Latest news with #nuclearproliferation


Russia Today
22-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
The age of American nuclear privilege is over
The question of nuclear proliferation is no longer hypothetical. It is happening. The only uncertainty now is how quickly it will proceed. In the not-too-distant future, we may see 15 nuclear powers instead of today's nine. Yet there is little reason to believe this development will fundamentally upend international politics, or bring about global catastrophe. The invention of nuclear weapons was a technological breakthrough that reshaped global affairs. More than anything else, nuclear weapons define the military hierarchy of states, creating a threat that no government can ignore. Perhaps their most profound consequence is the emergence of states that are essentially immune to external aggression. This was never true in the long history of war. No matter how powerful a state was, a coalition of rivals could always defeat it. The great empires were vulnerable to invasion. The Enlightenment-era monarchies – including Russia – depended on a balance of power system where no single nation could dominate the rest. But with nuclear weapons, that balance shifted. Two countries – Russia and the US – now possess such overwhelming destructive capability that neither can be seriously threatened, let alone defeated, even by a coalition. China, too, is gradually joining this exclusive tier, though its arsenal is still a fraction of Moscow's or Washington's. In this sense, nuclear weapons have brought a strange kind of peace: Not from trust, but from terror. War between nuclear superpowers is not only unthinkable, it is politically irrational. Becoming a nuclear superpower, however, is extremely expensive. Even China, with its vast resources, has only recently begun to approach the scale of Russian and American stockpiles. Few others can afford the same path. Fortunately, most countries don't need to. Major regional powers like India, Pakistan, Brazil, Iran, Japan, and even smaller ones like Israel, do not seek military invincibility on a global scale. Their nuclear ambitions, where they exist, are regional in nature – aimed at deterring neighbors, not conquering continents. Their limited arsenals do not upset the global balance of power. Nor do they need to. For decades, serious scholars – Western theorists as well as Russian strategists – have argued that limited nuclear proliferation may actually enhance international stability. The reasoning is simple: Nuclear weapons raise the cost of war. Nations become far more cautious when the price of aggression could be national annihilation. We've seen this play out already. North Korea, with a modest nuclear arsenal, feels emboldened in its dealings with Washington. Iran, by contrast, delayed too long and was attacked by Israel and the US in June 2025. The lesson was clear: In today's world, non-nuclear states are far more vulnerable to attack. This has exposed the weakness of the current non-proliferation regime. Countries like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea have all violated it, yet none have been meaningfully punished. Iran tried to comply and paid the price. It's no wonder others are watching and drawing their own conclusions. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan – each may be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons, either independently or with quiet American support. Washington has already shown it cares little about the long-term consequences for its East Asian allies. It is willing to provoke instability if it helps contain China. In this context, a wave of new nuclear powers is not just likely – it is practically inevitable. But it will not mean the end of the world. Why? Because even with more nuclear states, the true balance of power remains intact. No emerging nuclear country will soon reach the scale of Russia and the US. Most will build modest deterrents, enough to shield themselves from invasion but not to threaten global security. Their arsenals may be enough to inflict horrific damage on a rival – but not to destroy humanity. A regional war – between India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, or others – would be a tragedy. Millions could die. But the catastrophe would be geographically limited. These are not world-ending scenarios. And in cases such as these, the nuclear superpowers – Russia and the US – would likely act to impose peace before escalation spirals out of control. Of course, this is hardly a utopia. But it is also not the apocalypse Western hawks love to predict. In fact, compared to the real nightmare – a direct nuclear conflict between Russia and the US – this multipolar nuclear world may be the lesser evil. Proliferation may be regrettable. It may complicate diplomacy. But it is not madness. It is a rational response by sovereign states to a system where only nuclear-armed nations can truly secure their interests. The monopoly of power enjoyed by a handful of countries is eroding. That is not a failure of the system – it is the logical outcome of it. The strategic architecture of the post-war world has long rested on a fiction – that non-proliferation is universal, and that the West can police it indefinitely. This fiction is now collapsing. Countries are learning that treaties mean little without enforcement – and that security cannot be outsourced. In the long run, this will require a new approach. A world with 15 nuclear powers may not be ideal, but it is manageable – especially if the dominant players act with restraint and responsibility. Russia, as one of the original nuclear powers, understands this burden well. It will not be Moscow that upends this balance. But the West, driven by arrogance and short-term calculations, may yet provoke a crisis it cannot control. Washington's recklessness in East Asia, its casual indifference to the risks it imposes on allies, and its determination to maintain strategic dominance at all costs – that is the real danger. We are entering a new nuclear age. It will be more crowded, more complex, and more fragile. But it will not be ungovernable – so long as those with real power behave as custodians, not crusaders.


Russia Today
21-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
A new nuclear age is coming, but this time it's different
The question of nuclear proliferation is no longer hypothetical. It is happening. The only uncertainty now is how quickly it will proceed. In the not-too-distant future, we may see 15 nuclear powers instead of today's nine. Yet there is little reason to believe this development will fundamentally upend international politics, or bring about global catastrophe. The invention of nuclear weapons was a technological breakthrough that reshaped global affairs. More than anything else, nuclear weapons define the military hierarchy of states, creating a threat that no government can ignore. Perhaps their most profound consequence is the emergence of states that are essentially immune to external aggression. This was never true in the long history of war. No matter how powerful a state was, a coalition of rivals could always defeat it. The great empires were vulnerable to invasion. The Enlightenment-era monarchies – including Russia – depended on a balance of power system where no single nation could dominate the rest. But with nuclear weapons, that balance shifted. Two countries – Russia and the US – now possess such overwhelming destructive capability that neither can be seriously threatened, let alone defeated, even by a coalition. China, too, is gradually joining this exclusive tier, though its arsenal is still a fraction of Moscow's or Washington's. In this sense, nuclear weapons have brought a strange kind of peace: Not from trust, but from terror. War between nuclear superpowers is not only unthinkable, it is politically irrational. Becoming a nuclear superpower, however, is extremely expensive. Even China, with its vast resources, has only recently begun to approach the scale of Russian and American stockpiles. Few others can afford the same path. Fortunately, most countries don't need to. Major regional powers like India, Pakistan, Brazil, Iran, Japan, and even smaller ones like Israel, do not seek military invincibility on a global scale. Their nuclear ambitions, where they exist, are regional in nature – aimed at deterring neighbors, not conquering continents. Their limited arsenals do not upset the global balance of power. Nor do they need to. For decades, serious scholars – Western theorists as well as Russian strategists – have argued that limited nuclear proliferation may actually enhance international stability. The reasoning is simple: Nuclear weapons raise the cost of war. Nations become far more cautious when the price of aggression could be national annihilation. We've seen this play out already. North Korea, with a modest nuclear arsenal, feels emboldened in its dealings with Washington. Iran, by contrast, delayed too long and was attacked by Israel and the US in June 2025. The lesson was clear: In today's world, non-nuclear states are far more vulnerable to attack. This has exposed the weakness of the current non-proliferation regime. Countries like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea have all violated it, yet none have been meaningfully punished. Iran tried to comply and paid the price. It's no wonder others are watching and drawing their own conclusions. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan – each may be tempted to pursue nuclear weapons, either independently or with quiet American support. Washington has already shown it cares little about the long-term consequences for its East Asian allies. It is willing to provoke instability if it helps contain China. In this context, a wave of new nuclear powers is not just likely – it is practically inevitable. But it will not mean the end of the world. Why? Because even with more nuclear states, the true balance of power remains intact. No emerging nuclear country will soon reach the scale of Russia and the US. Most will build modest deterrents, enough to shield themselves from invasion but not to threaten global security. Their arsenals may be enough to inflict horrific damage on a rival – but not to destroy humanity. A regional war – between India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, or others – would be a tragedy. Millions could die. But the catastrophe would be geographically limited. These are not world-ending scenarios. And in cases such as these, the nuclear superpowers – Russia and the US – would likely act to impose peace before escalation spirals out of control. Of course, this is hardly a utopia. But it is also not the apocalypse Western hawks love to predict. In fact, compared to the real nightmare – a direct nuclear conflict between Russia and the US – this multipolar nuclear world may be the lesser evil. Proliferation may be regrettable. It may complicate diplomacy. But it is not madness. It is a rational response by sovereign states to a system where only nuclear-armed nations can truly secure their interests. The monopoly of power enjoyed by a handful of countries is eroding. That is not a failure of the system – it is the logical outcome of it. The strategic architecture of the post-war world has long rested on a fiction – that non-proliferation is universal, and that the West can police it indefinitely. This fiction is now collapsing. Countries are learning that treaties mean little without enforcement – and that security cannot be outsourced. In the long run, this will require a new approach. A world with 15 nuclear powers may not be ideal, but it is manageable – especially if the dominant players act with restraint and responsibility. Russia, as one of the original nuclear powers, understands this burden well. It will not be Moscow that upends this balance. But the West, driven by arrogance and short-term calculations, may yet provoke a crisis it cannot control. Washington's recklessness in East Asia, its casual indifference to the risks it imposes on allies, and its determination to maintain strategic dominance at all costs – that is the real danger. We are entering a new nuclear age. It will be more crowded, more complex, and more fragile. But it will not be ungovernable – so long as those with real power behave as custodians, not crusaders.


NHK
17-07-2025
- Politics
- NHK
New memorial marks 80 years from 1st nuclear test in US state of New Mexico
On the 80th anniversary of the world's first atomic bomb test in the US state of New Mexico, a memorial sign was unveiled at the site acknowledging the damage and suffering caused by the radioactive fallout. The first detonation of a nuclear weapon took place on July 16, 1945. Less than a month later, two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. About 100 people attended the dedication ceremony on Wednesday and called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The state government placed the marker near the entrance of the former test site. It includes an explanation of the damage from the blast's radioactivity and conveys the experiences of affected residents. Among the attendees at the ceremony was Melissa Parke, the Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, or ICAN. She said, "What happened here 80 years ago today also marked the beginning of an existential threat to humanity." She went on to say, "The story perpetuated by nuclear arms states that nuclear weapons keep the world safe through deterrence is a grotesque and dangerous lie." A man from an area affected by the test said people are going to read the sign and know the full story, that it just wasn't about a test, but an atomic bomb explosion. He called nuclear proliferation "ridiculous."


The National
04-07-2025
- Politics
- The National
What happens if Iran were to acquire the bomb?
The recent attacks on Iran and its nuclear facilities shocked the global community. While the world watches closely for further developments and hopes for a diplomatic resolution to this crisis, the attacks on Iran and its next steps will have a profound impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, established to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), negotiated in 1968. It enjoys nearly universal membership and was instrumental in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another two dozen states, as was predicted before the treaty was put in place. Iran, a party to the NPT, threatened to withdraw even before the attacks. If Iran were to leave the NPT and focus on resurrecting its nuclear programme to build nuclear weapons, it would deal a major blow to the non-proliferation regime and its credibility. Moreover, regardless of Iran's decision about its membership in the NPT or pursuit of nuclear weapons, the damage to the efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons has already been done. The 21st century has witnessed several attacks by nuclear-armed states against non-nuclear-weapon states, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the rationale of preventing the alleged acquisition of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Some countries, like Libya, agreed to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons and were nonetheless attacked later. Ukraine, which inherited a nuclear weapons arsenal from the Soviet Union, gave them back to Russia and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Many in Ukraine today ask themselves whether the decision to forgo nuclear weapons was the right one, and whether Ukraine would have been attacked if it had chosen to keep them. Countries also look at North Korea, which left the NPT and rushed to build nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US as a deterrent against military attacks. So far, this strategy has worked, and North Korea continues to expand and enhance its nuclear arsenal, proudly exhibiting it to ensure the US and others get the message. With the waning reliability of US commitments to its allies, some states may decide that they can only protect themselves with the ultimate deterrent – nuclear weapons. In South Korea, for example, public opinion already favours the nuclear weapons option. Iran's nuclear programme has made countries in the Middle East and beyond nervous for decades. We've heard disconcerting statements from Turkey and Saudi Arabia regarding a potential pursuit of nuclear weapons if Iran were to acquire the bomb. Would attacks on Iran and its nuclear programme shift the calculus of some of these countries regarding their own nuclear ambitions, serving as a catalyst for further nuclear proliferation? Iran insists on the peaceful nature of its programme. However, several elements of it were developed without a particular need for an existing or even planned nuclear energy programme and have been a source of proliferation concern. Iran was on the verge of having everything, including significant stocks of highly enriched uranium, but the bomb itself. It played the nuclear hedging game for over two decades but vastly expanded and accelerated it in the last couple of years. Future proliferators will take note of the risks posed by the ambiguity of their intentions while acquiring nuclear technologies and capabilities that could lead to weaponisation. It remains to be seen whether Iran will leave the NPT and focus on resurrecting its nuclear programme. Iran has already moved forward with the suspension of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a key component of the non-proliferation regime that inspects nuclear activities and facilities and is a legal obligation under the NPT. It would be in its own interest to return to full co-operation with the IAEA and offer full transparency of its nuclear programme. Ultimately, further proliferation in the region, ignited by Iran's withdrawal from the NPT and pursuit of nuclear weapons, would be against Iran's own interests. Beyond a diplomatic solution to the existing crisis, there are several steps that NPT states could pursue to prevent further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. One of these is an explicit legal obligation or regional agreement not to pursue national programmes for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel – two critical elements of the nuclear fuel cycle capable of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. In this regard, the UAE stands as an example of steering clear of any ambiguity in its nuclear power programme. In its agreement on nuclear co-operation with the US (the so-called 123 agreement), it took on an obligation not to pursue these sensitive technologies. Another option is for any new facility involving enrichment and reprocessing to be established as an international or multilateral facility subject to international safeguards. One could argue that robust regional and international co-operation on nuclear energy and its peaceful applications could eventually pave the way for co-operation, transparency and trust-building among countries in the region. Another way to alleviate proliferation concerns in the Middle East is the establishment of a regional verification arrangement to supplement IAEA safeguards, modelled on the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Such an arrangement could build confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. In recent years, interest in nuclear power as a carbon-neutral energy source has significantly increased, including in the Middle East. It holds the promise of reliable and clean energy, with uses in various other applications beyond electricity generation, including desalination of water and many other benefits. For this promise to be realised, the NPT must hold firm, and the system of checks on proliferation must remain in place.


South China Morning Post
27-06-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Hanoi's growing role in nuclear diplomacy is a sign of multilateral trust
In a development that may not have made headlines but carries significant diplomatic weight, Vietnam has been nominated to preside over the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set for 2026. At first glance, this might seem like a routine appointment within the well-worn cycles of international diplomacy. However, at a moment when nuclear anxieties are re-emerging – not least due to Iran's relatively opaque atomic activities – the selection signals a subtle but powerful shift: Vietnam is no longer just a capable regional actor, but a country the international community trusts to navigate the treacherous waters of global nuclear governance. This elevation comes as the spectre of nuclear proliferation once again casts a long shadow over international security. Iran's enrichment capabilities have rekindled fears of a destabilised Middle East, prompting urgent calls for credible diplomatic frameworks. In that context, Vietnam's appointment reflects a collective bet that a nation with no nuclear ambitions – and a history of balancing great power relations – can help restore confidence in a non-proliferation regime under mounting strain. The NPT review conferences are not mere ceremonial gatherings. These are high-stakes diplomatic arenas where nuclear and non-nuclear states negotiate the fragile balance between deterrence and disarmament, peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation risks. Presiding over such a conference demands neutrality, negotiation skills and a reputation for constructive engagement. Vietnam's nomination, therefore, is a geopolitical endorsement. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh speaks at the third United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice, France, on June 9. Photo: Reuters