JPMorgan's Ukraine war base case scenario coming into view

AllAfrica

9 hours ago

​JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the United States, has a global trends advisory organization called the Center for Geopolitics. One of its recent studies believes the Ukraine war's likely outcome is a mixed deal between Russia and Ukraine without foreign troops or security guarantees.
We may be seeing that outcome develop as Steven Witkoff, President Donald Trump's special envoy, heads to Moscow.
In May, the JPMorgan Chase Center published a brief study titled 'The Russia-Ukraine Endgame and the Future of Europe.' The authors, Derek Chollet, managing director and head of the Center, and Lisa Sawyer, executive director for geopolitics, served under Joe Biden at the Defense Department and, in Chollet's case, also at the State Department.
Both are confirmed Atlanticists and liberal in outlook. While not explicitly stated, both served during a period when the US was providing tens of billions in aid to Ukraine – funding military assistance, government salaries, soldiers' pensions and reconstruction efforts.
While the Endgame study received little attention or interest in the United States, it was reportedly taken very seriously by Ukraine's leadership. The 'scenarios' outlined in the study were discussed in a recent interview with Kiril Budanov, head of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) under the Ministry of Defense.
Budanov is regarded as one of the toughest and smartest operators in Ukraine, and his organization has reputedly carried out assassinations and bombings in Russia and elsewhere.
The study 'predicted' that some sort of deal between Ukraine and Russia would be done by the end of Q2 (end of June 2025). That prediction was, of course, wrong. Even so, the study offered four 'possible outcomes' for the endgame and suggested the likelihood, expressed in percentage terms, for each of the outcomes.
The four outcomes include a best case called the 'South Korea' model, which the authors gave a 15% probability for adoption. The second scenario is called 'Israel', for which the authors assign a 20% chance of success.
The third outcome is called 'Georgia,' which the authors say has a 50% chance of acceptance. Finally, there is the fourth outcome, 'the worst case', which the authors called 'Belarus.'
The South Korea outcome does not see Ukraine getting back any of its territory now under Russian control. However, the South Korea model anticipates the presence of a European tripwire military force 'backstopped by an American security guarantee.' In this 'best case,' Ukraine keeps 80% of its territory, leading to a stable outcome for Ukraine.
One version of the South Korea outcome is that the US$300 billion in Russian frozen assets would be used for reconstruction in Ukraine. The deal resembles South Korea because the US and others serve as a tripwire for North Korea and because the South Korean economy is booming.
The South Korea outcome is unlikely to be acceptable to Russia because it would keep NATO-like forces in Ukraine. It would also take Russian assets and use them to compensate Ukraine, something Russia will not accept. It also leaves the actual territorial issue unsettled and unsolved, meaning that Ukraine would not be compelled to accept the loss of territory to Russia.
The scenario says nothing about Western sanctions. Finally, the war could restart on any day and would quickly become a war in Europe, not just Ukraine. The South Korea option, therefore, would be a problem not only for Russia but also for Europe and the United States, and in fact would even be worse for NATO, which requires consensus to activate Article 5 of the NATO collective defense treaty.
The second outcome, dubbed 'Israel', would not include the tripwire troop presence on Ukrainian soil and is given a 20% chance of adoption by the warring parties. This option, which the authors say is 'still OK', offers nothing to Russia and acknowledges 'war would always be on [Ukraine's] doorstep.'
The authors suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin would perhaps agree to the scenario if it included sanctions relief. The second outcome, therefore, won't benefit Ukraine unless it has real assurances, including on arms supplies, cash for the government and some integration into Europe's economy.
It is impossible for the US to give financial guarantees without either a treaty with Ukraine and congressional approval, which would attempt to bind future congressional decisions. A treaty needs a two-thirds vote in the US Senate.
While a treaty might be drafted, it is likely to face amendments and delays in execution. In this connection, it is worth noting that Israel has no written American guarantees, and aid to Israel requires annual Congressional approval.
The third outcome is labeled 'Georgia', which the report's authors say has a 50% chance of adoption. This scenario rules out foreign troops and other security and financial guarantees. It would potentially include a package of reconstruction assistance, but not using frozen Russian assets for the purpose.
Under the scenario, Ukraine would not be integrated into either the European Union or NATO. The authors think that if the Georgia outcome wins out, Ukraine will drift inexorably into the Russian orbit for trade and other reasons.
The authors argue that 'Restrictions on military size and capacity – if part of a negotiated settlement – could prematurely stifle Ukraine's dynamic defense and tech sectors, erasing a potential engine of postwar growth.'
Before the war, Ukraine had an energetic and relatively low-cost tech sector, particularly in software development. European and Israeli companies subcontracted with Ukraine's tech sector. Some of this sector has been working on military projects because of the war.
However, there is no reason why the military sector is the only possible route for high-tech employment for Ukraine. Indeed, the commercial sector generally pays better and is often more dynamic than military projects. Moreover, some of the skills developed on military projects, including in regard to artificial intelligence, are highly prized these days and sought after in global markets.
For the Georgia outcome to work, it would need hard agreements on territories, borders, trade and related issues, along with sanctions relief and other confidence-building measures for both sides. It would also have to include a step back by NATO, something that will be hard to swallow for the ideologically committed Europeans.
The final outcome is dubbed 'Belarus', which is the report's 'worst case.' Its two main features are that the US abandons Ukraine and that Europe can't fill in on its own. The authors say that Russia would seek Ukraine's 'total capitulation' and would 'turn the country into a vassal state of Moscow.' US Special Envoy Steven Witkoff met with Vladimir Putin earlier in 2025.Photo: Kristina Kormilitsyna / TASS
While Russia has a list of demands, 'total capitulation' is not one of them. Like the first 'South Korea' outcome, the report's authors assign the 'Belarus' scenario a 15% chance.
As Ukraine's intelligence chief Budanov commented in his interview, there are many other scenarios than the four posited by the JPMorgan report. Yet the most interesting part of the report is its hard focus on the 'Georgia' outcome, so much so that if there is a deal struck, the deal will likely resemble that model.
It is another way of saying, without saying so, that the Russians are winning and this is probably the best that can be hoped for under the circumstances. This week, Russia is expecting Witkoff's arrival. According to Trump, the Russians asked for the meeting.
Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said negotiations between Russia and the US are 'yielding results.' Trump wants a ceasefire, something Russia has resisted. Will the Georgia option be on the table or something else?
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.