Latest news with #contracts
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Russell Wilson's negotiations with Broncos revealed strong evidence of collusion
System Arbitrator Christopher Droney had no choice but to find that the NFL tried to get its teams to collude regarding guaranteed contracts, given the black-and-white clarity of the evidence. Regarding whether the teams followed the league's lead, Droney ignored strong circumstantial evidence. Plenty of the evidence comes from the negotiations between the Broncos and quarterback Russell Wilson. Advertisement Wilson testified that, early in his discussions with the Broncos, he requested a seven-year, fully-guaranteed contract that would pay "around $50 million a year." The Broncos, said Wilson, "didn't blink." The trade that sent Wilson to Denver became official on March 16, 2022. In the following days, something changed. "I would say shortly after [the trade], maybe within the next ten days or so, they started getting cold feet on this fully guaranteed thing," Wilson testified in the hearing. Coincidentally — or not — "the NFL Management Council, with the blessing of the Commissioner, encouraged the 32 NFL Clubs to reduce guarantees in veterans' contracts at the March 2022 annual owners' meeting," as Droney concluded. The encouragement happened on March 28, only 12 days afer the Wilson trade was announced. Advertisement Is it really a surprise, then, that the Broncos backpedaled? The backpedaling continued through August, when the team was sold to the Walton-Penner group. After the sale became final, a deal with Wilson was pursued. The Broncos, despite Wilson's testimony that the team "didn't blink" at the prospect of a fully-guaranteed deal, took the position that a fully-guaranteed contract like Deshaun Watson's "was a non starter." During the talks, Broncos owner Greg Penner told other members of the Denver ownership group that "there's not[h]ing in here that other owners will consider off market (e.g. like the Watson guarantees)." Later, Penner told his partners that G.M. George Paton "feels very good about it for us as a franchise and the benchmark it sets (versus Watson) for the rest of the league." Advertisement Those comments are as powerful as the smoking-gun text exchange between Chargers owner Dean Spanos and Cardinals owner Michael Bidwill regarding the Kyler Murray deal. They are circumstantial evidence of the existence of an agreement among owners to hold down guarantees, and of a desire by Penner and the Broncos to comply with it. Why else would Penner care about other owners and other teams when negotiating a contract with Wilson? When Penner was the CEO of WalMart, did he care about the impact his decisions regarding key employee pay may have on Target's compensation structure for similar employees? The evidence of collusion was right there. Droney blew it. There's no other way to put it. And the NFL Players Association continues to blow it by not publicizing the contents of the 61-page ruling.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Russell Wilson's negotiation with Broncos revealed strong evidence of collusion
System Arbitrator Christopher Droney had no choice but to find that the NFL tried to get its teams to collude regarding guaranteed contracts, given the black-and-white clarity of the evidence. Regarding whether the teams followed the league's lead, Droney ignored strong circumstantial evidence. Plenty of the evidence comes from the negotiations between the Broncos and quarterback Russell Wilson. Advertisement Wilson testified that, early in his discussions with the Broncos, he requested a seven-year, fully-guaranteed contract that would pay "around $50 million a year." The Broncos, said Wilson, "didn't blink." The trade that sent Wilson to Denver became official on March 16, 2022. In the following days, something changed. "I would say shortly after [the trade], maybe within the next ten days or so, they started getting cold feet on this fully guaranteed thing," Wilson testified in the hearing. Coincidentally — or not — "the NFL Management Council, with the blessing of the Commissioner, encouraged the 32 NFL Clubs to reduce guarantees in veterans' contracts at the March 2022 annual owners' meeting," as Droney concluded. The encouragement happened on March 28, only 12 days afer the Wilson trade was announced. Advertisement Is it really a surprise, then, that the Broncos backpedaled? The backpedaling continued through August, when the team was sold to the Walton-Penner group. After the sale became final, a deal with Wilson was pursued. The Broncos, despite Wilson's testimony that the team "didn't blink" at the prospect of a fully-guaranteed deal, took the position that a fully-guaranteed contract like Deshaun Watson's "was a non starter." During the talks, Broncos owner Greg Penner told other members of the Denver ownership group that "there's not[h]ing in here that other owners will consider off market (e.g. like the Watson guarantees)." Later, Penner told his partners that G.M. George Paton "feels very good about it for us as a franchise and the benchmark it sets (versus Watson) for the rest of the league." Advertisement Those comments are as powerful as the smoking-gun text exchange between Chargers owner Dean Spanos and Cardinals owner Michael Bidwill regarding the Kyler Murray deal. They are circumstantial evidence of the existence of an agreement among owners to hold down guarantees, and of a desire by Penner and the Broncos to comply with it. Why else would Penner care about other owners and other teams when negotiating a contract with Wilson? When Penner was the CEO of WalMart, did he care about the impact his decisions regarding key employee pay may have on Target's compensation structure for similar employees? The evidence of collusion was right there. Droney blew it. There's no other way to put it. And the NFL Players Association continues to blow it by not publicizing the contents of the 61-page ruling.
New York Times
2 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
Every NHL team's worst value contract in 2024-25
In today's NHL, players aren't just judged on their ability; they're graded on value and efficiency — how large is their impact relative to their contract? Last week, we looked at some of the best bargain contracts in the NHL from this past season. Now let's look at players who didn't live up to their contracts in 2024-25 and how much longer those deals will be on the books. Advertisement Here's how we'll conduct this exercise. • We'll be using Dom Luszczyszyn's player model as a measuring stick. Net Rating provides an all-in-one performance metric that weighs factors such as point production, play-driving, defensive impact, penalties drawn, blocked shots, faceoffs, penalty-kill impact and more. That impact is then translated to a market value — what that player's contributions should be worth — and that market value is compared to their actual cap hit. • A player isn't 'bad' if he ends up on one of the inefficient lists. It just means he wasn't quite worth his cap hit in 2024-25, at least from a statistical perspective. There are plenty of high-end NHLers who you'll see throughout the piece, many of whom actually played very well this season. • We'll only be identifying players who underperformed their cap hit by at least $1 million. • No goalies will be analyzed. • There are blind spots in the model, like any statistical measure — it's not perfect. With that in mind, I used the model to generate an initial list of players for each team, but I occasionally exercised personal discretion to remove a player from the 'inefficient' contracts pile if I felt there was an obvious flaw or blind spot in the model's evaluation. • Players who spent the overwhelming majority of the season injured (Tyler Seguin, for example) or on LTIR weren't included. • Players who changed teams midseason weren't included either. Trevor Zegras: He burst onto the scene as an immediate game-breaker, scoring 61 points as a 20-year-old rookie and 65 points as a 21-year-old sophomore. However, the last two years under former Ducks head coach Greg Cronin were wildly disappointing. Zegras suffered injuries, which hindered his speed. His offensive creativity was stifled by Cronin, and he was frequently shuffled between center and the wing. Advertisement Zegras' talent level and early career scoring resume suggest that he should return to being a bona fide top-six forward in Philadelphia. This year, however, he failed to live up to the deal. Zegras produced a modest 32 points in 57 games, but more concerningly, had some of the worst two-way play-driving metrics in the league, primarily on the defensive end. Ryan Strome scored exactly 41 points for the third consecutive season. That doesn't sound too bad for $5 million, but the problem is that he gives back a lot of that value with very poor defensive metrics. Alex Killorn is still a decent play-driver at 35 — the Ducks outshot and outscored opponents during his five-on-five shifts — but the 19 goals and 37 points he scored aren't enough relative to his steep $6.25 million AAV. Elias Lindholm: Lindholm isn't the No. 1 center the Bruins were hoping for. He was excellent defensively in difficult matchups, but his 17 goals and 47 points aren't enough to justify a $7.75 million AAV. He turns 31 in December and has six years of term remaining, so there must be some long-term concern about how this deal will age. Charlie McAvoy had a down year, scoring just 23 points in 50 games, which marked the fewest points he's scored per game in any NHL season. Additionally, his two-way results were above average, but not in the elite range to which we're accustomed. However, on a big-picture level, there's no reason to worry about McAvoy's contract. He's still a bona fide No. 1 defenseman, and while his $9.5 million cap hit is steep, it's a figure he's lived up to when at his best. Just chalk this one up to an off year. If this exercise included goaltenders, Jeremy Swayman would have been far and away the Bruins' most inefficient contract for 2024-25. Swayman posted an .892 save percentage in 58 games, while in year one of a brand-new $8.25 million AAV contract extension. Owen Power: Power has faced growing pains, especially defensively, but the Sabres shouldn't be too worried about his contract. He's still only 22, has flashed impressive offensive skills, is a No. 1 pick and it's not exactly easy to hit your ceiling when you're playing on a bad team with subpar defense partners. Power was one of the 20 highest-paid defensemen in the NHL this past season and didn't live up to that pay grade, but with his talent, six years remaining on the deal and the skyrocketing salary cap, this is a contract that he should eventually grow into. Advertisement If anything, Mattias Samuelsson has the most problematic contract on the Sabres. He is injury-prone and has seen his play regress significantly. He has another five years left on his deal and could be a prime buyout candidate. Sam Lafferty and Connor Clifton were slightly overpaid further down the lineup. Jonathan Huberdeau: He was much better this season, scoring 28 goals (more than double the year before) and 62 points. His bounce-back was one of the reasons the Flames were surprisingly competitive this season. However, 62 points is still a far cry from the 90-100 point player you're expected to be when you're paid $10.5 million per year. Rasmus Andersson had a down year, producing just 31 points (his lowest output since the 2020-21 season) and struggling defensively in a hard matchups role. Context is key, however. Andersson played through a broken fibula late in the season, and he was forced to do a lot of heavy lifting driving his own pair as he mentored his young partner, Kevin Bahl. He should bounce back next season, and most would actually view his $4.55 million cap hit as a bargain. Andrei Svechnikov: The Hurricanes definitely need a lot more than the 20 goals and 48 points Svechnikov scored in 72 games at an expensive $7.75 million cap hit (tied for second highest on the Canes), but there's important context to bear in mind. For starters, Svechnikov tore his ACL in 2023. It often takes players a full two years to return to the level of play they were at before an ACL tear. NHL Edge shows that Svechnikov's top speed and speed bursts over 20 miles per hour were significantly down this season compared to earlier in his career. He was also constantly adjusting to different linemates all year, which isn't ideal for chemistry. It's encouraging that he bounced back in the playoffs with eight goals in 15 games. This is likely just a down year for Svechnikov, rather than a sign that the Canes should be worried about his contract. Advertisement Carolina intentionally signed Dmitry Orlov to an inflated cap hit contract in 2023 to keep the contract term down to two years. The idea was that he could be a steady top-four stopgap until youngsters such as Alexander Nikishin were ready to make an NHL impact. The plan has worked out exactly as designed, as he's coming off the books just as his game is starting to atrophy. TJ Brodie: The Blackhawks had several veterans who underperformed to varying degrees, but the good news is that most of them will come off the books soon. Brodie, who has already cleared waivers for a buyout, and Alec Martinez were often liabilities rather than stabilizing veteran presences. Jason Dickinson's offense regressed to only 16 points in 59 games. However, the bigger surprise was that his defensive impact, which had been consistently excellent, also wavered. Dickinson only drove 40.4 percent of expected goals during his five-on-five minutes, although it should be noted that he handled very difficult matchups. Philipp Kurashev and Joe Veleno didn't contribute much, despite earning over $2 million each. Veleno has already been shipped out to Seattle. Nick Foligno's production isn't worth $4.5 million at this stage in his career, but this isn't a contract the Hawks regret. He's paid more for his leadership and intangibles, plus there's only one year remaining. And while Tyler Bertuzzi was wildly inconsistent at times and couldn't drive play, he finished the season with 23 goals, which isn't terrible for his $5.5 million cap hit. Miles Wood: Wood had a down year, scoring just eight points in 37 games in an injury-plagued 2024-25 campaign. He took undisciplined penalties, posted below-average defensive numbers and was occasionally healthy scratched as well. Damon Severson: The Blue Jackets' cap sheet is pretty clean compared to most teams that miss the playoffs. Damon Severson's deal (six years remaining at a $6.25 million AAV) is the exception — he's been deeply inconsistent and mistake-prone — and you'd toss Elvis Merzlikins (two years left at a $5.4 million cap hit) in as well if you included goaltenders. Other than that, Columbus has done well not to saddle itself with overpaid veterans. Advertisement Jamie Benn: It's impressive that the Stars have been able to ice a Cup-contending team for years despite having nearly $20 million invested in Benn and Tyler Seguin (Seguin didn't make the inefficient list for this season because he only played 20 games). They've both been productive top-nine forwards, but neither has performed at an elite level, despite being two of the highest-paid forwards in the Western Conference. Benn only scored 16 goals and 49 points in the regular season. He was even worse in the playoffs, mustering just a single goal and two assists in 18 postseason appearances. Matt Dumba was a poor fit in Dallas from day one. He was the only defenseman on the Stars who had a negative five-on-five goal differential during the regular season, despite playing relatively sheltered third-pair minutes. It speaks volumes that he was healthy scratched for the entire playoffs, even early on when Miro Heiskanen was unavailable. Ben Chiarot: The Red Wings have a lot of promising, young players, but their inability to punch through as a playoff team largely comes down to an expensive veteran supporting cast that hasn't lived up to its end of the bargain. Detroit's blue line beyond Moritz Seider and Simon Edvinsson is a mess in particular, with none of Chiarot, Justin Holl or Jeff Petry performing up to their salaries. J.T. Compher had a solid first season in Motown last year, but his production declined to just 11 goals and 32 points in 76 games this season. He didn't have the best two-way numbers either (Red Wings controlled just 44 percent of shot attempts with Compher on the ice at five-on-five), which resulted in him underperforming his $5.1 million AAV. Andrew Copp is in a similar boat. He's above-average defensively and can handle tough matchups, but his offense (23 points in 56 games) and overall impact don't move the needle enough to justify his $5.625 million cap hit. Advertisement Vladimir Tarasenko slumped to only 11 goals this year, far below what you'd expect considering his $4.75 million AAV. Darnell Nurse: Everybody knows the Nurse situation at this point. He's a toolsy top-four defender prone to making the occasional big mistake and playoff inconsistencies. Nurse is nowhere close to being elite, which is the expectation when you're one of the highest-paid defensemen in the NHL. Last summer, the Oilers also invested $10 million of cap space toward Viktor Arvidsson, Adam Henrique and Jeff Skinner. Their Net Rating was just high enough to avoid making this list, but for all intents and purposes, those were inefficient contracts as well. Arvidsson scored only 27 points in 67 games despite getting tons of opportunities on Leon Draisaitl's line. Henrique doesn't score or defend at a high enough level to live up to his $3 million AAV. Skinner, meanwhile, was only dressed for five playoff games. Those three signings looked reasonable at the time, but in hindsight, it ended up being a poor investment, especially since it indirectly cost them Dylan Holloway and Philip Broberg later on. None: The Panthers have managed their books exceptionally well. Their roster is littered with excellent-value contracts, and for the second year in a row, they weren't held back by any inefficient deals. Drew Doughty: He missed more than half the season with a fractured ankle. When he came back, the 35-year-old showed noticeable signs of decline offensively and defensively. Doughty can still hang in a top-four role, and perhaps better health can help him bounce back next season, but he's one of the most-overpaid defensemen in the league at $11 million. Tanner Jeannot packed a punch physically, which had a useful impact, but his offensive contributions were non-existent (13 points in 67 games). Advertisement Yakov Trenin: His size, forechecking and defensive acumen are useful, but at a $3.5 million cap hit, you'd expect him to perform at the level of a bona fide third-line player. That didn't come to fruition as Trenin produced a measly 15 points in 76 games. His five-on-five points-per-60 rate ranked seventh worst among all NHL forwards who played at least 750 minutes in 2024-25. Besides that, the Wild did invest their dollars pretty efficiently. And that was a necessity when you factor in the nearly $15 million in dead cap space that Ryan Suter's and Zach Parise's buyouts consumed. You could argue that paying Ryan Hartman and Marcus Foligno a combined $8 million may not be ideal, considering their middling offensive profiles. However, those two bring enough other qualities with their physicality and defensive play to make their deals passable. Patrik Laine: The Canadiens had several middle-class players in the $3-5.5 million cap hit neighborhood who didn't live up to their contracts. The preceding Marc Bergevin regime signed a large chunk of those deals, and the good news is that many of these contracts are set to expire soon. Laine's contract stands out as the most inefficient deal on Montreal's books, but that trade was still a smart, sensible gamble for several reasons: Veteran forwards Josh Anderson (15 goals, 27 points) and Brendan Gallagher (21 goals, 38 points) were significantly better than in 2023-24, but they still aren't worth their cap hits. David Savard was an important stopgap to play tough top-four minutes in past years while the club's young defenders developed, but he slowed down significantly this year. He averaged 16:35, and yet the Canadiens still controlled only 43.6 percent of scoring chances and less than 40 percent of actual goals during his five-on-five shifts. Advertisement Montreal's bets on Kirby Dach and Alex Newhook as premium reclamation projects haven't panned out yet. Injuries have derailed Dach as he's fallen short of 60 games played in each of his first three seasons in Montreal. He struggled mightily in the second-line center role, unable to score points, drive offense or play reliable defense. However, he's shown in years past that he has the talent to be an effective top-nine winger, so shifting him back to the flank could unlock better form. Newhook, meanwhile, has shown flashes but hasn't been consistent enough, generating just 26 points (15 of which were goals) in 82 games. Brady Skjei: The Predators didn't have as many overpriced contracts as you might have guessed after their miserable 2024-25 season, but their two misses were colossal. Skjei was torched defensively all year, as Nashville was outscored by a whopping 28 goals during his five-on-five minutes. Offensively, he only mustered 33 points. He should improve in year two — he had to adjust to a drastic systems change, his PDO was low and the whole team around him struggled — but this is a worrisome contract long term. Steven Stamkos went from scoring 40 goals and being over the point-per-game mark with Tampa in 2023-24 to scoring a modest 53 points. It's not entirely his fault because the Predators didn't have the right playmaking center for him to play with. Ondrej Palat: He scored just 15 goals and 28 points despite playing on Jack Hughes' line for most of the season. Palat, 34, was better in the playoffs and can still help a team with his experience and two-way intelligence, but he doesn't belong in any contending team's top six. Dougie Hamilton's future will be fascinating to watch. The 32-year-old offensive defenseman is still a valuable contributor, but he isn't worth $9 million, and the Devils' right-side defense has a logjam (Johnathan Kovacevic and Brett Pesce are locked up long term, not to mention that Simon Nemec and Seamus Casey could be NHL-ready next season). Luke Hughes also looks ready to be The Guy offensively for New Jersey's blue line, which makes Hamilton's skill set less of a necessity. Erik Haula's $3.15 million cap hit was already cleared out in a shrewd salary dump trade with Nashville. Advertisement Anthony Duclair: The Islanders have several overpriced contracts with significant term remaining on their books. Duclair, who scored 24 goals in 2023-24, limped to just 11 points in 44 games in an injury-plagued season. He failed to ingratiate himself with Patrick Roy, which led to the latter savagely ripping him in a news conference, with Duclair subsequently stepping away from the team. Ryan Pulock was once an incredible top-four defenseman for New York during its contention window in 2020 and 2021, when the club made back-to-back Eastern Conference final appearances. His performance has heavily deteriorated since then. I'd argue that the Net Rating model penalizes him too harshly (he still plays difficult top-four minutes and matchups), but there's no question that he's bent under the pressure of that workload. Pierre Engvall was better down the stretch, but 15 points in 62 games and mediocre play-driving results won't cut it at a $3 million AAV. Bo Horvat performed closer to the level of a $7 million center than an $8.5 million one, according to Net Rating, but some context is required. He spent most of the year without Mathew Barzal, his usual running mate, because of the latter's injury troubles. That drop-off in linemate quality explains why Horvat's production slipped from 68 points in 2023-24 to 57 points this past season. Horvat should bounce back to being a 65ish point player if Barzal can stay healthy, at which point his contract would be fair value rather than inefficient. At $2.5 million, Casey Cizikas is paid to be an elite fourth-liner. He was exactly that at one stage in his career, but the 34-year-old is closer to being a run-of-the-mill fourth-liner these days. Chris Kreider: The Rangers' aging, expensive core mightily underperformed this season. Kreider was restricted by a back injury and illness that he played through. He tallied just 22 goals and eight assists in 68 games, a major drop-off from the 39 goals and 75 points he produced the year prior. He scored just 1.03 points per 60 at five-on-five, which ranked in the bottom 20 among all NHL forwards who played at least 750 minutes in 2024-25. Hopefully, better health can lead to a bounce-back in Anaheim. Advertisement Mika Zibanejad is no longer the first-line-caliber center he's paid to be — he doesn't drive play or score enough at five-on-five. The five years he has left at a $8.5 million AAV are problematic, but could a permanent shift to the wing be revitalizing? When J.T. Miller was acquired from the Canucks, Zibanejad was shifted to Miller's right wing at times. The two seemed to click, and Zibanejad tallied 33 points in the final 32 games of the season. Artemi Panarin remains an offensive star, but his production dropped by 31 points compared to 2023-24, falling just shy of the 90-point mark despite being one of the highest-paid players in the league. David Perron: The Senators' cap sheet is in a much stronger position than years past, with no true deadweight contracts holding them back. Perron had a slow start, with only four points in his first 20 games, but that was understandable, given that he was playing catch-up due to an injury and a health scare involving his daughter. He found his groove down the stretch and was much closer to being the player the Senators were hoping for when they signed him to a two-year deal. Claude Giroux is still a key cog of Ottawa's top six, but he slowed down a bit this year, with 50 points and slightly below-average play-driving metrics. He was closer to performing at the level of a $5 million-ish forward rather than a $6.5 million player. Sean Couturier: Philadelphia doesn't have as many bloated contracts as you might expect a non-playoff team to be stuck with. Couturier is the only clear overpayment: He's still an above-average two-way center, but his offensive game (45 points in 79 games) has taken a notable hit since returning in 2023 from a near two-year absence due to injuries. Owen Tippett had a down year, scoring 20 goals and 43 points. However, he was a near 30-goal scorer in the two years before that, is in his prime at age 26 and his contract will look better as the cap increases. Tippett's deal shouldn't be an issue — it profiles as closer to fair value than an overpayment moving forward. Advertisement Erik Karlsson: He has been a far cry from the 101-point, Norris Trophy-winning defenseman the Penguins thought they might get when they acquired him two summers ago. He's lackadaisical and mistake-prone defensively, and his offensive impact (53 points) has been good, but not elite. Karlsson has played closer to the level of a $6 million defenseman, according to Net Rating, which is a steep gap compared to his $10 million cap hit. Ryan Graves has been a disastrous fit in Pittsburgh. He's essentially a No. 6 defenseman locked up long term at a $4.5 million AAV. Kris Letang's game is rapidly declining. The 38-year-old's production dropped to 30 points in 74 games, his offensive play-driving metrics took a nosedive and he still makes loud defensive mistakes from time to time. This list doesn't include goaltenders; otherwise, Tristan Jarry (three years remaining at a $5.375 million AAV) would have been on here as well. Barclay Goodrow: The Sharks have some inefficient investments, but none of them are going to handcuff them long term. Goodrow and Marc-Édouard Vlasic (he didn't officially make the list due to games missed) are wildly overpaid, but they will help the Sharks reach the salary cap floor, which they currently aren't close to hitting. Vlasic was placed on unconditional waivers for the purpose of a buyout on Thursday, while Goodrow has two years remaining. The Sharks intentionally handed Alex Wennberg an inflated $5 million AAV to keep the term down to just two years when they signed him last summer. That's a shrewd decision for a rebuilding team — he was a solid two-way middle-six center this season. Chandler Stephenson: If goaltenders were included in this exercise, Philipp Grubauer would have far and away ranked as Seattle's worst value contract this season. Among skaters, Stephenson stands out as a clear anchor. His 51 points in 78 games don't seem too bad on the surface, but he's an empty calorie point producer who drags the team down as a two-way liability. Stephenson's defensive metrics were some of the worst in the league, with Seattle only controlling an alarming 36.5 percent of high-danger chances during his five-on-five shifts. Advertisement Andre Burakovsky scored only 37 points at a $5.5 million cap hit — it's impressive that the Kraken shed his contract to Chicago without having to attach a draft pick or retain salary. Jamie Oleksiak had a down year on the club's second pair. He decisively lost his matchups, with Seattle giving up far more shots, scoring chances and goals than they created during his even-strength minutes. Matty Beniers is elite defensively, but we're still waiting for his big offensive breakout after a modest 43-point campaign. He's still only 22 and has shown a higher offensive ceiling in the past (scored 57 points as a rookie), so I'm confident he'll grow in this area and that his $7.14 million AAV will eventually become a long-term bargain with the skyrocketing salary cap. Vince Dunn is uber talented offensively, but his defensive issues have dragged down his overall value. Dunn surrendered five-on-five high-danger chances and goals against per 60 at the worst rate among all Kraken defensemen this past season. The end result is that he played closer to the level of a $6 million defender, according to Dom's model. Nick Leddy: He missed more than half the season due to injury. He's still a smooth skater and solid puck mover, but that skill set is a bit redundant now that Cam Fowler and Philip Broberg are in the fold on left defense. Leddy isn't suited to being a top-four option on a contending team anymore, but he's on the books for one more year at $4 million. Justin Faulk is also overpaid. His contract is longer and more expensive than Leddy's, but the difference is that the Blues don't have an in-house replacement for his top-four minutes on the right side. Yes, it'd be nice for the Blues to get better play from Faulk at his $6.5 million AAV or ship him out and find a right-side upgrade, but acquiring top-four right-handed defensemen is never easy. Brayden Schenn is still a good player (50 points in 82 games), but he isn't quite a bona fide second-line play-driving center anymore. He's a tad expensive at $6.5 million. The good news is that he seemed to fare better later in the season, when linemates Dylan Holloway and Jordan Kyrou were able to do the heavy lifting in terms of play-driving. Advertisement Mathieu Joseph, Alexandre Texier and Radek Faksa were slightly overpaid in the bottom-six relative to their contributions. Conor Sheary: The Lightning weren't stuck with any inefficient contracts besides Sheary. The 33-year-old was buried in the AHL for most of the year, appearing in just five games for Tampa Bay. He has one season left at a $2 million AAV. Morgan Rielly: The Leafs owned more overpriced contracts than you'd expect for a contending team, but all those deals were in the 'slight overpay' range rather than albatrosses. Rielly's contract is probably the most concerning long term — his offense has slipped to 41 points this season, and he's below average defensively. He's still a capable second-pair quality defenseman, but he's expected to be more than that with a $7.5 million cap hit for the next five seasons. Max Domi showed better flashes in the playoffs, but was an awkward fit in Toronto's lineup for most of the season. He's too flawed defensively to win his matchups as a top-nine center, and doesn't generate quite enough offensively (33 points in 74 games) to stick as a full-time top-six winger either. David Kämpf and Calle Järnkrok were expendable bottom-six pieces on bloated cap hits. John Tavares didn't quite live up to his $11 million cap hit at age 34 (which is entirely understandable), but the Leafs must be happy that they got 38 goals and 74 points from him in the final year of his contract. Matias Maccelli: He amassed 49 points in 64 games (a 63-point pace over 82 games) as a 22-year-old rookie in 2022-23 and followed that up with 57 points as a sophomore. Unfortunately, his production collapsed, and he completely fell out of favor this past season. Maccelli slumped to just 18 points in 55 games and was a regular healthy scratch, appearing in only three of Utah's games after the 4 Nations break. He's a very crafty, slick playmaker, but he's undersized at 5-11, can be a mixed bag defensively and isn't a strong forechecker. Advertisement Lawson Crouse, a linemate of Maccelli in 2023-24, went from scoring 24 goals in 2022-23 and 23 goals in 2023-24 to only 12 goals and six assists in 81 games this past season. Eighteen points simply isn't going to cut it when you're on a $4.3 million cap hit. Elias Pettersson: He inexplicably limped to just 45 points in 64 games despite owning the fifth-highest cap hit in the NHL this season. He was still very sharp defensively, but his inability to drive top-line caliber offensive results had him performing at the level of a $6.6 million center, which is a huge letdown compared to his $11.6 million AAV. Dakota Joshua was playing catch-up all year after undergoing a testicular cancer diagnosis that delayed his start to the season. He was a shadow of the heavy forechecking, net-front scoring forward he had been in 2023-24. It'd be unfair to judge his performance this past season; hopefully, he can be healthier and more productive this fall. Brock Boeser had a disappointing campaign after scoring a career-high 40 goals in 2023-24. He regressed to 25 goals, was a non-factor at five-on-five for large stretches, especially without J.T. Miller, his usual center, and his two-way results slipped compared to last year. Alex Pietrangelo: He didn't perform at the elite level we're accustomed to, primarily because of injuries. The 35-year-old's defensive numbers took a hit — he scored the fewest points per game of his Golden Knights career — and his two-way results during the playoffs were troubling. Pietrangelo had to withdraw from the 4 Nations Face-Off due to health concerns, and there's uncertainty surrounding his playing future for next season. Andrew Mangiapane: His speed, energy and forechecking were very useful in the Capitals' bottom six. However, the 14 goals and 28 points he amassed obviously weren't commensurate with his expensive $5.8 million cap hit. Outside of that, Washington's cap spending was very efficient in 2024-25. None: The Jets got excellent bang for their buck this year, with no player significantly underperforming his contract. That efficiency drove them to a Presidents' Trophy-winning season. (Top photo of Jamie Benn and Ben Chiarot: Gregory Shamus / Getty Images)
New York Times
2 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
Football academies and rejection: ‘They feel they wasted 20 years of their life'
The end of June is significant in British football, marking the closing of a season and so the end of many players' contracts. All 92 clubs across England's top four divisions file their retained and released player lists with either the English Football League or the Premier League, a process that sees a typical top-flight team releasing more than a dozen players — many of whom have never played senior football. Advertisement Each year, hundreds of players — predominantly, but not exclusively, young adults — drop out of the professional game. Many others earn a contract elsewhere, often dropping down several divisions to do so, but this is regularly the start of a descent out of the sport. Fewer than one per cent of academy players ever get a single minute of first-team football. Here, The Athletic looks at what happens to the 99 per cent who do not 'make it', and how they are treated by the industry. Around 1.5million children play organised youth football in England, but only around 180 of them — 0.012 per cent — will realise their dreams of signing a professional contract with a Premier League club. An academy will typically start at under-nine level and by 16 — when players are eligible to receive two-year scholarships — around half of all players will drop out of the system. Of those remaining, just one in six will play the game professionally by the age of 21. Only one of every 200 players who enter the academy system will have a career in football. Those numbers paint a broad picture but ignore myriad personal stories and struggles. Johnny Gorman, who made a single Premier League appearance for Wolverhampton Wanderers (as an 89th-minute substitute) in 2012 and featured nine times for Northern Ireland's national team around then, is now a trainee clinical psychologist trying to raise awareness of the significant struggles of those dropping out of the game. In October, Gorman published Inside the Football Factory: Young Players' Reflections on 'Being Released', a research paper which shares the journeys of eight youngsters who went through English football's academy system. It found that, after getting released by their club, some players go through identity crises and experience difficulty transitioning to new careers. Psychological distress, including increased risk of addiction and mental health problems, is common. Many struggle to watch football post-release, as it renews their sense of rejection and failure. Advertisement 'Academy players are always told the same things: 'You are doing well', 'Focus on football', 'Keep working hard and forget everything else',' Gorman tells The Athletic. 'There is a massive carrot of stardom dangled in front of you. But at some stage, there is an inevitable bottleneck in the system. There are too many players and not enough opportunities.' Before joining Wolves, Gorman spent six years in Manchester United's youth system between 2003-09, alongside players including Jesse Lingard, Ravel Morrison, Ryan Tunnicliffe, Larnell Cole, Will Keane and Michael Keane. Though they all went on to play first-team football for various clubs, Gorman says the odds are stacked against young players making the grade. A notable exception is Marcus Rashford, who made his United senior debut as an 18-year-old in February 2016, at a time when no fit senior forwards were available to manager Louis van Gaal. Rashford scored twice that night against FC Midtjylland of Denmark in the Europa League and another two goals against Arsenal four days later, becoming a first-team regular. 'That moment was everything in defining his path,' Gorman says. 'Most players do not get that opportunity. Managers are under short-term pressure; it is natural to not risk inexperienced players, unless they are clearly outstanding, as they won't see the long-term benefits.' In 2010-11, Gorman was named Wolves' Academy Player of the Year, having already won nine caps for Northern Ireland's senior team. The winger made just one first-team appearance for Wolves as a late replacement away to Norwich City in March 2012 and did not play again at international level. 'The jump to first-team football is huge, not just in physicality but psychologically,' he says. 'You are left to fend for yourself, it is sink-or-swim. Some people have personalities more suited to that environment than others. If you are shy or introverted, it is more difficult. There are lots of intangibles.' Following that sole first-team appearance for Wolves, Gorman had loan spells at Plymouth Argyle in League Two, the fourth tier of English football, and non-League sides Macclesfield Town and Cambridge United the next season. After leaving Wolves permanently in summer 2013, he spent one season at Leyton Orient, in League One, before dropping out of the EFL permanently aged 21. Gorman spent the remainder of his career lower down the football pyramid, before retiring at 29 years old. Advertisement His research draws on his own experience and that of many of his contemporaries inspired his work in sports psychology. 'When a footballer is released from their academy club, they become disillusioned, their motivation drops, they become resentful and feel like they have wasted 20 years of their life,' says Gorman. 'They feel like failures.' Gorman's research details how academy footballers are conditioned by their sporting identity. 'You become 'Johnny the footballer'; you are no longer your own unique personality, but you are associated by that role,' he says. 'Football is so glamorous, it is normal for youngsters to associate with an identity that brings attention, status and adulation.' But once those players drop out of professional football, Gorman says, they no longer know who they are. 'Everyone in early adulthood is already in a vulnerable period,' he says. 'There are established links between being released and subsequent serious mental health issues. Players need help transitioning outside the football bubble.' All the participants in Gorman's study took between two and three years to establish a normal, civilian life after leaving football. 'A universal theme was the disorientation,' he says. 'We called this 'the period of bewilderment'.' The importance of player after-care is now being acknowledged. In 2022, Premier League club Crystal Palace announced an enhanced programme for former youngsters, then aged 18-23, they had previously released, with a dedicated player-care officer helping them find a new club, an education programme or a job. Gorman says these are 'well-meaning gestures' that may have a positive impact, but points out that: 'The players are carrying a lot of resentment, and the club is the source of it,' he says. 'It would make a lot more sense if this was done by an external organisation which all clubs in certain divisions or associations could buy into.' Advertisement He argues the industry creates personalities solely based on sport and is not proactive in building broad character traits or promoting other interests which players can fall back on when they reach the bottleneck of opportunities. 'Some players are conditioned to believe a Plan B detracts from the Plan A,' Gorman says. 'But this thinking can also be influenced by parents. They are the first point of care for their children. Parents are the adults in the room, but they can develop tunnel vision. I was fortunate that my parents always encouraged me to continue with education and varied interests, but many players don't have that.' Gorman's research has led to a realisation about his own career. He reflects on his release by Orient — his last professional club — at the end of the 2013-14 season, and the sense of disappointment he felt. 'Now I realise I was actually relieved,' says the now 32-year-old, who was born in the Yorkshire city of Sheffield and was briefly with Manchester City before joining neighbours United. 'I was in London by myself. I was isolated. I was conditioned to want to stay, but, in my heart, I wanted to escape the environment and be with my friends and family again. I did not want that pressure anymore, I just wanted to enjoy football again.' This admission was a common theme raised by players in Gorman's research: 'A lot of players didn't enjoy the environment and the pressures; the competitive team-mates, overly demanding coaches, the cut-throat environment from fans, being in the public eye.' This, Gorman says, was a result of the football bubble making players feel trapped. 'They feel there is no escape for them because they have no other career options. That is not a healthy environment,' he says. Each year, hundreds of young players must manage that potentially crushing sense of rejection, feelings of embarrassment, being lost, isolated and damaged. Many clubs do now have processes in place to support players, but the effects can nevertheless be devastating. In October 2020, Jeremy Wisten, a teenage former Manchester City academy player, died by suicide. Four months later, 20-year-old Matthew Langton took his own life, having dropped out of football after being released by Derby County and later Mansfield Town. At the 2013 inquest into the death of Josh Lyons, a former Tottenham Hotspur youth-team player, the coroner, Dr Karen Henderson, criticised the game for not doing more to support young footballers dealing with being released. 'It is very difficult to build up the hopes of a young man only then to have them dashed at a young age,' she said. 'It is very cruel. I find there was an absence and lack of support in football.' Advertisement Lyons was released from Tottenham's youth system at age 16 and fell into depression before dying by suicide 10 years later. This leads to questions for football institutionally, and how the sport must do more, not only with greater support after players are released but also pre-care within club academy structures. But clubs and leagues insist there are already support networks in place to deal with the fallout from academy rejection. Speaking to The Athletic earlier this month, Neil Saunders, the Premier League's director of football, outlined its elite player performance plan (EPPP), which has been in place since 2012. 'There's probably been an external perception that, 'Academies are great for those players that go through and play in the first teams, but what about the sacrifices that other boys make?' We've always promoted holistic development,' Saunders said. While the EPPP's primary function is player development and performance, its aims include benefiting those who would not become professional footballers, with a variety of care schemes implemented with a focus on education. Saunders spoke of how this has improved under the plan: 'Young players are now achieving above the national average in GCSEs (exams UK schoolchildren sit around age 16, equivalent to a U.S. high-school diploma), and we have more players going on to do A-Levels than ever before. We're working with universities to provide scholarships.' Indeed, Premier League and EFL academies have been awarded a rating of 'outstanding' by Ofsted, the body that inspects UK educational institutions, after assessing their provisions for apprentices. A Football Association (FA) spokesperson told The Athletic: 'The professional leagues and their clubs are primarily responsible for the development and well-being of players who are active in the elite academy system, and bespoke regulations are employed throughout. Advertisement 'They also work alongside the PFA (Professional Footballers' Association — effectively the trade union for players in England) to provide a wide variety of support services to both scholars and former youth players who are no longer involved in the game. We continue to work closely with all of these stakeholders to ensure that the highest possible standards are upheld, and the welfare of current and former players is prioritised.' A career in football should always be the aspiration, yet Gorman emphasises the importance of also nurturing young adults to have a wide range of interests and career opportunities. 'Players will always fall out of the system, as supply outstrips demand,' he says. 'What we should do is soften that fall, to normalise and rationalise it, to prepare players for that probability. They are being promised the world but that is not sustainable or realistic. 'Nobody wants to stop players from dreaming, but football needs to change its treatment of youngsters.' If you would like to talk to someone having read this article, please try Samaritans in the UK or U.S. You can call 116 123 for free from any phone.
Forbes
2 days ago
- Business
- Forbes
NFL Narrowly Defeats Collusion Claims Over Guaranteed Compensation
(Photo byIt is the general understanding among serious sports fans that NFL player contracts are less guaranteed, i.e., more permissive of unilateral termination by the player's club, than player contracts in MLB, the NBA, or the NHL. While the details and accuracy of that understanding are complex (see here at ch. 5), it is certainly true that the principal goal in contract negotiations for NFL players is often to maximize the amount of guaranteed compensation. No player achieved that goal more than quarterback DeShaun Watson, when he signed a five-year fully-guaranteed $230 million contract with the Cleveland Browns in March 2022. That contract, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, were the focus of a recent 'system arbitration' in which the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) alleged that the NFL and its 32 clubs had illegally colluded to suppress guaranteed compensation to NFL players. In a January 2025 arbitration decision recently released by reporter Pablo Torre, the NFL prevailed, but not without some concerning findings. A History of Collusion Allegations To understand the case and its adjudication requires historical context. The NFLPA and its players engaged in extensive litigation between 1987 and 1993 after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the NFL and NFLPA in 1987 (see summaries and analysis here and here). The players' litigation strategy evolved as a result of various court decisions, including the eventual decertification of the NFLPA as the players' bargaining representative under labor law and a class action antitrust lawsuit against the NFL and its clubs alleging that their salary cap, free agency, and Draft rules amounted to illegal agreements among competitors to suppress pay and other benefits in the labor market for NFL player services. Significantly, because the NFLPA had been decertified, the NFL's rules were no longer protected by a crucial concept in sports and the law, known as the non-statutory labor exemption. The litigation was finally settled in a lawsuit led by future Hall of Famer Reggie White. The settlement resolved those core areas of dispute and became the backbone of a new CBA and economic system for the NFL that continues to this day. As is common in class action settlements, the judge presiding over the litigation, retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes over the agreement's implementation. In the White case, that judge was David Doty of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. System Arbitration Next, to facilitate the process of resolving disputes under the settlement, according to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties agreed on a well-qualified lawyer, known as a 'Special Master,' to adjudicate disputes for potential appeal to Judge Doty. From 2002 until 2021, that role was held by Stephen Burbank, a now emeritus professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Burbank's 20-year run as the arbitrator for the most contentious disputes between the NFL and NFLPA was remarkable, particularly given that sports leagues and unions have regularly dismissed arbitrators after just one disagreeable ruling and some early decisions by Burbank against the NFL concerning signing bonus forfeitures. Indeed, after more than a decade of decisions by Judge Doty that the NFL believed favored the NFLPA, it resolved to end his oversight in the 2011 CBA negotiations. The 1993 CBA (and White settlement) was extended multiple times but, as a result of the 2006 CBA's expiration in March 2011, Judge Doty's jurisdiction ended. Nevertheless, when the parties finally reached a new CBA in July 2011, they retained essentially the same role for Professor Burbank. However, his title changed from Special Master to System Arbitrator, given that his role was now outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The System Arbitrator nevertheless retained jurisdiction to hear disputes – called 'System Arbitrations' – concerning the same items at issue in the litigation of 1987-93. Today, System Arbitrations cover select Articles of the CBA covering the NFL Player Contract, NFL Draft, rookie compensation, free agency, salary caps, and related concepts among a few others. These items go to the core 'system' of NFL operations, hence the title. The NFLPA's Collusion Case Of relevance to the instant case, the System Arbitrator has jurisdiction over Article 17, Anti-Collusion. This makes perfect sense. The players' principal legal argument in the past litigation was that NFL clubs were in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits multiple parties from entering into agreements that unreasonably restrain a market. Article 17 is akin to Section 1, as it prohibits clubs from entering into express or implied agreements which restrain the player labor market, including agreements not to offer particular types of contracts. In October 2022, the NFLPA commenced a System Arbitration alleging exactly that. In the wake of the Watson contract, the NFLPA alleged that NFL teams had impermissibly colluded to prevent three comparable quarterbacks – Russell Wilson, Lamar Jackson, and Kyler Murray – from obtaining fully guaranteed contracts like Watson. After discovery was conducted, the NFLPA broadened the case to seek relief on behalf of 594 veteran players who it claimed had received less guaranteed money in their 2023 contracts because of an agreement among NFL clubs to suppress guaranteed compensation. Following Burbank's retirement in 2021, Christopher F. Droney, a former judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was selected as the new System Arbitrator. In evaluating the NFLPA's claims, Droney evaluated three factors: (1) was concerted action contemplated and invited? (2) were clubs aware that they were being invited to participate in a collusive agreement to restrict guaranteed compensation? and (3) did clubs give adherence to and participate in a scheme? Was Concerted Action Contemplated And Invited? On the first question, the arbitrator found in the NFLPA's favor. At a March 2022 owners' meeting, the NFL's Management Council, led by then-General Counsel Jeff Pash, led a presentation in which the league highlighted and expressed concern with growth in the amount of guaranteed compensation. Complicating the analysis was the fact that the salary cap in 2021 declined to $182.5 million from $198.2 million in 2020 due to COVID-19 related adjustments. Teams had responded to this reduced salary cap space by converting non-guaranteed player salaries into guaranteed signing bonuses which were prorated over the life of the contract for salary cap purposes, thereby reducing the annual salary cap charge. In so doing, clubs had distorted the system and were paying large amounts of 'cash over cap.' Notably, prior to the meeting, Pash expressed his concerns about the growth in guaranteed compensation to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell. Goodell responded: 'Agreed but the tip of the market is most of the dollars and if we wait to see how it falls, it will be too late to counter. Agreed with raising [at the owners' meeting] with a big concern that this will erode a key aspect of our CBA that resisted guaranteed money except as clubs determined on their own.' Pash, a veteran of the NFL's historical antitrust battles, included multiple reminders in his presentation that clubs must make their own decisions. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found that 'Management Council, with the support of the Commissioner, sought to encourage Clubs to reverse the recent trend in guaranteed compensation, especially that growth that was not attributable to Covid.' Were Clubs Aware? On the second factor, the Arbitrator found that the clubs were not aware that they were being invited to participate in collusion. Not all of the owners attended the March 2022 meeting and many of them had little to no memory of the content of Management Council's presentation, among numerous other topics discussed at the meeting. At issue on this point was a series of communications between then-NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith and New England Patriots owner Bob Kraft. Smith testified that Kraft told him that Goodell had asked Kraft to speak to other owners about a problematic rise in guaranteed compensation. Goodell and Kraft denied any such conversation. The arbitrator ultimately found that no such conversation occurred. Notably, the arbitration process included testimony from numerous players, agents, NFL executives, club owners and executives, and others. Smith's allegations against Kraft was the only instance in which the arbitrator explicitly did not find the testimony credible. Did Clubs Adhere? The results of the clubs' alleged agreement was the most complicated part of the analysis. The sides offered competing analyses from economists. The NFLPA first relied on the expertise of Dr. Roger Noll, an emeritus professor at Stanford with extensive experience in the sports industry. Noll highlighted that teams' cash over cap and total cash expenditures decreased from 2022 to 2023. Next, Dr. John F. Johnson of Edgeworth Economics, on behalf of the NFLPA, introduced evidence showing a statistically significant decrease in signing bonuses and second-year guarantees after the March 2022 meeting. He estimated the players lost out on $612.21 million in compensation due to the clubs' collusive scheme. In response, the NFL's expert, Jonathan L. Walker of Secretariat, introduced evidence showing a 'massive increase' in spending in 2024 as compared to 2023. Ultimately, the arbitrator found that the evidence was not sufficiently consistent to find that the clubs had participated in a scheme to reduce guaranteed compensation. Notably, 14 of the 32 NFL clubs did not have the salary cap room to accommodate the damages Dr. Johnson claimed. Multiple NFL owners also testified that any such admonitions by the NFL would not have changed their spending plans, given the fierce competition within the league. Finally, the arbitrator found it telling that the NFLPA did not have any NFL player testify 'that they sought more extensive guarantees and were categorically denied them by team management.' Stopped At The Goal Line The NFLPA obtained and produced powerful evidence that the NFL provided information to clubs about guaranteed compensation for purposes of encouraging them to collectively change their spending habits. This is the exact type of information sharing and implicit agreement that the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice have previously warned human resources professionals is illegal. Nevertheless, to the NFL's benefit, the teams did not seem to fully heed the league's lessons. Under the terms of the CBA, the NFLPA had the right to appeal to a three-person panel within ten days of the arbitrator's order. The NFLPA declined to comment on the decision and whether it had appealed. The NFL did not respond to a request for comment. If the NFLPA did appeal, any award in its favor would be difficult to keep quiet. Either way, the NFL likely learned a lesson in what type of information to convey to clubs moving forward, or at least the manner in which it does so.
