukraine,[23] so I would not exclude developments that may cause a state takeover of these industries allowing their direct financing from the federal budget. The Kremlin Believes Time For Russian Big Private Business Is Largely Over The main result of the current "deprivatization" seems to be not so much the redistribution of property among the oligarchs as the consolidation of new assets for the state. Of 2.4 trillion rubles at which the companies that the Prosecutor-General's Office seized from their owners were valued, Rosimuschestvo retains assets worth almost one trillion, and more than 800 billion were transferred to various state companies or state banks, while the new private owners received no more than one-fourth of what was confiscated. Of course, there are certain expectations that Rosimuschestvo will not end up as the final owner of the confiscated assets, but I think that, given the logic of the current regime's actions, most of the assets will still end this part of their journey in the hands of state structures, so this is clearly not so much a redistribution as nationalization. Moreover, the initiative to open the new cases on the basis of which property can be seized and then converted into state revenue belongs not so much to the president, but it is now almost entirely in prosecutors' hands (97 percent of cases are opened by Prosecutor-General's Office and about two percent by the Investigative Committee). Hence, I would say that those who argue that the 50-year-old Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov is the main (and autonomous) figure behind all this, who thereby strengthens his reputation among the aging leading security officials and accustoms business and officials to recognize his powers and authority, might be right. Some insiders even began to treat him as a potential successor to President Putin, which, I would say, cannot be proved by any means. However, all such rumors confirm my opinion that "de-privatization" is not a process of inter-oligarchic redistribution, but something much more political in nature. The latter, of course, does not exclude the material interest of both the security officials and many of Putin's friends – but most likely they intend to profit from financial flows provided by using the new assets under state ownership than to formally become their owners. This is a much more familiar way of earning money for officials, who rarely want to turn themselves into classic entrepreneurs. What one may see now in Russia looks like a profound change is government's policies. It seems that for years, the Kremlin had opted for a "soft management" of the national economy based on manipulations with taxes or "corporate responsibility," meaning the exchange of some entrepreneurial freedoms for loyalty and cooperation. The businesses were expected to limit their offshore activities, to re-register in Russia, to pay taxes, and comply with their increases (in some cases predictable, in some, as in 2023-2024, unexpected), etc.[24] Those who violated these terms faced pressure, and, under some conditions, confiscation of their assets – primarily in case of open disloyalty, stealing funds or engaged in acute conflict of interests. Under such a regime, the redistribution was familiar, with more loyals rewarded by the assets that formerly belonged to less loyal ones (the attitude to the foreign investors that resulted in massive confiscations of 2022-2023 and in continuing attempts to prevent their return to Russia were driven by the same rationale).[25] Now, it looks like the main logic has changed – the state wants not to tax successful and profitable large enterprises but rather to own them. I would not say whether it wants either to maximize its own revenues or just to increase its control over the economy – but the drive is clear: the Kremlin believes the time for Russian big private business is largely over. The entrepreneurship should become limited to the mid-sized and small business that would dominate the logistics, retail, and service sectors while the industrial sector must, more-or-less, return to state ownership to meet the state's demand and promulgate its interests. The exceptions may remain – but they nevertheless will be just the exceptions that prove the rule. Some time ago President Putin had one more time called for not taking the ongoing process for nationalization – pretending that "nationalization is a process that is prescribed by law, [but] we do not apply this law, these norms."[26] Of course, the president lied as he does most of the time: I would say that there is still no law in Russia that would clearly regulate the nationalization process (there is only Art. 306 of the Civil Code, which refers to the possibility of its adoption),[27] but the distinct law that might be applied was never deliberated. Moreover, according to the Civil Code norms, any case of nationalization must be accompanied by the redemption of the asset's value (presumably based on market-driven estimates), and not its requisition. Lenin's "New Economic Policy" Yet, looking on what is going on in Russia, it is hard to agree with Putin: One may call the process as "etatization," emphasizing that the Russian state has little to do with the Russian people, but the essence remains the same – Russia is turning back to something resembling Lenin's "New Economic Policy" (NEP): a regime that allows private business to operate on the lower level, reserving the large productive enterprises to the state's sphere of interest. The problem, nevertheless, resides in a fact that no one can properly fix the dividing line between big and small, crucial and unimportant – and this opens a broad perspective for an overall increase of state influence. In the Soviet times, it took less than ten years to dismantle the NEP regime, and, it might be that a decade from now looks like a realistic timeframe for the complete destruction of Russia's big business. *Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and founder and director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.
Telegraph
07-07-2025
- Business
- Telegraph
Russian minister found dead hours after being sacked by Putin
Russia's transport minister killed himself hours after he was sacked by Vladimir Putin, according to state media. Roman Starovoit, the former governor of the Kursk region that was invaded by Ukrainian forces last year, was found dead in his car from a gunshot wound. Svetlana Petrenko, a spokesman for the Russian investigative committee, said 'suicide is the primary version', and added that investigators were working at the scene. Starovoit, 53, was dismissed from his position as minister of transport for unspecified reasons on Monday. Over the weekend, Ukrainian drone attacks sparked turmoil at Russian airports, with hundreds of passengers left stranded by flight cancellations. The Kremlin said the sacking was not related to a loss of confidence in the long-standing member of Putin's United Russia party. Starovoit served as governor of Kursk from 2019 to 2024, resigning over the invasion of the Ukrainian army. Alexei Smirnov, the former deputy who replaced him in the role, was arrested in April over claims of embezzlement during the construction of defences in the region. Sources told Ros Business Consulting (RBC) news, a privately owned Russian media channel, that Starovoit was also under threat of arrest as the construction began during his term. The veteran politician, who was born in Kursk, appeared to have used an award pistol to shoot himself in Odintsovo, a city in the Moscow region, RBC added. The car was found in Malevich park, sources told state-owned Izvestia. The suicide came days after Konstantin Strukov, the chief executive of Yuzhuralzoloto, Russia's third-largest gold producer, was barred from leaving the country after authorities charged him with corruption and moved to nationalise the company. Mr Strukov was on board his $50 million Bombardier jet when his departure to Turkey was halted by federal aviation authorities, the Kommersant business newspaper reported on Saturday. Pictures showed the tycoon looking at the floor as bailiffs and an official in a high-visibility jacket stood over his seat. Prosecutors have accused the 66-year-old of using his political influence to acquire lucrative mining contracts, and registering them in the name of family members. A court motion has been filed to seize his assets.
Al Manar
29-05-2025
- Politics
- Al Manar
Moscow Calls Kyiv's Peace Demand ‘Unconstructive' as It Pushes for Closed-Door Talks
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on Thursday dismissed Ukraine's demand for the immediate release of Russia's draft memorandum on a potential peace settlement, calling the request 'unconstructive.' He stressed the importance of creating a conducive environment for serious, closed-door negotiations. 'Russia has proposed a meeting in Istanbul next Monday to begin discussing settlement proposals. In this context, insisting on the immediate handover of documents is counterproductive. Either there is a readiness to negotiate, or a different stance must be adopted,' Peskov told reporters. Peskov emphasized that Moscow refuses to discuss the content of the documents publicly, citing the need for confidentiality in such sensitive matters. He reiterated Russia's support for continued direct negotiations with Ukraine. ❗️ Ukraine still hasn't responded to June 2 Istanbul talks proposal — Kremlin spox Peskov He added that Russia will not publicly discuss Ukraine's settlement details — RT (@RT_com) May 29, 2025 No Putin–Trump Talks Planned, Channels Remain Open Commenting on US–Russia relations, Peskov noted there are currently no plans for a new conversation between President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. However, he said communication lines remain open, and a call could be quickly arranged if necessary. He also referenced Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement on Wednesday, outlining Moscow's proposal for renewed talks with Ukraine, including a memorandum detailing Russia's position on the conflict's core issues. Lavrov: Russia Open to Dialogue Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Moscow's openness to dialogue, even with nations led by adversarial governments. 'We have never refused dialogue, even with countries adopting hostile positions against Russia, whether at the regional or local level,' Lavrov said during a meeting of the United Russia party's International Cooperation Committee. Separately, the Foreign Ministry confirmed Lavrov had discussed preparations for the upcoming June 2 negotiations in Istanbul with US counterpart Marco Rubio during a phone call. Lavrov stated that Russia had drafted a comprehensive memorandum addressing the root causes of the conflict, arguing that any viable resolution must tackle these issues in a credible and lasting manner. Russia Rejects Ukraine's Demand for Immediate Disclosure of Peace Proposal as 'Unconstructive' Russian Forces Capture New Towns in Donetsk and Kharkiv, Inflict Heavy Losses On the battlefield, the Russian Defense Ministry announced the capture of three additional towns as part of its ongoing military campaign launched in February 2022. In a statement, the ministry reported that units from the Western Group of Forces seized Stroyevka in Kharkiv, Southern forces took control of Gnatovka, and Central forces captured Shevchenko Pervoye in the Donetsk People's Republic. Russian MoD releaeses footage from recently-liberated Gnatovka in the Donetsk Republic — RT (@RT_com) May 29, 2025 The statement added that Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian troop concentrations across several regions, resulting in over 630 Ukrainian military casualties. It also reported the destruction of armored vehicles, artillery systems, ammunition depots, and strategic infrastructure, including drone manufacturing facilities and fuel stations. Air defense systems reportedly intercepted seven US-supplied JDAM guided bombs and shot down 132 Ukrainian drones. The Russian military operation, which began on February 24, 2022, is officially framed by Moscow as an effort to 'protect the people of Donbas,' whom it claims have faced years of persecution by Ukrainian authorities. The Defense Ministry also stated that Russian forces had repelled Ukraine's counteroffensive, despite extensive Western military and financial support to Kyiv. Russian forces reportedly destroyed large quantities of NATO-supplied equipment, including German Leopard 2 tanks and US and British armored vehicles.
Time of India
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Selfies from the front: Inside the 'VIP' brigade for ambitious Russian officials
For the past three years, many young men in Russia have been doing everything they can to avoid getting sent to fight in the war against Ukraine. But some Russians are enthusiastically signing up for service in what President Vladimir Putin has called the battle for his nation's survival by joining a drone brigade offering short stints far from the fighting. Pro-war Russian bloggers have described the unit, Kaskad, as a "sinecure for officials." Based in an undisclosed location in a part of Ukraine occupied by Russia, it provides a career boost to politically minded recruits, according to Kremlin watchers and military analysts who call Kaskad a "VIP unit." Thousands of men have been called up to fight in Ukraine since 2022 and have been kept at the front as a terrible toll mounts by the day. But stints with Kaskad tend to be short-term. And given it's a drone unit away from the front lines, the chances of being put in danger's way are relatively small, analysts say. Officials assigned to the unit usually stay three to eight months, get plenty of photo ops with automatic rifles and return to their jobs with a hero's welcome, according to numerous social media posts in which recruits have documented their deployments, and accounts pieced together by analysts. "Enlistment with Kaskad allows elite figures to sidestep statutory military service requirements with guaranteed safety and potentially curry favor with Kremlin," Britain's defence ministry said last year. More than 270 pro-Kremlin regional lawmakers and 200 members of the youth wing of governing United Russia party have served in the Russian army in Ukraine, said Andrei Turchak, the party's chairman. At least six members of parliament, dozens of pro-Kremlin youth activists and even one cosmonaut have done so in Kaskad. In Nov, 12 senior members of United Russia's youth wing in St Petersburg joined Kaskad on the same day. Among them was Aleksandr Malikov, who promptly updated his profile picture on social media, which shows a clean-shaven man, wearing sunglasses and cradling an automatic rifle, standing in front of a building with shattered windows and smoldering rubble. Just a few months earlier, Malikov was documenting his life as a local council member. Malikov described his decision to enlist as a patriotic duty but declined to describe his role at Kaskad. "Here, I keep on doing the same thing I've been doing for many years: supporting my country and taking an active role where I'm needed." Dmitri V Sablin, a longstanding member of parliament, has been commanding Kaskad since 2022. In 2023, a camouflage-clad Sablin introduced a Kaskad team to reporters. Footage showed two soldiers launching a combat drone from a field and others monitoring drone flights on a computer from a bunker. Kaskad has at least 54 crews operating 10 types of reconnaissance and combat drones along the front line, Sablin said. Stints in Kaskad have been helpful for the careers of some of its veterans. Yevgeny Pervyshov, for instance, was a low-ranking member of parliament when he joined Kaskad in Nov 2022. After his stint with the brigade, he was spotted by Putin at a televised meeting and offered a job. In Nov, Pervyshov became the first Ukraine war veteran to be appointed as a governor.
