African Lion 2025 wraps up with Morocco at the heart of multinational security
For the first time, the exercise integrated defensive cyber operations and expanded CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) scenarios, alongside joint academic training.
U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Michael Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, praised Morocco's role: «I want to thank Morocco for hosting African Lion and helping strengthen our collective security through rigorous, multinational training».
Highlighting Morocco's strategic importance, U.S. Embassy Chargée d'Affaires Aimee Cutrona said, «As a major non-NATO ally and historic security partner, Morocco plays a pivotal role in promoting regional stability».
The exercise featured HIMARS fire missions, airborne and amphibious operations, maritime interdiction, and humanitarian civic assistance programs that treated over 1,200 patients in rural areas. «Our medical personnel built readiness by executing critical war-time skills», noted U.S. Army Col. Kelley Togiola.
Maj. Gen. Andrew Gainey, Commanding General of SETAF-AF, summed up AL25's impact: «African Lion 25 was a clear demonstration of how we project power, build trust, and deliver results… That's what readiness looks like—and that's what deterrence demands».
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