Ingram Micro responds to ransomware incident impacting internal systems
"Ingram Micro recently identified ransomware on certain of its internal systems," the company said in a statement issued on 5 July. "Promptly after learning of the issue, the Company took steps to secure the relevant environment, including proactively taking certain systems offline and implementing other mitigation measures. The Company also launched an investigation with the assistance of leading cybersecurity experts and notified law enforcement."
The company is currently focused on restoring affected systems and minimising disruption to business operations. "Ingram Micro is working diligently to restore the affected systems so that it can process and ship orders, and the Company apologises for any disruption this issue is causing its customers, vendor partners, and others," the statement read.
Expert voices warn on supply chain risks
Industry experts have highlighted the growing risks associated with third-party access in the wake of the attack. Gareth Roberts, Head of Delivery at tmc3, a Qodea company, said: "It is crucial to remember that organisations are only as secure as their weakest link. Therefore, assessing the security practices of third-party suppliers and ensuring that data protection standards are being upheld is vital to a company's security posture."
Roberts underscored the importance of communication and transparency throughout the supply chain, noting that technical safeguards also play a key role in preventing such incidents. "To further protect information, businesses can implement specific technical measures such as strong encryption for data both in transit and at rest, which makes it unreadable to unauthorised users. Additionally, enforcing access controls and multi-factor authentication (MFA) helps ensure that sensitive data is only accessible to those who require it," he advised.
Alleged threat actor and industry context
The ransomware incident at Ingram Micro has reportedly been linked to a group known as SafePay, which allegedly accessed the company's systems via a compromised virtual private network (VPN). Jim Routh, Chief Trust Officer at Saviynt, commented: "The attack on Ingram Micro allegedly by SafePay is another example of the preference for threat actors to use compromised credentials to penetrate proprietary systems, in this case, gaining access to the virtual private network of Ingram Micro. Enterprises have an opportunity to improve their identity security capabilities to resist these types of attacks in the future."
Chris Hauk, Consumer Privacy Champion at Pixel Privacy, provided further context regarding the threat landscape. "With the toppling of LockBit and ALPHV, this has opened up 'opportunities' for upstart ransomware groups like SafePay. The group first gained fame with an early high-profile SafePay ransomware attack on UK telematics business Microlise, with SafePay claiming to have stolen 1.2 terabytes of data and demanding payment in less than 24 hours. However, little remains known about the group," Hauk noted.
Hauk added: "The reports I've seen indicate the group moves quickly, with fast encryption times, seeing attacks typically move from system breach to deployment in less than 24 hours."
He emphasised that organisations can protect against similar threats by implementing a series of robust security measures. "Organisations can protect against SafePay and similar types of ransomware attacks by placing strict access controls on their systems, strong authentication like multi-factor authentication, monitoring for newly discovered vulnerabilities, and implementing secure VPN connections to provide remote access," Hauk said.
Ongoing investigation and mitigation efforts
Ingram Micro's statement did not specify the extent of the disruption or when full system restoration is expected. The company has engaged leading cybersecurity experts to support its investigation and has notified relevant law enforcement authorities. The company also apologised for any inconvenience experienced by its customers and partners as a result of the incident.
As the investigation continues, Ingram Micro's experience underscores the persistent threat posed by ransomware and highlights the critical importance of vigilance, secure access management, and strong supply chain security practices within the IT sector.
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Techday NZ
4 days ago
- Techday NZ
Q2 2025 ransomware trends analysis: Boom and bust
"Tumultuous times" would be an accurate summary of Q2 2025 where ransomware threat actors are concerned. Rapid7's internal and publicly-available data analysis reveals a dynamic environment where major players come and go, newer groups work their way up the heavy-hitters ladder, and threat actors jostle for top dog status. Plus, there's law enforcement action thrown in there for good measure. In this article we highlight the key changes we saw represented in the data: shifting alliances, the disappearing act of a dominant force, and how this vanishing trick has led to a major redistribution of ransomware operations. At a glance Q2 2025 features many of the threat actors Rapid7 observed in Q1, with the top four leak site post groups quite a ways out in front of the rest. Qilin leads the pack by some distance, with SafePay and Akira in second place, and Play in third position. Lynx and INC Ransom lead the charge in the lower half of the chart, with DragonForce making its first appearance of the year alongside top 10 newcomers such as double extortionists NightSpire. In Q1 2025, there were 76 active ransomware groups. Out of those, 17 groups became inactive in Q2 2025, meaning they had no recorded leak posts in April, May, or June. These include (but are not limited to): 8base, BianLian, BlackBasta, Cactus, RansomExx, DarkVault, Zerolockersec, and CrazyHunter Team. There were 65 ransomware groups actively attacking in Q2 2025. While this represents a 14.47% decrease from the previous quarter, our data for the first half of 2025 shows an overall count of 96 unique groups - a 41.18% increase over the 68 we saw in 1H 2024. New ransomware groups active since the start of Q2 include (but are not limited to): KaWa4096, Warlock, Devman, Nova, and Dire Wolf, with 11 net new groups in Q2 2025 in total. Notably, power player RansomHub - the most prolific operator we observed in 2024, and leading our Q1 2025 top 10 - ceased operations completely at the beginning of April, with the group's infrastructure dropping offline. Affiliates primarily moved to other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) offerings, such as DragonForce and LockBit. Given that RansomHub affiliates are known for exploiting vulnerabilities to gain initial access, followed by double extortion, this could mean a significant ripple of ransomware distributors moving elsewhere. Popular targets in Q2: Services, healthcare, technology, legal, and finance were the most targeted industries in Q2 2025. The frontrunner this quarter is services, with 44.4% of posts containing these victims' data. In a distant second place is healthcare (10.6%), followed by technology in third (10.0%). Top regional targets include the United States (66.0%), the UK in second place with just 6.7%, and Canada (6.6%), Germany (4.2%), and Italy (3.2%) taking the other three top spots. Notable trends Q2 has seen plenty of infighting between prominent and up-and-coming threat actors, claims of rivals uniting, and major players hit by arrests. It makes sense, then, that affiliates would be in a state of flux, moving from one RaaS group to another, or even holding off altogether until the dust settles. With so many rebrands and launches of newer, more nimble ransomware groups to choose from, expect to see more affiliates striking out in bold new directions. Infighting sits uneasily next to cooperation in Q2, with some groups trying to facilitate bigger and better infrastructure, leak sites, and features offered to potential affiliates. DragonForce is a prime example, using its ransomware alongside other threat actors taking care of the initial access side of things. As we'll highlight later, DragonForce may have a shaky alliance with what remains of RansomHub - or perhaps it's something else altogether. In Q1, we took extra care to highlight that our top 10 included two sets of data; groups posting net-new leaks - that is, completely original and never-before-seen leak posts - and those posting reused or repurposed leaks. Well-known threat actors such as FunkSec and LockBit were found to be making use of old leak data, or mixing old data and faked attacks. Adopting new identities and reusing stale data for a quick promotional boost is also something to be wary of when covering ransomware groups and supposed leaks. For Q2, we've removed threat actors posting old or fake data from the top 10 completely. Q3 will no doubt require the same care and attention when looking to present the most accurate description of ransomware group activity possible. Ones to watch For Q2, our ones to watch are a mix of new and established names. Threat actor arrests, hostile inter-group takeovers, innovative affiliate services, and potentially dangerous ransomware outbreaks in healthcare organisations define a frantic few months. First observed in 2022, Scattered Spider is a threat actor that often combines nation-state-level tradecraft with aggressive social engineering. It continues to take the spotlight in high-profile incidents, even in the midst of arrests potentially tied to the collective. Experts in weaponising corporate environments and behaviours, careful attention is paid to the human side of corporate targets when sizing up a potential infiltration. This group is closely tied to social engineering techniques where initial access is concerned. Phishing, SIM swapping, and help desk social engineering are what Scattered Spider excels at, which can make early detection difficult. Large enterprises in industries such as gaming, telecommunications, and cloud computing are known to be attractive propositions to Scattered Spider. However, the group has also branched out into retail, finance, and the aviation sector. It's been speculated that they are the group behind the June 30 cyber attack impacting 5.7 million Qantas airlines customers. Scattered Spider often partners with RaaS group DragonForce, with the former handling initial access and the latter providing the ransomware; together, they can be a devastating tag team of intrusion and extortion, and one which can lead to confusion between said groups in specific attacks. We can't currently suggest how much impact recent arrests related to several retailer compromises may have on the threat actor. Suspicion of Computer Misuse Act offences, blackmail, money laundering, and participating in organised crime are not easy charges to shrug off. The "sink or swim" moment for Scattered Spider may already have passed by the time Q3 comes around. A new entry to our top 10 groups list, DragonForce (also known as "The DragonForce Ransomware Cartel") first came to light with a 2023 attack on the Ohio Lottery, impacting roughly 500,000 individuals with claims of stolen employee and customer data. More recently, a UK retailer, itself a victim of a major attack in April of this year, attributed the compromise to DragonForce. According to the company's chair, the attack, which is expected to impact this year's profits by around $400m, felt like it was intended to "destroy the business." DragonForce is media-savvy and has its own AI generated calling card, occasionally sent directly to BBC journalists to announce what may be new breaches. To add to the drama surrounding this threat actor, shortly after RansomHub's leak site went offline in late March, it was defaced with a prominent "R.I.P. 3/3/25" mess age. In April, DragonForce published a "new projects" portal on their own leak site linking back to that message - and explicitly invited RansomHub to join their newly branded "Ransomware Cartel." Analysts widely interpret this as a hostile takeover; DragonForce also publicly declared on the RAMP dark‑web forum that RansomHub had "decided to move to our infrastructure." The result is a tangled and dramatic subplot that seems to reflect DragonForce's strategic push to absorb affiliates and expand its footprint. A messy, convoluted tale with no clear narrative, but perhaps that's exactly what an up-and-coming threat actor with a view to expansion wants. In our Q1 2025 ransomware blog, Qilin came fourth in our top 10 list once non-net-new leak posts were excluded. We did say this threat actor was one to watch, and sure enough, Qilin is top of the list once similar non-net new exclusions are applied. Qilin, working its way through healthcare, financial, and manufacturing businesses since 2022, has had a dramatic few months since we last referenced its activities. Once more we return to the now-defunct RansomHub, because though absent, the shadow of its presence looms large; even with the increase in leak posts from Qilin in Q2, it would likely have remained in second place behind RansomHub's prolific output. With the behemoth out of the way, this is now Qilin's time to shine. In June, it was revealed that Qilin added a "call a lawyer" feature to its affiliate panel. Said lawyer is supposed to be able to assist with ransom negotiations, stolen data assessment, and potential breaking of laws by victims post-compromise. Doubt has been cast with regard to how useful this service would actually be, and an argument could be made that it does sound like something largely designed to attract more affiliates. New, flashy services and features help to put a RaaS offering a cut above the rest, which is surely something Qilin operators have considered when adding this new service. By the same token, sometimes publicity and making headlines can have the opposite effect where attracting affiliates is concerned. It was recently confirmed that a large-scale ransomware attack on one of the NHS's suppliers in 2024 was a contributory factor - among several others - to the death of a patient. In total, 170 patients suffered "low harm" impact as a result of the Qilin-attributed attack on Synnovis. With Qilin responsible for other attacks in the healthcare industry, it remains to be seen if the threat actor's "we don't care" attitude proves a little too rich for would-be affiliates. As with Q1, RaaS and double extortion are overwhelmingly favoured by the majority of threat actors in our top 10. The volume of leak posts over Q2 is high, with both never-before-seen leaks and rehashed data adding to the total. Additionally, some groups are making use of stealer logs and Initial Access Broker (IAB) forums which provide credentials for the first point of entry into a compromised network. The risk-reward line in the sand is perhaps making some groups become a little greedy in the rush to snap up new and potentially floating affiliates. Relaxing entry requirements for affiliate schemes, as DragonForce and Cicada3301 have done, may well lower the barrier to entry for wannabes. Considering how quickly rival groups will go to war with one another over actual or perceived slights, it seems risky to simply hope that new affiliates will play by the rules - or not get themselves caught and expose the inner workings of an operation. In the worst case scenario, a new affiliate not subject to stringent checks could turn out to be a security researcher, law enforcement, or even someone from a rival threat actor. As we said: risk-reward. Recommendations In our Q1 2025 post, we highlighted "Five things you can do now" to secure your organisation against the ever-present threat of ransomware-centric compromise. Effective multi-factor authentication (MFA) deployment, continuous patch management, and attack surface investigation are all great ways to set about tackling the ransomware scourge. But what can you do when your attacker is a specific threat actor, such as Scattered Spider? Lock down the help desk: An important part of Scattered Spider's intrusion techniques are help desk scams. Employee data scraped from LinkedIn profiles, combined with a lack of security precautions from the employer often hands Scattered Spider a first rung on the compromise ladder. Train help desk staff to recognise common social engineering techniques, especially around quick "emergency" resets, and enforce strict verification for password and MFA resets. High-privilege accounts may require multi-factor or even multi-person approvals, especially for out-of-band or urgent sounding reset requests. Place limits on how many support staffers can reset admin-level accounts, and ensure all such actions are logged with management. Deploy and secure your MFA: Phishing-resistant MFA is crucial for users, especially administrators. For example, the latter in particular should not be using easily compromised SMS messaging for authentication codes, as this is a form of authentication notorious for being hijacked with fake help desk calls. App-based OTP with number matching, or FIDO2 security keys, would be better options here. As Scattered Spider is known to deploy MFA fatigue techniques, countering this with the limiting of push attempts or number matching should be viewed as an important, if not essential, tool for warding off Scattered Spider attacks. No matter which form your MFA takes, quick detection of newly added devices or unusual IP activity can help a security team to prevent further pivots from the attacker. Revisit your identity hygiene and least privilege: With compromised credentials being such an important part of Scattered Spider's tactics, it makes sense to keep business-critical accounts from everyday activities. High-privilege tasks should be performed by unique accounts, with just-in-time elevation applied to said accounts so that even a compromise cannot lead to immediate escalation without an approval request. Tighten cloud security and monitoring: Scattered Spider's deep understanding of cloud environments using Amazon Web Services (AWS) Systems Manager Session Manager, EC2 Serial Console, and Identity and Access Management (IAM) role enumeration to pivot and persist within cloud infrastructure spells trouble for organisations with insecure cloud environments. Ensure cloud management pathways are locked down, and restrict the use of Systems Manager Session Manager and the EC2 Serial Console to authorised admin users only in AWS. Enable alerts if these features are used by new users or unusual IP addresses. Monitor cloud audit logs for AWS (CloudTrail), Microsoft Entra ID, for any sign of intrusion - this may take the form of IAM role enumeration calls, or unexpected IAM new user creation. Behaviour analytics can help to pinpoint when a low-privilege user suddenly begins performing admin-level actions. Ensure that a compromised Okta/SSO user cannot by itself administer the entire cloud environment by making use of the principle of least privilege. Enact a backup and response plan: Offline and encrypted backups of critical data, alongside regular testing of restoration plans, will ensure there is no eleventh hour panic should the worst happen. As Scattered Spider wastes no time from initial compromise to full domain/admin takeover, an incident response plan is crucial to quickly and safely lock down a Scattered Spider attack. Rapid invalidation of active sessions and tokens, forced enterprise-wide password resets, and locking down help desk password resets will work wonders here, as will the deployment of your incident response teams. Take it to the table: Tabletop exercises, which make full use of Scattered Spider's playbook of known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), should be a part of any scenario intended to determine how much of a Scattered Spider storm your organisation thinks it can weather. Focus on key Scattered Spider techniques, such as a dedicated help desk attack exercise. For example: maybe the attacker has already gained an employee's phone number from LinkedIn, and is attempting a SIM swap social engineering attempt on the help desk technician. Perhaps the attacker has instead compromised the login of the help desk worker via a phishing website, and is looking to create hidden privileged accounts. In this scenario, how would you know the rogue account had been created? What data would you look for to indicate unusual activity, and where would it live? We mentioned multi-person approvals for new account creation up above; what happens if there's no approval required? Conclusion The rise of groups such as DragonForce, as well as Qilin's newfound dominance in the face of RansomHub's absence, signals a period of what may be prolonged powerscale rebalancing and affiliate enticement among threat actors. Add to this the uncertain lay of the land with regard to supposed ransomware alliances, and we have a perfect storm of groups working together - yet remaining at odds - while businesses attempt to parse shifting threat actor patterns. The sheer chaos of this environment means that it's never been more important for organisations to make use of threat intelligence and explore what makes these groups tick. Their willingness to exploit new strains of ransomware and affiliate activity, while also leveraging social engineering, is clear to see. A defence-in-depth approach that covers both detection and response and social engineering training to address the human element is crucial. Maybe it's finally time to dust off that tabletop.
Techday NZ
6 days ago
- Techday NZ
Wise urges New Zealand MPs to end NZD $667m FX fee losses
Wise has urged Parliament to address what it describes as misleading bank fees on foreign transactions, claiming these are costing New Zealanders hundreds of millions of New Zealand dollars each year. The call was made as part of Wise's submission to Parliament's Finance and Expenditure Select Committee on the Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025, which is currently under consideration. Wise contends that changes are needed to protect both consumers and businesses who are affected each time a currency conversion takes place, whether through sending money overseas, shopping online, travelling abroad, or operating businesses internationally. Hidden costs Research commissioned by Wise from Edgar, Dunn & Company indicated that New Zealanders lost a total of NZD $667 million to hidden foreign exchange (FX) payment fees in 2023. According to projections, this figure is set to increase to NZD $991 million by 2029 if current practices continue. Wise argues that these losses are primarily due to banks advertising "fee-free" international transactions while actual costs are concealed via inflated exchange rates. Tristan Dakin, Country Manager ANZ at Wise, stated: "New Zealanders think they're getting a good deal because they see 'no fees' or 'zero commission'. But the real cost is hidden in the exchange rate mark-up, which can be vastly different to the rate you find on Google. By ensuring more transparency, parliament can put millions back into the wallets of consumers, while removing barriers for small businesses that want to expand internationally." Regulatory context New Zealand currently has no specific legal requirements in place to tackle the problem of hidden FX costs in cross-border banking and payments. However, Wise's submission follows growing discussions in both local and international contexts about the need to enhance competition and transparency. Last year, the New Zealand Commerce Commission noted there "appears to be room to improve competition" in this area, and the G20 is already working towards making international payments more affordable, faster, and more transparent worldwide. Dakin also commented: "What the banks are doing right now is unfair, misleading, and is somehow perfectly legal. That needs to change, or they will continue to take an unfair share from Kiwi consumers and businesses. With the Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025 and the growing international calls for reform, it's only a matter of time before governments all around the world take action on misleading FX fees." He added: "New Zealand has an incredible opportunity to set an example for the rest of the world. These proposed reforms offer a practical, low-cost solution that would help Kiwis make better choices and save money, while driving competition and innovation in the space." Proposed measures Wise's submission recommends several changes be included in the Bill. First, they suggest that all banks and financial service providers should be required to display the full cost of a transfer upfront, showing both fixed fees and exchange rate mark-ups. Wise also calls for a ban on advertising that implies transfers are "fee-free" when costs are actually embedded in the exchange rate. It believes that standardising how prices are displayed would make it easier for consumers and businesses to compare service providers effectively, and that key terms like "mid-market exchange rate" should be clearly defined to maintain consistency across the sector. The G20 has also cited the importance of enhancing cross-border payments, arguing that faster, cheaper, more transparent and more inclusive services would benefit citizens and economies worldwide by supporting economic growth, trade, development, and financial inclusion. Wise referenced this international perspective to highlight the relevance of its recommendations in the New Zealand context. Committee consideration The Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025 remains before the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee, which is expected to report later in the year. Wise, supported by the data from its commissioned research, is urging policymakers to act in order to address what it sees as a lack of transparency and competition in cross-border payments. The company's submission is part of a wider movement across several jurisdictions to regulate and clarify the costs of international money transfers and currency exchanges, amid projections of growing sums lost to hidden fees in the years ahead.
Scoop
6 days ago
- Scoop
Wise Urges Parliament To Act On Misleading Foreign Transaction Fees That Cost Kiwis Hundreds Of Millions Each Year
As the Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025 moves through parliament, Wise highlights the full scale of the problem to MPs Wellington: Wise is calling for more transparency and fairness on foreign transactions, as New Zealand consumers and businesses continue to be ripped off by hidden fees. In a submission to Parliament's Finance and Expenditure Select Committee on the Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025, Wise explains how banks claim to provide 'fee-free' cross currency services while hiding true costs behind inflated transfer rates. According to research by Edgar, Dunn & Company, commissioned by Wise, New Zealand consumers lost a total of NZD 667 million due to hidden FX payment fees in 2023, with this figure projected to increase to NZD 991 million by 2029.1 Tristan Dakin, Country Manager ANZ at Wise says: 'New Zealanders think they're getting a good deal because they see 'no fees' or 'zero commission'. But the real cost is hidden in the exchange rate mark-up, which can be vastly different to the rate you find on Google. By ensuring more transparency, parliament can put millions back into the wallets of consumers, while removing barriers for small businesses that want to expand internationally.' Growing push to tackle hidden FX While there are no current laws in place in New Zealand to address the issue, momentum for change is growing. Last year, the NZ Commerce Commission said there 'appears to be room to improve competition' in the space. And internationally, the G20 is acting on its roadmap for making international payments cheaper, faster, and more transparent. Dakin adds: 'What the banks are doing right now is unfair, misleading, and is somehow perfectly legal. That needs to change, or they will continue to take an unfair share from Kiwi consumers and businesses. With the Financial Markets Conduct Amendment Bill 2025 and the growing international calls for reform, it's only a matter of time before governments all around the world take action on misleading FX fees. New Zealand has an incredible opportunity to set an example for the rest of the world. These proposed reforms offer a practical, low-cost solution that would help Kiwis make better choices and save money, while driving competition and innovation in the space', says Dakin. The Bill is currently before Parliament's Finance and Expenditure Committee which is due to report on 19 October. Wise is calling for the following changes: Require banks and financial service providers to show the full cost of a transfer upfront, including both fixed fees and exchange rate markups. Ban advertising that claims transfers are 'fee-free' when a fee is hidden in the exchange rate. Standardise how pricing is shown, so people can compare providers easily. Define key terms like 'mid-market exchange rate' to ensure consistency. 1 The 2023 hidden fee data from Edgar, Dunn, and Company (EDC) were calculated based on the exchange rate margin offered by the largest banks in New Zealand when their customers move money from the country. Fee data from 2024 to 2029 are projected based on expected GDP growth of New Zealand. About Wise: Wise is a global technology company, building the best way to move and manage the world's money. Wise has more than 400,000 active New Zealand customers. With Wise Account and Wise Business, people and businesses can hold 40 currencies, move money between countries and spend money abroad. Large companies and banks use Wise technology too; an entirely new network for the world's money. One of the world's fastest growing, profitable tech companies, Wise launched in 2011 and is listed on the London Stock Exchange under the ticker, WISE. In fiscal year 2025, Wise supported around 14.8 million personal customers and 700,000 business customers, processing approximately £145.2 billion in cross-border transactions, and saving customers an estimated £2 billion.
