Latest news with #E3
Al-Ahram Weekly
an hour ago
- Business
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Sanctions or deal - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The revival of nuclear negotiations between Iran and Europe is intended to avoid imposing sanctions on Tehran again in October, but there are doubts surrounding the outcome. Iran has returned to the negotiating table less than two months after the Israeli-American war targeting its nuclear facilities and other military and civilian sites. On Friday, Iranian officials met officials from Britain, France, Germany and the EU at the Iranian consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. The three European countries, known as E3, along with Russia and China, are the parties that remain in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed with Tehran in 2015. The other party to the deal, the US, withdrew unilaterally from the agreement in 2018. According to JCPOA Iran had agreed to curb its nuclear programme in exchange for global sanctions relief. Lifting the UN-imposed sanctions has a deadline of 18 October 2025, unless the E3 trigger what is called a 'snapback' a month before the deadline. In a bid to avoid triggering a snapback by 18 September, negotiations with Iran have been launched. Prior to the Istanbul meeting, the Iranians met with Russian and Chinese representatives in Tehran to discuss the same issue. Though no outcome for these meetings was announced, Moscow and Beijing are believed to side with Iran rather than the West. Before the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in mid-June, the US and Iran held five rounds of indirect talks brokered by the Sultanate of Oman. Negotiations collapsed when Israel started bombing Iran and Iran retaliated by bombing Israel. Later, towards the end of the war, America launched an airforce attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The European signatories of JCPOA were sidelined during the American-Iranian negotiations. Despite this the E3 want to help revive those negotiations to restore the 2015 deal with the Americans re-joining it, or reach a new deal to stop Iran from enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level. Iran is also keen to reach a deal to avoid suffocating sanctions. A Dubai-based commentator told Al-Ahram Weekly that, despite Iranian statements about its 'strong position', their economy is in dire straits and Tehran cannot afford more sanctions. 'Even basic services are deteriorating. Look at the water shortage in last few days and how high temperatures have forced the government to announce a public holiday to ration water,' he said. But militants in Iran, including hard-line members of parliament, feel that negotiations with the Americans and the West are futile. They do not consider Europeans to be so different from Americans as they collectively support Israeli aggression against Iran. A European representative went to Istanbul ready to offer Iran an extension of the deadline for the re-imposition of international sanctions for six months if it agrees to conditions including resuming talks with Washington and cooperating with UN nuclear inspectors: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran is asking for guarantees that any negotiation should respect its sovereign right to continue nuclear activity for peaceful purposes, including uranium enrichment. It also wants negotiations to focus mainly on the nuclear issue and sanctions, not extending to its ballistic missile programme. Towards the end of the indirect talks, the Trump administration switched positions and called for a complete halt of uranium enrichment, not enriching to a lower level of producing uranium for power reactors. In response to America's withdrawal from JCPOA seven years ago, Iran had increased its enrichment activity beyond what was agreed in the deal in 2015. The deal stipulated enriching uranium to 3.67 per cent with a limit on produced amount. IAEA later said that Iranian enrichment reached 60 per cent. Israel has been claiming that this level is close to the 90 per cent purity needed to produce a nuclear bomb. Iran has always denied it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Nothing concrete came out of the meeting with the E3, except for the agreement to continue talks. The Europeans introduced a deadline to the talks should they not trigger a snapback: end of August. After the meeting in Istanbul, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi posted on X that Iran and the E3 held 'serious, frank, and detailed' talks, exchanging specific proposals on sanctions relief, the nuclear file, and the controversial snapback mechanism. Gharibabadi led the Iranian delegation at the talks. The Europeans also demanded that Iran should provide clarifications for 400 kilogrammes of enriched uranium, whose whereabouts have been unknown since last month's strikes by Israel and the US on Iran's nuclear sites. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei told official news agency IRNA that an IAEA delegation is expected in Tehran soon, but no nuclear site inspections are currently scheduled. Talks will focus on redefining the framework for interaction instead. That was confirmed by IAEA head Rafael Grossi who said on Friday that Iran has indicated it will be ready to restart technical-level discussions on its nuclear programme. He told reporters in Singapore that the IAEA had proposed that Iran should start discussions of 'the modalities as to how to restart or begin [inspections] again. So this is what we are planning to do, perhaps starting on technical details and later moving onto high-level consultations. So this will not include inspections yet,' Grossi added. As Israel started bombing Iran, Tehran suspended cooperation with IAEA. The level of damage to Iran's nuclear programme is not yet clear, even as Trump repeatedly said nuclear targets were destroyed by American bombing. It is not clear if the Europeans will act as a catalyst for the resumption of Iranian-American talks or fail to do so, blaming it on Iranian non-cooperation. If the month's deadline for Tehran to prove positive engagement is not met, escalation is expected. Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That will be seen by the US and Israel as a clear sign of Tehran heading towards the production of a nuclear bomb. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Deccan Herald
11 hours ago
- Business
- Deccan Herald
Iran returns to talks as ‘non-declared' nuclear power
Hardly a month into the Israel-Iran ceasefire initiated by United States President Donald Trump, new attempts to kickstart talks have begun. In consultation with Washington, the three European powers (E3) — France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — who are signatories of the 2015 Iran deal (JCPOA) are trying to reopen negotiations over the limits of Iran's nuclear activities. But they are dealing with a transformed Iran — a veritable non-declared nuclear weapon State in secret possession of 409 kilogrammes of highly-enriched uranium enough to make 10 nuclear bombs, and answerable to admission that the damage to its nuclear sites inflicted by the US air strikes is 'serious and severe' messages that any resumption of uranium enrichment activity as such will take time. Equally, its readiness for talks with the E3 is logical, as the countdown has begun for the expiry of the JCPOA in October, and the stage is shifting to the UN Security Council by the end of August when the European powers take the call to invoke the snapback mechanism and restore UN held consultations with the senior officials of Russia and China in Tehran last Thursday. Although Russia and China cannot exercise veto to block the snapback mechanism, they hold veto power vis-à-vis any E3 move to push the deadline for extending sanctions. Tehran expects Russia and China to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any restored round of discussion with the E3 at the official level was held in Istanbul on Friday. Little emerged from the meeting, but the Iranian side said the talks were 'frank and detailed,' addressing issues including last month's war and the possible restoration of sanctions. According to Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran's deputy foreign minister, 'Both sides came to the meeting with specific ideas, the various aspects of which were examined. It was agreed that consultations on this matter will continue.' .Trump warns Iran that its nuclear sites could be bombed E3 realise that there is hardly any time left to reach an agreement by the end of August, and would rather kick the can down the road by extending the timeline for actually restoring the sanctions. Against this backdrop, Manouchehr Mottaki, a former foreign minister and an influential member of the Majlis representing Tehran, has warned in an interview on Sunday that any move by the E3 to trigger the snapback mechanism of the JCPOA to pressure Tehran will instantaneously prompt the parliament to approve a motion to pull Iran out of the main sticking point continues to be the Trump administration's insistence at Israeli behest that Iran give up enrichment of uranium altogether and Iran's refusal to do so insisting it would instead agree to strict limits on that enrichment of the kind laid out in the 2015 some of the Europeans are reportedly less adamant so long as limits on enrichment are severe and monitored more closely than they are now. Considering that E3 is in constant consultations with Washington, the Trump administration too may have an open mind. Herein, possibly, lies the 'breakthrough' that Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in a recent interview with Fox News, claimed to have reached in his talks with US special envoy Steve Witkoff which the sudden Israeli attack on June 13 two related issues arise — first, the whereabouts of 408 kg of highly-enriched uranium [at 60 per cent] that Iran reportedly removed from its nuclear sites prior to the US bombing on July 22, and, second, Iran's revised parameters for any future IAEA has agreed to allow a technical team from the IAEA to visit Tehran in the coming weeks 'to discuss a new modality" on future interaction but 'not to go to the [nuclear] sites.' Technical level discussions on the nitty gritty of the IAEA safeguards are time-consuming. Meanwhile, what is happening to the 409 kg of 60 per cent enriched uranium is the million dollar question. In a recent podcast, the professor emeritus of science, technology, and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former Pentagon adviser, Theodore Postol, suggested that Iran must now be viewed in geopolitical terms as a 'non-declared nuclear weapon state', having shown in an experiment in early 2023 already that it could enrich uranium at 83.7 per cent, enough to make nuclear weapons. Postol points out that Iran now needs almost no enrichment effort to go to 90 per cent or above to produce nuclear bombs. There is no more monitoring of its production of centrifuges for the next several months at least, and each cascade can produce an estimated one bomb every 4-5 weeks. This can be done in total secrecy as no gigantic facility like Natanz is needed for it. A cascade can be installed in a room of 60 square meters with access to minimal electricity to operate the cascade — as little as 20 watts. Therefore, according to Postol, all that is needed is a small operation, if push comes to shove. In comparable circumstances, he recalled, Pakistan needed just 15 days after India this is a surreal situation. Look at the interplay of light and shade where images can be truths and semi-truths or quasi-truths bordering on fakes. Trump believes Iran's nuclear sites have been 'obliterated' (quasi-truth) while Iran says US bombing inflicted 'serious and severe' damage to its nuclear site (semi-truth). The E3 plans to trigger the JCPOA's snapback mechanism because Iran has violated the 2015 deal (quasi-truth) while Iran warns that if UN sanctions are restored in any such contrived manner, it will quit NPT (truth). The E3 is exploring ways and means of deferring restoration of sanctions (truth) but Iran disfavours it (semi-truth) while Russia and China will need to co-operate with the E3 and the US in the UNSC, for which the international climate is hardly conducive (truth). Iran underscores removal of Western sanctions as an absolute prerequisite (truth) while the E3 and the US remain ambivalent (truth). Iran rules out weaponisation (half-truth) while it is already a de facto non-declared nuclear power (truth) in possession of 409 kgs of highly-enriched uranium from which an estimated 10 nuclear bombs can be made in a small Russian President Vladimir Putin. On Monday, Putin had a telephone conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Interestingly, Putin 'expressed its willingness to facilitate in every possible way the search for negotiated solutions to the Iran nuclear issue.' This is happening even after Trump brushed aside any scope for Russian mediation. By the way, Postol also advised Israel that it is 'absolutely reckless' on its part not to believe that Iran is already a de facto nuclear weapon state. He specifically warned that any eruption of conflict may put Tel Aviv and Haifa in danger of annihilation.(M K Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat)Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.
Russia Today
20 hours ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Does Europe still matter in the Iran nuclear talks?
Europe still talks like a power – but it no longer acts like one. The recent meeting in Istanbul between Iran and the E3 nations – the UK, Germany, and France – was less a negotiation than a diplomatic performance. Though cloaked in formal statements and procedural optimism, the gathering resembled a carefully staged simulation of diplomacy, aimed more at signaling activity than achieving substance. For all their rhetorical commitment to dialogue, the E3 nations have long ceased to be meaningful actors in the Iranian nuclear file. Their insistence on maintaining a mediating role is no longer backed by either institutional capacity or political will. The talks in Istanbul offered no new proposals, no breakthroughs, and no signs of strategic coherence. Instead, they epitomized a pattern of 'negotiations for the sake of negotiations' – a ritualized diplomacy that conceals, rather than resolves, the underlying geopolitical rift. This was not the first time. A similar meeting held in Istanbul on May 16, 2025, produced the same optimistic rhetoric, only for the situation to unravel weeks later. By mid‑June, Israel had launched a series of strikes against Iran, and for the first time in history, the United States directly attacked Iran's Fordow nuclear facility during the '12‑day war.' That escalation demonstrated in stark terms the limits of Europe's ability to influence outcomes – and the acceptability of force in a conflict where Europe is now largely a bystander. Europe's problem is not just marginalization by the US, but voluntary irrelevance. While Paris, Berlin, and London posture as bridge‑builders between Tehran and Washington, in practice they operate within the parameters defined in Washington and West Jerusalem. The result is not constructive engagement, but an elaborate pretense – diplomacy without agency. The collapse of Europe's credibility in the Iranian nuclear file began long before these days. After Donald Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the E3 promised to shield Tehran from the shock of renewed US sanctions. Their flagship solution was the INSTEX financial mechanism – a supposed alternative channel for trade with Iran. But INSTEX never fulfilled that promise. Over its entire existence, it conducted only a single transaction – a humanitarian shipment of medical supplies in 2020 – and even that fell squarely within the categories of goods already exempt from US sanctions. There was no real test of Europe's willingness to defy Washington's restrictions, no challenge to the financial chokehold imposed on Iran's oil and banking sectors. The episode exposed INSTEX for what it was: a symbolic gesture designed to project strategic autonomy, not exercise it. By 2023, the mechanism had been quietly dismantled. This failure was not merely technical. It sent Tehran a clear message: when Washington applies pressure, Europe folds. Even the Biden administration's declared willingness to revive the JCPOA failed to change the dynamic. By March 2022, EU‑led talks in Vienna had stalled over US terrorism designations against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other unresolved issues. European officials vaguely cited 'external factors' as the reason, but the deeper problem was an unwillingness to confront Washington on Iran's core demands. A 'final compromise draft' circulated that summer, but by September, the E3 were publicly blaming Iran for the collapse of negotiations, accusing Tehran of introducing new conditions regarding its Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments. For Iran, the pattern was unmistakable: Europe had the rhetoric of diplomacy but lacked the leverage to deliver. The consequences became brutally clear in June 2025, when Israel launched a series of strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities – and the US directly struck Fordow. Europe, once imagined in Tehran as a potential mediator (with France once considered a direct channel to Washington), was reduced to issuing statements of 'concern.' Trust that Paris, Berlin, or London could act independently evaporated. For Iran, these episodes confirmed what INSTEX had already exposed. Again, the pattern is the same: when the stakes rise, the E3 has neither the instruments nor the will to defend its commitments. By 2024, any lingering illusion that the E3 could mediate independently between Washington and Tehran had collapsed. The European powers were no longer attempting to balance interests; they were enforcing Washington's strategy. Sanctions on Iran's aviation sector and civilian fleet, adopted by the EU in November 2024, were a clear signal that Brussels had aligned itself fully with the US 'maximum pressure' campaign. Even earlier that year, a high‑profile meeting with Iranian officials on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 underscored Europe's inability to deliver tangible results. The talks produced the usual optimistic statements but no progress. For Tehran, the message was again clear: European diplomacy was about optics, not outcomes. At the same time, the E3 pushed a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions censuring Iran for alleged violations of its international obligations. The latest, passed on June 12, 2025 – just one day before Israel's attacks and the unprecedented direct US strike on Fordow – was perceived in Tehran as a green light for escalation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly warned that the resolution would destabilize the region, but European leaders pressed ahead, seemingly oblivious to the consequences. In reality, the Europeans were not oblivious; they were irrelevant. Paris, Berlin, and London had ceased to shape events and had instead become instruments for applying pressure on Iran. As one Iranian diplomat observed privately, European leaders may initially criticize US decisions, but they ultimately align themselves unconditionally and even present those policies as the 'European position.' German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has gone further, openly supporting any decision made by Donald Trump. Diplomatic gatherings such as the Istanbul meeting served less as platforms for negotiation than as reconnaissance missions: opportunities to 'test the waters' of Tehran's demands and feed intelligence back to Washington. By mid‑2025, the E3's so‑called diplomacy was no longer about building bridges. It was about delivering ultimatums. With negotiations going nowhere, Europe and the United States set an August 2025 deadline for reaching a new agreement with Iran. The implicit threat was clear: if Tehran refused, London, Paris, and Berlin would activate the 'snapback' mechanism embedded in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, restoring pre‑JCPOA sanctions. For Tehran, this was not a legal step but an act of coercion. Iranian officials have long argued that the E3 forfeited their moral and legal authority to invoke snapback when they failed to uphold their own commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's warning could not have been more explicit: if Europe proceeds, Iran will consider withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In a letter to the UN secretary‑general and the Security Council, Araghchi accused the Europeans of aligning themselves politically and militarily with the US and Israel – even to the point of tacitly endorsing direct US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. The snapback procedure itself is legally contentious. Since the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, many international lawyers argue that Washington forfeited the right to trigger the mechanism. But in today's geopolitical landscape, that debate is academic. Under snapback rules, permanent Security Council members have no veto; only nine votes are required to reimpose sanctions. The outcome would be predetermined. And for the E3, the activation of snapback would seal a transformation already underway: from nominal mediators to open enforcers of US policy. The Istanbul meeting, then, was never about diplomacy. It was about pressure. Europe still sits at the table, but the conversation happens elsewhere. Diplomacy is dead; what remains is an ultimatum delivered on behalf of Washington – and Iran is unlikely to mistake it for anything else.
Arab News
a day ago
- Politics
- Arab News
UK-EU migration progress welcome but more must be done
Two visits to London in consecutive weeks this month, first by French President Emmanuel Macron and then German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, were a clear demonstration that the UK and leading EU countries are absolutely determined to put the debacle of Brexit behind them and embark on a healing journey, one which will enable them to deal constructively with the common challenges and opportunities they encounter — and all in a cordial spirit. The visits and the agreements and understandings reached during the talks announced the return of the informal E3 group of France, Germany and the UK as the backbone and driving force of European security. All three leaders were keen to display unity, regardless of whether the UK is inside or outside the EU, stressing that it is important not to let the past hold back close UK-EU cooperation. One of the issues that dominated both visits, particularly Macron's, was of stopping, or at least substantially reducing, irregular migration, mainly the arrival of immigrants on small boats. According to the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, about 37,000 people were detected crossing the English Channel in small boats last year. The first half of 2025 has seen an increasing number of people attempt this dangerous and costly journey, proving that the current deterrent measures hardly work. Tragically, the increase in the number of crossings also led to a record number of deaths — at least 82 people, including 14 children, in 2024. Migration is not a simple issue, not in terms of the reasons behind it, the legality of it or how it affects the countries of origin and destination. First, migration is a human trait — it has been part of humanity from the dawn of history and is done for economic, social, political and, increasingly, for environmental reasons. Without exploring and addressing these reasons, people will continue to look for routes to enter countries that promise them a safer and better life. Second, lumping together all the different types of migration muddles the public discourse. There are: economic migrants, which all European countries need; asylum seekers, who these countries have a moral and legal obligation to help; and those who are arriving for family reasons or to study. And, yes, there are those who arrive illegally. These are all different categories of migration that must be addressed according to their individual merits, while removing prejudices and biases against newcomers. Third, there is no escaping the fact that the discourse over migration has become toxic, divisive and fertile ground for right-wing parties and ultranationalist movements, which have no existence without it, and this endangers the stability of many societies and might lead to antimigration movements ascending to power. Lastly, it would be an illusion to believe that migration, especially the kind that most countries consider to be undermining their societies, can be stopped by legislation or by investing in better-equipped and more sophisticated border control forces without courageously investing in resolving the root causes. The 'one in, one out' migrant return deal agreed between the UK and France during Macron's visit is designed to serve as a deterrent to stop people from attempting to cross the Channel in small boats. The plan proposes that for each migrant the UK returns to France, another with a strong case for asylum in Britain will be allowed to come the other way. At this stage, it is unknown how many people will actually be sent away. And although those who are sent back to France will not be allowed to apply for asylum in the UK, one wonders how much of a deterrent this plan is. When more details surface, it will be possible to assess whether the number of migrants sent back justifies the cost and whether it can be scaled up when the pilot scheme comes to an end. But this does not, for instance, effectively deal with the smugglers who exploit the predicaments of those who are desperate enough to pay extortionate sums of money and risk their lives for a better future. Even going after the smugglers would not guarantee an end to small boat crossings, as it is too profitable a venture for more unscrupulous people not to take their place. A quick glance at the nationalities of those who attempted to reach the UK by boat between 2018 and 2024 reveals that 70 percent of them come from countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, Syria and Eritrea. Fighting criminal gangs is necessary, but can provide only limited answers, as there is a demand for their services, and even securing borders and international cooperation cannot seal them hermetically. The discourse over migration has become toxic, divisive and fertile ground for right-wing parties and ultranationalist movements. Yossi Mekelberg Instead, there is a need to go beyond international cooperation and stopping irregular migration when the migrants are already en route or sending them back when they arrive. First, there must be an integral migration policy that promotes safe and orderly pathways and that establishes legal migration channels that meet the need for migration and the demand for it. But above all, the challenge — and the current record of the international community is not encouraging — is to solve the underlying political, economic, social and environmental problems that lead people to try and escape their countries of origin, whether temporarily or permanently. As long as domestic political instability, including wars, violence, oppression and corruption, is rife and there are no employment opportunities or access to basic needs, people will look for an escape route. A growing issue linked to migration is the worsening impacts of climate change. And the collective global neglect of this existential threat to humanity is bound to lead to more people attempting to escape hostile climate conditions. Programs like 'one in, one out,' as much as they are a welcome, proactive and cooperative move to stop irregular migration by small boats, do not go far enough. Only a holistic approach that recognizes the need for migration in the EU, that meets the drive for migration of those who embark on such journeys, legally and illegally, and, most importantly and drastically, that results in a substantial improvement of conditions in migrants' countries of origin can provide a chance to regulate migration to the benefit of all.
Business Insider
a day ago
- Business
- Business Insider
Microsoft Stock (NASDAQ:MSFT) Slips Depsite Stifel Price Hike
It should have been a better day for tech giant Microsoft (MSFT), as Stifel analysts offered up new commentary on the stock. In fact, they also offered up a range of reasons why Microsoft is poised for gains going forward. But investors were not so sure. In fact, they sent Microsoft shares down fractionally in Monday afternoon's trading. Elevate Your Investing Strategy: Take advantage of TipRanks Premium at 50% off! Unlock powerful investing tools, advanced data, and expert analyst insights to help you invest with confidence. Stifel analysts maintained a Buy rating on Microsoft shares, and raised the price target from its previous $500 per share to $550 per share. That represents a substantial jump over current levels, and suggests Microsoft could blow through its 52-week high, which was down around $518.29. Several reasons gave Stifel confidence in this assertion, starting with enterprise spending that was starting to pick up, as well as improved execution in non- AI issues along with growing demand for generative AI systems. However, not all the news was good. Stifel analysts noted that Microsoft's '…previous supply and demand imbalance concerns…' were likely to keep going, extending into the second half of the 2026 fiscal year. Capital expenditure was also likely to increase with that. Preparing for Gamescom After the Electronics Entertainment Expo (E3) normally hit in June, the next major event for gamers was Gamescom. Called the European equivalent of E3 by some, it was the update that gave us a look at what was likely to hit with the holiday shopping season. Considering that is now about three months or so out, depending on when you start, it is worth a look. And Microsoft is getting ready for the big event with some new developments. Several games will have playable demonstrations on hand, including Hollow Knight: Silksong, Grounded 2, Ninja Gaiden 4, and Borderlands 4, among others. Opening Night Live will feature the world premiere of Call of Duty: Black Ops 7. Plus, the ROG Xbox Ally and the ROG Xbox Ally X will both be on hand with over 120 different gaming stations on hand. Is Microsoft a Buy, Hold or Sell? Turning to Wall Street, analysts have a Strong Buy consensus rating on MSFT stock based on 31 Buys and three Holds assigned in the past three months, as indicated by the graphic below. After a 20.38% rally in its share price over the past year, the average MSFT price target of $554.97 per share implies 8.48% upside potential.
