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Yahoo
4 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Analysis: PKK recalibrates from armed struggle to politics in Turkiye
'We voluntarily destroy our weapons … as a step of goodwill and determination,' said senior Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Bese Hozat, speaking in front of a gathering of the group's fighters. The footage, filmed last Friday in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaimaniyah, then shows the fighters – about 30 of them – placing their weapons inside a cauldron, where they were set alight. The ceremony may have been symbolic, but it capped what might be one of the most consequential periods in Turkiye's recent political history. It wraps up a carefully planned sequence of gestures and messages, and shows that both sides are not just coordinating symbolically, but are also politically aligned in their intent to move from armed conflict to political dialogue. The choreography of the build-up to the ceremony unfolded with remarkable precision, revealing both political coordination and calculated restraint. Such an alignment would have been impossible without mutual recognition between the PKK and Turkiye of the importance of what was about to happen, as well as the consequences of any failure. On July 7, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan received his country's pro-Kurdish DEM Party delegation for the second time in four months. A smiling group photo from the meeting was widely circulated, signalling both the normalisation of dialogue and the symbolic approval of the process at the highest level. Two days later, on July 9, Abdullah Ocalan – the imprisoned PKK leader and founder – appeared in a seven-minute video released by ANF, the PKK's affiliated media outlet. It marked his first public visual appearance in 26 years and carried a simple but historic message: The time for arms has ended. In it, Ocalan emphasised that the movement's original aim, the recognition of Kurdish identity, had been achieved, and that political engagement must now replace armed resistance. The message was as much to the PKK as it was to the public. Lastly, on July 13, Erdogan addressed the governing AK Party's retreat, reaffirming his commitment to the disarmament process and announcing that a parliamentary commission would be established to address its legal framework. His message aimed to reassure the broader public, especially his supporters, that the process would strengthen national untiy and benefits all of Turkiye's citizens, whatever their to the Kurdish public Ocalan's rare video message aimed to reassure his Kurdish supporters that this was not a defeat, but a recalibration: a shift from armed struggle to political engagement. The message was carefully measured and stripped of triumphalism; it sought to redefine the past, rather than glorify it. The dignified tone of the weapons-burning ceremony allowed both the PKK and state narratives to coexist. It did not alienate those who had sacrificed for the PKK's struggle – activists, politicians in prison or exile, and the families of the disappeared. Instead, it signalled that their voices had been heard. Despite his years of isolation, Ocalan's words still carry weight. Not only because of his symbolic authority, but because his message reflects what many Kurds now seek: dignity without martyrdom, a voice without violence, and a future beyond armed struggle. Public support for disarmament is growing, even among those long sceptical of the state's intent. Recent surveys show that more than 90 percent of DEM voters, as well as those who identify as Kurdish or Zaza (a Kurdish-adjacent minority group) in Turkiye, support the process. Belief that the PKK will fully disarm is also significantly higher than the national average. The PKK's decision to disarm is not a retreat but a recalibration. Since its founding in 1978, the group has waged a protracted armed struggle against the Turkish state, demanding autonomy and rights for Kurds. But after decades of rebellion, the regional landscape has changed. In northern Iraq and Syria, the PKK's operational space has altered. While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a key PKK-linked actor, remains active in northeastern Syria, its future hinges on shifting US commitments and delicate understandings with the new government in Damascus, an ally of Turkiye. At the same time, Iran's weakening regional influence, sustained Turkish military pressure, and a quiet but growing preference among Western actors for a stable Turkiye have all contributed to reshaping the group's strategic calculus. Crucially, this recalibration does not conflict with the United States and Israel's core interests in curbing Iranian influence and maintaining a manageable status quo in Syria. Against this backdrop, a disarmed and politically engaged Kurdish movement in Turkiye is not an isolated anomaly. In this context, the PKK has opted to step off the battlefield and into the political arena. As Ocalan expressed in his July 9 message, 'I believe in the strength of peace, not the force of arms.' The weapons-burning ceremony is not the end of the disarmament process. A Turkish parliamentary commission is expected to define the conditions for the reintegration of PKK fighters into civilian and political life in Turkiye, while a verification mechanism involving the Turkish Armed Forces and intelligence agency will monitor disarmament and issue a report to guide further steps. Hozat, the PKK senior leader, framed the ceremony as a political milestone, and reaffirmed the group's ambition to enter civilian politics, expressing an aim to become 'pioneers of democratic politics in Amed [Diyarbakir], Ankara, and Istanbul' – a deliberate reference to key centres of Kurdish representation in Turkiye and national political power. Yet this transition hinges on comprehensive legal reforms and credible guarantees that are both socially and politically viable, and civil society groups and humanitarian organisations in Turkiye are likely to play an active role in the forthcoming stages of full political support In Turkiye, there is broad buy-in for the peace process with the PKK from across the political spectrum. This is largely because the process benefits nearly all political actors by reducing the securitised political climate, easing judicial pressure, and offering a chance to reset deeply polarised governance. With 'terrorism' charges having been used expansively in recent years, even members of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) have found themselves entangled in legal problems. In this context, a de-escalation appeals to many, including party leaders such as Ozgur Ozel and Ekrem Imamoglu, even if many remain wary of the AK Party's intentions. For many CHP supporters, what they view as the contradiction of a reconciliation effort with the PKK unfolding alongside a clampdown on opposition mayors is hard to ignore. Other Turkish parties have been supportive, despite coming from different political traditions. The DEM Party has, of course, been a central part of the negotiations and the messaging that a page has been turned on the past. It is notable that the group that the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – perhaps the Turkish political party most opposed to the DEM Party and long a staunch opponent of any rapprochement with Kurdish nationalist groups – has also publicly backed the process, and indeed has also been heavily involved in the choreography in the past few months. Its leader, Devlet Bahceli, has been front and centre in the process, formally inviting Ocalan to dissolve the PKK and reaching out to DEM members of parliament. His pragmatic stance has stemmed from his belief that the end of the PKK's armed campaign aligns with national interests. In fact, delays in the process were ultimately overcome with the aid of the MHP leader. And the AK Party has steered the peace process through some of its central figures, including Efkan Ala, a former interior minister and one of Erdogan's most-trusted political allies. Erdogan has personally taken on the task of normalising the discourse of making peace with the PKK. Still, not everyone in the party may be on board. Years of conflict with the PKK and attacks from the group, securitised rhetoric, the criminalisation of DEM-aligned actors, and the stigma surrounding any cooperation with the DEM Party have left deep internal reservations. Stepping away from that position is not easy, even if Erdogan has set a clear tone, signalling firm commitment from the very top of the Turkish pitfalls This is not a conventional peace process, nor is it a one-sided act of capitulation. Rather, it marks a convergence – tenuous, complex, and partial – between two longstanding adversaries. Spoilers exist – within the state, among political factions, and across the border – but so far, none has derailed the process. But those tied to the war economy, ideological hardliners, or actors who thrive in a securitised climate might yet try, even if the process has already weathered a lot of potential pitfalls, including the Turkish military bombing PKK positions in March and regional turbulence in the form of the war between Israel and Iran. However, that does not mean that no future problems could arise. What lies ahead may be even harder. Without meaningful political reforms or guarantees, the space opened up by disarmament may quickly narrow again. On the Kurdish political side, many questions also still remain. DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakirhan, speaking in an interview with the Kurdish media outlet Rudaw last Wednesday, emphasised that symbolic gestures must be followed by institutional action. 'We have submitted our proposals to the speaker of parliament,' he noted, including mechanisms for reintegrating former militants into political and civilian life. 'We don't need to dwell on the details — those will follow. But there must be clarity: What happens to those who disarm? Where do they go? What protections will they have? These are not trivialities; they are the foundation of a credible peace.' He is right to point out that disarmament alone is not enough; it is merely the starting point. The real question is what comes next. What will happen to those imprisoned on 'terror' charges, whether for political reasons or past involvement in armed struggle? What about the fighters still in the mountains, the families stranded and the political figures exiled in Iraq, Europe or elsewhere? And what about the broader ecosystem: civil society actors, journalists, and others long caught in the grey zones of criminalisation? For the PKK's disarmament to reach this point, the right domestic and geopolitical conditions had to align, and today, they have. Weapons will be burned, and the armed chapter, potentially including the Syrian front, as hinted by ongoing but difficult negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, will come to a close within Turkiye's borders. But from this point on, representative politics, diplomacy, and public deliberation will matter more than ever. It marks a historic threshold. What follows will depend not on symbols, but on substance: on the courage to legislate, to decentralise power, and to trust society's readiness for coexistence. No one can fully predict how the region will evolve, and most actors are likely preparing for multiple scenarios, not a single roadmap. The long-term impact of this move remains unclear and perhaps deliberately so.
Al Jazeera
5 days ago
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Analysis: PKK recalibrates from armed struggle to politics in Turkiye
'We voluntarily destroy our weapons … as a step of goodwill and determination,' said senior Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Bese Hozat, speaking in front of a gathering of the group's fighters. The footage, filmed last Friday in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaimaniyah, then shows the fighters – about 30 of them – placing their weapons inside a cauldron, where they were set alight. The ceremony may have been symbolic, but it capped what might be one of the most consequential periods in Turkiye's recent political history. It wraps up a carefully planned sequence of gestures and messages, and shows that both sides are not just coordinating symbolically, but are also politically aligned in their intent to move from armed conflict to political dialogue. The choreography of the build-up to the ceremony unfolded with remarkable precision, revealing both political coordination and calculated restraint. Such an alignment would have been impossible without mutual recognition between the PKK and Turkiye of the importance of what was about to happen, as well as the consequences of any failure. On July 7, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan received his country's pro-Kurdish DEM Party delegation for the second time in four months. A smiling group photo from the meeting was widely circulated, signalling both the normalisation of dialogue and the symbolic approval of the process at the highest level. Two days later, on July 9, Abdullah Ocalan – the imprisoned PKK leader and founder – appeared in a seven-minute video released by ANF, the PKK's affiliated media outlet. It marked his first public visual appearance in 26 years and carried a simple but historic message: The time for arms has ended. In it, Ocalan emphasised that the movement's original aim, the recognition of Kurdish identity, had been achieved, and that political engagement must now replace armed resistance. The message was as much to the PKK as it was to the public. Lastly, on July 13, Erdogan addressed the governing AK Party's retreat, reaffirming his commitment to the disarmament process and announcing that a parliamentary commission would be established to address its legal framework. His message aimed to reassure the broader public, especially his supporters, that the process would strengthen national untiy and benefits all of Turkiye's citizens, whatever their ethnicity. Message to the Kurdish public Ocalan's rare video message aimed to reassure his Kurdish supporters that this was not a defeat, but a recalibration: a shift from armed struggle to political engagement. The message was carefully measured and stripped of triumphalism; it sought to redefine the past, rather than glorify it. The dignified tone of the weapons-burning ceremony allowed both the PKK and state narratives to coexist. It did not alienate those who had sacrificed for the PKK's struggle – activists, politicians in prison or exile, and the families of the disappeared. Instead, it signalled that their voices had been heard. Despite his years of isolation, Ocalan's words still carry weight. Not only because of his symbolic authority, but because his message reflects what many Kurds now seek: dignity without martyrdom, a voice without violence, and a future beyond armed struggle. Public support for disarmament is growing, even among those long sceptical of the state's intent. Recent surveys show that more than 90 percent of DEM voters, as well as those who identify as Kurdish or Zaza (a Kurdish-adjacent minority group) in Turkiye, support the process. Belief that the PKK will fully disarm is also significantly higher than the national average. The PKK's decision to disarm is not a retreat but a recalibration. Since its founding in 1978, the group has waged a protracted armed struggle against the Turkish state, demanding autonomy and rights for Kurds. But after decades of rebellion, the regional landscape has changed. In northern Iraq and Syria, the PKK's operational space has altered. While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a key PKK-linked actor, remains active in northeastern Syria, its future hinges on shifting US commitments and delicate understandings with the new government in Damascus, an ally of Turkiye. At the same time, Iran's weakening regional influence, sustained Turkish military pressure, and a quiet but growing preference among Western actors for a stable Turkiye have all contributed to reshaping the group's strategic calculus. Crucially, this recalibration does not conflict with the United States and Israel's core interests in curbing Iranian influence and maintaining a manageable status quo in Syria. Against this backdrop, a disarmed and politically engaged Kurdish movement in Turkiye is not an isolated anomaly. In this context, the PKK has opted to step off the battlefield and into the political arena. As Ocalan expressed in his July 9 message, 'I believe in the strength of peace, not the force of arms.' The weapons-burning ceremony is not the end of the disarmament process. A Turkish parliamentary commission is expected to define the conditions for the reintegration of PKK fighters into civilian and political life in Turkiye, while a verification mechanism involving the Turkish Armed Forces and intelligence agency will monitor disarmament and issue a report to guide further steps. Hozat, the PKK senior leader, framed the ceremony as a political milestone, and reaffirmed the group's ambition to enter civilian politics, expressing an aim to become 'pioneers of democratic politics in Amed [Diyarbakir], Ankara, and Istanbul' – a deliberate reference to key centres of Kurdish representation in Turkiye and national political power. Yet this transition hinges on comprehensive legal reforms and credible guarantees that are both socially and politically viable, and civil society groups and humanitarian organisations in Turkiye are likely to play an active role in the forthcoming stages of full disarmament. Turkish political support In Turkiye, there is broad buy-in for the peace process with the PKK from across the political spectrum. This is largely because the process benefits nearly all political actors by reducing the securitised political climate, easing judicial pressure, and offering a chance to reset deeply polarised governance. With 'terrorism' charges having been used expansively in recent years, even members of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) have found themselves entangled in legal problems. In this context, a de-escalation appeals to many, including party leaders such as Ozgur Ozel and Ekrem Imamoglu, even if many remain wary of the AK Party's intentions. For many CHP supporters, what they view as the contradiction of a reconciliation effort with the PKK unfolding alongside a clampdown on opposition mayors is hard to ignore. Other Turkish parties have been supportive, despite coming from different political traditions. The DEM Party has, of course, been a central part of the negotiations and the messaging that a page has been turned on the past. It is notable that the group that the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – perhaps the Turkish political party most opposed to the DEM Party and long a staunch opponent of any rapprochement with Kurdish nationalist groups – has also publicly backed the process, and indeed has also been heavily involved in the choreography in the past few months. Its leader, Devlet Bahceli, has been front and centre in the process, formally inviting Ocalan to dissolve the PKK and reaching out to DEM members of parliament. His pragmatic stance has stemmed from his belief that the end of the PKK's armed campaign aligns with national interests. In fact, delays in the process were ultimately overcome with the aid of the MHP leader. And the AK Party has steered the peace process through some of its central figures, including Efkan Ala, a former interior minister and one of Erdogan's most-trusted political allies. Erdogan has personally taken on the task of normalising the discourse of making peace with the PKK. Still, not everyone in the party may be on board. Years of conflict with the PKK and attacks from the group, securitised rhetoric, the criminalisation of DEM-aligned actors, and the stigma surrounding any cooperation with the DEM Party have left deep internal reservations. Stepping away from that position is not easy, even if Erdogan has set a clear tone, signalling firm commitment from the very top of the Turkish establishment. Potential pitfalls This is not a conventional peace process, nor is it a one-sided act of capitulation. Rather, it marks a convergence – tenuous, complex, and partial – between two longstanding adversaries. Spoilers exist – within the state, among political factions, and across the border – but so far, none has derailed the process. But those tied to the war economy, ideological hardliners, or actors who thrive in a securitised climate might yet try, even if the process has already weathered a lot of potential pitfalls, including the Turkish military bombing PKK positions in March and regional turbulence in the form of the war between Israel and Iran. However, that does not mean that no future problems could arise. What lies ahead may be even harder. Without meaningful political reforms or guarantees, the space opened up by disarmament may quickly narrow again. On the Kurdish political side, many questions also still remain. DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakirhan, speaking in an interview with the Kurdish media outlet Rudaw last Wednesday, emphasised that symbolic gestures must be followed by institutional action. 'We have submitted our proposals to the speaker of parliament,' he noted, including mechanisms for reintegrating former militants into political and civilian life. 'We don't need to dwell on the details — those will follow. But there must be clarity: What happens to those who disarm? Where do they go? What protections will they have? These are not trivialities; they are the foundation of a credible peace.' He is right to point out that disarmament alone is not enough; it is merely the starting point. The real question is what comes next. What will happen to those imprisoned on 'terror' charges, whether for political reasons or past involvement in armed struggle? What about the fighters still in the mountains, the families stranded and the political figures exiled in Iraq, Europe or elsewhere? And what about the broader ecosystem: civil society actors, journalists, and others long caught in the grey zones of criminalisation? For the PKK's disarmament to reach this point, the right domestic and geopolitical conditions had to align, and today, they have. Weapons will be burned, and the armed chapter, potentially including the Syrian front, as hinted by ongoing but difficult negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, will come to a close within Turkiye's borders. But from this point on, representative politics, diplomacy, and public deliberation will matter more than ever. It marks a historic threshold. What follows will depend not on symbols, but on substance: on the courage to legislate, to decentralise power, and to trust society's readiness for coexistence. No one can fully predict how the region will evolve, and most actors are likely preparing for multiple scenarios, not a single roadmap. The long-term impact of this move remains unclear and perhaps deliberately so.
Zawya
01-07-2025
- Business
- Zawya
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus M.Ryzhenkov holds negotiations with the Minister of International Relations of Botswana
On July 1, 2025 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, Maxim Ryzhenkov, held a meeting with the Minister of International Relations of the Republic of Botswana, Phenyo Butale, who is paying an official visit to Belarus. This is the first visit by the head of Botswana's foreign ministry to our country in the history of Belarusian-Botswana relations. During the meeting, the parties discussed ways to strengthen political and interministerial dialogue, expand mutual trade, cooperation in the fields of agriculture and food security, healthcare, education, and the formation of a legal framework. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to coordinate on all aspects of the bilateral and international agenda. The ministers agreed on practical steps to intensify cooperation and confirmed their mutual interest in holding a series of bilateral events in 2025–2026. Following the negotiations, a joint statement was signed by the foreign ministers of Belarus and Botswana, expressing their intention to strengthen multifaceted cooperation. Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus.
RNZ News
30-06-2025
- Politics
- RNZ News
Tjibaou on New Caledonia talks in Paris: 'We want to resolve this now'
By Nic Maclellan , Islands Business Emmanuel Tjibaou being interviewed by public broadcaster NC la 1ère in August 2024. Photo: screen shot NC la 1ère "We want to resolve this now, and that is why I am committed to dialogue." That's Emmanuel Tjibaou, president of the independence party Union Calédonienne (UC) and one of New Caledonia's deputies in the French National Assembly. On Wednesday this week, Tjibaou and other New Caledonian leaders join talks in Paris initiated by French President Emmanuel Macron, in an attempt to forge a consensus between supporters and opponents of independence. The talks aim to progress an agreement on New Caledonia's political future, to replace the 1998 Noumea Accord that has governed the French Pacific territory for the last 25 years. Speaking to Islands Business before flying out to Paris, Tjibaou said: "Of course we'll negotiate, we'll discuss. For someone like me who comes from a Pacific society, from culture and custom, it is something we are used to dealing with on a daily basis. We intend to complete this agreement - though not at any cost." More than a year ago, on 13 May 2024, New Caledonia erupted in riots and clashes between Kanak protestors and French security forces. After six months of conflict, France's Overseas Minister Manuel Valls has facilitated a series of talks and negotiations since February, to address the post-conflict economic crisis and finalise a new political agreement for New Caledonia. Tjibaou is a central figure in efforts to bridge the ongoing gap between the independence movement and conservative parties that want to remain within the French Republic. He is son of the late Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the charismatic founder of the independence coalition Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), who was assassinated in 1989. A former director of the Tjibaou Cultural Centre and then cultural director in New Caledonia's Northern Province, Emmanuel Tjibaou was only elected to public office last year. Tjibaou won a seat in the French National Assembly in July 2024, defeating Alcide Ponga (leader of the anti-independence party Rassemblement and current President of New Caledonia). It was the first time in 38 years that a pro-independence Kanak had been elected as a deputy in the French legislature in Paris. Then, last November, Tjibaou was also elected as president of Union Calédonienne (UC), the oldest political party in New Caledonia and the largest member of the FLNKS coalition. Last week, UC "reaffirmed the necessary continuation of dialogue in order to complete the trajectory of the country's decolonisation process, initiated with the [1988] Matignon-Oudinot and [1998] Nouméa Accords." Tjibaou explained: "It is with this determination that today I am going to the discussion table in Paris. I will not leave the discussion table. If last year we mobilised in the streets, with people who died, this commitment remains the foundation on which we will achieve this path of emancipation." "The challenge for us is to discuss the modalities related to the decolonisation process that was initiated in 1988, or even back to 1983 and the meeting at Nainville-les-Roches, when the colonised Kanak people agreed to share their right to self-determination with the 'victims of history'" (a term used for the descendants of the prisoners, free settlers and indentured labours brought to New Caledonia in the century after France annexed the islands in 1853). "We have never gone back on this word - until today, we hold to it," Tjibaou added. "But the right to self-determination remains, and the colonised people didn't express themselves in the third referendum in 2021." Between 6 - 8 May, France's Overseas Minister Manuel Valls convened a three-day, closed-door meeting of New Caledonian leaders at the Deva hotel, near the rural town of Bourail. Valls' draft negotiating text included unprecedented concessions to the independence movement, which has long called for a pathway to sovereign independence, albeit with a transitional period of "interdependence" involving shared sovereignty between New Caledonia and France. Under the Noumea Accord, the French State currently retains control of the sovereign powers of defence, police and courts, currency and most aspects of foreign affairs. At Deva, Valls proposed that some of these powers could be transferred to the Government and Congress of New Caledonia, but then delegated back to Paris during a transitional period. The Valls proposal also suggested options for dual nationality, and the creation of international standing following a timeframe to be determined and negotiated. Union Calédonienne and the FLNKS accepted this proposal as the basis for the negotiations. They were joined by other groups in the Deva talks, which all confirmed they were open to core elements of the proposal: Eveil océanien; Calédonie ensemble; and the Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance (comprising the independence parties Palika and UPM, which have suspended involvement in the FLNKS Political Bureau). Despite this growing consensus, Valls' concessions to the independence movement angered leaders of the anti-independence groups Les Loyalistes and Rassemblement-Les Républicains, who scuttled the Deva talks. At the time, Loyalist Nicolas Metzdorf said: "We will never accept independence, independence in association, or a trajectory towards independence." In contrast, Emmanuel Tjibaou told Islands Business that "it is important to recall the stakes that are part of the Noumea Accord, which is a decolonisation agreement. Based on the last negotiations held at Deva, we must discuss the transfer of sovereign powers. Those talks were about establishing a transition phase in which France accompanies us to transfer these powers, as well as determining the shared interests that our two countries would have, and then to transcribe them into interdependence agreements." Tjibaou said that while there were ongoing differences over timing and the length of any transitional period of shared sovereignty, there were many areas of agreement during the trilateral discussions held since February. "This is the trajectory in which we are committed," he said, "together with what was agreed at Deva as points of convergence on reforms to be undertaken here in the country - such as the reform of public administration, or the diversification of the nickel sector." Since the Deva negotiations, Loyalist leaders have been pressing French President Macron to overrule his own minister, and take charge of the talks. After Deva ended without agreement, Nicolas Metzdorf met personally with President Macron in Paris, to press the Loyalists' criticisms of the Valls proposal. Anti-independence politicians were encouraged when Macron met Forum island leaders at the Pacific-France summit on 10 June, held on the sidelines of the third UN Ocean Conference in Nice. Macron told Pacific leaders he was considering a "new project" for New Caledonia, raising hope amongst Loyalists that he would roll back key concessions outlined in the Valls' proposal. Sonia Backès, President of New Caledonia's Southern Province, was encouraged by Macron's language, noting last week that "if he had wanted to say 'I want to support Manuel Valls proposal', he wouldn't have talked about a 'new project' for New Caledonia." Last Wednesday, key Loyalist leaders held a large public meeting at a stadium in Paita, on the outskirts of the capital Noumea. The anti-independence politicians - including President of New Caledonia Alcide Ponga, Sonia Backès, Christopher Gygès and Gil Brial - made feisty speeches attacking both the independence movement and Overseas Minister Valls. Criticising the Valls proposal, Nicolas Metzdorf told the audience that "a bad agreement is worse than no agreement." Before the crowd, Gil Brial of Les Loyalistes used more earthy language to denounce the Overseas Minister's proposal for shared sovereignty. "If you're walking on the footpath and you see something on the ground, from a distance it may look like a dog turd," Brial said. "If when you come closer, it has the texture of a turd, and if you come closer still, it has the smell of a turd, you don't need to taste it to be sure that it's shit. With the Valls proposal, it's the same." Despite this public posturing, sources in Noumea have confirmed to Islands Business that both Metzdorf and Brial have continued to hold informal discussions with independence leaders in the lead up to the next round of discussions. The lengthy negotiations to finalise an agreement are complicated by electoral politics. Even as they try to forge a consensus on political status and the future of the crucial nickel industry, political parties are preparing for elections for New Caledonia's three provincial assemblies and Congress. These polls are currently scheduled on 30 November, but may be delayed again until next year. The provincial elections, under a restricted electoral roll of New Caledonian citizens, were due in May 2024, but were postponed as New Caledonia erupted in conflict on 13 May last year. The crisis was triggered as President Macron unilaterally sought to reform the provincial electoral rolls without a consensus agreement amongst all leaders in New Caledonia. After 14 deaths, with hundreds injured and 2,600 arrests, the economy is devastated and New Caledonians are anxious about unemployment, damaged livelihoods and reduced public services in health, transport and education. Many people are tired of the ongoing political uncertainty, and poorer people are doing it tough, affected by reduced health services, cutbacks to public transport to working class suburbs of Noumea, and the loss of one in six jobs in the private sector last year. In a letter to politicians on 24 June, President Macron confirmed that a new meeting on New Caledonia's political and economic future will proceed in Paris, starting on Wednesday 2 July: "Beyond the crucial institutional issues, I hope that our discussions can also address economic and societal challenges." As well as the parties involved in the Deva negotiations, the Paris talks will include a meeting with New Caledonian business, community and customary leaders, to discuss the current economic and social crisis. The FLNKS has confirmed it will join these discussions in Paris, but "warns against any attempts to use these issues to influence the political discussions… political stability is a prerequisite for economic and social stability, and it will only be achieved through the process of access to full sovereignty." Macron's initiative comes at a difficult time in French politics. Resolving the New Caledonia stand-off is just one of many challenges facing the French President, at a time of turmoil in world affairs, trade wars and breaches of human rights and international law - including the IDF's ongoing massacre in Gaza and the US and Israeli bombardment of Iran. With only two years until the end of his second term of office, Macron's standing in the polls is disastrous (a recent opinion poll saw 21% support for the President, and just 17% for his embattled Prime Minister François Bayrou). Under Bayrou, the French government doesn't have a governing majority in the National Assembly, and he faces no-confidence motions in coming months that may bring down the government. The political chaos in Paris highlights the need to finalise an agreement for New Caledonia. However, the invitation to this week's summit in Paris was long on rhetoric but had little detail on the structure and substance of the meeting. In a statement on Monday, the FLNKS noted "the lack of clarity from the French State regarding the meeting, concerning the program, the format, and the agenda." In Noumea, there has been widespread speculation about whether Macron intends to undercut his minister and abandon Valls' proposal. However last week, the Overseas Minister suggested that he will continue to lead the discussions on New Caledonia's institutional future. "An agreement remains possible and we are counting a lot on the discussions we will have next week with the President of the Republic, and then with all the political actors of this territory" Valls said. "There will obviously be a sequence of political negotiations that I will lead with all political actors, that is to say the parliamentary groups represented at the Congress of New Caledonia. But there will also be an economic and social session with economic, social, and community actors who will be invited." On Saturday, the FLNKS held a convention at Cedwan tribe near Pouebo in the Northern Province, to brief members on current developments and prepare for this week's talks in Paris. At the Convention, delegates stressed that the Valls proposal tabled at Deva remained a "floor" for future discussions, warning against attempts to roll back past concessions: "The FLNKS urges the French State to keep its word and resume discussions from the point where they left off at Deva. The movement reaffirms that this proposal constitutes the basis for the new negotiations in Paris, and that no exchanges will take place below this." As New Caledonia's two deputies in the French National Assembly, both Nicolas Metzdorf and Emmanuel Tjibaou have used their platform in the legislature to brief French politicians on current developments on the other side of the world. Both supporters and opponents of independence have also been active on the international stage since the Deva talks. There were New Caledonian delegations - from both Loyalists and the independence movement - at the regional seminar of the UN Special Committee of Decolonisation, held in Dili, Timor-Leste in May. Last month, Roch Wamytan - a veteran UC politician and former speaker of the Congress of New Caledonia - was joined by Palika's Charles Wea at the UN Fourth Committee, calling for international monitoring of the ongoing talks with the French State. On 9 June in New York, Wamytan told the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation that the proposal from the French State must be at the heart of current talks: "The proposal is a first and constitutes the word of the State…The FLNKS has clearly understood and is ready to discuss this option in depth, and is awaiting instructions from the administering power, following the decision by local advocates of recolonisation and the break-up of the country to break off discussions." Wamytan, also led the FLNKS to the 23rd Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Leaders' Summit, held in Suva in June. The FLNKS (rather than the Government of New Caledonia) is a full MSG member, alongside the independent states of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. As incoming MSG Chair, Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka met Wamytan on 25 June and "reiterated Fiji's steadfast support for the FLNKS and for the people of New Caledonia." After the meeting, Rabuka noted that "Fiji has remained actively engaged in discussions on New Caledonia at the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation, including close collaboration with Papua New Guinea on related resolutions to ensure progress on decolonisation." For UC President Emmanuel Tjibaou, "it is with the support of our comrades from the region that we can advocate for respect for international law, particularly UN resolution 1514" [the 1961 UN General Assembly decolonisation resolution]. "It is within this trajectory of decolonisation that we are engaged, and it is also in this trajectory that the countries of the region support us," he said. "From the moment we align ourselves with this perspective, it is also a way to apply pressure on the French State. If today the State is asserting its Indo-Pacific Strategy everywhere in the region, we must integrate the issue of decolonisation of our country into this discussion. I am thinking of us, I am thinking of the situation of French Polynesia - this is where we need support. This is where we ultimately reaffirm our identity as islanders." As the massacre of non-combatants continues in Ukraine, Palestine and Iran, Tjibaou stressed that "the international solidarity movement is essential, because we are in a situation where we are a colonised people according to international law. Today, we see that the French State is giving lessons to Trump, it is giving lessons to Israel on the application of international law, but it does not even apply this law in its own country." -This article was first published by Islands Business
Zawya
08-06-2025
- Politics
- Zawya
Libyans in Benghazi relay frustrations about the political and security situation to United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), propose solutions
DSRSG Stephanie Koury concluded on Thursday a three-day visit to Benghazi as part of the UNSMIL's consultations with various stakeholders on the outcomes of the Advisory Committee and the options proposed for the way forward. She conducted a series of meetings including with political parties, youth, women, civil society representatives, people with disabilities, elders and notables from Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Almarj, Shahat, and Albaidha, and finally with the head and members of Benghazi municipal council. In all her engagements, DSRSG Koury briefed interlocutors on the work of the Advisory Committee and the recommendations they have presented to the Mission, which include: Conducting presidential and legislative elections simultaneously with adjustments to contentious issues in the current electoral laws; Conducting parliamentary elections first, followed by adopting a permanent constitution, and then by conducting presidential elections; Adopting a permanent constitution before national elections; or Establishing a political dialogue committee, according to article 64 of the Libyan Political Agreement, to temporarily replace all institutions, finalize electoral laws and select a temporary government. They also discussed the preconditions in the Advisory Committee Report, including restructuring of the High National Electoral Commission, securing independent funding and agreeing on an electoral roadmap and one government. Many participants expressed appreciation for the work of the Advisory Committee, and demanded an urgent action to address the current political stalemate and identify a Libyan-owned solution with no further delay. In all meetings, they expressed their frustration with the prolonged political stalemate, insecurity, and economic hardship, demanding an end to the political divisions including the two governments through a peaceful Libyan-owned solution. They also criticized foreign interference, observing that member states interference in Libyan affairs has complicated reaching any solution. While the participants believe that elections will be the starting point for resolving the legitimacy crisis, the majority cited support for the fourth option, reflecting their mistrust in the current leaders. 'The current institutions seek to preserve the status quo,' said one leading figure. These actors don't want a solution.' Some voiced support for first establishing a permanent constitution, then going for elections, emphasizing the importance of stability and ensuring safeguards or limitations on power by elected officials. Interlocutors also emphasized the importance to ensure a meaningful inclusive of civil society, youth and women representation, elders, and people with disabilities and move beyond the familiar figures and institutions to form a united government and stabilize the country. Participants with disabilities also emphasized the need for special measures to ensure their inclusion in the legislative chambers, similar to what is provided to components or women. The participants also discussed the current Libya's security situation, expressing upset at recent clashes in Tripoli, highlighting the need to overcome security obstacles, bring an end to militias and build one professional army and police. They also emphasized the need for solidarity among Libyans and the interconnectedness of the people and regions of Libya. One participant observed, 'while the clashes recently happened in Tripoli, the impacts are felt by Libyans throughout the country'. The representatives of political parties and associations in Benghazi specifically stressed the need for Libyans to agree through dialogue on fundamental elements related to state building and long-lasting stability as well as unifying and building state institutions, including military and security, and agreeing on a path to elections. They emphasized the need for credible national and international guarantees to protect any future political settlement reached by Libyans, stressing the criticality of having oversight mechanisms and clear timeframes and for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on those who attempt to obstruct or derail the political process. DSRSG Koury listened to their views on the political options and also their concerns. She emphasized the need to come to an end to ongoing transitions, emphasizing it is the time for strengthening state institutions and getting to a permanent constitution and allow the Libyan people to choose their leaders and enjoy the richness of their homeland. She also underlined the Mission's efforts to promote stability in the capital and prevent further outbreak of clashes so as to protect civilians and ensure a conducive environment for any inclusive political process. Distributed by APO Group on behalf of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
