Latest news with #modernWarfare
Yahoo
05-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
IDF unit Refaim's data-layered warfare one of the most effective weapons against Hamas, Hezbollah
Refaim deploys compact teams of operators trained in both classic infantry combat and advanced technological warfare. In Gaza and Lebanon, a small, elite Israeli military unit is quietly redefining modern warfare. Known as the 888 Multi-Dimensional Unit — or more commonly by its Hebrew name Refaim — the IDF's most classified combat formation has emerged as one of the most effective weapons in Israel's wars against Hamas and Hezbollah. Established in 2020 under the IDF's multi-year momentum plan (Tnufa), Refaim was designed as an experimental force to fuse ground maneuvering with high-tech precision, integrating advanced drones, robotics, and real-time intelligence. On October 7, 2023, officers and fighters from the unit were scheduled to depart for a top-secret, large-scale training exercise in the US. However, following Hamas's large-scale attack, the unit were forced to assist in southern Israel. Unit commander Col. Roy Levy and training platoon commander Capt. Yotam Ben-Bassat entered Gaza Division territory and were killed in combat with terrorists at Kibbutz Re'im. Communications officer Lt. Yonatan Gutin fell in battle at Kibbutz Be'eri. Sgt. Itai Nehmias, who had managed to rescue civilians, was killed during combat at Moshav Mivtahim. Despite the losses, Refaim split into special teams and embedded with the 162nd Division's brigade combat teams from the first day of ground maneuvering in Gaza. Later, the unit was reassigned to operations under the 252nd Reserve Division and then to Division 99, and operated in the Netzarim Corridor in Gaza. A senior officer noted that Refaim quickly distinguished itself through its 'battlefield agility,' often operating ahead of armored units to detect threats, gather intelligence, and efficiently take out enemy cells. On October 19, 2024, the Refaim forces were integrated into the Jabaliya campaign. Refaim deploys compact teams of operators trained in both classic infantry combat and advanced technological warfare. Each platoon — of which there are only a few — specializes in surveillance, artillery guidance, or strike operations. They move fast, work independently, and rely heavily on autonomous systems and drone swarms. One senior officer described the unit's approach as 'data-layered warfare.' Refaim's teams use real-time aerial footage, pattern recognition, and live target mapping to convert raw intelligence into precise action — often within minutes. This capability has turned Refaim into a critical tool for division commanders. 'Give them a sliver of intel, and they'll turn it into a kill,' one official said. 'Silently.' "The enemy won't even know we're there. Sometimes, that target is hit by a kamikaze drone.' However, over the course of several months in Gaza, the unit has suffered multiple casualties, including Maj. Hod Shreibman, who was killed in close combat during a house-clearing operation in the Jabaliya refugee camp, a deadly battle that ultimately resulted in the elimination of 25 Hamas operatives, some of whom were linked to the October 7 massacre. In early 2025, Refaim was redeployed to southern Lebanon to conduct precision strikes against Hezbollah. There, the unit adapted to the region's complex terrain and the enemy's tactics, employing drone networks and AI-powered surveillance to identify and eliminate ten Hezbollah field commanders. 'The field teams created a profile of the enemy, understood this very different environment from Gaza, and built intelligence that still supports Northern Command. When Hezbollah tried to touch a missile or rocket — we hit them. It was pinpoint work with big results, even identifying people just by photos," Maj.-Gen. Uri Gordin said of the unit's efforts. While the IDF officially maintains a defensive posture in the north, Refaim's operations in Lebanon blurred the lines — combining preemptive strikes, long-range reconnaissance, and real-time targeting. 'If a Hezbollah operative even touches a missile, we see it. We're watching, and we're ready,' said a senior Northern Command officer. The unit's work has been credited with thwarting Hezbollah's efforts to entrench itself along the border under the guise of humanitarian activity. Recently, the unit returned to northern Gaza with Division 162, now led by Brig. Gen. Shagiv Dahan, where Refaim uses its ability to rapidly absorb new classified drones and technologies for offense and defense, including performance testing, high-level operator training, and tactics development. 'The combination of capabilities no other ground unit has makes Refaim the Division Commander's whip. They can hold wide areas over time with precision. Their layering method — peeling terrain, creating data layers — has proven revolutionary," a senior Southern Command officer said. Refaim calls this "Adaptation" – the ability to quickly reorganize around a mission from division or brigade command. 'We tested multiple methods and technologies pre-war. They matured into this. Refaim closes fire loops — alone or with support. It's a profession. It gives the division commander an independent tool for recon and strike," a senior officer said. Refaim has not been included in discussions regarding the possibility of downsizing certain elite units amid broader manpower concerns across the IDF. Senior IDF officials have categorically denied any plan to scale back the unit, noting its unmatched contribution across multiple fronts. 'There's no other unit like Refaim,' one ground forces officer said. 'It's not just a special force — it's a combat lab, a tech incubator, and a front-line tool rolled into one.' All Refaim platoon commanders are veteran officers from elite infantry brigades such as Golani, Paratroopers, or Nahal, who are brought in for a third command position. Their fighters are carefully selected; many choose Refaim over traditional special forces tracks or air force pilot courses. Backed by cutting-edge technology and battlefield experience, Refaim is seen as the prototype for future ground operations. As Hamas continues to adapt with guerrilla tactics and Hezbollah grows bolder, the IDF's ability to outmaneuver enemies in real-time will be critical. From mapping tunnel networks to intercepting terror cells mid-escape, the unit is becoming a cornerstone of Israel's ground doctrine. 'Refaim doesn't just close fire loops,' one officer said. 'They redesign them. And they do it faster than anyone else.'
Telegraph
02-06-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
Russia's ‘Pearl Harbour' has left Putin's attack plans in tatters
Wars have always forced innovation. From Hannibal at Cannae and Alexander the Great at Gaugamela to the SAS commandos of the desert campaign in the Second World War, tactical breakthroughs have shattered enemy complacency and changed battle strategy for ever. Sunday's extraordinary Ukrainian attacks against Russia's strategic bomber force – arguably one of the most important raids in the history of modern warfare – will have a similar effect. The rules of war have just been rewritten, and the consequences will be felt globally. The most immediate impact will be felt in Russia, where the illusion of invincibility that hung over its long-range aviation fleet has been so spectacularly sundered. Officials in Kyiv reckon they have destroyed or damaged up to a third of Russia's most prized air assets, planes that have wrought devastation in Ukraine for so long. The two principal consequences of Operation Spider's Web, as Ukraine has christened it, can be broken down into the psychological and the strategic. Both will shape the way Vladimir Putin is able to wage war. Perhaps most significantly, the raid will complicate Moscow's strategy of raining bombs on Ukrainian cities. Russia has been reliant on its Tupolev bombers, which can fly thousands of miles and carry nuclear or conventional warheads, to conduct large-scale cruise missile attacks. Moscow will find this harder to do if it has lost a significant number of its strategic bombers, according to Fabian Hoffman, a missile technology expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, a Washington-based think-tank. 'To generate this type of force power, you need these big bombers that can carry multiple cruise missiles,' he said. 'If you take out the bombers, then you really limit Russia's ability to launch these types of attacks.' During the largest sorties, multiple bombers take to the air to fire dozens of cruise missiles from different locations in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian defences. For such missions to succeed, Russia has to operate a strict rotational system: for every bomber in use, a second is undergoing short-term repairs, while a third is in long-term maintenance, according to military analysts. Russia has relatively few strategic bombers, with most independent experts estimating no more than 90 in operation. Ukrainian officials said on Monday that their army of quadcopter drones had destroyed 13 Russian aircraft – 12 of them strategic bombers – a figure echoed by Russian military bloggers. Another two dozen may have been damaged, though to what extent remains unknown. Given the scale of the raid, it seems likely that while Russia will still be able to mount cruise missile attacks on Ukraine, it may have to do so with reduced frequency and intensity. In addition, Russia will be forced to divert resources to protect facilities far from the front, straining its war machine. The psychological consequences are just as significant. For more than a week, Ukraine has endured some of the most intense Russian bombardment of the war. Its frontline cities lie in ruins, while Russian forces have been advancing relentlessly – if glacially – for more than a year. The brazenness and ingenuity of Operation Spider's Web will lift spirits, just as earlier Ukrainian spectaculars did. The sinking of the Moskva, flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, in 2022, and the maritime drone assaults that forced the Russian navy largely to abandon the Crimean port of Sevastopol are the most memorable of these. Operation Spider's Web – in which the jewels of Russia's air force exploded into fireballs 2,600 miles from the Ukrainian border – may well eclipse both. The mission will likewise damage morale in Russia. It did more than burn planes: it also scorched Russia's national confidence. Moscow will not be able to replace its losses quickly or easily. The Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers that made up most of the losses are no longer being produced. Russia is still making the Tu-160 – the largest and heaviest bomber in the world – but production is so slow that one or two enter service each year. The losses may also force Moscow into making choices it would rather avoid. Russia's long-range bombers fly around the world to menace the edges of Nato airspace and maritime waters. Putin may now have to sacrifice his desire to project military power globally in order to maintain full aerial pressure on Ukraine. This dilemma will be welcomed in Western capitals – yet Ukraine's June surprise will be causing sleepless nights outside Russia. Military planners everywhere will now be fretting about the security of their own air forces. Many Western countries have concentrated their air assets in ever fewer bases to save money. Aircraft are frequently parked on aprons with no protection from the skies. Western governments now face the unpleasant prospect of having to invest heavily in hardened aircraft shelters and counter-drone systems. This will be both expensive and time-consuming – but until it is done, prized Nato assets will remain vulnerable to any malign state or non-state actor with a handful of cheap kamikaze drones.
Bloomberg
02-06-2025
- General
- Bloomberg
Zelenskiy Comments on Russia Drone Strikes, Peace Talks
00:00 Operation Spider Web showed what modern warfare looks like, and why it's so important to stay ahead with technology. All our joint investments in drone production, all our shared battlefield experience. Everything we are doing together with our partners is making your stronger. Talks in Istanbul just ended, and I'm waiting for the minister [INAUDIBLE] A full report. They exchanged documents through the Turkish side and we are preparing an EU release of prisoners of the war. Third, the upcoming NATO summit can strengthen Europe's security. Or if it sends the wrong signal, it will only encourage Putin. The key to lasting peace is clear. The aggressor must not receive any reward for war. Putin must get nothing that would justify his aggression. Any reward would only show him that war pays off.
Forbes
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Space Superiority: Why The Space Force Must Lead In AI Warfare
President Trump meets with Space Force and national security officials in the Oval Office on Golden ... More Dome. The dimensions of modern warfare have shifted so suddenly and in such a way that even our country's newest service is neither preparing for nor even really thinking much about. Today's battles are defined as much by interconnected networks and the software-driven systems on them as by the kinetic effects of traditional weapons. Futurists a generation ago envisioned a network-centric battlefield, but few could have predicted the sophistication of today's adversaries or the complexity of the digital tactics they now employ. What was once academic theory is now battlefield reality and will determine the fate of not just a battle but the survivability of empires. To maintain superiority, the United States Space Force has no choice but to prioritize the development and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) as a core warfighting capability. AI is poised to transform warfare as profoundly as aviation was in the early decades of the 20th century. The Brookings Institution already finds that Generative AI is revolutionizing industries at a breadth and pace unseen since the Industrial Revolution, while more autonomous technologies are accelerating the determination of winners and losers from agriculture to transportation. The next stop is agentic AI: autonomous software systems capable of learning and operating independently. In military terms, these AI agents function as cyber warriors, battling for control in the digital realm. And while this might all sound madly futuristic, our adversaries are already developing, deploying, and testing such capabilities. The Space Force, the first digital service and one defined by software more than anything else, must conceive, develop, deploy, and command these AI agents across its entire space systems architecture, end-to-end. These agents must be integrated into every mission system tasked with combat force employment because only they, and the Guardian warriors who operate them, will differentiate our Space Force from any other. The successful deployment and operation of these weapons is the order of battle, and our leaders must ensure positive control over operations and the evolution of their capability. This challenge is uniquely acute for the Space Force. Unlike other military branches, it is inherently digital in its nature. Its future victories will depend more on mastering data science and AI-driven operations and far less on rocket science. Just as air superiority was essential to American dominance in the 20th century, space superiority, assured by occupying orbits and enabled by AI agents, will be essential for America in this century. Yet, while our adversaries surge ahead, the Pentagon remains restrained by decision-making processes conceived in the 1960s and barely updated since the 1990s. The Department of Defense's bureaucratic inertia is ill-suited to the demands of real-time, adaptive AI warfare. There are rumors on Capitol Hill that rather than redesigning these processes to suit a new era, in a fit of panic some senior decisionmakers are actually considering avoiding it all by just leasing services for core space warfighting missions. Doing so for communications and missile warning would be catastrophic and certain to ensure warfighting commanders have neither command nor control of their assigned forces for today and the future. Abrogating to corporate digital mercenaries at a time when competitors like China are aggressively investing in AI agents to gain an edge in network-centric warfare will mean certain defeat. By accommodating the inherited dysfunctions of the past instead of adopting the processes needed to win, the U.S. Space Force risks echoing France's misplaced confidence in 1939, relying on a Maginot Line built for the last war, only to be swiftly outmaneuvered by more agile adversaries. To control is to own and for that reason all mission critical systems must remain government owned. While ownership is more cost-effective for taxpayers than renting, the case for owning these systems goes beyond fiscal prudence, it's a strategic imperative. Ownership ensures the Space Force always defines what these systems can do, how they evolve, and how they respond to threats. In an era where software, AI algorithms, cloud and edge computing, and zero-trust architectures determine mission success, solely thinking about hardware is no longer sufficient. The ability to develop, deploy, and control bespoke AI capabilities will dictate who prevails in the next generation of space conflict. To rise to this challenge, the Space Force must fully adopt a digital-first mindset. From initial Guardian training to strategic planning, software and AI tools must be viewed as foundational to every mission. If satellites are their rifles, then software stacks and AI agents are the ammunition bunkers that empower those weapons. Future Guardians must be as proficient in AI and data operations as today's pilots are in aerodynamics. Mastering orbital dynamics and transfer orbits were what defined space superiority in the past, today this can be done on an iPhone. It's only when a digital mindset becomes part of every Guardian's DNA that the Space Force will be truly prepared for offensive, defensive, and combat support missions in, from, and to space. If the Space Force proceeds with outsourcing its core missions with lease agreements and does not put AI at the forefront, we must all rethink what the Space Force is. Without direct control of the operations and future of these capabilities, the Space Force becomes little more than a team of contracting managers. Securing American interests in space begins with cultivating space-minded personnel, instilling a warrior ethos, and having plans and procedures necessary for space superiority. Failing to own and control its future will indicate willful ignorance of this fundamental shift in the nature of warfare; both in space and enabled by space. And without decisive action by Congress, today's space leaders will find their successors standing proudly atop their own Maginot Line, 100 years later, and just as irrelevant. For the Space Force and the Congress who resources it, the choice is clear: adapt and lead in AI-driven space operations, or risk irrelevance in the conflicts of tomorrow.
