Sinking ship: US undersea nuclear deterrent's plunging credibility
The US Navy's plan to replace its aging undersea nuclear deterrent faces costly delays, raising concerns about the credibility of its posture and future ability to keep pace with China's naval expansion.
This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report mentioning that the US Navy faces an estimated 12 to 16-month delay in the delivery of its first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), threatening the timely replacement of aging Ohio-class SSBNs.
The delay, attributed to shipyard workforce shortages, supply chain disruptions and component delivery setbacks—particularly Northrop Grumman's late turbine generators and Huntington Ingalls Industries' bow section—raises concerns about the impact on subsequent submarines.
The US Navy is considering extending the service life of up to five Ohio-class boats to mitigate risks, but this strategy involves additional costs and logistical hurdles.
Meanwhile, the simultaneous construction of Columbia-class SSBNs and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) presents industrial-base challenges as shipyards and suppliers struggle to scale production. The US Navy and industry aim to increase Virginia-class production to two boats annually by 2028, yet the current output remains at 1.1-1.2 submarines per year.
Rising costs compound the issue, with the Columbia-class program's procurement budget growing 12.1% in the past year alone. Further overruns could siphon funding from other US Navy shipbuilding programs, placing additional strain on the US Department of Defense's (DOD) long-term naval strategy.
Amid ballooning costs and delays, the US may need to ramp up submarine production more urgently than ever. In an article this month for We Are The Mighty, Logan Nye mentions that, at present, China relies on anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) such as the DF-21D and DF-26B to keep US carrier battlegroups at bay from Taiwan.
Nye points out those ASBMs are useless against SSNs that can evade them by diving. He also emphasizes that SSNs are self-sufficient for months, which may be critical if US supply chains in the Pacific are threatened.
Further, in a 2024 American Affairs article, Jerry Hendrix suggests that SSNs may be considered the 'first response force' during a Taiwan conflict due to those advantages. However, Hendrix points out that the post-Cold War peace dividend eroded the US submarine industrial base, resulting in the US not having enough submarines when most needed.
The situation is not much better for the US SSBN fleet, as it too suffers from a weak US submarine industrial base. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) says that as of August 2024, 14 Ohio-class SSBNs form the foundation of the US sea-based nuclear deterrent.
According to NTI, each Ohio-class SSBN has 20 missile launch tubes armed with the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The report also says the US Navy is replacing these older missiles with the Trident II D5LE, which has an upgraded guidance system for improved accuracy.
The report mentions that assuming the US Navy has 12 operational Ohio-class SSBNs with 20 launch tubes each and four warheads per missile, they have 960 warheads. However, it mentions that only 8-10 Ohio-class SSBNs are typically deployed at one time due to regular minor repairs, so the number of active warheads in the field may be closer to 720.
The US Navy's plan to retire Ohio-class SSBNs at approximately one per year starting in 2027 raises concerns about the credibility and survivability of the US undersea nuclear deterrent since they carry 54% of the US deployed nuclear arsenal.
Emphasizing the importance of the US SSBN fleet, Geoff Wilson and other writers mention in a February 2025 Stimson Center article that SSBNs are the cornerstone of the US 'finite deterrence' doctrine, with SSBN stealth and survivability disincentivizing a first strike that would eliminate all other nuclear forces, creating strategic stability at lower cost.
Wilson and others argue that the US SSBN fleet can maintain deterrence against multiple targets at a lower cost than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which are less critical for deterrence than other delivery options such as bombers.
However, a smaller US SSBN fleet could undermine the credibility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal. In a June 2020 article for The Strategist, Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark argue that while the US sea-based nuclear arsenal is the most survivable leg of its nuclear triad, it is also the most brittle.
Mahnken and Clark argue that if an SSBN can't launch its missiles, communicate with commanders or is destroyed, all its missiles will be lost. They also highlight that losing only one SSBN on patrol could eliminate an entire leg of the nuclear triad.
Further, they point out that the lethality of the US undersea nuclear deterrent has prompted near-peer adversaries like China and Russia to enhance their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to target US SSBNs.
Emphasizing the potential fragility of the US undersea nuclear arsenal, they project that during the 2030s, it is probable that only one Columbia-class SSBN will be operational at any given time in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, supported by one or two vessels at sea as backup.
Despite those fragility concerns, Owen Cote Jr mentions in a January 2019 article in the peer-reviewed Bulletin of Atomic Scientists journal that SSBNs remain the most credible deterrent for the US due to their unmatched survivability and stealth.
Cote Jr. highlights the historical effectiveness of US SSBNs, particularly during the Cold War, when they proved resilient against Soviet ASW capabilities. He also addresses concerns about emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing, which could make oceans transparent.
Regarding those concerns, Cote Jr says these fears are largely unfounded, emphasizing the US's advanced acoustic surveillance systems, such as SOSUS and the Fixed Distributed System (FDS), that can detect Chinese or Russian submarines alongside its favorable maritime geography encompassing vast swathes of the Atlantic and Pacific, make it exceedingly difficult for near-peer adversaries to detect its SSBNs.
Further, Stephen Biddle and Eric Labs mention in a Foreign Policy article this month that while China's shipbuilding capacity dwarfs the US's by a factor of 230, US warships are typically larger and have superior sensors, electronics and weapons.
Contextualizing submarine capabilities, Biddle and Labs mention that China's submarine force consists of mostly conventionally powered submarines, while the US operates an all-nuclear fleet of 49 SSNs, 14 SSBNs and four nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGN). They emphasize that, unlike their Chinese counterparts, US crews have battle experience and superior training.
However, Biddle and Labs say that China is building aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in half the time it takes the US to make the same vessels. They caution that the US places itself at serious risk by assuming future wars will be short and that debates over the US-China naval balance should be tempered by considering the dynamics of competitive production for naval wars of attrition.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
AllAfrica
14 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Submarine delays sinking US edge in a Taiwan war
A widening gap between US submarine ambitions and industrial capacity is reshaping the undersea balance just as China accelerates its challenge beneath the waves. This month, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted that the US Navy has deferred procurement of its next-generation attack submarine, the SSN(X), from fiscal year 2035 to 2040 due to overall budget constraints, as stated in the Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. The delay raises concerns about a critical production gap following the completion of the Columbia-class line and threatens continuity in the submarine industrial base. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the average unit cost of the SSN(X) at US$8.7 billion, 23% higher than the Navy's own $7.1 billion projection. Designed to exceed adversaries in speed, stealth, payload capacity and autonomous system integration, the SSN(X) draws on traits from the Seawolf, Virginia and Columbia classes, with CBO estimating a displacement of roughly 10,100 tons. The deferral has reignited debate over propulsion choices, but the US Navy maintains its opposition to low-enriched uranium (LEU), citing endurance losses, developmental uncertainties and a potential 20–30-year, $25 billion timeline for an alternative fuel system. General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) are expected to share construction duties, but the five-year delay casts doubt on workforce retention and supplier viability. Congress faces growing pressure to reconcile fiscal constraints with strategic imperatives as China accelerates its undersea buildup. The deferral underscores a growing mismatch between strategic urgency and industrial capacity, exposing vulnerabilities in undersea readiness just as China ramps up its naval modernization. Production bottlenecks, workforce attrition and tight budgets are converging to undermine the one domain where the US has still retained its clear advantage. Underscoring this strategic importance, William Toti writes in a December 2023 Proceedings article that US attack submarines (SSNs) will serve as the linchpin of undersea dominance in a Taiwan Strait crisis, conducting high-risk anti-surface warfare (ASuW) to blunt China's potential invasion or blockade. He notes that SSNs can operate covertly in shallow, contested waters, striking People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers with torpedoes while remaining undetected. Their stealth, he argues, allows early deployment without escalating tensions, though their limited numbers highlight dangerous shortfalls. Toti emphasizes that with US air power likely constrained and surface forces withheld in early stages of a conflict, SSNs may constitute the only decisive maritime counterforce. He calls for expanding the submarine fleet, speeding up weapons production and prioritizing ASuW readiness in anticipation of Indo-Pacific contingencies. However, even the world's best submarines may face formidable odds. Bryan Clark writes in a December 2022 Hudson Institute article that China's layered anti-submarine warfare (ASW) network—including passive seabed sensors, low-frequency active sonar, ASW missiles and mines—could expose and suppress US submarines in contested waters. Clark warns that China's growing fleet of modern conventional submarines, including the air-independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped Yuan-class, may overwhelm US ASW capabilities at chokepoints like the Miyako and Luzon straits. Without integrating unmanned systems such as relocatable sonar arrays and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) with towed sensors, he says, the US Navy risks tactical paralysis. Meanwhile, the US submarine force is overstretched. Jerry Hendrix notes in a 2024 American Affairs article that the Navy's current fleet of 53 fast-attack submarines suffers from chronic maintenance delays, with nearly a third sidelined. He argues that these issues diminish operational readiness, reduce surge capacity during crises and compromise deterrence credibility. He adds that US submarines often must enter contested zones ahead of surface or air forces, making their availability critical. Further, a February 2025 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights persistent delays in shipbuilding, noting that from 2019 to 2023, the US Navy significantly underdelivered Virginia-class submarines compared to its shipbuilding plans from FY2019 to FY2023. The report identifies workforce shortages, supplier constraints and overly optimistic schedule assumptions as key contributors. The report states that the Columbia-class program also faces risks due to industrial base limitations. GAO criticizes the lack of performance metrics and coordination in Navy investments, warning that without structural reforms and sustained workforce development, the Navy may struggle to meet future shipbuilding goals. By contrast, Sarah Kirchberger writes in a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China's submarine industrial base has expanded rapidly due to massive state investment, civil-military integration and modular shipbuilding practices. She notes that major shipyards such as Bohai and Wuchang have significantly increased construction capacity, positioning them to support the development of strategic platforms like the Type 095 and Type 096. However, Kirchberger cautions that China continues to lag in key technological areas, including nuclear propulsion, acoustic quieting, and advanced materials—factors that directly impact submarine stealth and survivability. She adds that China still relies on foreign—particularly Russian—technologies, and that limited transparency hinders external assessments of its actual capabilities. While China's progress in scaling production is notable, Kirchberger argues that persistent technical shortfalls limit its ability to challenge US undersea dominance in the near term. Reinforcing this view, Ryan Martinson notes in a June 2025 Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) article that Chinese submarines face 'extremely high' detection risks immediately after leaving port due to the US Navy's three-dimensional undersea surveillance network. He describes a system combining seabed sensors, ASW aircraft, satellites, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and sonar-equipped vessels across the First Island Chain. Martinson adds that PLAN experts themselves admit interception risks remain high even in China's 'near seas,' raising doubts about strategic utility and nuclear deterrence. The saturated acoustic environment, he says, renders Chinese submarines effectively 'not-so-silent,' limiting their survivability and wartime deployment. Ultimately, the US's edge beneath the waves is eroding not from enemy fire, but from self-inflicted industrial stagnation and delay. Unless urgently addressed, these setbacks could hand China a dangerous opportunity in the Indo-Pacific and a potential Taiwan war win.
South China Morning Post
2 days ago
- South China Morning Post
US to build Philippines boat hub for South China Sea edge, ‘low-footprint' deterrence
A discreet but strategically significant US-funded boat maintenance hub in the western Philippines is poised to strengthen Manila's maritime presence in the contested South China Sea while avoiding raising the risk of political escalation. The new facility in Quezon, a coastal town on Palawan Island less than 260km (162 miles) from the flashpoint Second Thomas Shoal, could enable the Philippine Navy to maintain a more persistent and responsive posture amid rising tensions with China, in what analysts say is part of Washington's broader push for 'low-footprint' deterrence in the region. Designed to service and deploy small Philippine naval craft, the hub's proximity to disputed waters is seen as an advantage. 'That proximity matters operationally – it reduces transit time and enhances the credibility of Manila's maritime presence,' said Sylwia Monika Gorska, a political analyst and doctoral candidate at the University of Central Lancashire. The project, first reported by the United States Naval Institute on Monday, is part of a larger shift in US regional strategy that prioritises smaller, dual-use infrastructure over permanent military bases. It will support rigid-hulled inflatable boats and 'assault boats' built by Oregon-based Reconcraft, which specialises in vessels used by military and law-enforcement agencies. The US embassy in Manila confirmed that the initiative would enhance repair capabilities for Philippine vessels at the nearby Naval Detachment Oyster Bay – improving readiness without overtly expanding America's military footprint. Philippine navy vessels anchored at Oyster Bay naval facility in Palawan province. A new US-funded boat maintenance hub is expected to enhance repair capabilities for Philippine vessels at the facility. Photo: AFP From Washington's perspective, the investment supported 'partner-led deterrence' by enabling allies to operate more independently, without requiring forward-deployed US assets, Gorska said.
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- AllAfrica
Carrier crunch leaves US unprepared for a China fight
The US Navy is running out of aircraft carriers—and time—as global threats multiply faster than it can build, launch or sustain its next-generation warships. USNI reported this month that delivery of the USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), the US Navy's second Ford-class aircraft carrier, has been delayed by two years due to ongoing challenges with integrating Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE). Originally scheduled for July 2025, the carrier is now expected to enter service by March 2027, according to the US Navy. That will reduce its fleet to 10 carriers, below the legally mandated 11 units, for nearly a year following the May 2026 retirement of USS Nimitz (CVN-68). The delay stems from the Navy's 2020 decision to shift from a dual-phase to a single-phase delivery plan, which was meant to enable earlier incorporation of the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. Lessons learned from CVN-78 were only partially applied to CVN-79, and retrofitting proved complex, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). The US Navy is now coordinating with stakeholders to explore preliminary acceptance prior to full delivery. Similar delays also affect the CVN-80 Enterprise, now projected for July 2030, due to supply chain and material availability issues, extending its timeline by 28 months. These setbacks highlight broader integration and sustainment challenges in the Ford-class program, with US Navy officials working to mitigate operational gaps and preserve readiness amid increasingly strained global commitments. Persistent delays, spiraling costs and unresolved technical flaws in the Ford-class program are undermining the US Navy's ability to field and sustain the kind of forward-deployed force needed to deter rising multi-theater threats from near-peer and regional adversaries like China. Summarizing key concerns, Brent Eastwood notes in a June 2025 National Security Journal article that the Ford-class's $13 billion per unit cost, $5 billion in R&D and 23% cost overrun have alarmed lawmakers. Chris Panella notes in a March 2025 Business Insider piece that delays in procuring CVN-82 threaten over 60,000 jobs across more than 2,000 firms. Without immediate action, he says 96% of sole-source suppliers could halt production by 2027, raising costs and risking the loss of skilled workers. Eastwood also warns that repeated construction delays—such as the USS Enterprise's slip to 2029—undermine fleet readiness, just as emerging threats like hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and cyberattacks raise serious doubts about carrier survivability in conflict scenarios. He adds that munitions and fuel resupply demands place additional pressure on logistics chains already stretched thin. Eastwood further notes that unproven technologies such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and AAG have contributed to deployment delays. A January 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that although both systems aboard the USS Gerald R Ford have shown improvement, they still fall well short of US Navy reliability goals—EMALS averaging just 614 cycles between failures against a target of 4,166, and AAG at 460 against 16,500. The CRS report says these persistent gaps have led the US Navy to enhance testing protocols and data collection for further refinement. At the operational level, Ford-class delays are straining the Navy's ability to meet global Carrier Strike Group (CSG) commitments. Steven Wills observes in a July 2024 article for the Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) that the US Navy's carrier force remains overstretched, operating with only 11 carriers in a world that demands at least 15 for sustained global presence. Wills writes that repeated crises, particularly in the Red Sea, have pushed deployments beyond readiness cycles, disrupting both maintenance and training. He points out that the US Navy's reliance on temporary solutions—like rushing Pacific-based carriers to relieve overburdened ships—reflects persistent gaps in force structure and planning. These shortfalls, Wills argues, are degrading air superiority in key theaters like the Indo-Pacific and the Levant and are the consequence of years of procurement underreach. He also criticizes the logic of 'cheating the math' by slashing carrier numbers without adjusting mission demands. Ishaan Anand, in a CMS article this month, further stresses that concurrent maritime crises in the Red Sea and Indo-Pacific reveal the US Navy's growing dual-theater challenge. He notes that the extended deployment of the Eisenhower CSG to counter Houthi threats in CENTCOM's area of responsibility has diverted assets from priority Indo-Pacific zones, enabling China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to ramp up exercises near Taiwan and the Luzon Strait. Anand writes that the absence of forward-deployed carriers like the USS Ronald Reagan has forced the US Navy to rely on destroyers and littoral combat ships with far less power projection capability. He argues this operational tradeoff—between Middle Eastern deterrence and Indo-Pacific stability—shows the US Navy's inability to maintain a carrier-led presence in two contested regions simultaneously. And yet a third front may already be forming. As Russia becomes more assertive in the Arctic and North Atlantic, US carrier strike groups have been forward-deployed to Northern Europe as part of NATO deterrence efforts. This signals a growing awareness in Washington that even while juggling crises in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, Europe cannot be neglected. The convergence of these crises has elevated the specter of a simultaneous three-front contingency in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, testing whether a US Navy built for peacetime presence can withstand wartime demands. Hal Brands warns in an October 2022 Bloomberg article that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's designs on Taiwan, and Iran's nuclear provocations expose fundamental US vulnerabilities under its current 'one-war' defense planning framework. He argues that while these adversaries are not formally aligned, their actions could generate overlapping crises that would force the US into unacceptable tradeoffs, fracturing its global posture. Mackenzie Eaglen underscores this point in an August 2024 National Security Journal article, stating that the 'one-war' force-sizing construct is increasingly seen as obsolete in the face of converging near-peer threats from China and Russia, alongside regional challengers such as Iran and North Korea. Eaglen cites the US Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which warns that the US lacks the capabilities and capacity to prevail across multiple theaters—a vulnerability that could embolden adversaries to test US resolve. She writes that despite calls for a 'Multiple Theater Force Construct,' the US military remains smaller, older, and less ready, with naval, ground, and air assets stretched across outdated global postures. Pivoting between regions, she argues, invites dangerous strategic gaps that erode deterrence and compromise leadership at a time when unity of effort is most crucial. The Ford class's technical limits, operational wear, and inability to meet multiple strategic demands suggest the US Navy's carrier-focused force isn't prepared to deter or fight future wars.
