China Can Subsume Taiwan Without Firing A Single Shot

Memri

6 hours ago

China's invasion of Taiwan is widely considered imminent. Some analysts predict that such action could occur as early as 2026, just before the end of President Xi Jinping's third term. Others believe it will take place in 2027 to mark the founding of the People's Liberation Army. Regardless of the timing, the Chinese government maintains that reunifying Taiwan with the mainland is a constitutional obligation enshrined in its 1982 constitution.
China's increasing reliance on grey-zone tactics, coercive action, and sustained military pressure have led many to believe that reunification will be pursued through armed conflict. But this may not be the case.
In the aftermath of President Trump's "America First" policy and the trade wars that alienated many of the United States' traditional partners, China has positioned itself as a stable, responsible and cooperative partner to most countries. This shift in posture has attracted a new roster of global allies which has expanded China's influence. Thus, launching an invasion of Taiwan, at this critical juncture, could squander the diplomatic goodwill Beijing has earned and jeopardize the strategic alliances built. For China, the costs may outweigh the benefits.
Experts believe that Beijing has developed an alternative strategy to achieve unification without resorting to armed conflict. The strategy leverages on Taiwan's reliance on global trade.
Taiwan is, in fact, the world's second most trade-dependent economy, after the Netherlands.[1] In 2024 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) stated that, in 2022, Taiwan's exports accounted for 69 percent of its GDP, while imports made up 61 percent.[2] By comparison, in 2023, imports of the United States comprised around 14 percent of its GDP while exports made up 11 percent.[3] Simply put, Taiwan's economic lifeline remains deeply and inseparably tied to global trade.
This is because Taiwan sources 97 percent of its energy needs – oil, gas, and coal – from abroad, with domestic stockpiles sufficient for only five months.[4] The island also imports 70 percent of its food,[5] with emergency reserves estimated to last just one year. Thus, any significant disruption to Taiwan's trade is akin to suffocating the island republic.
Being an island nation, Taiwan lacks overland supply routes and is entirely dependent on maritime and air freight for the inflow and outflow of goods. This geographic reality makes it particularly vulnerable to external pressure.
The CSIS reported that, as early as 2006, China's National Defense University published a paper advocating the use of a blockade as the most efficient means to subdue Taiwan.[6] The strategy envisions severing Taiwan's connection to the global economy – cutting off energy supplies, trade flows, and critical materials needed to sustain the island nation's population of 24 million.
Over time, such a blockade will inflict severe economic and humanitarian costs, gradually eroding Taiwan's defense capabilities, morale, and political resolve. In Beijing's calculation, prolonged pressure may weaken the island's resistance to compel it to capitulate to a unification – all without firing a single shot.
(Source: X)
How Will The Blockade Take Place?
It will take only one significant incident – real or fabricated – in the Taiwan Strait for Beijing to declare a security threat warranting immediate action. In such a scenario, China will impose a quarantine zone around Taiwan, framing it as a precautionary measure. To reinforce the narrative that the move is a law enforcement operation rather than a military one, Beijing will likely deploy its coast guard to secure the perimeter. Meanwhile, the Chinese navy would remain on standby in open sea, ostensibly to "protect" the coast guard, while also signaling military readiness and strategic intent.
Taiwan has only a handful of deep-water ports – Kaohsiung, Keelung, Taichung, the Port of Taipei, and Mailiao. These strategic entry points will likely be the focus of the blockade. By controlling access to these ports, Beijing could choke off Taiwan's trade and energy lifelines.
China's coast guard may breach Taiwan's contiguous zone – within 24 nautical miles of its coast – sending a message that Beijing does not recognize Taiwan's sovereignty. However, to maintain plausible deniability and avoid the appearance of an outright invasion, it may stop short of entering Taiwan's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Beijing could then impose strict customs protocols, authorizing its coast guard to board and inspect passing vessels. Ships that fail to comply with Beijing's rules will be denied passage, effectively disrupting Taiwan's supply lines.
A blockade framed as a security quarantine may not be interpreted as an act of war under international law. This ambiguity is strategic – designed to avoid triggering direct military intervention by the U.S. and its allies under existing defense commitments to Taiwan.
If Taiwan is unable to break or circumvent the blockade, it risks a gradual erosion of its sovereignty. Isolated and economically strangled, the island nation could be pushed toward a slow and reluctant surrender – accomplishing Beijing's objective without formally engaging in war.
What If Taiwan Fights Back?
If Taiwan chooses to respond militarily, it will provide Beijing with the justification it needs to escalate the conflict. In such a case, China would likely transition the operation from a quasi-civil enforcement action to a full-scale military campaign, with its navy taking the lead in enforcing the blockade. Taiwan will find itself rapidly drawn into a war it is ill-equipped to win.
In the event of escalation, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would likely deploy submarines to mine the waters surrounding Taiwan, particularly near key ports and energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could enforce a no-fly zone over Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), asserting control over both air and maritime domains.
To further isolate the island, China may sever Taiwan's 12 undersea telecommunications cables. While Taiwan maintain some satellite communications through a partnership with France's Eutelsat, these will prove insufficient to maintain full digital interconnection with the outside world. In short, any military escalation would deepen Taiwan's isolation and vulnerability.
At this point, the United States and its allies might intervene – triggering one of several possible war scenarios, all of which will carry catastrophic consequences for Taiwan and its population.
Faced with the risks, Taiwan's leadership will be confronted with a hard decision – whether to escalate the conflict and face possible devastation or to de-escalate – possibly at the cost of sovereignty – in an effort to spare its people from the horrors of war.
Either way, China has a good chance of subsuming Taiwan in this manner. A blockade is a low-risk, high-leverage strategy to force Taiwan into submission.
*Andrew J. Masigan is the MEMRI China Media Studies Project Special Advisor. He is a Manila-based economist, businessman, and political columnist for The Philippine Star. Masigan's articles in MEMRI are also published in The Philippine Star.