Putin is more likely to start a nuclear war than many are prepared to admit

Telegraph

3 days ago

We've grown used to blood-curdling nuclear threats from Russia's leadership – but this time, Donald Trump has very publicly reacted to them by moving two nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia.
Russia has primarily used nuclear sabre-rattling as part of its information warfare to scare the West. Sadly, it has delivered results. Western states moved cautiously after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, in part because of the Kremlin's nuclear threats.
Trump's submarine move is a direct response to social media posts by Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president. Many Russians believe that Medvedev is a heavy drinker, and some have suggested that some of his posts were written while drunk. His role within the Russian regime hierarchy is now as a snarling attack dog, hurling blood-curdling threats at the Kremlin's enemies.
It is good that Trump is beginning to see through the Russian regime. He is clearly angry that his policy of appeasing the Kremlin hasn't worked – despite his extraordinary tactic of offering, over the heads of the Ukrainians, a peace deal that would have allowed Vladimir Putin to pay virtually no price for the appalling actions of his armies.
It is perhaps not so good that Trump has made it clear that he is reacting directly to Medvedev's nuclear bluster. The Russian regime now knows that it is possible to goad the president into real-world actions if they can upset him enough online. They have spent years studying the president and their understanding of human motivation is deeply researched. There is a risk that nuclear policy – which historically has been agonised over by experts due to its extraordinary importance and the terrible risks of getting it wrong – is now part of high stakes 'trash talking' on social media.
While the risk that Putin will order the use of nuclear weapons is small, it is not non-existent. Ever since the Russian leader began his political and military conflict with Ukraine back in 2005 to force it into eventual unification with Russia, he has escalated crises when he has failed to achieve his aims.
The Russian leader did so in 2014 with the partial invasion of eastern Ukraine, and then in 2022 with the full invasion. Will he escalate again with nuclear weapons? There is a much-speculated-on secret nuclear theory in Russia called 'escalate to de-escalate', in which nuclear weapons are used to regain control of a conflict, forcing an enemy to surrender, or face annihilation.
Confidential Russian papers have suggested that a first stage might involve a 'demonstration strike', perhaps a one-off strike on water. The second would be the targeting of a low-population site on land, potentially an abandoned town or city. The third would be a 'deterrence-demonstration' on a potential military target such as a transport hub. From there, nuclear use would escalate to multiple tactical nuclear strikes across a theatre of operations.
Putin has already weakened the grounds for using nuclear weapons. Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine gives two main grounds for using nuclear weapons: either in response to their use by others or when the existence of the Russian Federation is threatened.
A more recent 2020 document allowed for a nuclear strike if Russia is facing an imminent nuclear attack (so pre-empting a pre-emptive strike), or if Russia would lose control of its arsenal via, for example, multiple, conventional precision strikes. Both are inherently dangerous. Twice in the Cold War, junior officers of the then-Soviet Union refused to react when technology or their superiors told them to prepare nuclear weapons. Their brave actions saved the world from a potentially catastrophic escalation.
Last year, Putin lowered Russia's nuclear weapon threshold again, decreeing that an attack on Russia with conventional missile systems might justify a nuclear response, although Ukraine's infamous Spider's Web attack on his bomber fleet this June did not result in a nuclear response. Ukrainians have long argued that Russia's threats are a bluff to hide a failing army weighed down by a million casualties.
What can be done? There are no good options, and this crisis may get more dangerous yet. Putin's regime is bent on war – there is no simpler way to say it. He doesn't want peace. I have been in Kyiv this week discussing my book on Russia's new form of warfare and the city is under regular and, on occasions, prolonged missile attack. Putin has strung Trump along.
The best bet for the West is for Ukraine – with allied support, especially in air defence to protect its resilient but suffering citizens – to fight Russia to a standstill and (hopefully) force a snarling Russian leader to end the war. Most of the alternatives don't bear thinking about.