Latest news with #superpower
Bloomberg
3 days ago
- Politics
- Bloomberg
Why the World Is Haunted by This White House
Donald Trump is the 14th US president of my lifetime, and he claims a unique distinction. Through all the previous White House incumbencies, months went by when even educated, informed British, German, Indian, Brazilian, French or Australian people did not give a moment's thought to America's leader. Sure, we noticed when a president visited our country or started a war or got impeached or had an incredibly beautiful wife who dressed wonderfully. We knew that the US was the richest and most influential nation on earth, and that on the big things we needed to play follow-my-leader. But even somebody like me, who lived in the US for a couple of years, and visited regularly until January 2025, did not lie awake nights wondering what our neighborhood superpower might do next.
News.com.au
6 days ago
- Business
- News.com.au
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says China ‘confident' as emerging superpower as trip comes to close
China is 'confident' in its emergence as a global superpower, Anthony Albanese says as he wraps up his lengthy state visit to the country. The Prime Minister has spent the last five days spruiking Australia's multisector offerings in Shanghai, Beijing and Chengdu. In turn, the Chinese have bombarded him with a charm offensive, showing him the sights, treating him to banquets with Communist Party top brass, lavish lunches with business leaders and even a dash of panda diplomacy. Speaking to media on Thursday from Chengdu's Anshun Bridge, Mr Albanese was asked how he would describe China's mood as it ascends to 'superpower' status. 'China sees itself as confident going forward,' he replied. Against a backdrop of central Chengdu's towering skyline, he went on to praise China's rapid development, specifically his host city's 'innovative architecture'. 'Quite clearly new, dynamic and creative,' Mr Albanese said. The comments were in line with his efforts to frame the Australia-China relationship in friendlier terms as both countries navigate an unpredictable White House. In the past decade, the relationship has been marred by a trade war and an ongoing battle for influence in the region. It has also taken an increasingly militaristic nature as China rapidly builds up its arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons amid warnings Xi Jinping is eyeing an invasion of Taiwan. Mr Albanese has said he raised those concerns with the Chinese President when they met in Beijing earlier this week. Despite their thorny nature, he emerged from the talks positive that peace through trade and people-to-people ties was possible. Though, asked on Thursday if he regarded Mr Xi a 'friend', Mr Albanese had plenty of nice things to say but held off using that word. 'I regard the relationship with President Xi as warm and engaging,' Mr Albanese said. 'We have had four bilateral meetings, but have also engaged other times as well, on an informal basis. 'That's a positive thing.' He added that Mr Xi 'sent a very warm message of congratulations' after Labor's landslide federal election win in May. Mr Albanese finished up is official engagements on Thursday afternoon with a visit to a Cochlear factory in Chengdu, shining a spotlight on Australian med tech in the research hub. It came after he had a lunch with leaders in the space. He will fly back to Australia on Friday.
Telegraph
08-07-2025
- Business
- Telegraph
Trump has found a way to cut out China
Donald Trump is opening up a new frontier in his trade war. Despite striking a pact with China last month, the US president is threatening to reignite tensions with Beijing by entangling the entirety of Asia in a sprawling web of tariff deals. Even with fresh levies imposed on Japan and South Korea, Trump is racing to land a string of agreements across the continent, including with Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia. If he pulls that off, he will build a cage around Xi Jinping's ability to use Asian markets to prop up Beijing's strained export-driven economy. 'What we are witnessing is no passing trade war,' says Neil Shearing, an economist at Capital Economics. 'Rather, it is the manifestation of a deeper, more durable superpower rivalry between the world's two largest economies.' Already, Trump's trade pacts with Britain and Vietnam have set a template for his plan to weaken Beijing's trading power. The UK deal revealed tools for the White House to 'veto' Chinese investment in Britain, while the Vietnam agreement aims to stop Beijing from relying on a loophole to avoid US tariffs. Trump has achieved the latter by putting a 40pc levy on 'transshipments' – that is goods imported into Vietnam, mostly from China, and then re-exported to America. This new tariff is double the 20pc levy on Vietnamese-made goods, thereby sending a clear message to Hanoi. While Vietnam is welcome to export to the US if it can cope with a 20pc levy, Trump will come down on the country like a tonne of bricks if it replaces 'Made in Vietnam' stickers with 'Made in China'. The president has also since threatened other South East Asian countries with more aggressive tariffs unless they make a deal in the next three weeks. This includes a potential 25pc levy on Malaysia, 32pc on Indonesia and 36pc on Thailand and Cambodia. Trump's demands will certainly include Vietnam-style measures to increase the squeeze on China. Export-driven economy Trading figures clearly show why Vietnam has emerged as an early candidate for this strategy. Since Trump first came to power in 2017, China's machinery and electrical goods shipments to Vietnam have risen from about 17pc of its total exports to almost half. And since he returned to the White House this year, Vietnam's imports of these goods from China have jumped by almost a quarter. In the year to May, Vietnam imported $174bn (£129bn) of goods from China and exported $132bn to the US. The ebb and flow of these two figures tend to track each other remarkably closely. Exports to Asia are integral to Xi's attempt to keep China's economy expanding by at least 5pc a year. Beijing juices up GDP by pumping subsidies and investments into manufacturing. This is because Chinese households simply don't spend enough to allow consumption to power the economy. 'Whenever Chinese domestic spending growth sags, export growth accelerates,' says David Lubin, a senior research fellow at the think tank Chatham House. 'And that's simply because Chinese companies can't sell stuff domestically, so they sell it abroad.' At home, this economic model has led to overcapacity and oversupply, forcing businesses into damaging price wars. If these companies can't export their surplus to Asia, supply gluts appear inevitable. Yet, the escape valve remains open. Even though China's exports to the US have dropped more than 40pc from a year ago, its total exports worldwide have climbed by almost 5pc. That has included a 15pc increase in shipments to 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. But the pressure is building on China, as revealed in Beijing's strident reaction to the US-Vietnam trade deal. He Yongqian, the commerce ministry spokesman, branded it 'a typical act of unilateral bullying' and vowed that hostile deals would prompt China to 'take resolute countermeasures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests'. This demonstrates the unenviable position that Vietnam finds itself in, particularly as the US and China are its two largest trading partners. Picking sides Soon, other Asian economies might face an equally painful choice between the battling behemoths. Trump this week has shown he is unafraid to wield a big stick, wherever he thinks it might work. On Monday, he posted on his Truth Social platform that he would slap a new 10pc tariff on 'any country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of Brics' – the ever-expanding group of countries led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This came in response to a Brics summit in Brazil, which included not only the wider membership of Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE, but also a new set of 'partners' from Latin America, Africa and central Asia – as well as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. In a statement issued after the summit, the participating countries attacked 'the proliferation of trade-restrictive actions'. They didn't name the US, but said 'unilateral' measures could 'reduce global trade, disrupt global supply chains and introduce uncertainty into international economic and trade activities'. Speaking after Trump's post, Mao Ning, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, said Brics was 'not a bloc for confrontation, nor does it target any country'. 'Tariffs should not be used as a tool for coercion and pressuring,' she said. 'Arbitrary tariff hikes serve no one's interest.' Beijing's approach is more carrot than stick. China presents itself, accurately or otherwise, as the friend of poorer countries and a defender of multilateral bodies such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. 'As a developing country and a member of the Global South, China breathes the same breath with other developing countries and pursues a shared future with them,' China's state news agency Xinhua recently quoted President Xi as saying. The incentives for developing countries to take China's side in the trade war include the $1 trillion-plus Belt and Road Initiative, which bankrolls global infrastructure projects, and more recently the Shanghai-headquartered New Development Bank, also known as 'the Brics Bank'. In Indonesia, which is scrambling to secure a trade deal with Trump, Beijing has also been in love-bomb mode. Last week, President Prabowo Subianto was on hand for the groundbreaking ceremony on a $6bn Chinese-Indonesian joint venture project to mine nickel and make batteries for electric vehicles. He called it 'colossal, an extraordinary breakthrough', which was no doubt music to Xi's ears. Beijing's response But the Chinese also seem ready to play hard-ball. With India potentially lining up to replace China as the main supplier of iPhones to America, reports surfaced in recent weeks that hundreds of mission-critical Chinese engineers and technicians at Taiwanese firm Foxconn's iPhone plants in India had been recalled to China. Bloomberg has reported that this is part of a broader move: Beijing has informally told companies and regulators to stop exporting key equipment, personnel and know-how to India and Southeast Asia – seemingly to stop multinationals such as Apple being able to shift operations out of China quickly. The Foxconn gambit was less blustery than a Trump tariff, but it shows that Xi is playing the game. And he has a huge head-start, says Chatham House's Lubin. China has been building almost unassailable positions in industries such as solar panels, electric vehicles, batteries and, most importantly, rare earths and magnets. This already shored up Beijing's hand in the trade talks with Trump, forcing him to back down from his most aggressive tariff threats. And it might help mitigate the impact of Trump's iron cage of trade deals. Lubin describes Xi's strategy as an 'asymmetric decoupling' from the US. 'The result of establishing China as a manufacturing powerhouse is to make the world more dependent on China,' he says. 'And that gives China leverage.' The question now is whether Xi's leverage – monopolies in key sectors, plus a shower of money for his Asian partners – is enough to combat Trump's ever-toughening tariff threats. That's the call Asian countries will now have to make.
Yahoo
07-07-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Why China Isn't a Bigger Player in the Middle East
The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here. China isn't ready to be the world's next superpower: That's one thing the exchange of fire between Israel and Iran in June made abundantly clear. The country that was perhaps Tehran's most important diplomatic and economic partner wound up playing virtually no role when Iran and Israel came to blows. This, despite the fact that Beijing has actively sought stronger relations with many countries in the Middle East—not just Iran but also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—and despite China's evident stake in promoting stability in a region that supplies more than half of its oil imports. So why didn't China step up? Beijing did make some effort to assert its influence. In mid-June, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point plan, calling for a cease-fire and negotiations to contend with Iran's nuclear program, and offering to play a 'constructive role' in restoring peace. But Xi's proposal went nowhere. He couldn't bring the belligerents to the table—especially not Israel. [Read: The Iran-China-Russia axis crumbles when it matters] The two countries have never been particularly close, and Beijing deeply offended the Israeli leadership by taking a pro-Hamas position after the group's October 7, 2023, terror attack on Israeli civilians. But amid Israel's recent military successes, Beijing has tried to soften its approach. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has opened a dialogue with his Israeli counterparts and in a phone call in October stated that China 'is ready to resume exchanges in all aspects as soon as possible,' according to an official summary of his comments. But Israel's leaders are likely to remain cautious, given China's relationship with Tehran. In the recent past, Beijing has helped the Iranians circumvent Washington-led sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Alongside Russia and India, China has welcomed Iran into two important forums: the BRICS group of emerging economies and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an association of countries connected to Central Asia. And China purchases nearly all of Iran's oil exports, providing vital resources to its moribund economy. Given these links, Chinese leaders might be expected to wield influence over Tehran. They've done so in the past: In 2015, China encouraged Iran's leadership to join the Obama administration's nuclear deal, and in 2023, it brokered a détente between Tehran and its regional rival, Saudi Arabia. But if China and Iran are too close for Israel's comfort, they are still not as close as they appear to be. Iran certainly has reason to question whether China is fully committed to the relationship. In 2021, China promised to invest $400 billion in Iran over 25 years as part of an enhanced strategic partnership, but progress toward that goal has been slow. Chinese cumulative direct investment in Iran reached only $3.9 billion at the end of 2023. And Chinese companies have been wary of doing business with Iran due to U.S. sanctions—a risk made clear when Meng Wanzhou, now deputy chair of the telecom giant Huawei, was detained in Canada in 2018 at Washington's request on sanctions-related charges. China also takes advantage of Iran's vulnerability by purchasing its oil at steep discounts. As a result, Tehran has tried to balance Chinese influence by maintaining strong ties to India, Beijing's chief rival within the developing world. The Iranians also undoubtedly know that China can't ultimately protect them from the United States and Israel. Trade with China cannot fully substitute for real relief from Western sanctions. Beijing isn't likely to pressure Washington into lifting them, either. And although China has been steadily upgrading its armed forces, it still can't project military power all the way to the Middle East. Beijing probably wouldn't want to do so anyway: It tends to eschew the sorts of close alliances and mutual-defense arrangements that Washington routinely forges with other governments. 'China is not trying to be the security provider in the Middle East, and honestly, no one has asked China to,' Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center who specializes in Chinese foreign policy, told me. [Read: Why isn't Russia defending Iran?] Beijing's response to the Israel-Iran conflict reflected all of these limitations. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has offered his Iranian counterpart little beyond diplomatic support. 'As a security partner, China is not there' for Iran, Mohammed Baharoon, the director general of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center, told me. 'If we are talking about a security situation, like the war, Russia has a closer relationship with Iran than China.' For many in the Middle East, China's standoffishness doesn't seem like the worst thing: Beijing isn't doing anything to escalate the Israel-Iran conflict, either. But then, China is also in no position to challenge or provide a counterweight to the United States in the region. The Gulf states have cultivated ever more trade and investment with China—but they still crave close diplomatic and economic relations with Washington above all. President Donald Trump's May visit, during which the Gulf royals lavishly feted him,'is proof that the U.S. is the most important partner for these countries,' Jonathan Fulton, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who monitors Chinese policy in the Middle East from Abu Dhabi, told me. Within the region, China is not seen as 'leading political, strategic, diplomatic, and economic issues. Right now, there is really only one country that does all of that, and that's the U.S.' The same is true on a global scale. Xi attempted to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, and to promote his own peace proposal, after Moscow's invasion in 2022. But his all-too-obvious favor for Russia undercut his credibility as a broker. Efforts to intervene in the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in 2023 fell flat due to Beijing's overt pro-Palestinian bias. Wang Yi repeatedly called for a cease-fire, but the U.S. engaged in the consistent diplomacy that eventually produced one. In both cases, Xi exploited the crises to further Chinese interests—deepening ties to a desperate and isolated Russian President Vladimir Putin, and scoring propaganda points in the global South by criticizing Washington's support for Israel. China's actions in these crises are indicative of its true role in global affairs. The so-called axis of authoritarianism—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—is not a tightly coordinated cabal. And China's economic heft is not translating into political and military power as quickly as it could be. Chinese leaders just haven't marshaled the diplomatic and military muscle—still less the political will—to usurp America's position as the world's premier power. To get there, Chinese leaders will need not just more resources and experience but also a new vision for their role in the world. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Russia Today
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Nearly half of Americans believe US won't be a superpower within a decade
A significant share of American adults believe the United States may face severe crises within the next decade and lose its status as a global superpower, according to a recent YouGov survey. Of the 1,111 adults polled online in mid-June, 21% said it is very likely the US will see its global position decline in the next 10 years. Another 24% said such a scenario is somewhat likely. In total, 45% of respondents said a complete economic collapse is at least somewhat plausible. Forty percent said they foresee a civil war, while the same proportion believed there would be a total breakdown of law and order. Nearly as many (38%) said they believe the US may no longer be a democracy in 10 years. Thirty-one percent said the country could become a fascist dictatorship, while 20% predicted a communist dictatorship. Only 43% of respondents said the current US political system is working at least somewhat well, though opinions varied sharply along partisan lines. Among Democrats, 26% said the system functions adequately, compared to 69% of Republicans and 36% of independents. While most Americans said they believe they live in a democracy regardless of political affiliation, a majority also believe the country is experiencing a constitutional crisis. That view was shared by 56% of respondents, including 82% of Democrats and 26% of Republicans. Forty-seven percent of Democrats said they are very scared about the direction of global affairs, compared to 10% of Republicans and 30% of independents. Compared to a decade ago, 67% of those polled said they see more political violence and misinformation in the US, with at least half believing those issues are more severe in the US than in other democracies.
