Marcos Mostly Got What He Wanted Out of Trump

The Diplomat

a day ago

Philippine President Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos Jr.'s visit last week to the White House – the first by any Southeast Asian head of state – can only be viewed as a remarkable success, despite some minor complications on trade. Senior Trump administration officials, including the president himself, profusely praised Manila for helping the United States to counter China, with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Bridge Colby, even going so far as to tout the Philippines as a 'model ally.' This is all the more stunning given that the Philippines spends very little of its GDP on defense – roughly 1.3 percent – and yet U.S. allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific and Europe who spend more have encountered greater turbulence with Washington.
Ahead of his visit, Marcos highlighted how important it would be for the two nations to sign a new trade deal to avoid triggering the Trump administration's 20 percent reciprocal tariffs on August 1. With some trepidation, he wondered aloud 'how much progress we can make' while in Washington 'to alleviate the effects of a very severe tariff schedule on the Philippines.' Additionally, Marcos hoped to receive clear support from Trump to bolster Manila's position against China's constant encroachments of its exclusive economic zone, which has now become tantamount to a gray zone war.
Following their meeting, Marcos and Trump announced a new reciprocal tariff rate of 19 percent. By negotiating a reduced tariff rate, Marcos has put the Philippines in a strong position relative to its peers. Take ASEAN, for example, of which the Philippines is a member. After Singapore, with its 10 percent tariff rate, the Philippines is actually tied with Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia as having the second-lowest tariff rate. All other nations are currently at 20 percent or higher. This includes Vietnam, a key emerging strategic partner for the United States in countering China, which was unable to secure a figure below 20 percent in negotiations with the Trump administration. By another measure, out of all roughly equal-sized economies worldwide, the Philippines' rate is less than the average tariff the U.S. has imposed on them.
Marcos can hardly claim total success, however. For one thing, critics have blasted him for failing to seal an 'alliance discount' in trade negotiations. It is easy for anyone to see, for example, that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, though not U.S. security allies, received the same rate as the Philippines. Moreover, Japan – another key security ally – was able to substantially lower its reciprocal tariff rate from 25 to 15 percent, although commentators have also acknowledged the comparative advantages of Japan, particularly derived from its status as the world's third-largest economy. Marcos nonetheless tried to defend his trade deliverable by arguing that although 'one percent might seem like a very small concession…when you put it in real terms, it is a significant achievement,' reaffirming the old adage in politics that 'if you're explaining, you're losing' the battle of narratives.'
To add to the confusion, Marcos clarified after the summit that Manila had lowered the tariff barrier on U.S. automobile exports to zero percent, but he did not confirm Trump's announcement that all U.S. exports would enjoy zero percent tariffs, nor did he provide any specific details on how the new trade deal might help the Philippines. The lack of clarity and apparent unilateral concessions led several Philippine legislators to sharply criticize him for participating in 'a disastrous humiliation ritual' and 'the worst insult that a host can throw at his guest.'
On the defense side, the outcome was quite positive. Trump, for example, praised the Philippines, stating: 'They're a very important nation militarily, and we've had some great drills lately,' in a reference to not only recent joint military exercises in the South China Sea, but also near Taiwan, aimed at bolstering deterrence against China. Trump further endorsed some flexibility in Manila's foreign policy approach, stating: 'You could deal with China…you should deal with China.' Manila welcomed this statement because it occasionally attempts diplomacy with Beijing to resolve outstanding sovereignty disputes with Beijing, as it did in the summer of 2024 following a violent incident over the resupply of Second Thomas Shoal. Marcos and Trump's public forum in the Oval Office could only have gone better for the Philippines had it not been dominated by reporters' questions over whether Trump might release the Jeffrey Epstein files.
Also, notably, the day before Marcos met Trump, he visited the State Department to discuss alliance relations with Secretary of State and Acting National Security Adviser Marco Rubio. While there, both men 'underscored the importance of the ironclad United States-Philippines alliance to maintaining peace,' an important reaffirmation using common policy lingo spanning across the first Trump and Biden administrations. This strongly suggests continuity with the past, rather than any kind of America First-driven break from it – an extremely important signal that not all allies and partners are necessarily receiving from Washington.
Although Marcos' visit could have been better, particularly on trade, it also featured no obvious mistakes or missed opportunities. And to be sure, there is only so much Marcos could hope for in dealing with an unpredictable Trump. If anything, Marcos and his administration should be comfortable with the current state of U.S.-Philippines relations, as there is little evidence that anything has changed for the worse, and ample evidence that Washington continues to value the Philippines—at least as much as is possible in these extraordinary times in U.S. foreign policy.