Not as easy as strong Israel vs weak Iran, Netanyahu must be stopped: Daniel Levy

New Indian Express

21-06-2025

Israel and Iran are now locked in a war that's probably the most worrying in recent times. More so with President Donald Trump's overt support, both on Truth Social and with his statements, for Israel.
Will it light up a Middle East that was already a tinderbox? What about Trump's "within-two-weeks" deadline? Will the US step in after that? And what are the long-time implications that the world has to fear?
Daniel Levy, peace negotiator under Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, and now the President of the US Middle East Project shares his thoughts in this interview with The New Indian Express.
Excerpts:
Can we begin with your thoughts on the Israel-Iran war? It began with Israel launching an attack just days ahead of Iran's sixth round of talks with the US. Iran was caught unawares…
I think one has to see this in the context of a few things.
Firstly, that narrow angle of Israel-Iran. People may be aware that Prime Minister Netanyahu, especially, has spoken about the Iranian threat for three decades. But, and this is quite important, there was no intelligence, credible information that Iran was hurtling towards weaponising its nuclear enrichment programme.
Iran has certainly advanced the levels of enrichment ever since Trump, at the request of Israel in his first term, chose to pull out and therefore nullify the nuclear agreement that had been reached in 2015. But Israel is making the claim that this had to happen now since Iran was tipping into an urgent attempt to weaponise. That doesn't seem credible.
You could argue that operationally, with the successful degradation of Hezbollah by Israel, with (ex-Syrian President) Assad being removed, not by Israel, but internally, and with Iran's air defences being weakened, this was operationally an opportunity. But I think one has to look at at least three other vectors, and I'll list them very briefly.
Number one, the Israelis were probably worried, and Netanyahu specifically, that if the latest round of US-Iran talks advanced, then the US would give a clear no in terms of Israel's desire to strike at the Iranian facilities and to strike at Iran more generally.
So, the timing, I think, was designed to undermine those talks. Perhaps Trump believed it would help the talks, but I don't think that's how most people see it playing out.
Secondly, you always have to look a little bit at the domestic politics inside Israel.
Netanyahu is in a coalition crisis. He has held his government together, which is a remarkable success, but he is entering election season and needs something to reshuffle the deck. He's losing in every opinion poll. This was probably his last big roll of the dice.
And thirdly, this of course happens against the backdrop of what has been going on with Israel's assault on the Palestinians. And, in particular, you beginning to see perhaps a tipping point being reached with the images out of Gaza — the intentional starvation programme and another level of cruelty with the shooting of people there. Israel's war crimes in Gaza were beginning to move even Israel's Western allies to question them. This war has been a fabulous distraction.
So, if you package that together, I think you can understand the backdrop.
Coming specifically to the US intelligence report that said Iran was at least three years away from developing a nuclear bomb. Does that not question the very rationale of the war?
Yes, I think most people on the outside do question the rationale of the war.
I think the Israeli claim as to why they are doing this doesn't stack up with the evidence and the composite picture one can establish of what's going on.
But now that the war is on, let us look at what Netanyahu has tried to do. He has been focussing really in one space, that tiny bit of real-estate between the ears of the American president. And he has tried to create an equation where he brings the US into this war to directly engage, because they can do things that the Israelis can't, because then it becomes America's problem. So, I think that's also an important prism through which to understand this.
Can they bring the Americans in?
I think the Israelis are now trying to communicate the message to the Americans that with us having gone this far, it's more dangerous not to finish the job. Because the Iranians may now decide they have to change their strategic posture.
They're trying to create a fait accompli. It looked like Trump was going that way. Now there is apparently a pause in the American decision-making structure.
Let's talk about the situation on the ground. Is it as simple as a very strong Israel versus significantly weakened Iran?
Really interesting question. I don't think it's that simple.
One of the reasons it's not that simple is the need to factor the pain threshold of the respective parties.
Let's look at the nature of the Iranian economy. They are very used to running a resistance economy, living under sanctions.
Israel is the opposite, a very plugged-in nation.
What the war does to Israel's economy — when you can't go in and out of the country, the airspace inside Israel is largely or almost entirely closed to commercial vehicles, where Israel is brought to an economic standstill —can hurt it deeply.
And then there's the more simple pain threshold.
Israelis have never seen these kinds of strikes deep inside their own cities and towns before. And although while they are able to inflict pain on Iran that is more dramatic, more devastating, Iran doesn't have to meet them one for one.
Israelis are also looking at a couple of other things. They do not have an endless supply of interceptor missiles. Their interceptors don't get knocked out of the factory at the rate of hundreds a day. That supply is, I think, a limiting factor.
Then there is their Air Force operating 2,000 kilometres from their border in the skies. These can be quite draining on their pilots after a point.
So, there are factors here that could mean Israel doesn't have the capacity to continue this indefinitely.
Israel is also a small country. Its population of approximately 10 million, even less, limits those whom it can draw into the ranks of its military, especially when two large population groups, the ultra-orthodox and the Palestinians, don't serve. Israelis are exhausted from the amount of reserve duty they've been doing.
If we factor all of this in, it's not a cakewalk for Israel.
I'm hearing that Iran is capable of producing missiles at a pretty good clip when compared to Israel. Is that true?
Well, I'm reading the same information. I think it's sufficiently sourced and it sounds quite credible.
So, Israel is now focussing on the missile launching facilities spread across Iran. It hasn't managed to take those out thus far.
I think we cannot know for sure how depleted Israel's interceptor missiles are. Just as we cannot know exactly how many missiles Iran has left, how able it is to replenish those stocks.
But it does seem like Iran is able to continue to inflict a not-so-insignificant degree of pain.
And let's just acknowledge that there are things that Iran has not brought into the equation yet.
Number one, they've chosen not to expand the circle of the conflict. They have been targeting Israel directly.
The other factor that hasn't come into play is that the Houthis and the militias in Iraq have been very quiet.
These two factors are perhaps being kept in abeyance to wait and see where this goes, and also to signal to the US that we still have other assets that we can bring in to play that could threaten you directly. But we're not doing that, because you haven't joined this war directly.
There is what is happening in Gaza for over 600 days. And there is Iran now. What are your thoughts about the way the world has reacted?
We all may come to look back on what is happening and rue the fact that we let it happen.
We may ask where we were when relentless war crimes were being committed against the Palestinians in Gaza. We may live to regret that because it may make it harder to hold others to any kind of standard in the wake of this.
What Israel was doing to the Palestinians for decades in the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem — the unwillingness to end an occupation that has now been declared by the International Court of Justice as illegal in its very nature, the relentless closures, denial of human rights and dignities — all of these have been left to fester.
Hamas responded to this by carrying out its own violations of international law. And Israel's response was to double down and to pursue a policy that doesn't make sense in any which way.
It only makes sense if you factor in much broader, problematic, and let's just use the honest words, extreme messianic goals, which seem to be making the Palestinian territories unlivable for Palestinians.
They have openly declared their intention to ethnically cleanse. And that's why, with significant credibility and in the international court, this is now being judged as a genocide.
But the world stood by. Let's narrow that down a little. Israel's Western allies stood by and allowed this to happen, continue to arm Israel, continue to provide diplomatic cover, of course, with the US in the lead. But it wasn't just the US. I think as much of the rest of the world and the global majority global South totally failed.
I certainly think we have set ourselves on a very dangerous path.
The most vital question now is if Donald Trump will join the war. There's already been a significant level of support from the US for Israel. But now that the US President has come out with his 'within two weeks' statement, do you sense a keenness to do a deal?
This is really the question that everyone is toiling with. And it's so difficult because we know because this is a president very capable of flipping on a dime. We also know that two weeks may not be two weeks.
What is interesting to look at is the serious contestation of the need for war within the Trump world, within MAGA, the Make America Great Again community. There is serious pushback here.
You have some of the most significant figures who helped get Trump elected, saying, "Wait a minute! you said you were the peace guy, not the war guy. You said you would put American interests first. How is this an American interest?"
They say Israel started this war. Israel is trying to drag America into this war. We have no existential challenge here. Our Gulf allies don't want us to do this. This isn't going to be good for our economy if oil fields burn, if others are brought into this.
They say we've been here before. This isn't our first rodeo. America got dragged into the Iraq war by domestic neoconservatives lying and by Israel pushing.
They are asking Trump is he is going to be another American president led by the nose by an Israeli prime minister?
On the other hand, there are those saying, Mr President, everyone's now calling you the TACO president. Trump Always Chickens Out. You've got to prove that that's not the case. This could reset the deck in terms of you showing that you can use force, but you're ready to make deals that can help you in other circumstances. Israel and (many in the Jewish lobby in America) will be making that case.
We've teed this up for you, Mr President. You know, the guy likes Golf. Israel would say we've taken the ball right up to the hole. All you have to do is a gentle little putt, blow up Fordo (Iran's nuclear plant hidden in the deepest of their bunkers) and don't worry. What could possibly go wrong?
The question is going to be, do those who make the what could possibly go wrong argument win? Or will it those who say I'll list for you what could go wrong.
That's the dynamic.
But we have to also be acutely aware that if you wait for two weeks, you can be a hostage of events, of circumstances, of developments.
Does Iran get provoked to an extent that it does something that makes the Americans feel they have to come in? Do the Israelis conduct some kind of provocation with a view to bringing the Americans in?
I do worry that if this is pushed further, the consequences are going to be significant. They may be ones that we haven't anticipated.
The expectation of the 'dealmakers' is that Iranians will do all the yielding. How likely is that?
I think this is the distinction between a peace deal and a diktat that amounts to demanding a capitulation. I don't see the second option being accepted.
I think those who do want to bring Trump into this militarily are trying to set up the equation that says, of course you can negotiate if Iran comes and says we'll give up everything — we'll give up not only our rights under the NPT, under the non-proliferation treaty for civilian nuclear enrichment, but we'll also give up all our missile programme. Basically, tell the Americans and Israel, you guys take over.
It's almost the same as regime change. So, I don't think that that is a negotiating format that can deliver a result, which is precisely why some are saying that's the only negotiated outcome you should accept, Mr President.
There's a zone of agreement. But it's not the one that American negotiators have been willing to contemplate thus far.
Hopefully, it could change. I mean, you clearly again have these competing factions. And according to what we've read and what we're led to believe, Steve Witkoff was in a negotiation with the Iranians where there were possibly mutually acceptable solutions on the enrichment issue.
Now we're going to have to see whether they take a maximalist line or whether there is wiggle room for an agreement.
Let's also just step back and acknowledge that Witkoff is zero for three. They went in during Russia, Ukraine, Iran and the Gaza ceasefire. And in all three places, conflict is now more intense than when Witkoff started.
You have been a seasoned negotiator yourself at the very highest levels. If you were put in charge of this peace negotiation, how would you have gone about it?
I think there's a quite simple rule of negotiation. Of course, the details always matter.
That simple rule is, of course, you can use pressure. Of course, you try to influence the negotiating margins of the other side. But in negotiation, you have to create a situation where both parties can have a narrative that works in their political setting. They must be able to turn to their own people and say, look, the other side are going to be saying X. But here's why, for our side, this is a not only a dignified, but also good outcome.
There isn't a way that you can negotiate if you don't hold that in your mind.
I'd also say the details do matter. And there is a genuine question and concern here.
Are the Americans up to speed on the details of the files that this team is dealing with? Look, we've all had experience with a US that comes in with preconceived notions that gets things wrong.
But here, I think you have a more distinct problem, which is have they dispensed with so much of the expertise that you have people insufficiently familiar with the files? That can be a good thing if they don't carry all the baggage, some of which was unhelpful from the past. But it can be bad if they don't know what they're supposed to be negotiating.
Going by what you say, is this negotiation then already doomed to fail?
I don't want to say that, not only because I want to have a reason to get out of bed in the morning, but because it depends what intentionality you go in with.
If both Israel and Iran are convinced that the other options are worse for them, then I still think they can get to a negotiating position that could see this deescalate rather than the opposite. But it's not the path we seem to be on.
We seem to be on a path where either America will be pulled in, and then this really becomes, in a more direct way, America's war. In some respects, both Gaza and Iran already have an element in which they're America's war.
We either seem to be on the path to that, or on the path to, at some stage, Israel deciding that without America, there's not much more it can do.
Israel has done an awful lot. It's beginning to suffer exhaustion on its home front. So, it could declare unilaterally this is over, daring the Iranians to violate that.
But, having already perhaps caused enough chaos and anger, even if there is short-term quiet, we may well have the reverberations and the repercussions and the dangers that flow from this for quite some time to come.
The negotiating door is still open. But it's difficult right now.
Finally, this war is playing out in the Middle East, and there are the many religious fault lines to consider. Many of the humanitarian red lines have also been crossed. What do you see as a long-term impact, and how worried should we be?
I think the news here is not good. What I'm saying is that there are lines that have been crossed, which we may well all regret.
The long-term effect of this, I fear, in the region itself, is that more and more of the public, but also in their own ways, more of the leaderships, are going to be convinced that Israel is acting like a radicalising, destabilising, revisionist state, which is a problem.
Because when your population is watching these images every day, it winds that population up. It becomes a security issue for Israel. And so, I think people would really like to see Israel step back from this, be encouraged to step back from this, also for its own good, for its own well-being, by its friends.
It has friends in the West, it has friends elsewhere. But Israel needs to step back from this, because otherwise we are in a very significant downward spiral that won't just end in the Middle East.