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First Post
5 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
Netanyahu is considering calling an election in Israel. But can he actually win?
To win another term, Benjamin Netanyahu would have to spin a narrative of victory on three fronts: securing the release of the hostages, defeating Hamas and delivering regional security. It is a tall order read more One of Israel's ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, Shas, has announced it will resign from prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government. The party said its decision was made due to the government's failure to pass a bill exempting ultra-Orthodox students from military service. Its exit increases the political pressure on Netanyahu. Days earlier, six members of another ultra-Orthodox coalition partner, the United Torah Judaism party, also quit the government citing the same concerns. The moves leave Netanyahu with a minority in parliament, which will make it difficult for his government to function. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Opposition leader Yair Lapid says the government now 'has no authority', and has called for a new round of elections. But even before these developments, Netanyahu was reportedly considering calling an early election in a bid to remain in power despite his unpopularity. Spinning the narrative To win another term he would, in my view, have to spin a narrative of victory on three fronts: securing the release of the hostages, defeating Hamas and delivering regional security. It is a tall order. In his visit to Washington in early July, Netanyahu emphasised his pursuit of a ceasefire in Gaza that facilitates the return of the remaining hostages held by Hamas. Israelis have grown increasingly weary of the war, with recent surveys showing popular support for ending it if this brings back those still held captive. A ceasefire that sees hostages released would probably help Netanyahu generate support during an election campaign. But Netanyahu has insisted that, while he wants to reach a hostage-ceasefire deal, he will not agree to one 'at any price'. This indicates not only Israel's refusal to compromise on security but also that any deal Netanyahu does make – whether or not it sees the release of all the hostages – will be presented as a victory to Israeli voters. To provide the electorate with further hope of an end to the fighting, Netanyahu will also have to claim that the military campaign in Gaza is nearing its goals. Senior military officials stated recently that they have 'almost fully achieved' their objectives – namely, defeating Hamas. Netanyahu has, so far, prolonged the war to remain in power. But he will now need to spin the military campaign as a victory if he wants to win votes. This will be especially hard as critics like Yitzhak Brik, a retired Israeli general, claim that the number of Hamas fighters is now back to its pre-war level. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD People take part in a protest demanding the end of the war and immediate release of hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government in Tel Aviv, Israel, Saturday, July 5, 2025. (AP Photo) The hard-right members of Netanyahu's government add another dimension to this equation. His two ultranationalist coalition partners, Jewish Power and Religious Zionism, oppose ending the war entirely. They insist on fighting Hamas to the finish. Netanyahu will most likely want to keep his options open during an election campaign to then form a coalition with whatever he can pull together at the time. He may calculate that a short-term pause in fighting to free hostages can be spun as a victory to win votes, after which military operations could resume to appease hardliners if he needs them. A final part of Netanyahu's electoral strategy will be to push the message that he has delivered regional security. He has declared the war with Iran in June a success, saying 'we sent Iran's nuclear program down the drain'. And Israel has also continued its campaign of strikes to assert its military dominance in the region, the latest in Syria and Lebanon. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD What about Palestinians? Observers warn that Netanyahu's approach is about political survival, and will come at the expense of long-term peace prospects for Israelis and Palestinians. According to New York Times, he seems to be 'kicking the Palestinian issue once again down the road'. Indeed, part of Netanyahu's mooted strategy for claiming victory in Gaza involves supporting a constrained political outcome for the Palestinians that ends the fighting without Israel conceding on core issues. Palestinians make their way with belongings as they flee their homes after the Israeli military issued orders for evacuation from eastern Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 19, 2025. Reuters In this scenario, the Gaza Strip would be carved up and demilitarised under prolonged Israeli security oversight. Some areas would be annexed by Israel. Remaining parts of Gaza, along with fragments of the West Bank, would be handed over to an interim authority to create the appearance of a nascent Palestinian state. The goal would be to declare that Israel has facilitated Palestinian statehood – but strictly on Israel's terms – while eliminating Hamas's rule in Gaza. The reality would probably be a designed chaos to force as many Palestinians as possible to leave. Such a state, lacking full sovereignty and territorial continuity, would fall far short of the independent state that Palestinians seek. Crucially, this imposed outcome would also bypass substantive negotiation of issues like borders, refugees and Jerusalem, which both Israel and Palestine claim as their capital. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Palestinian leaders would almost certainly reject a curtailed state. And if they did not then ordinary Palestinians – reeling from the war's devastation – are unlikely to view it as a just peace. A new cycle of violence would probably begin and the Palestinian population will have been heavily concentrated into restricted spaces that would be wide open to Israeli bombardment. As Netanyahu weighs pulling the election trigger, he is effectively writing the next chapter of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The outcome of this manoeuvring is highly uncertain. If his three-pronged victory narrative convinces Israeli voters, he could return to power with a fresh mandate and perhaps a retooled coalition. He might seek a broader unity government after an election, sidelining his most hardline partners in favour of centrist voices to navigate post-war diplomacy. But if the public deems his victories hollow or indeed false, an election could sweep him out of office. This would open the door for opposition leaders who may take a different approach to Gaza and the Palestinians. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Brian Brivati, Visiting Professor of Contemporary History and Human Rights, Kingston University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
6 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
The Wheels Are Falling Off Netanyahu's Government
The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here. Outside of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu appears ascendant. After the Israeli leader inflicted heavy losses on Iran last month, The New York Times dubbed the apparent victory his 'political resurrection' and 'the culmination of a hard-fought comeback from the lowest point in his long political career.' Inside Israel, however, the reality could not be more different. As has been the case for more than two years, polls continue to show that Netanyahu's coalition would lose the next election, were it to be held today. And this week, his government lost two of its parties, effectively leaving it with control of just 50 of the Israeli Parliament's 120 seats. The result: Netanyahu now sits atop a de facto minority government that is no longer able to legislate, and Israel is careening toward new elections, most likely in early 2026. The reason for this unraveling is twofold. To maintain his grip on power, despite his personal unpopularity and ongoing corruption trial, Netanyahu has relied upon two constituencies: the ultra-Orthodox religious parties (which hold 18 seats) and the far-right ultranationalist parties (which hold 14 seats). Both of these groups support policies at odds with the views of the Israeli majority, and both are now at odds with Netanyahu. For more than a decade, the ultra-Orthodox have backed Netanyahu even as many Israelis have turned on him. In exchange, the prime minister has provided generous state subsidies to ultra-Orthodox institutions and protected the community from Israel's military draft: Whereas most Jewish Israelis serve in the Israel Defense Forces, most young ultra-Orthodox men are instead paid by the government to study religious texts. This arrangement has been profoundly unpopular even among Netanyahu's voters but was tolerated during peacetime as a necessary concession for continued right-wing governance. [Read: The earthquake that could shatter Netanyahu's coalition] Since October 7, that tolerance has collapsed. Faced with an open-ended, multifront war, Israel is in desperate need of more manpower and can no longer countenance exempting the ultra-Orthodox—the country's fastest-growing demographic—from military service. Many Israelis, including those on the right, have become incensed by what they perceive as a lack of social solidarity from the ultra-Orthodox community, whose members have largely continued to go about their daily lives even as their neighbors have been forced to leave their families and businesses to fight Israel's wars. The Israeli supreme court has also ruled that the ultra-Orthodox carve-out violates the principle of equality under the law, tasking the legislature with instituting a fairer regime. This popular outcry, coupled with Netanyahu's political dependence on the ultra-Orthodox, has put the prime minister in a vise: He can either continue exempting the ultra-Orthodox and anger not just the public and the courts but also his own party, or revoke that exemption and lose the ultra-Orthodox—and with them, his coalition. Of late, Netanyahu has attempted to fudge the issue by pushing through legislation that would create a technical process for drafting the ultra-Orthodox but in practice make the new requirements easy to evade. This effort has met resistance in his party, however, and the bill has not passed—leading to the departure of the ultra-Orthodox parties from the government this week. For now, those parties have said that they won't vote to force new elections, giving Netanyahu time to try to appease them. But unless he can figure out a way to pass a bill that somehow satisfies the ultra-Orthodox and their critics, it's merely a matter of time before his erstwhile allies completely switch sides. And that's not Netanyahu's only problem. He is also facing threats of secession from his far-right partners, who are fundamentally opposed to ending the war in Gaza, because they seek to ethnically cleanse the enclave and populate it with Jewish settlements. Most Israelis oppose this far-right fever dream and support a deal that would end the war in exchange for the release of hostages. But as with military exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox, Netanyahu here is beholden to a radical minority whose votes keep him in power. At the same time, the Israeli leader is under growing pressure from President Donald Trump to end the Gaza war, once again putting him in an impossible position. If Netanyahu doesn't strike a deal, he risks alienating the U.S. president; if he does, he is likely to lose one or both of the far-right parties in his government. [Read: The Israeli government goes extreme right] Given these proliferating threats to his position, Netanyahu has been doing what he does best: playing for time. The summer recess for Israel's Parliament begins on July 27 and extends through the Jewish holidays, until late October. During that time, the Parliament cannot vote to dissolve itself, and so it would be hard for lawmakers to compel new elections. Netanyahu could reach a cease-fire in Gaza, for example, and the far-right would not be able to immediately bring down the coalition. The prime minister just has to run out the clock until the end of the month, and then he will have space either to get all of his partners back on his side—an unlikely prospect—or to make moves that upset his coalition but put him in a better position for the election that would be called upon the Parliament's return. Whenever that contest does happen—most likely around January—Netanyahu will face arguably the steepest political challenge of his career. Last election, his coalition received just 48.4 percent of the vote, attaining a parliamentary majority only because of a technicality in Israel's electoral system. That coalition has been losing in the polls since April 2023, and no amount of success against Hezbollah or Tehran has altered the trajectory. Thanks to his campaign in Iran, Netanyahu may be in his strongest position since the catastrophe of October 7. But after alienating so many of his allies and the majority of the Israeli people, that still might not be enough. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
6 days ago
- Politics
- Atlantic
The Wheels are Falling Off Netanyahu's Government
Outside of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu appears ascendant. After the Israeli leader inflicted heavy losses on Iran last month, The New York Times dubbed the apparent victory his 'political resurrection' and 'the culmination of a hard-fought comeback from the lowest point in his long political career.' Inside Israel, however, the reality could not be more different. As has been the case for more than two years, polls continue to show that Netanyahu's coalition would lose the next election, were it to be held today. And this week, his government lost two of its parties, effectively leaving it with control of just 50 of the Israeli Parliament's 120 seats. The result: Netanyahu now sits atop a de facto minority government that is no longer able to legislate, and Israel is careening toward new elections, most likely in early 2026. The reason for this unraveling is twofold. To maintain his grip on power, despite his personal unpopularity and ongoing corruption trial, Netanyahu has relied upon two constituencies: the ultra-Orthodox religious parties (which hold 18 seats) and the far-right ultranationalist parties (which hold 14 seats). Both of these groups support policies at odds with the views of the Israeli majority, and both are now at odds with Netanyahu. For more than a decade, the ultra-Orthodox have backed Netanyahu even as many Israelis have turned on him. In exchange, the prime minister has provided generous state subsidies to ultra-Orthodox institutions and protected the community from Israel's military draft: Whereas most Jewish Israelis serve in the Israel Defense Forces, most young ultra-Orthodox men are instead paid by the government to study religious texts. This arrangement has been profoundly unpopular even among Netanyahu's voters but was tolerated during peacetime as a necessary concession for continued right-wing governance. Since October 7, that tolerance has collapsed. Faced with an open-ended, multifront war, Israel is in desperate need of more manpower and can no longer countenance exempting the ultra-Orthodox—the country's fastest-growing demographic—from military service. Many Israelis, including those on the right, have become incensed by what they perceive as a lack of social solidarity from the ultra-Orthodox community, whose members have largely continued to go about their daily lives even as their neighbors have been forced to leave their families and businesses to fight Israel's wars. The Israeli supreme court has also ruled that the ultra-Orthodox carve-out violates the principle of equality under the law, tasking the legislature with instituting a fairer regime. This popular outcry, coupled with Netanyahu's political dependence on the ultra-Orthodox, has put the prime minister in a vise: He can either continue exempting the ultra-Orthodox and anger not just the public and the courts but also his own party, or revoke that exemption and lose the ultra-Orthodox—and with them, his coalition. Of late, Netanyahu has attempted to fudge the issue by pushing through legislation that would create a technical process for drafting the ultra-Orthodox but in practice make the new requirements easy to evade. This effort has met resistance in his party, however, and the bill has not passed—leading to the departure of the ultra-Orthodox parties from the government this week. For now, those parties have said that they won't vote to force new elections, giving Netanyahu time to try to appease them. But unless he can figure out a way to pass a bill that somehow satisfies the ultra-Orthodox and their critics, it's merely a matter of time before his erstwhile allies completely switch sides. And that's not Netanyahu's only problem. He is also facing threats of secession from his far-right partners, who are fundamentally opposed to ending the war in Gaza, because they seek to ethnically cleanse the enclave and populate it with Jewish settlements. Most Israelis oppose this far-right fever dream and support a deal that would end the war in exchange for the release of hostages. But as with military exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox, Netanyahu here is beholden to a radical minority whose votes keep him in power. At the same time, the Israeli leader is under growing pressure from President Donald Trump to end the Gaza war, once again putting him in an impossible position. If Netanyahu doesn't strike a deal, he risks alienating the U.S. president; if he does, he is likely to lose one or both of the far-right parties in his government. Given these proliferating threats to his position, Netanyahu has been doing what he does best: playing for time. The summer recess for Israel's Parliament begins on July 27 and extends through the Jewish holidays, until late October. During that time, the Parliament cannot vote to dissolve itself, and so it would be hard for lawmakers to compel new elections. Netanyahu could reach a cease-fire in Gaza, for example, and the far-right would not be able to immediately bring down the coalition. The prime minister just has to run out the clock until the end of the month, and then he will have space either to get all of his partners back on his side—an unlikely prospect—or to make moves that upset his coalition but put him in a better position for the election that would be called upon the Parliament's return. Whenever that contest does happen—most likely around January—Netanyahu will face arguably the steepest political challenge of his career. Last election, his coalition received just 48.4 percent of the vote, attaining a parliamentary majority only because of a technicality in Israel's electoral system. That coalition has been losing in the polls since April 2023, and no amount of success against Hezbollah or Tehran has altered the trajectory. Thanks to his campaign in Iran, Netanyahu may be in his strongest position since the catastrophe of October 7. But after alienating so many of his allies and the majority of the Israeli people, that still might not be enough.
Middle East Eye
6 days ago
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
Removing Netanyahu would not end the genocidal logic of Zionism
A recent extended feature in the New York Times presents readers with a long-form analysis of the genocide in Gaza. The central claim made by the authors is that the continuation of the war serves Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal interest in clinging to power. This is particularly relevant given his ongoing corruption trial, and the severe blow to his political standing after the 7 October military failure. According to the Times article, this convergence of events has pushed Netanyahu to prolong the war as a means of survival. But this framing, popular among liberal Zionist circles, dangerously reduces the catastrophe in Gaza to the ambitions of a single man. It ignores the broad public support in Israel not only for the genocide in Gaza but for attacks throughout the region. Israel's military actions - especially in the context of the sectarian violence in Syria - can only be understood as those of an imperial power seeking to impose its will on the region through force, intimidation, and the threat of territorial expansion. It conveniently ignores a deeper question: why, after nearly two years of horrifying footage from Gaza, does the Israeli public continue to support the war - and in fact, demand its escalation? New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters At the heart of Israeli public discourse today lies not the morality of the war, but the question of who should bear the burden of fighting it. The main debate is over drafting ultra-Orthodox Jews, who have so far been exempt from military service and want that to be enshrined in law. The secular and national-religious public demands 'equality in sacrifice', assuming that the war must go on - only more fairly. When the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox party United Torah Judaism recently announced its departure from the government over the conscription issue, it was not a protest against the war itself, but rather a dispute over who should serve in it. Global backlash This framing comes at a moment of growing international backlash. The global boycott movement has penetrated academia, with the International Sociological Association recently calling to sever ties with the Israeli Sociological Society over its failure to condemn the Gaza genocide. Cultural boycotts, while less visible, are also on the rise. Politically, US support for Israel - once bipartisan - is now openly debated in both parties. Discussions range from ethical questions over the Gaza genocide to concerns about the disproportionate influence Israel holds in American politics. Follow Middle East Eye's live coverage of the Israel-Palestine war At the same time, ordinary Israelis travelling abroad are encountering global criticism for the first time in their lives. Yet instead of prompting reflection, this scrutiny has driven many deeper into denial. For much of the Israeli public, the problem is not what is happening in Gaza - it's the world's antisemitism, both western and eastern. In their eyes, the world has turned against them, and thus no soul-searching is needed. The catastrophe unfolding in Gaza is enabled by broad public consensus, a judiciary that legitimises it, and a political culture that has long dehumanised Palestinians Netanyahu, who lived a significant portion of his youth in the US, understands American politics well. When he says the Gaza war has not 'achieved its objectives', he is not referring to conditions on the ground, but rather to his standing in the polls. The recent strikes on Iran, despite failing to produce any strategic outcome, modestly improved his approval ratings. Worse still, both Netanyahu's allies and his so-called opposition have successfully encouraged and normalised genocidal rhetoric, to the point that it has become mainstream. According to recent polls, 82 percent of Jewish Israelis support the transfer (expulsion) of Gaza's population. Lacking any ability to convince countries to accept these refugees, what is emerging is a de facto concentration camp in Gaza. In this context, discussions about a ceasefire are structurally hollow. Israel has shown - to Hamas and others - that it does not honour agreements: not in Gaza, not in Lebanon, not in Syria. Israeli diplomacy is fundamentally built on military power and the unilateral ability to break promises. Ruthless strategies Even as the Israeli public grows increasingly impatient with the Gaza war, demanding the release of hostages and watching with concern the mounting death toll among Israeli soldiers, it is disturbing to see no-one questioning the state's ruthless strategies, which aim to confine millions of Palestinians into an area comprising less than a quarter of Gaza. There is open discussion of reviving Giora Eiland's 'General's Plan', which explicitly recommends starvation as a tool of forced displacement. But the catastrophe unfolding in Gaza is not the work of one man. It is enabled by broad public consensus, a judiciary that legitimises it, and a political culture that has long relied on the dehumanisation of Palestinians. In the occupied West Bank, the same logic plays out: Israeli soldiers, police and judges either ignore or actively assist settlers in carrying out pogroms against Palestinians. Israel's genocide in Gaza is a war on demographics Read More » The current crisis marks a desperate attempt - by some - to 'save Israel from itself' by offering Israelis a ladder to climb down from the tree. The hope is that Israel may return to its pre-Netanyahu posture: endless negotiations, rhetorical peace processes, and a fantasy of a Palestinian state that was never meant to materialise. This illusion served the world well, allowing western nations to defend Israel's actions while pretending a two-state solution was still viable. But demography and ideology have shifted. Israel cannot go back. The scale of destruction in Gaza has reopened the core of the Palestinian question: what happens when there are no refugee camps left, no territories to push people into, and no countries willing to absorb them? The conversation then turns - unavoidably - to the right of return for Palestinians expelled in 1948. Blaming Netanyahu in isolation is intellectually dishonest. He is not an aberration, but a product of Zionist logic - a logic that has always viewed Palestinians as inferior. Without addressing this foundational belief system, replacing Netanyahu will change nothing. We may get a leader who is less aggressive, more polished - but the structural violence will persist, merely in a softer form. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Sydney Morning Herald
7 days ago
- Sydney Morning Herald
Police claim progress but no closer to finding synagogue arson kingpin
Counter-terrorism detectives have sought to reassure the Jewish community they are closing in on those responsible for the arson attack that gutted Melbourne's Adass Israel synagogue, despite police privately admitting the investigation has stalled. Victoria Police acting Deputy Commissioner Chris Gilbert and federal police detectives attached to the joint counter-terrorism team investigating December's firebombing met Adass Israel members on Wednesday and briefed them on what they claimed was a breakthrough in the case. The briefing took place on the same day police arrested a 20-year-old Williamstown man and charged him with stealing a car used by the arsonists on the night of the synagogue fire. The briefing was held hours before this masthead revealed the taskforce's attempts to unmask the mastermind of the attack had 'hit a wall'. Police will allege the man was seen driving a stolen Volkswagen a few weeks before the same car was used in a series of arson attacks and other crime culminating in the torching of the ultra-Orthodox synagogue in Ripponlea on December 6. The man, who was also charged with failing to provide police access to his phone, was not asked to enter a plea and was bailed to appear in court in three months. A police source familiar with the taskforce investigation but not authorised to speak publicly about it said detectives had connected the car to the Adass Israel attack shortly after the firebombing but a decision was taken to track the vehicle in the hope of identifying the person or group ultimately responsible. Adass Israel board member Benjamin Klein said police flagged the arrest at Wednesday's briefing and told attendees it was 'a very important piece of the puzzle'. 'From our conversations, they seem confident that things are progressing well and all hands are on deck,' Klein said. 'They are hoping this arrest will lead to the next step, which is understanding who is behind it.'
