First Putin-Macron call in years covers Ukraine, Iranian nuclear program
In their first phone call in three years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron spoke for two hours on Tuesday, discussing the war in Ukraine and Iran's nuclear program, according to a statement from the Élysée Palace.
The Élysée said Macron urged Putin to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine "as soon as possible." Regarding Iran, both leaders agreed to coordinate their positions and maintain communication shortly.
Based on a separate statement from the Kremlin, Putin stressed that any resolution to the Ukraine conflict must be "comprehensive, address the root causes, and reflect realities on the ground."
The Kremlin added that Putin told Macron the West had been building a hostile base in Ukraine for years, a situation he claimed would prolong the fighting.
Relations between Macron and Putin have gone through several phases. The two maintained relatively strong ties before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and they continued communicating in the early months of the war. However, diplomatic and personal relations deteriorated sharply, with no direct contact until this latest call.
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Memri
an hour ago
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For Russia, Beijing Is An Umbrella To Hide Under In Bad Weather
Several years have passed since Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a solemn setting in Beijing, signed the "no limits" comprehensive partnership. Today, three years after the ongoing escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, we can confidently state that China has not abandoned its support for Moscow, despite unprecedented international pressure and large-scale sanctions that have fallen on Russia. This fact makes us think about the nature and depth of Russian-Chinese relations, their resilience in the face of global challenges and, most importantly, about the extent to which the Chinese leadership is aware of the Kremlin's plans. Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, March 21, 2023. (Source: What Price Is China Willing To Pay To Maintain Its Partnership With Russia? Let's recall February 2022. A few weeks before the start of the so-called "special military operation," Vladimir Putin made a long-awaited visit to Beijing. This was the Russian president's first foreign visit since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and it was timed to coincide with the opening of the Winter Olympic Games. The meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping was a closed, confidential conversation that lasted much longer than planned. Putin, as the highest-ranking foreign leader at the Olympics, received special attention from the Chinese leadership. In addition to signing a number of commercial agreements, the visit culminated in a joint statement declaring a boundless partnership between Russia and China. Ironically, just 20 days after this statement, which sounded like a symbol of a growing alliance, Russia launched a military operation in Ukraine. Since then, the question of whether Xi Jinping knew about Putin's plans has haunted the minds of analysts, experts, and ordinary citizens around the world. In the weeks leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, Western media outlets published shocking reports predicting a possible invasion. However, these publications, full of alarming headlines, were received with a certain degree of skepticism. The scale of the impending escalation and its duration seemed unimaginable. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who was directly involved in the conflict, did not expect such a development. Many Western leaders and senior intelligence officials with access to intelligence also underestimated Putin's resolve. And here the key question arises: Did Xi Jinping have full information about the Russian president's plans? Did he ask the Russian leader about his intentions immediately before signing the "Statement on Comprehensive Partnership"? The exact answer to this question is still unknown. However, several sources and subsequent actions claim that the American intelligence services passed on intelligence to the Chinese side indicating an upcoming invasion. Of course, the information was not sufficient; some details, especially related to the methods of obtaining the intelligence, were classified. But this significant episode raises questions not only about the extent of Xi Jinping's possible awareness, but also about the strategic calculations of the Chinese leadership, its long-term goals, and what price China is willing to pay to maintain its partnership with its closest neighbor in the context of an ongoing war. Elvira Vikhareva China's Dual Rhetoric China's position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is often described as "sitting on the Great Wall of China." At first glance, it seems that Beijing is trying to balance on the edge, simultaneously supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity and demonstrating an understanding of Russia's concerns. For example, statements about support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, are officially voiced by China along with calls for a diplomatic solution to the conflict and recognition of Russia's "legitimate security concerns." This dual rhetoric allows China to indirectly condemn the Russian invasion while simultaneously reserving the opportunity to claim the role of a global mediator in the future. However, behind the rhetoric about the rule of international law is a hidden criticism of NATO's eastward expansion. China, seeking its own global influence, is using the situation to denounce U.S. and NATO policies, presenting the alliance's expansion as a provocative factor that contributes to the escalation of tensions. The veiled attacks on NATO are part of China's broader strategy to undermine U.S. positions in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen its own influence. As they say, it is not that simple. In this context, U.S. partnerships with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India are seen by Beijing as potential threats to its interests. This attempt to sit on two chairs at once is far from unique to the current crisis. Similar tactics have been seen before, for example, during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In both cases, China avoided directly condemning Russia's actions, preferring a neutral stance that allowed it to maintain close relations with Moscow. This confirms the deep strategic nature of the Sino-Russian partnership, which has existed long before Putin and Xi Jinping came to power. Historically, the relationship between China and Russia, which has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has always been based on mutual benefit. In the context of the Cold War, interactions between the two communist powers were complex, often complicated by ideological and territorial disputes. However, after a radical revision of their foreign policies in the 1980s, both countries found grounds for more constructive cooperation. Already in the 21st century, in our time, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has once again brought the two powers closer together. The strengthening of authoritarianism in Russia and the simultaneous personalization of power in China have become two interconnected trends in recent years that are increasingly intertwined, creating a complex geopolitical gradient. A key element of this connection is China's perception of the United States of America as a strategic long-term rival, in fact, an enemy. Incidentally, anti-American sentiments are not alien to Russia either. This perception certainly influences Beijing's actions on the world stage, shaping its foreign policy and strategic alliances. China-Russia Cooperation In Confronting The West Increased Significantly Even during U.S. President Donald Trump's election campaign, China and U.S. experts speculated about his desire to sever close ties between Russia and Beijing. Trump's China and Russia policies are often compared to a "reverse Kissinger" or "reverse Nixon." This means an attempt to reverse the strategy used by Henry Kissinger during Richard Nixon's presidency — that is, a strategy of rapprochement with China to counter the Soviet Union. In Trump's case, it is a potential rapprochement with Russia to counter China. However, unlike in mathematics, where rearranging the terms does not change the sum, in geopolitics, such changes can have dramatic consequences. The historical parallels between today's China and the Soviet Union of the 1970s that supporters of Trump's policies cite are only partially true. The main problem with this analogy is that it ignores the significant differences between the two countries and their international positions. The Soviet Union of the 1970s, despite its ideological status, already had internal contradictions and economic problems, which made it vulnerable to strategic maneuvers. Modern China, on the contrary, demonstrates significant economic power and a rapidly developing technological sector, making it more resilient and less predictable in its actions than the USSR in the 1970s. The success of Nixon and Kissinger lay in their ability to exploit the discord between China and the Soviet Union that arose after the split in the communist movement. They were able to offer China an advantageous alliance against a common enemy, relying on existing frictions. In the case of Trump, the situation is much more complicated. Despite the existence of contradictions between Russia and China in certain areas, their cooperation in confronting the West has increased significantly. This is due to the coincidence of strategic interests in weakening the influence of the United States and NATO. Therefore, simply "switching" partners, as Trump tried to do, does not take into account the deep geopolitical nuances. Moreover, Donald Trump's policy faced internal opposition. In the Republican Party, despite growing anti-Chinese sentiment, there were other points of view on relations with Russia and China. There was a fear that rapprochement with Russia, especially given its authoritarian regime and history of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, could be too costly in the long term and harm the interests of the United States. There is another fork in the road. According to Sinologists, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in the United States that Beijing and Russia need to be cut off from becoming global leaders of the 21st century. Supporters of this argument are most likely not very wrong. America's strength is that in addition to high technology, the size of its economy, the power of its army, and the presence of a large number of friends and allies, people are friends with America not so much out of coercion or forced position, but because of common interests and values. Until recently, China, for example, did not have such allies, although a military alliance with North Korea was formally looming. February 2022 gave China the opportunity to strengthen foreign policy alliances, and such that you do not have to go far. Russia is right next door. And if Moscow suddenly decides to become a pro-Western country, a country that supports American policy towards China, China will find itself in a strategic encirclement. Therefore, completely abandoning support for Russia becomes completely unacceptable for China. On the other hand, realizing that sooner or later relations with the West will tend toward confrontation, China values Europe and the United States as a valuable resource, and if a conflict is inevitable, then China has the power to delay this conflict as much as possible in time, using those years when relations are deteriorating, but not deteriorating rapidly. During this time, the West can gain access to global markets, investments, and to the global financial system as a whole, so it is not advantageous for China to violate the red lines that the U.S. has voiced regarding the Ukrainian crisis. And the situation is much more complicated than simply "crossing red lines." China Acts Exclusively In Its Own Interests Over the past two years, China has demonstrated a certain delicacy in balancing on the edge. Despite the Western establishment's claims about the supply of components for Russian weapons, it is important to note several key nuances. First, many of these Chinese suppliers are already under U.S. sanctions. Second, trade is conducted primarily in the yuan, bypassing dollar transactions, which makes it less vulnerable to Western pressure. Third, payments and deliveries are made across the land border, which makes it much more difficult for the West to control and suppress these supplies. In fact, China uses the "gray zones" of international sanctions, getting as close as possible to the "red lines" without openly crossing them. Balancing this, China is actively developing economic relations with Russia, ignoring Western sanctions where possible. Trade turnover between Beijing and Moscow over the past year reached a whopping $240 billion, showing an increase of 35 percent compared to 2022. At the same time, a huge part of these transactions (90 percent) are carried out in rubles and yuan, minimizing dependence on the U.S. dollar and the euro. The predominance of the yuan (70 percent) in these settlements indicates China's desire to strengthen its currency and reduce the influence of Western financial systems. But Russia's dependence on China, at least in economic terms, is colossal. China provides about 30 percent of Russia's exports and 40 percent of imports, including the military sphere. If China stopped its cooperation with Russia, this would cause extremely serious damage to the Russian economy, calling into question Russia's ability to continue military action in Ukraine. All of the above are key factors that make the West fear a complete turn from China towards Russia. Yes, China plays a key role in supporting Moscow, but at the same time it acts exclusively in its own interests. It cunningly and evasively profits from the current situation, reducing dependence on the West. Attempts by Western lobbyists to force China to exert greater pressure on Russia have not yet been successful and I believe this will not happen. The integration of the Chinese way of life in Russian cities alone is worth something, integration as a tribute to support from Beijing (from the introduction of compulsory Chinese language in schools to everyday needs and currency). The West does not offer China sufficiently advantageous alternatives. Beijing, counting on a long-term resource, has already found fertile ground by settling on Russian territory and this strategy is bringing it real results. A Weather Phenomenon From the very beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, everything that turned out to be advantageous for China, as well as everything that turned out to be disadvantageous for it, happened essentially without its active participation. The statement about a comprehensive partnership without restrictions (probably made for beautiful headlines) became fateful. At the turn of 2025, everything that is happening is perceived by China as a weather phenomenon to which it is necessary to adapt while sitting on that very "Great Chinese Wall." And they are succeeding so far. On the one hand, China has received a Russia that is much more dependent on it, and has received more opportunities to reduce the costs of resources that it receives from Russia. Plus, China got the U.S., which is stuck in resolving several conflicts, but has slightly less strength to confront China. On the other hand, along with this, China got an economic crisis, global inflation, and increased chaos in the world while it is already difficult to predict anything and plan some strategy. Nevertheless, for China, turbulence in the world, outside of Beijing, is nothing more than "weather" that you can neither like or dislike: You must adapt to it. Well, for Russia, Beijing is that very umbrella in that very "bad weather" – an umbrella under which you can hide which is strong enough for now. *Elvira Vikhareva is a renowned Russian opposition politician based in Russia. In 2023, she was poisoned with heavy metal salts.
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