Govt allows single-point command for Army, Navy, Air Force via Chief of Defence Staff & DMA Secy
on Tuesday authorised the
Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS) and Secretary,
Department of Military Affairs
(DMA), to issue
Joint Instructions and Joint Orders
applicable to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in a step aimed at modernising the functioning of the
Indian Armed Forces
.
The announcement marks a departure from the earlier system where each Service issued separate instructions on matters involving two or more Services.
The first Joint Order titled 'Approval, Promulgation and Numbering of Joint Instructions and Joint Orders' was issued the same day.
The order focuses on streamlining processes, removing redundancies, and enhancing coordination across the Services.
The move is expected to improve administrative efficiency and foster transparency. It is also seen as a foundation for strengthening jointness in military operations and planning.
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According to the
Ministry of Defence
, this step marks the beginning of a new phase of integration across the three Services, reinforcing the Armed Forces' unity of purpose.
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Indian Express
3 hours ago
- Indian Express
P Chidambaram writes: Military boldness, political timidity
During the debate in both Houses of Parliament last week, the government gave the impression that Operation Sindoor had been finally paused, the goals had been achieved, and it is back to the usual way of doing things. That would be wrong. The truth is, the military was playing a tough game when the civilian government forcibly snatched the ball. Operation Sindoor has busted some myths: that fighting a war against Pakistan will be easy, that India's superiority in conventional war will prevail, and that India has friends and Pakistan none. The military leadership was exemplary. Apparently, they asked for and got operational freedom. The Indian armed forces' first-mover advantage gave them early wins: 9 places that hosted terrorist infrastructure were demolished and several terrorists were killed. However, Pakistan's armed forces quickly recovered. They counter-attacked on May 7-8 using China-made aircraft (J-10), China-made missiles (PL-15) and drones acquired from Türkiye. Realising that 'tactical mistakes' had been made, the military leadership paused the operation and 're-strategised'. That is leadership. It re-launched the Operation on May 9-10, struck at 11 military airbases and severely damaged them. Inevitably, the Indian armed forces suffered some 'losses', and the Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of Army Staff admitted the losses. That too is leadership. Contrast the political leadership. It will not admit the mistakes or the losses. Like an ostrich whose head is buried in the sand, it maintains that India scored a 'decisive victory' in Operation Sindoor. If there was a decisive victory, why did India not press its advantage, secure more military gains, and demand and obtain from Pakistan political concessions? Why was the first outreach by the DGMO, Pakistan accepted immediately and without conditions? There were no answers from the government. [A celebrated example of a decisive victory was the surrender of Pakistan's General Niazi to India's Lt General Aurora on December 16, 1971.] Nor will the political leadership acknowledge the reality: Pakistan and China have forged strong military and political bonds. China is supplying new generation fighter aircraft and missiles to Pakistan. Obviously, China was testing its military hardware in a battlefield in a real war. The military bond is visible. On the political front, China's foreign minister Wang Yi praised Pakistan's 'resolute action on terrorism'. China also voted in favour when IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank approved large amounts of loans to Pakistan. The other reality is that Pakistan's (at least the Pakistan military's) bonds with the United States are firmly in place. President Trump invited General Asim Munir, Pakistan's Army Chief, to lunch at the White House, an unprecedented honour to a person who is not Head of State or Head of Government. Mr Trump thanked General Munir 'for not going into the war and ending the war', and gloated again that he had brought about the ceasefire. The Prime Minister and the Home Minister do not miss an opportunity to rebuke the Opposition but dare not rebut or refute President Trump or President Xi or their foreign ministers. The overwhelming reality is that the US and China are on the same page in their support to Pakistan militarily, politically and economically. Keeping aside their differences, the US and China have decided to support and patronise Pakistan. Worse, every country to which India reached out offered sympathy for the victims of the Pahalgam attack and condemned terrorism but did not condemn Pakistan as the perpetrator. India's political leadership refuses to acknowledge the reality and continues to nurture the false belief that Pakistan is friendless and India has friends all over the world. The other delusion of the Indian political leadership is that the 'terror ecosystem' has been smashed in Jammu & Kashmir. The truth is different. Ministry of Home Affairs disclosed to the all-party meeting on April 24, 2025 (immediately after the Pahalgam attack on April 22) that, between June 2014 and May 2024, there were — Undeniably, there were terrorist incidents and casualties in the governments of A B Vajpayee (1998-2004) and Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) as well. The terror ecosystem is populated by Pakistan-based infiltrators and India-based extremists, especially in Kashmir. Often, they work together, strike together and help each other. On April 26, the government demolished several houses in Kashmir of suspected 'terrorists associated with the Pahalgam massacre' — the owners were obviously India-based. In June 2025, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested two Indians for harbouring the suspected terrorists. The suspected terrorists were neutralised on July 27-28 and identified as infiltrators. India-based terrorists have committed terrorist attacks in the past. For example, Mumbai witnessed terror attacks in 2006 (suburban train bomb blasts), 2008 (Tajmahal Hotel) and 2011 (Zaveri Bazaar). The 2006 incident was committed by India-based terrorists, the 2008 attack was by 10 Pakistani infiltrators including Kasab, and the 2011 incident was by India-based terrorists. The government's claim that the terror ecosystem in India has been dismantled is manifestly wrong. The failure of intelligence and the absence of security forces in Pahalgam led to the tragedy. No one in the government has taken responsibility. The military's gains in Operation Sindoor will have a deterrent effect on Pakistan but the political leadership's timidity before the US and China may cancel the gains and give encouragement to Pakistan.
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First Post
17 hours ago
- First Post
India–China thaw: Strategic signalling, not concession
Earlier this month, it was announced that India is resuming the issuance of tourist visas for Chinese citizens. Just before this, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval visited China for meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar travelled to China shortly after and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This was the first such meeting since the Galwan Valley clash of 2020. This is a strategic signal from India amidst new circumstances created by some of the most powerful states in the existing international system. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India's recent uptick in diplomatic ties with China is not a concession; instead, it reflects India's calculated posture of strategic signalling. With the bilateral trade agreement with the US currently stalled and the global economic landscape shifting rapidly, India is engaging with China not to resolve old disputes but to gain strategic leverage through the creation of optics. Since late 2024, India and China have entered into a deliberate but structural phase to engage with each other to reduce tensions along the Himalayan border. After experiencing four years of protected standoff following the deadly Galwan face-off, the diplomatic levers have shifted. The latest phase began with an important breakthrough on October 21, 2024, when both countries agreed on a border pact, letting each other patrol at previously restricted friction points like Depsang and Demchok. The agreement helped significantly in restoring trust and establishing communication between two powerful neighbours. After this agreement there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges between both the powers. These consistent meetings, though, suggest a pattern in which both nations are trying to reduce mistrust and restore a dialogue to prevent further crisis. Both nations are engaging at a greater pace than they ever were doing. For India, this is about asserting sovereignty while avoiding conflict. For China, it is about projecting stability along its southern frontier as it faces growing pressure in the Western Pacific and domestic economic headwinds. Yet the question remains: Why is India doing this now when the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is still contested? New Delhi is pursuing economic de-risking, not decoupling from China. Despite all the geopolitical friction, India remains deeply entwined with Chinese capital, tech, and rare earth dependencies. India acknowledges this fact and is opting for stability management. Chasing a compartmentalised relationship that seeks to discuss boundary questions without foreclosing economic activities. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, India finds itself in utmost precarity when China also responded with bans and curbs on rare earth materials. Additionally, in an attempt to limit technology transfers to India, along with skilled workers, the Chinese government has recalled hundreds of Chinese engineers and technicians from Foxconn's iPhone factories in India. Foxconn is meeting the shortages by bringing in Taiwanese technicians. India is neither unaware nor unresponsive. Similarly, the suspicion runs through: Will this ongoing round of discussions succeed in producing lasting peace, or is it merely a tactical de-escalation? Historical experience suggests otherwise. The Galwan incursions occurred in the backdrop of the Wuhan summit in 2018 and the Chennai informal summit in 2019, which were also celebrated as turning points. Also, the fundamental issue, the differing perceptions of the LAC, remains unresolved. Confidence-building is underway, but confidence itself remains fragile. The recent diplomatic engagements in Beijing, including discussions on 'de-escalation' and 'normalising people-to-people exchange', occur against a backdrop where India perceives the complete resolution of the border issue as a prerequisite for normal relations, while China prefers to compartmentalise the border issue, pushing for cooperation while maintaining territorial claims and even military posturing. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD While both sides have expressed a desire for a 'positive trajectory' and optimism for 'stable and constructive ties', the talks were steered towards managing disagreements rather than fundamentally resolving them. Opening direct air services and the Kailash Manasarovar yatra are positive steps but do not address the core issue of strategic and territorial disputes. Beijing, on the other hand, strongly objected to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's public birthday greeting to the Dalai Lama in July 2025, reiterating its opposition to any official engagement with the Tibetan spiritual leader. While both nations appear to agree on the need for immediate stability, their long-term goals diverge. India seeks a restoration of the pre-2020 border status and a rules-based order in Asia and elsewhere; China, meanwhile, aims to assert regional influence with and without direct confrontation, and examples range from Doklam to Galwan to China trying to wipe out the identity of Tibet, building the biggest dam on the Yarlung Tsanpo to throttle the downstream Brahmaputra River in India, and so on. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Operation Sindoor also served as an indirect test of tensions between India and China. Beijing's response, calling India's retaliation against terrorism 'unfortunate', caused a rift in New Delhi. While urging 'restraint on all sides", China notably refrained from denouncing the terror provocation or addressing India's security concerns. After Operation Sindoor, the deputy chief of army staff for India also issued a warning on Sino-Pakistan collusion during the operation. If there's one significant shift in India's approach, it is a more layered diplomacy—engaging China bilaterally but also within the framework of multilateral forums like the SCO and Brics, while continuing strategic balancing elsewhere. It is not containment nor alignment, but calibrated coexistence. For Beijing too, stabilising ties with Delhi serves a larger goal: preventing a second front while managing the US pressure in East Asia. Given that the US has lifted export restrictions on Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) tools and software bound for Chinese buyers, and the EU is desperately engaging with China, there is no clarity on whether India can ever count on Western powers. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India understands China as a threat and has been at the receiving end of more conflicts, military and otherwise, with China than any other country in the world. However, it is also a neighbour and a powerful one, with which India will have to manage its relationship. There is no better way in such a complex scenario except diplomacy and optics. Sriparna Pathak is a professor of China Studies at OP Jindal Global University and a senior fellow at the Jindal India Institute. Gaurav Sen is a senior research fellow at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. He is the author of the book 'Peril of the Pacific: Military Balance and Battle for Taiwan'. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Hindu
2 days ago
- The Hindu
Entire country fights a war, says Rajnath, seeks civil-military synergy
Calling for enhanced civil-military synergy, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Friday (August 1, 2025) that war is not fought by the military alone, the whole nation fights it. Mr. Singh was addressing the 84th Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civilian Services Day at DRDO Bhawan, where he said that in the 'rapidly changing security scenario, there is a need to move ahead with dynamism and innovative spirit while making constant improvements according to the evolving needs', said a statement from the government. The Minister said the 'exceptional back-end support' provided by different departments of the Ministry of Defence to the Armed Forces was key to the success of Operation Sindoor. Emphasising that a robust administrative system was integral for a strong military power, Mr. Singh lauded the AFHQ Civilian Services for playing an important role in strengthening the country's security system during war as well as peace time. 'AFHQ Services acts as an institutional memory for the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It provides consistency, domain expertise and uniformity in the administration, while playing a key role in policy continuity and establishing civil-military synergy. It is a strong pillar of a modern and integrated national defence system,' he said. 'Emerging technologies, new challenges and changing global scenario indicate that training should not be just a formal process, but a continuous cycle of development. Skill upgradation, ethical orientation and behavioural excellence need to be added as integral parts of training,' he said. As part of the event, the Minister launched a redeveloped website of Office of Joint Secretary and Chief Administrative Officer that will provide all relevant information about the office to the employees and general public.
