Nvidia CEO says China's military unlikely to use U.S. AI chips
Addressing the largest concern Washington has cited in placing increasing restrictions on U.S. technology exports to the Asian nation, Huang said the Chinese military will avoid using U.S. technology because of the risks associated with doing so.
"We don't have to worry about it,' he said in an interview on CNN's "Fareed Zakaria GPS" broadcast Sunday.
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The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Africa and China: Turning FOCAC's Strategic Upgrades Into Real Outcomes
As African and Chinese leaders gathered once again in Changsha in June 2025 for the Ministerial Meeting of Coordinators on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the momentum from last year's landmark Beijing Summit was unmistakable. With representatives from 53 African countries in attendance, the September 2024 Beijing Summit was a diplomatic milestone – hailed as the most successful Africa+1 summit ever held. Outside the big conference hall, China's President Xi Jinping met one-on-one with leaders from 40 African nations on bilateral agendas. But beyond the red carpets and formalities, the Beijing Summit marked a new chapter – one in which Africa's voice grows louder and its strategy sharper. For African leaders, one of most significant outcomes was the upgrade of the overall Africa-China relationship to an 'all weather partnership' and every single Africa-China bilateral relationship to at least a 'strategic partnership,' with several achieving even higher designations. This may sound like diplomatic jargon, but the implications are tangible. The 'strategic' designation in a bilateral partnership means collaboration goes far beyond ad hoc cooperation on individual projects or sectors, and both sides would embed their collaboration within development plans with institutionalized mechanisms to ensure follow-through. Such strategically framed cooperation is built to weather external shocks, from regional instability to global market swings, and encompasses high‑level coordination on peace and security as well as structured consensus‑building on international governance. A review of the outcomes from implementing the 2024 Beijing Action Plan shows that the diplomatic elevation of Africa-China ties is already translating into tangible results. One notable shift is on trade: in a move that goes far beyond the limited impact of last December's pledge to remove tariffs on exports from African Least Developed Countries (LDCs), China has now eliminated all remaining tariffs on goods from 53 African countries with which Beijing has diplomatic ties. This move contrasts sharply with recent U.S. trade measures that have imposed tariffs as high as 50 percent on African exports. On investment, the numbers are equally telling: between the September 2024 Beijing summit and March 2025, new investment from Chinese enterprises in Africa reached 13.38 billion yuan ($1.87 billion), alongside 130 billion yuan in financing and 140 billion yuan in insurance support for African development projects. These shifts confirm that upgraded ties are not merely symbolic – they are shaping resource flows and market access in real time. And yet, here's the key point: the significance of these gains hinges on whether African countries can make them matter. As our data at Development Reimagined shows, upgrades often coincide with summit years or top-leadership visits, but what truly drives elevation is consistent, substantive engagement. Angola is a clear example. After establishing a strategic partnership in 2010 during then-Vice President Xi Jinping's visit, Angola joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, aligning its development strategy with China's global vision. In March 2024, following President João Lourenço's visit to Beijing, the relationship was elevated to a 'comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,' which is a top-tier status that builds on shared long-term strategic goals – sometimes with joint timelines for delivery – and includes targeted commitments in sectors like infrastructure, energy, and development finance, as well as consensus on regional and global governance issues. For 35 years in a row, China's foreign minister has visited Africa on the first overseas trip at the start of the calendar year. The pattern continued in 2025, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi's tour of Namibia, the Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria reinforcing shared priorities in infrastructure, industrialization, and trade. These visits were soon followed by more detailed bilateral agreements – such as the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Congo, and a strategic cooperation agreement on agro-processing and industrial park development with Namibia during the recent Changsha meeting. Crucially, it's not only Africa's largest economies that saw upgrades. Madagascar, for example, had already achieved a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership as early as 2017, a signal of recognition for its long-term cooperation under Belt and Road Initiative and a focus on agricultural innovation. Hybrid rice technology and shared research hubs are not minor add-ons to the relationship – they're the future of climate-smart food sovereignty. Likewise, Rwanda's elevation during last FOCAC has leveraged innovation in modernizing agricultural productivity and promoted exports such as coffee and chili to the Chinese market. In short, China is responsive to proactive African engagement. The new structure of relations reflects demand, not charity. This opens a clear opportunity – but also a challenge. African states must now sharpen their strategies to maximize the new framework. The Beijing Action Plan speaks broadly about shared goals, but implementation depends on country-specific proposals and clarity. If a country wants better trade access, it needs to make the case with data, readiness, and product consistency. If it seeks support for industrial upgrading, it must show how it will create jobs and value, not just import factories. Nigeria offers a clear example of how strategic upgrades can serve as a springboard – but only when matched with a clear national agenda. Although its strategic partnership with China dates back to 2005, the relationship remained largely quiet until 2024. The inauguration of the China-Nigeria Intergovernmental Committee in June – co-chaired by Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Yusuf Tuggar – marked a shift toward more structured engagement. Since then, follow-up has gained momentum, aligning with Nigeria's goal of shifting from a net importer of Chinese goods to a competitive exporter. One key outcome was the China-Nigeria three-year cooperation plan (covering 2024–2026) prioritizing energy, mining, and metallurgy, with a focus on deepening value addition and upgrading Nigeria's industrial base. Another achievement was the renewal of a 15 billion yuan currency swap agreement. Already, the contours of these ambitions are taking shape. Multiple bilateral deals signed during FOCAC promise greater infrastructure investment, from ports and railways to energy corridors. Notably, renewable energy featured prominently. Botswana has launched a Chinese-financed 100MW solar plant, Uganda and Tanzania have advanced major hydropower stations, and wind projects are progressing in Egypt, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe. These early movers reflect how some countries are already leveraging upgraded ties to drive their green industrial agendas. In health, COVID-19's legacy has galvanized a shift toward joint vaccine production, medical logistics, and regional public health infrastructure. Digital infrastructure and e-commerce platforms were also on the table, recognizing that Africa's growth must now be digitally-enabled. Still, the weight of these opportunities varies by preparedness. Countries that enter these upgraded partnerships with clear development blueprints – rooted in national plans and continental frameworks like Agenda 2063 – are more likely to see benefits flow. Others risk symbolic upgrades that fail to translate into impact. There is also a growing concern about Chinese stakeholders advancing projects without deep African involvement, which may lead to misplaced investments and local pushback. That's why strategic planning at the national level is now more urgent than ever. The next phase of China-Africa cooperation will of course be led from Beijing but also shaped in national ministries, regional blocs, and African cities and towns where real implementation occurs. What's promising is that many African governments are learning from one another. Whether it's the expansion of borehole projects improving water access in Rwanda and Zimbabwe through Chinese aid, Ethiopia's industrial zones transforming manufacturing capacity, or Tanzania's surge in sesame exports and production since the introduction of the 'Green Lane' initiative, there are valuable lessons emerging across the continent. FOCAC can – and should – be more than a talking shop. It can become a platform where African countries negotiate not just with China, but also learn to negotiate better with each other, building regional value chains and leveraging collective priorities. FOCAC 2024 marked a milestone, but 2025 is the year that will test whether upgraded ties can deliver real outcomes. As China deepens engagement with other regions – through summits with Latin America, Central Asia, and beyond – Africa must sharpen its own value proposition. African policymakers must ask: what do these upgraded ties mean for us now? More importantly, how do we move from diplomatic words to domestic wins? The tools are there. The action plan is ongoing. The ball, now, is in Africa's court.
NHK
10 hours ago
- NHK
Behind rise of Japan's data centers
The Japanese government is promoting the expansion of data centers to regional areas to cope with the demand for generative AI.
Japan Times
11 hours ago
- Japan Times
BOJ finishes offloading bank stocks, bringing attention to ETFs
The Bank of Japan finished selling millions of dollars of stocks it bought from besieged banks during a domestic banking crisis in the early 2000s and the later Lehman Shock, ending a nearly two decade process and bringing closer market attention to the fate of its much bigger pile of exchange-traded funds. The BOJ's holdings of the shares purchased from banks hit zero as of July 10, falling from ¥2.5 billion ($17.4 million) 10 days ago, according to its balance sheet report Monday. It's well ahead of a self-imposed deadline of March next year, although the milestone was expected to happen around this time after a steady drop of roughly ¥10 billion per month in recent years. The offloading of the shares suggest that the BOJ's normalization process more broadly could be accomplished without disrupting financial markets, although it would take a considerable amount of time. The assets were originally bought as a crisis response measure, years before the introduction of the massive monetary easing program that Gov. Kazuo Ueda's board is now in the process of unwinding. Between 2002 and 2010, the BOJ acquired about ¥2.4 trillion ($16.3 billion) of stocks from private banks in two separate periods to help stabilize the financial system at the time — initially seen as extraordinary steps to take for a major central bank. The BOJ's actions in the years following have ultimately made those steps less shocking. The central bank became the biggest holder of Japanese stocks around 2020 and the size of the central bank's ETF holdings are now 15 times larger than the shares it obtained from beleaguered banks. In a report Friday, Goldman Sachs economists noted that it's reasonable to expect the bank to start gradually selling ETFs in fiscal 2026 to minimize its loss and the impact on the stock market. The BOJ began buying stocks held by banks in November 2002, after a severe banking crisis that saw bank shares tumbling for about three years. The central bank kept buying for about two years in a bid to help banks address their dire nonperforming loan problem. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the BOJ bought again between February 2009 and April 2010. It's taken the central bank nearly 18 years to offload the shares completely, after it first began selling in October 2007. At the end of 2015, the BOJ said it would extend the selling duration by a decade, through to March 2026. If the BOJ applies the same selling pace it did for the bank stocks, it would take more than 200 years to completely offload the far larger ETF holdings from its balance sheet. "It fulfilled the intended objective,' Ueda said at a news conference last month, referring to the bank stocks buying initiative. "Offloading them isn't completely finished yet but so far it's been proceeding without negative market impact or financial loss for us.' Getting rid of the bank stocks entirely helps lower the hurdle to consider ETFs, as the simultaneous sale of both asset types could risk a overly large negative impact on the markets. Starting with the end of negative interest rates and expansionary asset purchases in March last year, the BOJ has been cautiously normalizing policy, with the latest updated government bond buying plan in June, illustrating its caution. Ueda's board decided to slow the pace of tapering the bond buying from the next fiscal year given recent heightened volatility in the bond market. One BOJ policy board member said in April last year that the bank should reduce the ETF holdings to zero even if it takes time. At the same time, Ueda has kept his options open — in March he didn't rule out holding ETFs indefinitely. From the perspective of the BOJ's financial health, there is little need to rush to dispose of its stock fund assets. The bank earned ¥1.4 trillion in revenue from ETF dividends in the fiscal year ended in March 2025. That's offering sizable support for the bank's finances at a time when the cost of paying interest to banks is bound to rise further in tandem with rate hikes. The sizable ETF profits have drawn attention from investors and politicians. Some opposition party lawmakers are already calling for using the BOJ's ETFs to fund government finances. Some analysts say that the BOJ could hand out the ETFs to the public. "As I have said many times, there is no change in our stance to take time to consider what to do with the ETF holdings,' Ueda told reporters last month.
