Latest news with #borderclash
France 24
3 hours ago
- Politics
- France 24
Anxiety and pride among Cambodia's future conscripts
"My family is poor. If I am called in for the service, I am worried that my family might face financial issues," 25-year-old tuk-tuk driver Voeun Dara told AFP in Phnom Penh. "It is worrisome for me." Citing rising tensions with Thailand, Prime Minister Hun Manet says Cambodia will next year activate a long-dormant law requiring citizens aged 18 to 30 to enlist in the military. Hun Manet has proposed conscripts serve for two years to bolster the country's 200,000 personnel after a territorial dispute boiled over into a border clash, killing one Cambodian soldier in late May. Graphic design student Ray Kimhak's brother-in-law, a volunteer soldier, has already been deployed to the countries' 800-kilometre-long (500-mile) border. But the 21-year-old says he would gladly join him if compelled by conscription. "He said it was a bit difficult to sleep in the jungle, and it rains a lot. But these difficulties don't discourage me at all," Ray Kimhak told AFP at his university in the capital. "We are ready to protect our territory because when it is gone, we would never get it back." 'We should be ready' Cambodia's conscription law dates back to 2006 but has never been enforced. Hun Manet has said it will be used to replace retiring troops, though it is unclear how many citizens are set to be called up. The country of 17 million has a long and dark history of forced enlistment. Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge communist regime, which ruled from 1975 to 1979, conscripted fighting-aged men, and sometimes children, into its ranks as it perpetrated a genocide that killed two million. One 64-year-old who was conscripted by the Khmer Rouge at 17 told AFP he supported the government's decision, despite standing on a landmine during his time as a soldier. "I was forced to be a soldier by Pol Pot," he told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity from the Thai border town of Sampov Lun. "Being a soldier is not easy, but I support the government's plan of military conscription in the face of a border dispute with Thailand. We need to protect our land." Under the newly activated conscription legislation, those who refuse to serve in wartime would face three years in prison, while peacetime refuseniks would face one year behind bars. Sipping green tea at a cafe, 18-year-old IT student Oeng Sirayuth says he fully supports Hun Manet's call to arms. "We should be ready, because tension with our neighbouring country is growing," he said. But personally he hopes for a deferral as he finishes his studies. "I am a bit reluctant because I have never thought that I will have to join the military service," he said. "I think 60 percent of young people are ready to join the military, so these people can go first, and those who are not yet ready can enter the service later." Under the modern-day conscription legislation, women will be allowed to opt for volunteer work rather than military service. But 23-year-old internet provider saleswoman Leakhena said she stands ready to serve on the frontlines. Last month her family delivered donations to Cambodian soldiers patrolling the border, where tensions have spiked with Thailand over a disputed area known as the Emerald Triangle. "We have to do something to protect our nation," said Leakhena, speaking on the condition that only her first name was revealed. "I feel proud for our soldiers. They are so brave," she added. 'Trust needs to be earned' Cambodia allocated approximately $739 million for defence in 2025, the largest share of the country's $9.32 billion national budget, according to official figures. Hun Manet has pledged to "look at increasing" the defence budget as part of reforms to beef up the military. But one young would-be conscript urged the government to defer its plans as the country recovers its finances from the Covid-19 pandemic. "Our economy is still struggling," said the 20-year-old fine art student, who asked not to be named. "We are in the state of developing our country, so if we enforce the law soon we might face some problems for our economy." Political analyst Ou Virak also said Cambodia's military faces challenges from within as it seeks to win buy-in from a new generation of conscripts. "Military training, chain of command, and military discipline are all issues that need to be addressed," he told AFP. © 2025 AFP
South China Morning Post
09-07-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Man in Thailand pours fish sauce on image of Cambodia's Hun Sen in protest
A man who embarked on a 30-km protest walk barefoot and splashed fish sauce on a portrait of Cambodia 's Senate leader and former prime minister Hun Sen outside the country's embassy in Bangkok has been arrested by Thai police. Angered by Cambodia's actions during a border clash with Thailand , 69-year-old retired tennis coach Thewa Sritawan walked for almost five hours from his home in Pak Kret, in neighbouring Nonthaburi province, at dawn on Monday to carry out his protest. He carried only a bag containing the portrait and a bottle of the fermented sauce. 'I left at 6am. I was determined to protest Hun Sen's aggression over our disputed borders,' Thewa told police, as reported by the Taiger news website. Thewa also hopped on a motor taxi towards the end of his journey and arrived at the Cambodian embassy on Pracha Uthit Road at about 11am. Once there, he laid the portrait on the pavement and doused it with the sauce. Nam plaa raa, or Thai fermented fish sauce, is an essential seasoning in Thai cooking made by fermenting freshwater fish in salt and rice bran or flour for at least six months to bring about its distinctive taste and smell. It was that smell which alerted the embassy's security guards to Thewa's actions and they quickly intervened to stop him and called the police, according to the Bangkok Post newspaper.
Arab News
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
The Sudan-Egypt-Libya border ‘triangle of fire'
On a scorching morning in early June, the border triangle where Sudan, Egypt and Libya meet appeared calm as usual. Yet, beneath that stillness, the embers of a hidden conflict were about to ignite. On June 6, a serious clash occurred when a unit from the Subul Al-Salam Battalion, which is affiliated with the forces led by Khalifa Haftar, advanced 3 km into Sudanese territory near Jabal Al-Uwaynat. The Libyan force encountered Sudanese elements from the joint forces, backed by the Sudanese army. Soon after, a video surfaced showing a Rapid Support Forces commander ordering his men to retreat from Egyptian territory, affirming: 'This is not our land.' This was no isolated incident — it was a clear signal of the increasingly entangled front lines between Sudan, Egypt and Libya, and of the Sudanese civil war spilling into a broader regional arena. The border triangle — also adjacent to northern Chad — is one of the region's most geopolitically sensitive areas. This remote desert expanse is a porous corridor for smuggling networks and transnational armed groups. Following the Qaddafi regime's collapse in 2011, it became a hotbed of lawlessness and a junction for arms, gold and drug smuggling, as well as irregular migrant trafficking. The discovery of gold flowing from northern Darfur through Libya and Niger to Mauritania between 2011 and 2014 added more fuel to the conflict over smuggling routes. The reaction to last month's incident was swift. The Sudanese army issued a statement the next day, accusing Haftar's forces of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces in attacking Sudanese military positions, forcing them to evacuate. Meanwhile, on June 11, the militia announced via Telegram that it had gained full control of the area. This confirmed that control of the triangle had shifted to the Rapid Support Forces and its allies — an important shift in the course of the Sudanese war. Haftar's Libyan National Army denied Sudan's accusations, calling them an attempt to 'confuse the situation and export Sudan's internal crisis.' Haftar's command urged the Sudanese army not to drag it into the conflict. Haftar appears to view Sudan not just as a neighbor, but as a vulnerable flank ripe for exploitation. He sees in Rapid Support Forces leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, a useful ally, especially since his group controls major gold mines in Darfur and Kordofan, with their proceeds funding his war effort. As a result, the alliance has turned southern Libya and the border triangle into part of Sudan's war theater. Libya's involvement is not ideological or official but is driven by military and commercial interests. It also offers geopolitical leverage — Haftar's influence along the Chad-Sudan frontier strengthens his regional hand. These developments place Egypt in a sensitive position. Cairo maintains a close relationship with Haftar, whom it sees as a key ally for stability in eastern Libya and securing its western border. At the same time, it backs the Sudanese army under Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan as the legitimate authority and a bulwark against Sudanese chaos. Reports of Haftar-backed forces supporting the Rapid Support Forces present Egypt with a dilemma. Securing the southern border with Sudan is a top priority for Egypt's national security. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has warned that state collapse or the spread of militias in Sudan would directly threaten Egypt. An escalation in northern Sudan could trigger refugee waves and the infiltration of armed or terrorist elements. Egypt was alarmed by the images of clashes involving Libyan forces allied to it and a Sudanese militia it considers a red line. Rapid Support Forces consolidation in the triangle poses a threat to Egypt's national security, especially given its mistrust of the militia. Cairo is also wary of alienating Haftar. Egypt has invested politically and militarily in Haftar's forces to stabilize its western border and contain any spillover from Libya. Analysts suggest Egypt has adopted a pragmatic tactic. Publicly, it issued a diplomatic statement urging 'restraint and respect for Sudan's sovereignty,' without directly naming Haftar. Behind the scenes, it is believed to have taken steps to prevent future incidents. Egyptian experts warn that Cairo must act before Hemedti solidifies his foothold. A prolonged Rapid Support Forces presence could turn the triangle into a forward base or haven for mercenaries, complicating efforts to dislodge them. These developments are tied to intense diplomatic activity. In the last week of June, high-level meetings directly linked to the crisis took place. On June 30, El-Sisi received Haftar in the coastal city of El-Alamein. The Egyptian president reiterated that 'Libya's stability is an integral part of Egypt's national security.' Though the official statement focused on Libya, analysts believe the Sudanese file was central in the closed-door talks. This remote desert expanse is a porous corridor for smuggling networks and transnational armed groups. Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy The same day, Al-Burhan made an unannounced arrival in Cairo from Spain. He held an urgent meeting with El-Sisi in El-Alamein, where they discussed military developments in the triangle. El-Sisi reaffirmed Egypt's support for Sudan's unity and expressed readiness to assist the Sudanese people. Sudanese sources said the meeting focused primarily on the 'border triangle crisis' and ways for Cairo and Khartoum to coordinate. The simultaneous presence of Haftar and Al-Burhan in Egypt likely was not coincidental. Diplomatic sources suggest Cairo attempted to arrange a backchannel meeting to ease tensions. However, broader calculations may have prevented a direct encounter. Still, Egypt's message was clear: Haftar must proceed cautiously and Al-Burhan has Cairo's backing. Meanwhile, in mid-June, Hemedti issued remarks following his forces' capture of the triangle and another zone called Karb Al-Toum in northern Darfur. He stated: 'Some parties tried to drive a wedge between me and Cairo — they will not succeed anymore.' This was seen as an attempt to win Egypt over by signaling that he does not seek confrontation. These developments reveal Egypt is walking a delicate diplomatic tightrope. It reassures Al-Burhan of Cairo's support, reminds Haftar of their partnership and subtly warns Hemedti. Egypt now finds itself balancing two allies — Haftar in the west and Al-Burhan in the south — while trying to prevent their conflict from becoming its own.
CNA
26-06-2025
- Politics
- CNA
Commentary: Thailand-Cambodia tensions reveal risks of backchannel diplomacy
SYDNEY: On Jun 15, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made a private phone call to Cambodia's Senate President Hun Sen, a former prime minister who remains the dominant political figure in the country. The call was meant to de-escalate tensions following a deadly border clash that had reignited long-standing disputes near the Preah Vihear temple. It was conducted informally, personally, and outside official diplomatic channels. Three days later, a 9-minute audio excerpt was leaked. Hun Sen admitted to recording and disseminating the call, later releasing the full 17-minute audio on Facebook. What followed has been political chaos in Thailand: A coalition partner withdrew from government, protests erupted, and the Thai Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest with Cambodia, and Paetongtarn now faces a no-confidence vote in parliament. The fallout was not just a bilateral misstep; it exposed a structural vulnerability in how diplomacy is increasingly conducted. This incident serves as a textbook case of protocol vulnerability: the risks that arise when state-level diplomacy proceeds through undocumented, unaccountable, and unprotected means. More broadly, it illustrates what may be termed 'diplomatic authority drift', the growing trend of foreign policy influence shifting to individuals outside formal executive roles, often without mandate or oversight. MISALIGNMENT OF STATUS AND AUTHORITY At the heart of the Thailand-Cambodia case lies a misalignment of status and authority. Paetongtarn is the sitting head of government. Hun Sen, while no longer prime minister, retains unparalleled political sway. His son, Hun Manet, is the formal counterpart – yet it was Hun Sen who took the call, recorded it and made it public. This is a form of hybrid leadership diplomacy, where former leaders operate without clear accountability yet retain access to the levers of statecraft. For Paetongtarn, engaging directly with Hun Sen may have felt natural, rooted in familial ties and political history. But in bypassing formal channels, she exposed herself to reputational and political risk. Unlike official bilateral meetings, private engagements offer no diplomatic immunity, no archival record and no crisis management structure. Once public, they become political weapons. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states have long relied on personal rapport and informal backchannels to manage tensions as part of 'the ASEAN way'. But the Thailand-Cambodia incident highlights the risks of informality when it lacks procedural anchors. The region has no shared norms or safeguards to govern the use of such channels, leaving bilateral diplomacy vulnerable to personal discretion and political exploitation. The risks do not stem from personal rapport itself – which remains a valid and often effective diplomatic tool – but from informality without norms. Private calls bypass institutional records, oversight mechanisms and contingency planning. This is not unique to Southeast Asia. During the first Trump administration, high-level engagement by non-official actors such as Jared Kushner and Rudy Giuliani frequently bypassed formal channels, blurring lines of authority. As the State Department's role has diminished, the US itself has become susceptible to diplomatic authority drift. This is a reminder that even in well-established systems, diplomatic norms can erode when political leaders personalise foreign policy without effective institutional checks. INSTITUTIONAL SILENCE IN ASEAN In Southeast Asia, however, this drift is compounded by institutional silence. ASEAN's broader architecture, such as the ASEAN Charter and practices such as the rotating Chair or the Secretary-General's mandate, offers no formal or informal norms to manage such hybrid situations. Bilateral relations have, quite naturally, been treated as sovereign matters. But for a grouping that aspires to regional centrality and quiet diplomacy, the absence of shared expectations around diplomatic conduct is increasingly untenable. ASEAN's non-interference principle, while crucial for its founding and stability, paradoxically means it generally avoids directly addressing the legitimacy of individual political actors or intervening in what are seen as 'bilateral' incidents. Yet its silence leaves its diplomacy exposed to personalist improvisation with regional consequences. The recent episode is emblematic of a wider pattern. In Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad's second premiership was marked by personal engagements that often bypassed formal coordination. In Myanmar, the NLD government maintained a hybrid model of civilian diplomacy and military backchannels prior to the 2021 coup. Elsewhere, dynastic or elder figures continue to exercise strategic influence without formal roles. In each case, personalism fills an institutional void – but also risks misalignment. This is not the first time ASEAN's diplomatic architecture has shown its limits. In earlier commentary on the Myanmar crisis, I warned of a 'parallel diplomacy trap', where some informal, ad hoc engagement efforts supplant the formal structures ASEAN relies on to maintain coherence. The Paetongtarn-Hun Sen call is a vivid example of this dysfunction playing out bilaterally. Good-faith outreach, when unanchored, can trigger crisis. The outcome is not flexibility, but friction. NEED FOR SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF DIPLOMATIC CONDUCT ASEAN's model of informality is not the problem; its lack of complementary norms is. What is needed is not heavy-handed institutionalisation, but a set of shared understandings – soft norms that clarify the difference between personal engagement and official diplomacy. Three practical steps could begin this process. First, ASEAN should encourage member states to document high-level informal engagements within existing diplomatic protocols. Second, it could promote shared understandings around the use of non-executive actors in foreign policy dialogue. Third, it could discreetly empower the ASEAN Chair or Troika to advise or caution members when diplomatic practice threatens regional stability. These proposed norms are not a call for ASEAN to abandon non-interference or to mediate bilateral disputes. Rather, they are about building a shared understanding of diplomatic conduct – one that helps contain the collateral damage when informally managed bilateral issues unexpectedly destabilise broader relations. This should not be confused with Track II diplomacy or the role of public diplomacy actors, which deliberately operate outside state authority. The concern here is different: when individuals embedded in the state apparatus, but without formal mandate, perform foreign policy functions without oversight. The Thailand-Cambodia call leak revealed how easily personalised diplomacy can spiral into political crisis. For ASEAN, the challenge is not to abandon its informal culture, but to protect it – by ensuring it is not left to the whims of legacy actors or private calculations. Without that, ASEAN will remain a diplomatic community that celebrates consensus yet lacks the tools to protect the very process on which consensus depends.
Washington Post
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Washington Post
Cambodia threatens Thai fruits ban as tensions over border disputes continue to soar
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — Cambodia on Monday said it would stop importing Thai fruits and vegetables if Thailand refused to lift border restrictions imposed following a deadly clash in one of the disputed areas between the two countries. An armed confrontation at the border on May 28 left one Cambodian soldier dead . The incident, which each side blamed on the other, reportedly took place in a relatively small 'no man's land' along their border that both countries claim as their own.
