Latest news with #VirginiaClass
Sustainability Times
9 hours ago
- Science
- Sustainability Times
'US Navy Breaks the Silence': World's First Reusable Underwater Spy Robot Deployed on Nuclear Submarine
IN A NUTSHELL 🔍 The US Navy has successfully deployed and recovered the world's first reusable spy robot, the Yellow Moray , from a nuclear submarine. , from a nuclear submarine. 🤖 This achievement marks a significant advancement in naval technology, allowing submarines to extend capabilities using robotic systems without risking human lives. without risking human lives. 🌊 The Yellow Moray autonomously conducted missions lasting 6 to 10 hours, proving the Navy's ability to use unmanned systems multiple times in one deployment. autonomously conducted missions lasting 6 to 10 hours, proving the Navy's ability to use unmanned systems multiple times in one deployment. ⚓ This operation underscores the strategic importance of robotic systems in future undersea missions, offering more options while minimizing risks to sailors. In a groundbreaking advancement for naval operations, the US Navy has successfully integrated unmanned technology into its submarine missions. This significant achievement involves the deployment and recovery of an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) from a nuclear-powered submarine. The USS Delaware, a Virginia-class attack submarine, served as the platform for this innovative operation. Known as the Yellow Moray, this reusable spy robot marks a pivotal moment in undersea warfare, demonstrating the Navy's commitment to enhancing its operational capabilities while minimizing risks to personnel. This article delves into the details of this milestone mission, exploring the implications and future potential of such technology in military applications. World's First Reusable Spy Robot for Submarines The recent mission took place in the US European Command (EUCOM) area of operations and featured the Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine USS Delaware (SSN 791). This successful test signifies a formidable leap in naval technology, as submarines can now enhance their capabilities using robotic systems without endangering divers or crew members. The Yellow Moray is based on the REMUS 600, a well-established UUV design used for various underwater missions, including seafloor mapping and intelligence gathering. This torpedo-shaped robot can autonomously carry out missions, operating independently of human control once launched. During this deployment, the USS Delaware launched and recovered the Yellow Moray robot three times, with each mission lasting between 6 and 10 hours. All operations utilized the submarine's torpedo tube, a traditional launch system for torpedoes. This operation demonstrated the Navy's capacity to use the same UUV multiple times in one deployment, enabling the execution of missions in areas too shallow or hazardous for submarines. Moreover, the elimination of divers in launching and recovery processes further underscores the Navy's ability to conduct safe and efficient operations with minimal human involvement. Spy and Return in Secret This mission illustrates the US Navy's readiness to integrate manned submarines with advanced robotic systems in real-world scenarios. These robotic vehicles can access areas deemed risky or impossible for submarines, undertaking missions that are either too mundane or dangerous for human personnel. Tasks such as scanning the seabed for mines, conducting surveillance, or scouting enemy waters can now be performed more effectively. 'This capability allows us to extend our reach,' stated Vice Admiral Rob Gaucher, Commander of Submarine Forces. 'The Yellow Moray reduces risk to our submarines and divers by handling dull, dirty, and dangerous missions.' The initial tests weren't without challenges. During early trials in a Norwegian fjord, the Yellow Moray failed to return to the torpedo tube due to a damaged part. Despite this setback, the Navy swiftly adapted by repairing the robot and resuming successful operations from the USS Delaware. This adaptability highlights the Navy's ability to maintain flexibility and mobility in future operations, emphasizing the strategic importance of robotic systems in future undersea missions. Technological Adaptation and Future Prospects The Navy's ability to quickly diagnose and repair the Yellow Moray underlines the importance of technological resilience in military operations. Technicians identified the damaged component and returned the robot to the US for necessary repairs. Post-repair, the robot was flown back to Europe and successfully launched and recovered in subsequent missions from the USS Delaware. This swift adaptation ensures that missions remain on schedule, demonstrating the Navy's readiness to overcome obstacles and maintain operational integrity. In a notable first, Navy divers loaded the Yellow Moray into the submarine via the torpedo tube while docked in Norway, proving that future missions could remain flexible and adaptable. The Navy's commitment to equipping more submarines with robotic systems like the Yellow Moray signifies a shift towards a more autonomous and resilient naval force. This mission reinforces the notion that the future of submarine warfare is not only underwater but also robotic, offering commanders expanded operational options while minimizing risks to sailors. Implications for Future Naval Warfare The integration of robotic systems into naval operations presents significant implications for the future of warfare. The ability to deploy and recover UUVs like the Yellow Moray from submarines enhances the Navy's strategic capabilities, providing commanders with a versatile tool for diverse missions. This technology also opens new avenues for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, allowing the Navy to operate in previously inaccessible or high-risk areas. The Yellow Moray's success suggests that future naval missions will increasingly rely on robotic and autonomous systems to undertake tasks that are too dangerous or impractical for humans. As the Navy continues to develop and integrate these technologies, it will inevitably reshape the landscape of undersea warfare. This evolution raises an intriguing question: How will the continued advancement of robotic technology redefine the boundaries of naval operations in the coming decades? Our author used artificial intelligence to enhance this article. Did you like it? 4.6/5 (25)
The Advertiser
14 hours ago
- Business
- The Advertiser
Arbitrarily increasing defence spending would be a tremendous waste of money. Here's why
The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that.
South China Morning Post
17-06-2025
- Business
- South China Morning Post
Why Australia should welcome collapse of lopsided Aukus deal
The Aukus partnership, the 2021 deal whereby the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to provide Australia with at least eight nuclear-propelled submarines over the next three decades, has come under review by the US Defence Department. Advertisement The prospect of its collapse has generated predictable hand-wringing among those who welcomed the deepening alliance, and especially among those interested in seeing Australia inject billions of dollars into underfunded, underperforming American and British naval shipyards. But in Australia, an Aukus breakdown should be a cause for celebration. After all, there has never been any certainty that the promised subs would arrive on time. The US is supposed to supply three, or possibly five, Virginia-class submarines from 2032, with another five newly designed SSN-Aukus-class subs (built mainly in the UK) coming into service from the early 2040s. But the US and the UK's industrial capacities are already strained, owing to their own national submarine-building targets, and both have explicit opt-out rights. Some analysts assume that the Defence Department review is just another Trumpian extortion exercise , designed to extract an even bigger financial commitment from Australia. But while comforting to some Australians (though not anyone in the Treasury), this interpretation is misconceived. There are very real concerns in Washington that even with more Australian dollars devoted to expanding shipyard capacity, the US will not be able to increase production to the extent required to make available three – let alone five – Virginia-class subs by the early 2030s. Moreover, Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of defence for policy who is leading the review, has long been a sceptic of the project, and he will not hesitate to put America's own new-boat target first. Advertisement Even in the unlikely event that everything falls smoothly into place – from the transfers of Virginia-class subs to the construction of new British boats, with no human-resource bottlenecks or cost overruns – Australia will be waiting decades for the last boat to arrive. But given that our existing geriatric Collins-class fleet is already on life support , this timeline poses a serious challenge. How will we address our capability gap in the meantime?
Washington Post
16-06-2025
- Sport
- Washington Post
Girls' lacrosse Top 10: Good Counsel, Stone Ridge top final rankings
The Virginia Class 5 and 6 championship games Saturday marked the end of the girls' lacrosse season in the D.C. area. There was plenty of continued dominance this spring, as four of the 10 teams in these final rankings extended a streak of consecutive state or conference titles. Just like last season, Good Counsel and Stone Ridge finish as the top two teams after each program won conference championships. Yorktown and Broadneck affirmed their public school supremacy, while Marriotts Ridge and Riverside round out the rankings after winning state titles of their own. The Falcons have lost just three games since the 2023 season. Despite graduating plenty of talent ahead of this season, the Falcons cruised through Washington Catholic Athletic Conference play and won the conference championship for a fourth straight year. Last ranked: 1 The Falcons have lost just three games since the 2023 season. Despite graduating plenty of talent ahead of this season, the Falcons cruised through Washington Catholic Athletic Conference play and won the conference championship for a fourth straight year. Last ranked: 1 The Gators completed their three-peat, besting St. Stephen's/St. Agnes for their third straight Independent School League championship. LR: 2 The Gators completed their three-peat, besting St. Stephen's/St. Agnes for their third straight Independent School League championship. LR: 2 Coach Claire Berg led a talented Panthers squad to the first Virginia Independent Schools Athletic Association Division I Championship in program history. LR: 4 Coach Claire Berg led a talented Panthers squad to the first Virginia Independent Schools Athletic Association Division I Championship in program history. LR: 4 Since 2022, Coach Jenny Keimig has led the Patriots to three Virginia Class 6 titles in four years. In Saturday's final, the Patriots topped Madison, 16-14. LR: 6 Since 2022, Coach Jenny Keimig has led the Patriots to three Virginia Class 6 titles in four years. In Saturday's final, the Patriots topped Madison, 16-14. LR: 6 In one of the most challenging girls' lacrosse conferences in the country, the Cavaliers made it to the Interscholastic Athletic Association of Maryland A Final but came up short against Maryvale Prep. LR: 5 In one of the most challenging girls' lacrosse conferences in the country, the Cavaliers made it to the Interscholastic Athletic Association of Maryland A Final but came up short against Maryvale Prep. LR: 5 The Bruins continued their dynasty by winning a fifth straight Maryland Class 4A championship in Coach Katy Kelley's final year. LR: 8 The Bruins continued their dynasty by winning a fifth straight Maryland Class 4A championship in Coach Katy Kelley's final year. LR: 8 The Falcons advanced to a third straight Maryland Class 3A final but lost to Marriotts Ridge, 11-10. LR: 3 The Falcons advanced to a third straight Maryland Class 3A final but lost to Marriotts Ridge, 11-10. LR: 3 Coach Kathy Jenkins's squad won 20-plus games for the first time since 2022 but fell in the ISL final and VISSA semifinal. LR: 7 Coach Kathy Jenkins's squad won 20-plus games for the first time since 2022 but fell in the ISL final and VISSA semifinal. LR: 7 The Mavericks dethroned Severna Park atop Maryland Class 3A by defeating the Falcons, 11-10, in the championship game. LR: 10 The Mavericks dethroned Severna Park atop Maryland Class 3A by defeating the Falcons, 11-10, in the championship game. LR: 10 The Rams stormed back in the Virginia Class 5 final Saturday to beat powerhouse Douglas Freeman and win their first state title since 2018. LR: NR Dropped out: No. 9 Glenelg The Rams stormed back in the Virginia Class 5 final Saturday to beat powerhouse Douglas Freeman and win their first state title since 2018. LR: NR Dropped out: No. 9 Glenelg
Business Wire
16-06-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
BWXT Announces Leadership Changes
BUSINESS WIRE)--BWX Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: BWXT) announced today the appointment of Kevin M. McCoy as the company's chief nuclear officer. In this role, McCoy will support the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy to accelerate the pace of Columbia and Virginia Class submarine production programs for the U.S. Navy. Since 2022, McCoy has served as president of BWXT's Government Operations segment where he was responsible for overseeing BWXT's Nuclear Operations and Technical Services Groups and its subsidiary Advanced Technologies, LLC. McCoy has over 40 years of leadership experience in shipyard operations, nuclear industrial operations and senior engineering positions in the U.S. Navy and private sector. He served as chief engineer of the U.S. Navy from 2005 to 2008 and as commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) from 2008 to 2013. He retired with the rank of Vice Admiral. Before joining BWXT, McCoy served as president of Irving Shipbuilding Inc. in Nova Scotia, Canada, from 2013 to 2021. With extensive shipbuilding and ship repair related experience, McCoy's accomplishments include the design, procurement, construction oversight, maintenance, modernization and engineering support of the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines, surface ships, aircraft carriers and weapon systems. He served in leadership positions in five of the U.S. Navy's nuclear shipyards and commanded the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard from 2001 to 2004. 'Kevin McCoy has been a tremendously successful leader at BWXT and throughout his career,' said Rex Geveden, BWXT president and chief executive officer. 'His commitment to our Navy and the nation is inspirational, and we are proud to be partnering with the U.S. Navy on this critical endeavor.' With McCoy's new role, BWXT is also making the following leadership announcements: Joseph K. Miller succeeds McCoy as president of Government Operations. Since 2021, Miller has served as president of BWXT Advanced Technologies. Under Miller's leadership, Advanced Technologies achieved 10x growth in program content and successfully contracted two federally funded first-of-a-kind prototype programs for advanced nuclear microreactors. Miller joined BWXT in 2011 as an engineer working on advanced commercial energy solutions, had advanced into managerial roles by 2013, became the program manager for advanced nuclear applications in 2017, and general manager of Advanced Technologies in 2020. Before joining BWXT, he was a mechanical test engineer for new construction of Virginia-class submarines at Newport News Shipbuilding and a semiconductor equipment engineer at Samsung Austin Semiconductor. Miller began his career serving in the U.S. Navy onboard the USS Norfolk (SSN 714). Miller holds a master's degree in radiation health physics from Oregon State University and a bachelor's degree in nuclear engineering from Thomas Edison State College. He serves on the Central Virginia Community College Educational Foundation Board, the Nuclear Energy Maritime Organization Ltd. Board and the Oregon State University Nuclear Science and Engineering Advisory Board. 'Under Joe's leadership, BWXT Advanced Technologies has transformed initial concepts into real hardware, advancing not only the company, but nuclear power and propulsion capabilities across the nation,' said Geveden. 'He will bring his leadership and enthusiasm to Government Operations, focusing on safely delivering critical systems to our national security customers, and building further success on the strong foundation laid by Kevin McCoy and the Government Operations team.' Katherine (Kate) Haggerty Kelly succeeds Miller as president of BWXT Advanced Technologies. Kelly has been the director for space and emerging programs of Advanced Technologies since 2022, leading the strategy and execution of the space and advanced manufacturing portfolio. Before her current position, Kelly was the advanced nuclear systems program manager, focused on developing nuclear projects to promote the company's R&D interests in advanced manufacturing and nuclear thermal propulsion technologies. She also held project management, quality control and operational excellence positions within BWXT's Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg, Virginia. She joined the company in 2012 as a system design engineer on a small modular reactor program. Kelly received the Women in Aerospace Initiative-Inspiration-Impact Award for her contributions to the space nuclear industry and her advocacy for promoting people in aerospace. She earned a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering from the University of Notre Dame and has Lean Six Sigma Black Belt and Project Management Professional ® certifications. 'Kate Kelly is a rising star at BWXT,' said Joseph Miller, president of Government Operations. 'Her engineering expertise, program management skills and innate leadership capabilities will bring much continued success.' About BWXT
