Thailand's export-led model needs rejig

Bangkok Post

2 days ago

Time is running out for Thailand, and the stakes have never been higher. As Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira arrived in Washington this week for critical trade talks with the US negotiation team, Thailand confronts not just a tariff negotiation but an existential challenge to its export-dependent economic model. With US President Donald Trump's 90-day grace period expiring on July 8, Thailand must secure a deal or face a punishing 36% tariff that threatens to unravel decades of export-led development strategy.
The domestic political vacuum resulting from the Constitutional Court's suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra over a leaked phone conversation with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen complicates matters further. The court's decision has plunged the government into crisis precisely when political stability is most crucial. Finance Minister Pichai's negotiation team may now have to convince their US counterpart not only of their proposals' merits but of their own government's tenure and authority to implement any agreement reached.
The challenge is compounded by regional competitive dynamics that Thailand can no longer ignore. While Thailand scrambles to secure its first formal in-person meeting, Vietnam has already engaged in multiple rounds of talks with Washington. This late start means that Thailand must secure favourable terms while ensuring they remain competitive relative to what Vietnam and other Asean neighbours ultimately achieve.
While the US has indicated an 18% levy, Thailand aims to reduce the 36% "reciprocal tariff" to the universal minimum of 10%. The US has requested Thailand address tax measures, non-tariff barriers, digital trade, and economic security concerns to reduce its US$45.6 billion (1.48 trillion baht) bilateral trade deficit. Thailand's earlier offer included greater market access and tighter screening of transshipments. While policymakers know a full-scale deal is unlikely before July 8, there is hope for an extension agreement.
Yet Thailand's underlying vulnerabilities remain stark. The United States remains Thailand's largest export market, accounting for 15% of everything the country sells abroad. Thailand's top export categories -- industrial machinery and electrical equipment -- are particularly vulnerable, as the US accounts for more than one-fifth of total exports in these sectors.
These intermediate products frequently serve as inputs for subsequent manufacturing stages, meaning supply chain disruptions can ripple across multiple production levels. When export-focused companies experience demand volatility, effects often reach smaller domestic suppliers who may not be directly exposed to export markets. This pattern extends to Thailand's other major export sectors, including processed food and rubber manufacturing, where smaller suppliers possess limited financial buffers to weather pricing pressures.
This challenge extends beyond Thailand. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore, which depend on comparable export portfolios, confront similar vulnerabilities, intensifying the race to reduce US market dependence. Additionally, foreign direct investment implications present more serious concerns. Thailand's export success has depended on attracting multinational corporations to establish manufacturing operations, capitalising on cost advantages and investment incentives.
Tariffs disrupt this logic by raising costs of reaching crucial markets like the United States from Thailand. When multinational companies reassess operational strategies, options like reshoring, nearshoring, friendshoring, or consolidating operations gain increased appeal, pushing companies to rethink their global footprints.
Thailand's deepening relationship with China further compounds these strategic challenges. China has become a rival to Japan as Thailand's most important foreign investment source, pouring money into electric vehicles, digital infrastructure, and real estate. While bringing significant benefits including technology transfer and capital inflows, being closer to China now poses risks in Mr Trump's worldview.
Thailand's electric vehicle ambitions exemplify this dilemma. Chinese automakers like BYD have made massive investments as the country positions itself as Southeast Asia's EV hub. But if Mr Trump views Thailand as facilitating Chinese access to global markets, the carefully crafted EV industrial strategy could become a liability rather than an asset.
Meanwhile, Thailand faces another China-related challenge: the flood of cheaper Chinese products entering the domestic market as Chinese exporters seek alternative outlets after being shut out of America. While Thai consumers may benefit from lower prices, smaller domestic manufacturers risk being eliminated by competition from Chinese companies dumping excess capacity throughout Southeast Asia.
Thailand's diplomatic position has been weakened by recent policy missteps straining relations with Washington precisely when maximum leverage is needed. The deportation of Uyghurs to China, hosting Myanmar's junta leader in Bangkok, and arresting an American academic on lese-majeste charges have all sent wrong signals at the wrong moment. The current domestic political uncertainty simply does not help.
Thailand's conciliatory offer to increase imports of US energy, agricultural products and aircraft might sound reasonable but is overly simplistic and reinforces asymmetric negotiations without securing meaningful concessions in return.
As multinational companies rethink supply chain structures, the real challenge for Thailand is leveraging the country's competitive positioning based on deeper understanding of its roles within global industries. Countries that perform critical tasks or provide complete ecosystems are harder to replace in global value chains.
Thai policymakers must begin by comprehensively mapping how Thailand-based firms participate in global value chains across industries. Thailand needs a granular understanding of what tasks are performed where, which firms are involved, how they connect to global networks, and what competitive advantages they provide. This analysis should inform policies that go beyond traditional tax incentives toward making operations in Thailand essential for multinational companies. As firms reassess their global footprints, Thailand must provide compelling reasons for their continued presence.
Mr Trump's tariffs represent more than a trade policy challenge that can be overcome through negotiations. They signal a fundamental shift in how global economic relationships are structured and supply chains are reconfigured. Disruptions caused by rising nationalism, geopolitical rivalry, and unpredictable trade policy are the new rules of the game.
As the July 8 deadline approaches, Thailand's future prosperity depends not just on what negotiators can achieve in Washington, but on securing terms that preserve competitiveness against regional rivals while building an economy resilient enough to thrive regardless of trade policy volatility. To thrive and survive in this new environment, countries need to think beyond tariff negotiations and re-evaluate how to fundamentally strengthen their economic foundations. Thailand's strategic recalibration is not just urgent, but existential.