EU country urges Global South to play role in Ukraine conflict resolution
'Countries of the Global South should be one part of these [Ukrainian] security guarantees,' the minister stated on Tuesday, speaking on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue, a conference on geopolitics and geoeconomics in New Delhi. 'Countries like China, Brazil, also India, introduced some peace proposals, and they want to be involved in this.'
In contrast to some other members of the EU, Slovakia does not believe that the Ukraine conflict can be resolved in Kiev's favor through ongoing military support, Blanar explained. Consequently, Bratislava supports the new approach adopted by US President Donald Trump, who is pursuing the restoration of dialogue with Russia and an end to the hostilities through compromise.
According to Blanar, Slovakia views peace in Ukraine as an outcome that would benefit the entire world, meaning 'all the stakeholders, like India, and China, and Brazil, the Global South, and also the countries of the European Union, should be around the table and securing this peace for the future.'
Moscow perceives the EU to be an obstacle to resolving the Ukraine conflict, citing the bloc's pledge to continue supplies of weapons to Kiev and its resistance to making any concessions to Russia.
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