Peace Fund and the Quest for Peace and Security in Africa

In 1993, the Peace Fund has remained dormant due to African leaders' lack of commitment and political will to act on their resolution and financially support the AU.
Image: Pixabay
In June, thirty-two years ago, in its quest to ensure and implement African-led peace and security initiatives, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which preceded the African Union (AU), resolved to establish a Peace Fund.
This was seen as a strategic and vital financial instrument for achieving home-grown peace and security in Africa. However, since its establishment in 1993, the Peace Fund has remained dormant due to African leaders' lack of commitment and political will to act on their resolution and financially support the AU.
The fund was revitalised in 2016 and officially adopted by the AU in 2018 after 25 years of dormancy.
The revitalisation happened after the African heads of state resolved in Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda, that Africa, more than ever before, needs financial autonomy and ownership of its peace and security initiatives to practically implement the fourth aspiration of the AU Agenda 2063 of building a peaceful and secure Africa through the critical step of silencing the guns by 2020. Unfortunately, this target has not been met to date.
The resolution further indicated that the peace fund, as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), must encompass critical areas of stabilisation, including preventive diplomacy, mediation, institutional capacity building, and peace support operations (PSO), while also financing the preparedness of other APSA structures.
The AU urges its member states, individuals, and the private sector to contribute to the peace fund. Following the restructuring and adoption of the funding model for the peace fund, the secretariat launched an intensive and extensive resource mobilisation strategy aimed at raising at least US$400 million by 2021.
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This target was only achieved in June 2025. However, research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reveals that before 2024, of the US$392 million mobilised for the peace fund, AU member states contributed 98% of the budget, while US$6 million (2%) came from individuals and the private sector.
Towards the end of 2024, however, contributions from member states decreased by 34%, while private donations rose from 2% to 36%.
Despite all these interventions and resource mobilisation efforts, Max Boqwana (October 2024) argues that Africa still accounts for 70% of global conflicts. And, almost eight years after revitalising the peace fund, the Thabo Mbeki Foundation convened the inaugural African Peace and Security Dialogue from 4 to 6 October 2024.
The dialogue critically analysed, discussed, and provided insights into the root causes of prolonged violent conflict in Africa, focusing particularly on two regions: West Africa and the Horn of Africa. Many panellists and participants expressed concerns about the lack of strong leadership and political will to mobilise domestic resources for financing peace and security initiatives.
Some argue that Africa is home to the most critical minerals, which should be harnessed and utilised for the continent's development.
The ongoing protracted violent conflict and civil wars in Africa necessitate a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the peace fund, more so since there is a narrative that the financial contribution of the member states towards the fund continues to face a spiral decline.
It is essential to highlight that over two weeks ago, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation held its annual governance symposium in Marrakech, Morocco, where Ibrahim raised a serious concern regarding the fact that 70% of the AU's annual budget comes from Europeans under the pretext of 'development partners'. Africa's dependency syndrome continues to undermine its agenda of achieving socio-economic and political self-reliance in pursuing development and home-grown peace and security initiatives.
At the next summit in February 2026, I still contend that the AU needs to discuss and develop a criterion for selecting the so-called 'development partners', as even parasitic partners are masquerading as genuine partners of Africa.
It can be posited that if this partnership and resource mobilisation issue is not effectively addressed, it will continue to obfuscate and derail the intended purpose of the peace fund.
Asuquo (2025) argues that one of the reasons African States fail to fund the AU's peace fund sufficiently is 'a (created) culture of external mediation: Post-independence, African nations have routinely turned to external actors like the UN, World Bank, and Western powers for arbitration and funding, setting a precedent that weakens pan-African accountability'. It is time for the AU to develop its African-led conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding.
Critically, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have been locked in a prolonged diplomatic crisis, leading Kinshasa (DRC) to seek sanctions from France against Kigali (Rwanda).
This shows that some African leaders still perceive European nations as having the most effective solutions to African problems; this belief persists despite the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) attempting to de-escalate tensions in the Eastern DRC.
However, the reality is that there was inadequate coordination among mediators, compounded by insufficient financial support.
Evidence shows that only US$5 million was allocated from the peace fund for the conflict in Eastern DRC.
The budget proved inadequate to the point that the PSC utilised its annual council-to-council meeting with the European Union to request additional funding for mediation. The AU has also urged its member states to contribute their dues to the peace fund.
A crucial question must be addressed: who and how has the peace fund been financially managed since its revitalisation?
For instance, two weeks ago, the AU advertised positions for an independent fund manager and the hiring of a custodian bank for the AU peace fund.
It is concerning that the post-criteria are not clearly stated within the context of the peace fund's objectives, which may further undermine the AU's financial autonomy and ownership of its peace and security architecture.
Regarding the conflict between Kinshasa and Kigali, it is evident that there has been no adequate preventative diplomacy, PSO, and well-coordinated mediation, as these essential interventions fall within the mandate of the peace fund as stated in Article 21 of the PSC protocol.
In South Sudan, Africa's newest state, which has experienced violent conflict since it seceded from northern Sudan in 2011, effective interventions through the peace fund have yet to be effectively implemented.
As a result, South Sudanese established a non-governmental organisation (NGO) called the Peace Canal in 2019 and adopted a fundraising strategy, 'Peace Opportunity Fund,' to finance locally led peacebuilding initiatives in South Sudan.
Seventeen advisors from four major ethnic groups lead the NGO; unfortunately, this initiative has attracted donors from beyond the continent, and some have undermined the noble intention of inclusive peacebuilding, particularly the integration of indigenous peacebuilding methods and strategies into the broader post-conflict reconstruction and development.
This is a great initiative that AU was supposed to effectively support through the peace fund in a quest to realise its strategic objective of African-led peace and security initiatives. On the other hand, two weeks ago, Naomi Kilungu, an armed conflict expert in Africa, predicted that 'Africa will have spent over US$ 300 billion by the end of this year (2025) on armed conflicts'.
However, because AU has only managed to secure US$400 million for the peace fund, there will be a shortfall of at least US$ 299.6 billion.
If the shortfall cannot be mobilised domestically, the so-called 'development partners' would take over and continue their nefarious agenda in Africa.
Indeed, Africa needs the emergence of Pan-African thought leaders who will act locally and think globally with unflinching love for the people of this continent. Leaders who will genuinely end parasitic partnerships and colonialism in its forms and content.
Orapeleng Matshediso is a Masters graduate of Pan African Development Studies and Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg (Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation). The author is also an alumnus of the then Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI).
Orapeleng Matshediso is a Masters graduate of Pan African Development Studies and Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg (Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation).
Image: Supplied.

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SA not ready for fallout if Israel-Iran ceasefire fails, warns UJ professor

The Citizen

an hour ago

The Citizen

SA not ready for fallout if Israel-Iran ceasefire fails, warns UJ professor

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WTO fisheries agreement gains momentum, but will Africa's coastal states rise to the challenge?

Daily Maverick

13 hours ago

Daily Maverick

WTO fisheries agreement gains momentum, but will Africa's coastal states rise to the challenge?

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