Latest from AllAfrica
AllAfrica
an hour ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
The 12-day war with Iran: too short?
Donald Trump is the president and I'm not. He deserves credit for the successful strikes on some of Iran's nuclear sites – carried out flawlessly by US forces after Israel had peeled apart Iran's vaunted air defenses to allow free run of Iranian skies. But, if the president asks me, I'll tell him he perhaps stopped a little too soon. Yes, Iran took a hammering by any measure. But wait a while. The Iranian regime just might claim it absorbed all the blows Israel and the Americans could deliver – and was not defeated. After all, it's still in power – and it still has the secret police and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to keep itself in power. The attacks sorely embarrassed Iran's rulers. How else to describe killing Iran's top military leaders and nuclear experts and hitting targets at will – capped off by the B2 attacks on the nuclear sites? It embarrassed, but maybe didn't humiliate – or at least not enough, and especially in the eyes of the Iranian citizenry. Attacks, for example, might have targeted every IRGC facility and key node of regime coercive power –secret police, paramilitaries and intelligence services – and thuse demonstrated impotency enough to make people less afraid of the regime. The White House's ceasefire announcement of a '12-day war' that achieved its limited objective of destroying Iran's nuclear infrastructure brought to mind President George H.W. Bush's halting of the Gulf War too soon in 1991. It was declared a tidy '100-hour' ground war. But it allowed Saddam Hussein to retain power and keep most of his military – which he promptly used to slaughter the Marsh Arabs and Kurds who had revolted with US encouragement, Chagrined, Team Bush fell back on the excuse it was only authorized by UN Resolution to expel Iraq from Kuwait and continuing operations would have caused troubles with coalition partners and regional nations. But had President Bush continued the war for even another week, America might have avoided everything that's happened since – to include Al Qaeda, 9/11, the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War. That would have been a small price to pay. American leaders sometimes just can't finish the deal, it seems. Recall letting Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora after bringing down the Taliban in record time. Such a defeat would have been enough of a thrashing for us to change our behavior…but maybe not enough for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to change theirs. President George W. Bush was also too quick to declare victory in Iraq in 2003 – and hurrying to withdraw US forces. Remember 'Mission Accomplished'? But can't the US just return and hit Iran if the need arises and it doesn't agree to a deal? That's easier said than done. An administration only has so much political bandwidth. And opposition to restarting a fight that was supposedly finished can be immense. There's never as good a time as the first time to get things done right militarily. Admittedly, America, Israel and even regional friends are better off than they were – with Iranian proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis either reeling, cowed or quiescent. But one fairly asks: Don't the Iranians know they're defeated? By our standards, they should. By theirs, perhaps not. They might just call it a set-back. Make some apparent concessions, suggest there might be more and string talks along while reconstituting power and eliminating any nascent opposition. And wait for the Americans to lose interest and move onto the next 'hot' thing. Talks with Iran now seem in the cards. It's hard to imagine negotiations transforming the Iranian regime into nicer people. Maybe President Trump makes an offer, and if it's refused, he applies 'maximum pressure'—as in Trump's first term and collapses the economy—to include real sanctions that are enforced. Also, maybe Washington relearns political warfare and convinces Iranian citizens that the corrupt regime prevents Iran being treated like a normal country. Given China's longstanding support for Iran—to include buying 90% of Iran's exported oil that makes up 20% of Iran's GDP—Washington will need to give Beijing a choice, 'do business with Iran, or do business with the US.' But not both. Will this be enough to change the nature of Iran's regime? Maybe not. It's still the same people who tortured CIA station chief Bill Buckley for over a year before killing him in 1985 and who then sent films of it back to Langley. This regime isn't going to change its stripes willingly. It's still the same people who tortured CIA station chief Bill Buckley for over a year before killing him in 1985, and then sent films of it back to Langley. This regime isn't going to change its stripes willingly. And, as noted earlier, re-attacking Iran is politically problematic. Not impossible, but a lot harder than it was two weeks ago. Sometimes fighting a short war a little longer and harder is the best way to prevent a bigger war. Stopping short in1991 brought another 30+ years of conflict. Nearly 45 years of bending over backwards to placate Iran, trying anything but force got America nowhere. It did cost many lives. When it comes to ending fights in the Middle East, US officialdom ought to watch the old 1972 television commercial that cautions against penny-wise, pound-foolish behavior with the warning: 'You can pay me now or you can pay me (a lot more) later.' That's a tough lesson for Washington to re-learn (though maybe it never learned it in the first place). Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He was the first Marine liaison officer to the Japan Self Defense Force, and is a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning to America. This article was first published by The Sunday Guardian and is republished with permission.
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Give the A-10s to Taiwan and they can stop a Chinese sea invasion
The US Air Force proposes to 'divest' itself of 162 A-10 Warthog aircraft by 2026 and send them to the boneyard at Davis Monthan Airbase in Tucson, Arizona. There the A-10s would rot away in the sun. If the US Air Force does not want them anymore, they would be gone by the end of 2026 or sooner. Sending them to the scrap heap would be a massive mistake. Better to send them to Taiwan where they could make a major contribution to defending the island. Taiwan faces the risk of a massive invasion from China, something the Chinese army, navy and air force have been practicing for years. The US knows the risk of a Chinese invasion, and Washington has accelerated its efforts to pivot to the Pacific. Planners know that any attack on Taiwan could end US influence in the region and deprive the US of vital assets, including specialized semiconductors needed for the Artificial Intelligence revolution. Companies such as Nvidia, which calls itself the world leader in artificial intelligence computing, relies on Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) to manufacture their advanced chips. A scene at TSMC. No matter how you look at it, Taiwan will have to shoulder the burden of an initial attack by China. The first few days will be critical. Swarms of Chinese invasion craft, supported by missiles and drones, will push Taiwan's modest defense resources to the breaking point. Taiwan's air force consists of modernized, but quite old, F-16s and home-grown short-legged F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighter jets. A near-fourth generation jet, the F-CK-1 is underpowered and has limited range and endurance. Taiwan's existing aircraft are unlikely to be able to stop an incoming invasion fleet, or support Taiwanese air defenses by knocking out swarms of drones. F-CK-1A model. The A-10, however, can do both jobs, and it is more sturdy and survivable than any Taiwan air force jet in the inventory. The A-10 also has superior firepower and is equipped with new weapons ideally suited to sinking an invasion fleet or blasting away at drones. An A-10 peels away from a KC-135 tanker over Afghanistan, February 2011 with Pave Penny pod visible and featuring a false canopy painted in dark gray on the underside. The A-10 is a creature of the 1970s. Originally built by the now defunct Fairchild-Republic company between 1972 to 1984 in Farmingdale, New York, the A-10 was conceived as a ground attack plane to knock out Soviet tanks and other armor on the battlefield. Its creators thought of the A-10 playing a big role in stopping a Soviet invasion of then-West Germany through the Fulda Gap, an ideal funnel where Soviet armor could be picked off. That mission faded away just as the USSR dematerialized. But over the years, and especially in the last half decade, the remaining A-10s have been significantly modified and equipped to carry new weapons that were not yet dreamed about in the 1970s. Equipped with new, sturdy wings, new electronics and fire control, laser designators, and 'smart' rocket pods, the A-10's upgrades complement the huge firepower of its GAU-8 Avenger 30mm hydraulically driven seven-barrel Gatling-style autocannon. The autocannon fires PGU-14/B armor-piercing incendiary rounds featuring a depleted uranium penetrator that can easily tear up any landing ship or other seagoing vessel. The new star of the show is the A-10's ability to fire the new/old 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II. The APKWS is an old Hydra unguided rocket that is upgraded with a guidance kit that is operated with a laser designator to hit a target. APKWS recently were diverted to the Middle East from Ukraine because they proved valuable in shooting down Houthi drones. The APKWS II system is highly effective but cheap compared with using air-to-air missiles to knock out drones. The cost of a Sidewinder AIM-9X missile is around $600,000; typically two are fired at a target to nail it. The all up cost of the APKWS including the unguided Hydra unguided rocket (which are about $3,000 each) is less than $25,000. Because it is a man-in-the-loop guidance package – unlike the Sidewinder, which uses an infrared seeker – the chance for a successful hit is better. Sidewinder has far better range, but most of the time small drones are not picked up by radar or E/O sensors until they are much nearer. The range of the APKWS is around two miles. Most drones cannot fight back, so knocking them out of the sky is a turkey shoot. If Taiwan had the full fleet of A-10s it could focus its air defenses against Chinese missiles and let the A-10s operate against drones. If Taiwan had the full fleet of A-10s it could focus its air defenses against Chinese missiles and let the A-10s operate against drones. Compared with modern jet fighters the cost of operating the A-10 is far lower, coming in at $6,000 to $9,000 per hour compared versus the F-16's $30,000 per hour. A-10 aircraft are made to be robust, including titanium armor to protect the cockpit and self-sealing fuel tanks if the plane is hit by ground fire. The upgraded A-10s also has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) which means it can see targets even in bad weather. This means that if the PLA Navy tries to launch an invasion in heavy overcast conditions, thinking it can preclude Taiwan's use of airpower, the SAR upgrade takes that strategy off the table because SAR can see through clouds, mist and bad weather. In the past Taiwan has always wanted the newest and the greatest, not old stuff that the US has often dumped on the island. That view is understandable, but the A-10 must be viewed as a formidable exception. The A-10 would hand to Taiwan a capability it sorely lacks, and one that China will fear. With F-16s challenging China's air arm, the A-10 can sink an invasion fleet and do so quickly. In the past the US has refused to export the A-10, a strange posture considering that the Air Force has a low opinion of the fighter. But the potential struggle over Taiwan is looming. Taiwanese air crews could quickly be trained here by the existing operators, and support and maintenance assets rapidly transferred to the island. Any new equipment, if we had any, will take years to materialize and probably can't duplicate the flexibility and utility of the A-10. So, if the Air Force does not want the A-10, the A-10 can still contribute to Taiwan's defense and to security in the Pacific region. Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
AllAfrica
6 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
What the Iran bombing shows about American power and its limits
Last week was a good week for American power and for Donald Trump. The attack he ordered on Iran, against most expectations, was a successful demonstration of that power especially as it intimidated Iran sufficiently to discourage immediate retaliation. The agreement by NATO to set a 5% target for defense spending in proportion to GDP counts as another political success for Trump, especially as NATO's Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, gave that success a ridiculous embellishment by describing him as 'Daddy. Celebratory hamburgers and Cokes would have been called for over the weekend at Mar-a-Lago. The success of Trump's bombing of Iran is not measured in terms of whether US 'bunker-busting' bombs have destroyed Iran's nuclear-weapons program. Trump says that they have, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khameini says they haven't – and we can be sure that both are lying. Almost certainly, based on satellite photos and reports from US and Israeli intelligence, the three big nuclear facilities the bombs struck have been crippled in the sense that it will take time and a great deal of money to rebuild and reopen them. Yet Israeli intelligence also believes that Iran still possesses an unknown quantity of enriched uranium and an unknown number of secret facilities. Whatever Trump and the US Department of Defense may say, the Israelis know that if Iran wished to resume its nuclear program, it could do so, albeit at great expense. The real question is not whether the nuclear program has been destroyed. The real questions concern whether Iran's political will to develop nuclear weapons has been destroyed by America's willingness to fight alongside Israel; and whether Israel's own political leadership is now prepared to wait and try to gauge Iranian intentions or whether instead it might seek to renew its own attacks in response to any indication, however minor, that the nuclear or missile programmes are being resumed. Certainly, Trump now has leverage over Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, since the American bombing did Netanyahu a big favor. However, the leverage works both ways: By persuading Trump that the bombing was worth the risk Netanyahu gave Trump a big political win, and in the aftermath of the (so far) 12-day war it is Israeli intelligence which will play a crucial role in reporting on Iran's behavior and intentions. So, for the time being, Trump and Netanyahu are in a relationship of mutual dependency. Trump might hope to be able to press Netanyahu to bring an end to his attacks on Gaza and to find a way to bring Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf Arab countries together again to find a long-term solution to that conflict. But if Netanyahu decides that a ceasefire in Gaza is not in his interests, he has tools in his hands with which he can resist American pressure. It is an old story: US military power is extraordinary, but America's ability to shape sustainable diplomatic and political outcomes in the aftermath even of successful military action has been shown many times to be limited. If this brief but effective bombing of Iran were to bring a sustainable and positive political outcome, it would be an extraordinary exception to the long-term rule. Much depends on what now happens inside Iran. The killings by Israel of a large swath of Iran's military and scientific leadership means that a new generation has suddenly been promoted. Wartime conditions have led to a tightening of control over the country by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the most ideological part of the armed forces. Executions of suspected Israeli spies are under way. The 86-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei remains in theoretical charge, but in reality a new generation of militants is now in day-to-day control. They will certainly have been intimidated by the American attack and will not feel strong enough to wish to provoke further attacks. Some form of negotiation will likely get going with the Americans about the nuclear program, though it is also possible that the new militant leaders may simply try to keep their heads low for a while, to give them time to consolidate their power. One big thing that has happened as a result of Trump's bombing decision is that the idea that the US president is averse to risk and simply likes doing deals has been shown to be incomplete. He does like deals and doesn't like risk, but plainly is willing to use military action when he sees an opportunity or a necessity. It is unlikely that China ever felt confident that Trump would not intervene if they were to attempt to invade or blockade Taiwan, but certainly they now know to take the threat of US military intervention during the Trump presidency seriously. An optimistic view would be that Trump's success in Iran might now encourage him to make a bold intervention on the side of Ukraine and against Vladimir Putin's Russia. This is evidently what European members of NATO are hoping for, and it is what Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was pushing for when he spoke with Trump at the NATO summit on June 25, and again asked to be allowed to buy more US missile defense systems and other weapons. Yet just as American power to shape political outcomes has been shown in the long term to be limited, during the seven months so far of Trump's presidency we have seen that his attention span and commitment to specific causes are also limited. However often Europeans debase themselves by calling him 'Daddy,' it will not change the reality that European countries cannot rely on America and that they need to protect themselves. The importance of NATO's new 5% spending target is not the target itself, which is largely meaningless: Even America currently spends only 3.5% of GDP and is unlikely to achieve 5% given the size of its fiscal deficit and public debt. The importance lies in the fact that a wide range of European governments, led by Germany, France and the UK, have committed themselves to build their defenses up to a level at which they no longer need to depend on America. Under Trump, America will often be hostile, especially over trade, and so will need to be resisted by a confident and resolute Europe. However much success American power might have found last week, the US cannot be relied upon – and its long-term influence is, anyway, limited. Europe is not on its own, but it needs to be self-reliant. Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute. A version of this article has been published in Italian by La Stampa and can be found in English on the substack Bill Emmott's Global View. It is republished here with kind permission.
AllAfrica
8 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
US loath to drop 'economic bunker buster' on China, India, Russia
US Senator Lindsey Graham recently said that his bill to impose 500% tariffs on every country that imports Russian resources is 'an economic bunker buster against China, India, and Russia' – yet, for all his tough talk, the US is still reluctant to drop it. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump Administration is 'quietly pressuring' the Senate to water down the legislation by turning 'the word 'shall' into 'may' wherever it appears in the bill's text, removing the mandatory nature of the prescribed reprimands.' The Journal's report was lent credence when Graham himself proposed an exemption for countries that aid Ukraine, thus averting an unprecedented US-EU trade war in the event that his bill passes into law. Trump's remark to Politico in mid-June about how 'sanctions cost us a lot of money' suggest that he's not interested in going this route, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio later adding that sanctions could derail the Ukrainian peace process, although he also didn't rule them out in the future. These are sensible explanations for the United States' reluctance to drop its 'economic bunker buster' on Russia but they don't account for its reluctance to drop it on China and India, which have served as invaluable valves for Russia from the West's sanctions pressure due to their large-scale import of its oil. Graham expects that they'll cut off their purchases if the US threatens them with 500% tariffs but they're unlikely to comply since they know that the US would also harm its own economy through such means. Not only that, but the trade deal that US and China recently agreed to would be jeopardized, as would the ongoing talks with India over a similar such agreement. Trump is pleased with both and doesn't want to rock the boat right now. While he might revert back to his previous tariff pressure if things don't go his way, he could just unilaterally impose more tariffs against either in that scenario, and they probably wouldn't be anywhere near the counterproductive level that Graham's legislation demands. Seeing as how the US is once again trying to 'subordinate India,' which is part of his administration's efforts to reshape South Asian geopolitics, he's more prone to imposing higher tariffs against it instead of China but it's premature to predict that he ultimately will. In any case, the pretext probably wouldn't be energy-related given that he has surprisingly posted that 'China can continue to purchase Oil from Iran' in spite of early February's Executive Order that explicitly aims to 'drive Iran's export of oil to zero.' It would therefore be utterly bizarre for Trump to impose tariffs of any level on India or whoever else for purchasing Russian resources when he now no longer cares about the United States' systemic rival China purchasing oil from none other than Iran, which he just bombed, in defiance of his own decree. The aforementioned calculations make it very unlikely that Trump will drop Graham's 'bunker buster' on either of those two. If his bill should become law, it's likely that a loophole would be found to avoid complying with it. This prediction brings the analysis back around to the future of Graham's 'economic bunker buster.' Quite clearly, the Trump Administration doesn't want him to move it through Congress. He may respect the administration's wishes, thus leading to his bill becoming nothing but bluster. This is especially likely if his team signals that it's already found a loophole to get around it unless he changes the language as reportedly requested. China, India, and Russia, therefore, almost certainly have nothing to worry about.
AllAfrica
8 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
US builds next-generation bunker buster with China in mind
After blasting Iran's nuke bunkers with 13-ton bombs, the US is racing to build a smarter, sleeker penetrator for the next war, possibly with China. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that in the wake of the US Air Force's first combat use of the 13,000-kilogram GBU-57/B massive ordnance penetrator during the June strikes on Iran's Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer, the US Department of Defense has accelerated efforts to develop a successor: the next generation penetrator (NGP). The strikes, which involved 14 MOPs delivered exclusively by B-2 bombers, underscored both the weapon's precision and its operational limitations, particularly in light of the B-21 Raider's reduced payload capacity. A February 2024 US Air Force contracting notice outlines NGP requirements, including sub-9,900-kilogram warheads capable of precision strikes with a circular error probable of within 2.2 meters. Notably, the NGP may feature standoff capability via propulsion systems, improved void-sensing or embedded fuzing technologies, and enhanced or scalable terminal effects. The push for a successor, spurred by lessons from past MOP development and growing global interest in deeply buried facilities, targets adversaries beyond Iran, including North Korea, China, and Russia. The US Air Force aims to receive initial prototypes within two years of contract award, though a complete operational deployment timeline remains unspecified, according to the same February 2024 USAF notice. The future NGP is likely to form part of the Long Range Strike system, alongside platforms like the B-21 and the AGM-181A Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, making it a critical asset for penetrating hardened targets. This need to address hardened targets more effectively, highlighted by possible limitations in the Iran strikes, may have prompted the US to fast-track NGP development, especially with peer adversaries like China in mind. Multiple media outlets cited a leaked US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stating that US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities failed to destroy the core of the program and merely set it back by months. Du Wenlong noted in the South China Morning Post that Iran's Fordow site lies 80 meters underground, 30 meters deeper than the GBU-57's stated penetration capability, raising doubts as to whether the strike hit critical infrastructure. Song Zhongping said in the same article that although the US dropped 14 bombs, satellite imagery showed six craters, suggesting two bombs may have been aimed at each target, possibly to reinforce penetration. He added that while some infrastructure may have been damaged, complete elimination is implausible. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth downplayed the DIA report's findings, calling them 'preliminary,' and noting that the report itself states battle damage assessment takes weeks to complete. Hegseth said the report was not coordinated with the intelligence community and suffers from low confidence due to information gaps. These Iranian lessons could foreshadow far more complex strike dilemmas in a potential conflict with China. In a November 2024 RAND report, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others at RAND noted that if initial US strikes on China's maritime and surface assets fail, the US may need to launch long-range conventional attacks against China's buried inland facilities. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others wrote that command-and-control nodes and missile storage sites are essential to sustaining People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations. Satellite imagery cited by Newsweek in May 2025 shows a 1,500-acre site dubbed 'Beijing Military City' near Qinglonghu, southwest of the capital, with deep pits believed to house hardened bunkers capable of sheltering China's leadership in a nuclear war. Hans Kristensen and others wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in March 2025 that China built over 320 underground missile silos between 2021 and 2025 at Yumen in Gansu, Hami in Xinjiang, and Ordos in Inner Mongolia, significantly expanding its nuclear deterrent capabilities. They stated these silos, with standardized layouts, are designed for solid-fuel DF-41 ICBMs with potential launch-on-warning capability, supported by hardened command infrastructure and possibly nearby underground storage. They also noted continued DF-5B silo construction, reinforcing survivability through dual platforms. Furthermore, Greg Weaver argued in an April 2025 Atlantic Council report that standoff capability is essential for enhancing US aircraft survivability when striking mainland China. He noted that China's advanced air defenses and long-range missiles pose serious threats to forward-deployed US aircraft, making it vital to use standoff delivery systems that launch from outside the range of Chinese defenses. Yet even with advanced penetrators and standoff options, strikes on the Chinese mainland carry severe risks. In a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article, Brian McLean argued that while some strategists believe China can differentiate between conventional and nuclear attacks, hitting leadership bunkers or missile forces might be mistaken for a decapitation or disarmament attempt. He warned that even conventional strikes affecting China's nuclear posture or regime stability could provoke a nuclear response, especially if China perceives its second-strike capability as compromised. As the US weighs options beyond tactical reach, the broader question of deterrence comes into play. McLean said the best way to avoid escalation may be a strategy of deterrence by denial, convincing China not to attack Taiwan in the first place. However, Chen Xi wrote in a September 2022 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that deterrence by denial hinges on forward-deployed forces and regional basing, both of which are increasingly vulnerable to China's growing missile capabilities and anti-access/area denial systems. Chen cautioned that this posture could fuel perceptions of encirclement or US intent to strike first, raising escalation risks. He also pointed to practical limitations, including the difficulty of dispersing assets across allied territories, uncertain host-nation support, and ambiguous defense commitments that may weaken US credibility.
