Russian media search for China boy who met Putin 25 years ago; now engineer recalls kiss
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Now an engineer, the man has recalled the moment the president kissed his forehead and says the encounter had a lasting impact on his life.
On July 17, Russia Today TV, which is also known as RT, posted a 'missing person search' on a major social media platform.
Peng Pai pictured with President Putin's hands resting on his shoulders a quarter of a century ago in a Beijing park. Photo: handout
The post recounted how, on July 17, 2000, Putin, then 47, made his first official visit to Beijing as President.
After visiting the Forbidden City, Putin suggested rowing in a park. The sudden change of plan left security unable to clear the area in time, drawing a crowd of tourists.
During the visit, Putin interacted with a 12-year-old Chinese boy and his father, creating a heartwarming moment captured by photographers.
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The boy, Peng Pai, is reportedly from Yueyang City in Hunan province, central China.
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