Looming US troop cuts in Europe raise questions about Nato's future
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Washington is currently conducting a review of its military deployments worldwide – set to be unveiled in the coming months – and the expectation is it will lead to drawdowns in Europe.
That prospect is fraying the nerves of US allies, especially as fears swirl that Russia could look to attack a Nato country within the next few years if the war in Ukraine dies down.
However, the alliance is basking in Trump's new-found goodwill following its June summit in The Hague, and his officials are making encouraging noises that Europe will not be left in the lurch.
'We've agreed to no surprises and no gaps in the strategic framework of Europe,' said Matthew Whitaker, US ambassador to Nato, adding he expected the review to come out in 'late summer, early fall'.
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'I have daily conversations with our allies about the process,' he said.
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AllAfrica
27 minutes ago
- AllAfrica
Why Trump shouldn't attend Xi's 'Victory Day' parade
As rumors swirl about President Donald Trump possibly attending China's 'Victory Day' parade this September, it's worth sounding an alarm. Such a visit to Beijing would be a strategic blunder that undermines Washington's Indo-Pacific posture, undercuts American allies and sends a troubling message to the wider world. On its face, this kind of diplomatic invitation may be tempting at this delicate juncture in bilateral relations. Trump has long shown an affinity for grand displays of military prowess, high-stakes diplomacy and face-to-face theatrics. A handshake with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in front of goose-stepping soldiers might make for dramatic television. If Beijing officials dangle the promise of a new trade agreement, it might even be a transactional win. But the costs would far outweigh the optics. First, there is the history and symbolism of Victory Day itself. China's September 3 commemoration is not merely a celebration of the end of World War II. It's a well-worn anti-Japanese ritual. While framed as a tribute to China's role in defeating fascism, the parade often serves as a thinly veiled nationalist spectacle aimed at disparaging modern Japan and legitimizing the Communist Party's historical narrative. This is not to suggest that Japan's actions during World War II were innocent or justified — far from it. But China's Victory Day parade is more about nationalist messaging and historical revisionism than sober remembrance, and ultimately aims to serve Beijing's current strategic goals. The irony is that most of the conventional resistance to Japan came not from Mao Zedong's Communist forces, but from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army — the same Nationalists who later fled to Taiwan. By standing alongside Xi and possibly even Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump would risk endorsing this misleading version of history. That, in turn, would alienate two of America's strategic partners in East Asia, namely Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan, in particular, would have reason to feel betrayed. Its very identity is rooted in the struggle against the same Chinese Communist Party that now seeks to erase its role, and seemingly its existence, from the annals of history. South Korea, too, would draw the wrong conclusions. Lee Jae-myung, the left-leaning president, has reportedly decided not to attend the same ceremony as a quiet signal of the importance of maintaining his country's alignment with Washington. Trump's presence could undercut this calculation, emboldening voices within Seoul that favor a tilt toward Beijing. It would surely sow confusion among American allies in East Asia at a time when Washington is demanding their deeper support for its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China. There is also precedent to consider. In 2015, then-President Park Geun-hye of South Korea attended the same parade as the only US ally to do so. While she sought to strike a delicate diplomatic balance, the visit spectacularly backfired. Her decision raised significant eyebrows in Washington and Tokyo, and the political backlash at home was even greater. To this day, her appearance standing between Putin and Xi atop Tiananmen Tower is remembered not as a diplomatic gambit but as a major miscalculation. The stakes in 2025 are even higher. The world is witnessing the most dangerous moment for the global order since the end of the Cold War. China is waging an economic war against the West and flirting with military adventurism in the Taiwan Strait. Russia, meanwhile, remains entrenched in a war of aggression in Ukraine. For Trump to attend a parade that implicitly legitimizes both of these regimes would hand Beijing and Moscow a propaganda victory. Even more troubling is the message it would send about America's military posture in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese military parades prominently feature missiles and weapons systems explicitly designed to threaten US bases, forces and partners, including in Guam, Japan and Taiwan. Trump's attendance at the celebration could be interpreted as tacit approval of Beijing's growing ambitions and invite serious doubt about Washington's security resolve. There is also the potential domestic political cost. Trump built his election campaign on confronting China, restoring American strength, and putting 'America First.' Attending a parade that glorifies communist China's military might would hand his critics a damning visual contradiction. To national security conservatives and China hawks, it could look like a compromise of the very principles Trump claims to represent and defend. It would likewise undercut the recent efforts of Republican foreign policy voices such as Elbridge Colby and Brian Mast, who have been urging America's East Asian allies to take on a more assertive role in Washington's broader efforts to counterbalance China. Trump would thus be well advised to stay home on September 3. Kenji Yoshida is a Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward
AllAfrica
an hour ago
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JPMorgan's Ukraine war base case scenario coming into view
JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the United States, has a global trends advisory organization called the Center for Geopolitics. One of its recent studies believes the Ukraine war's likely outcome is a mixed deal between Russia and Ukraine without foreign troops or security guarantees. We may be seeing that outcome develop as Steven Witkoff, President Donald Trump's special envoy, heads to Moscow. In May, the JPMorgan Chase Center published a brief study titled 'The Russia-Ukraine Endgame and the Future of Europe.' The authors, Derek Chollet, managing director and head of the Center, and Lisa Sawyer, executive director for geopolitics, served under Joe Biden at the Defense Department and, in Chollet's case, also at the State Department. Both are confirmed Atlanticists and liberal in outlook. While not explicitly stated, both served during a period when the US was providing tens of billions in aid to Ukraine – funding military assistance, government salaries, soldiers' pensions and reconstruction efforts. While the Endgame study received little attention or interest in the United States, it was reportedly taken very seriously by Ukraine's leadership. The 'scenarios' outlined in the study were discussed in a recent interview with Kiril Budanov, head of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) under the Ministry of Defense. Budanov is regarded as one of the toughest and smartest operators in Ukraine, and his organization has reputedly carried out assassinations and bombings in Russia and elsewhere. The study 'predicted' that some sort of deal between Ukraine and Russia would be done by the end of Q2 (end of June 2025). That prediction was, of course, wrong. Even so, the study offered four 'possible outcomes' for the endgame and suggested the likelihood, expressed in percentage terms, for each of the outcomes. The four outcomes include a best case called the 'South Korea' model, which the authors gave a 15% probability for adoption. The second scenario is called 'Israel', for which the authors assign a 20% chance of success. The third outcome is called 'Georgia,' which the authors say has a 50% chance of acceptance. Finally, there is the fourth outcome, 'the worst case', which the authors called 'Belarus.' The South Korea outcome does not see Ukraine getting back any of its territory now under Russian control. However, the South Korea model anticipates the presence of a European tripwire military force 'backstopped by an American security guarantee.' In this 'best case,' Ukraine keeps 80% of its territory, leading to a stable outcome for Ukraine. One version of the South Korea outcome is that the US$300 billion in Russian frozen assets would be used for reconstruction in Ukraine. The deal resembles South Korea because the US and others serve as a tripwire for North Korea and because the South Korean economy is booming. The South Korea outcome is unlikely to be acceptable to Russia because it would keep NATO-like forces in Ukraine. It would also take Russian assets and use them to compensate Ukraine, something Russia will not accept. It also leaves the actual territorial issue unsettled and unsolved, meaning that Ukraine would not be compelled to accept the loss of territory to Russia. The scenario says nothing about Western sanctions. Finally, the war could restart on any day and would quickly become a war in Europe, not just Ukraine. The South Korea option, therefore, would be a problem not only for Russia but also for Europe and the United States, and in fact would even be worse for NATO, which requires consensus to activate Article 5 of the NATO collective defense treaty. The second outcome, dubbed 'Israel', would not include the tripwire troop presence on Ukrainian soil and is given a 20% chance of adoption by the warring parties. This option, which the authors say is 'still OK', offers nothing to Russia and acknowledges 'war would always be on [Ukraine's] doorstep.' The authors suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin would perhaps agree to the scenario if it included sanctions relief. The second outcome, therefore, won't benefit Ukraine unless it has real assurances, including on arms supplies, cash for the government and some integration into Europe's economy. It is impossible for the US to give financial guarantees without either a treaty with Ukraine and congressional approval, which would attempt to bind future congressional decisions. A treaty needs a two-thirds vote in the US Senate. While a treaty might be drafted, it is likely to face amendments and delays in execution. In this connection, it is worth noting that Israel has no written American guarantees, and aid to Israel requires annual Congressional approval. The third outcome is labeled 'Georgia', which the report's authors say has a 50% chance of adoption. This scenario rules out foreign troops and other security and financial guarantees. It would potentially include a package of reconstruction assistance, but not using frozen Russian assets for the purpose. Under the scenario, Ukraine would not be integrated into either the European Union or NATO. The authors think that if the Georgia outcome wins out, Ukraine will drift inexorably into the Russian orbit for trade and other reasons. The authors argue that 'Restrictions on military size and capacity – if part of a negotiated settlement – could prematurely stifle Ukraine's dynamic defense and tech sectors, erasing a potential engine of postwar growth.' Before the war, Ukraine had an energetic and relatively low-cost tech sector, particularly in software development. European and Israeli companies subcontracted with Ukraine's tech sector. Some of this sector has been working on military projects because of the war. However, there is no reason why the military sector is the only possible route for high-tech employment for Ukraine. Indeed, the commercial sector generally pays better and is often more dynamic than military projects. 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Like the first 'South Korea' outcome, the report's authors assign the 'Belarus' scenario a 15% chance. As Ukraine's intelligence chief Budanov commented in his interview, there are many other scenarios than the four posited by the JPMorgan report. Yet the most interesting part of the report is its hard focus on the 'Georgia' outcome, so much so that if there is a deal struck, the deal will likely resemble that model. It is another way of saying, without saying so, that the Russians are winning and this is probably the best that can be hoped for under the circumstances. This week, Russia is expecting Witkoff's arrival. According to Trump, the Russians asked for the meeting. Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said negotiations between Russia and the US are 'yielding results.' Trump wants a ceasefire, something Russia has resisted. Will the Georgia option be on the table or something else? Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
South China Morning Post
an hour ago
- South China Morning Post
Texas governor orders arrest of Democrats absent at redistricting vote
Texas Governor Greg Abbott has ordered Democratic lawmakers to be brought back to the state capital after they left Texas in a bid to prevent voting on a Republican plan to redraw the state's congressional districts. Advertisement The exodus by Democratic members of the Texas legislature was intended to deny Republicans the quorum necessary to vote on the redistricting plan, which President Donald Trump has championed. By redrawing district lines in hopes of flipping some seats currently held by Democrats, the Republicans aim to protect the party's narrow US House of Representatives majority in next year's midterm elections. At Monday's session the Republican speaker of the state House issued civil warrants for the Democrats - most of whom have gone to Illinois, New York or Massachusetts - to be brought back to Austin. But the orders apply only within the state, and breaking quorum is not a crime. US President Donald Trump and Texas Governor Greg Abbott. File photo: The Dallas Morning News via TNS 'To ensure compliance, I ordered the Texas Department of Public Safety to locate, arrest, and return to the House chamber any member who has abandoned their duty to Texans,' Abbott said in a statement.
