After the strikes, Iran's only path may be a deal

Al Arabiya

5 days ago

Many might assume that after Israel and the United States launched a wave of devastating strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would retreat from diplomacy, hardened and humiliated, unwilling to engage in negotiations. On the surface, that may seem logical – why would a country whose pride and sovereignty were violated seek to sit down with its attackers at the negotiating table? But that logic misreads the internal dynamics of the Iranian government and the grave pressure it is under. In reality, despite the recent destruction of key nuclear infrastructure and the exposure of its military vulnerabilities, Iran is more desperate than ever to reach a deal with the United States. Not because it wants to – but because it has no choice.
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At the top of the list of pressures is the threat of the reimposition of UN 'snapback' sanctions, a mechanism embedded in the original 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These sanctions are not just symbolic slaps on the wrist – they are devastating economic measures that would further cripple Iran's already fragile economy. Over the past several weeks, the so-called EU3 – Britain, France, and Germany – have made it unequivocally clear that if Iran fails to reach a new agreement with the US by the end of August 2025, they will initiate the snapback process at the United Nations. This is no idle threat; the European powers are aligned and prepared, and Iran knows it.
To understand the gravity of this threat, it's essential to grasp what the snapback sanctions entail. When the JCPOA was originally negotiated, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2231, which lifted many of the previous multilateral sanctions that had crushed Iran's economy throughout the 2000s. However, this resolution included a safety mechanism known as the 'snapback' clause, allowing any of the participating parties to reimpose those sanctions if Iran was found to be in serious violation of its commitments. The snapback is unique in that it bypasses the standard Security Council veto process. If a participating country files a complaint and follows the procedural steps – including a 15-day dispute resolution window and referral to the UN Security Council – the reimposition of sanctions is automatic unless the Council affirmatively votes to continue lifting them. In other words, once the process starts, Iran is powerless to stop it.
If snapback sanctions are triggered, the consequences for Iran would be catastrophic. All the UN measures lifted under the JCPOA would come roaring back into effect. This includes a comprehensive arms embargo, a prohibition on ballistic missile development, restrictions on nuclear technology transfers, asset freezes on key Iranian officials, and, most devastatingly, a severe blow to Iran's energy sector. Oil exports, which represent the backbone of the Iranian economy, would be strangled once again. International banking and trade would be further isolated, and European and Asian companies would face secondary sanctions for doing business with Iran. In short, the modest economic relief Iran has clung to since the collapse of the original deal would evaporate entirely, pushing the country deeper into financial crisis. The Iranian government knows this. Its leaders have no illusions about the implications.
But the looming economic pain is only one half of the equation. The second, and perhaps even more urgent, reason that Iran is most likely desperate for a deal is that it is at its weakest strategic and military point in decades. The twelve-day war in June 2025, marked by a series of Israeli and American airstrikes on Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure, exposed just how vulnerable the government truly is. Despite years of chest-beating rhetoric and boasts of self-sufficiency, Iran was unable to defend its most sensitive and critical sites. The Fordow underground enrichment facility was severely damaged. The Natanz facility suffered multiple direct hits. Missile and drone factories were either disabled or wiped out entirely. Iran's air defense systems failed to intercept much of the incoming firepower, and the leadership was left stunned, humiliated, and scrambling to respond.
The consequences of these attacks go beyond material losses. They shattered the illusion that Iran could maintain a credible deterrent through its nuclear program. Tehran had long used the ambiguity around its enrichment levels and breakout timelines as a form of leverage, signaling to the world that it could, if cornered, dash toward a bomb. But now, with many of its enrichment facilities either destroyed or under surveillance, that leverage is gone. The United States and Israel have demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to strike again. President Donald Trump has made it clear that he is in 'no rush to talk' and is prepared to authorize further military action if necessary. Iran's nuclear bluff has been called – and it has little to show for it.
Faced with this reality, Iran sees a deal with the United States not as a diplomatic win but as a necessary act of survival. Tehran hopes that by reaching an agreement, it can secure certain assurances – chief among them, the end of further Israeli or American attacks. In the minds of Iranian decision-makers, a deal would buy time, restore a degree of international legitimacy, and potentially open the door to limited economic relief before the snapback hammer falls. They are not negotiating from a position of strength; they are cornered, exposed, and deeply anxious about the government's future stability.
Internally, the political calculus has also shifted. Iranian leaders are not naive; they understand the United States holds nearly all the cards. But they also know that continued defiance could lead to more strikes, deeper sanctions, and the eventual unraveling of the Islamic Republic itself.
Meanwhile, Iran's traditional allies – Russia and China – have been noticeably quiet. Moscow, bogged down in its own quagmire in Ukraine and facing increasing Western pressure, has offered little more than rhetorical support. Tehran is effectively isolated. It's only path out of the tightening noose is through Washington.
In conclusion, while it may seem counterintuitive that Iran would seek to negotiate in the wake of such a humiliating military defeat, that very humiliation is what makes diplomacy imperative. Iran is not entering talks from a place of power. It is entering them from a place of desperation. The government is facing the reimposition of crippling international sanctions, a shattered military posture, and a complete loss of nuclear leverage. Its economy is teetering. Its allies are distant. Its leadership is nervous. For Iran's rulers, a deal is no longer a strategic choice – it is a matter of government survival. That is why, despite everything, they will likely be so eager to talk.