What a U.S. terrorist designation could mean for the Polisario Front

Ya Biladi

13 hours ago

The bipartisan bill introduced by Representatives Joe Wilson (Republican) and Jimmy Panetta (Democrat) seeks to designate the Polisario Front as a « foreign terrorist organization » (FTO). However, even if the bill passes, the designation would not be automatic: under U.S. law, the final decision rests with the Secretary of State, who acts on advice from the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice (8 U.S.C. § 1189).
To persuade Congress—and ultimately Secretary of State Marco Rubio—Joe Wilson emphasizes the Polisario's ties to Hezbollah and Iran. He could also highlight threats of terrorist attacks against foreign interests in Western Sahara by leaders of the separatist movement.
If the «Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act» succeeds and the State Department officially labels the Polisario as an FTO, here are four key consequences to expect:
Implications of the FTO designation in the United States
Asset freeze: The Treasury could block any funds controlled by the Polisario within U.S. jurisdiction. This freeze would be targeted; a global blockade would require an additional designation as a «Specially Designated Global Terrorist» (SDGT) by OFAC. In practice, many non-U.S. banks would likely halt processing dollar payments to avoid risks.
Prosecution for «material support»: Anyone in the U.S. providing material assistance could face up to 20 years in prison (18 U.S.C. § 2339B). However, humanitarian licenses could still be granted, as has been done for groups like the Houthis, ensuring vital aid reaches civilians.
Visas and border controls: Members and supporters would be legally inadmissible under INA § 212. Diplomatic exemptions might apply for UN personnel, but access to the U.S. would become the exception rather than the rule.
Polisario's credibility and finances under pressure
Loss of «liberation movement» aura: The FTO label would legally equate the Polisario with groups like Hezbollah or the PKK, seriously undermining its third-worldist narrative.
Fundraising challenges: American payment platforms would sever ties, and European banks would adopt a strict cautionary stance. Non-dollar channels such as cryptocurrencies or Asian banks might persist unless secondary sanctions are imposed.
NGOs under scrutiny: Humanitarian organizations would need OFAC licenses to operate in the Tindouf camps. Any advocacy or training involving the Polisario would become legally risky.
Algeria in a delicate spot
No automatic «State Sponsor of Terrorism» label: That designation requires clear, repeated support for attacks targeting U.S. interests.
«Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act» law leverage: If Algeria pursues significant new Russian arms deals, CAATSA sanctions could be triggered, but this would be a highly political and conditional decision.
Narrative costs: Supporting a group officially labeled as terrorist would damage Algeria's position, especially since some Sahel countries accuse it of backing terrorist groups in the region.
Possible mitigation: Algeria might push for the disarmament of Polisario militias to ease international pressure.
Multilateral repercussions: shifting from «decolonization» to «security»
At the UN Security Council: The U.S. could push to add counter-terrorism to MINURSO's mandate during its next renewal. This would require a new resolution and must avoid a Russian or Chinese veto.
Within the African Union: Some member states concerned about their image might distance themselves from the SADR, potentially leading to a formal suspension if 36 countries support amending the AU's founding charter.
Bilateral relations: Hesitant countries would have a stronger rationale to openly back Morocco's autonomy plan.
In short, if Washington finally brands the Polisario Front as an FTO, it would shine a spotlight on the alliances behind the Polisario—making them more visible, and more politically costly for countries like Algeria and South Africa to support.