Off the rails. Disused trains, record-low cargo and engine shortages: how the war has impacted Russian Railways — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Nevertheless, Russia's rail network is congested, not only with trains rushing to deliver military supplies urgently needed at the front, but with unused carriages. It also critically lacks both the personnel and locomotives required to keep the rail system running smoothly, and these problems only seem to be getting worse.
This matters not only because Russian Railways is one of Russia's largest and richest state-owned enterprises, but because railway transport activity is also a bellwether for the wider economy — freight must be moved today in order for business to be done tomorrow. When rail traffic is disrupted, it usually signals that an industrial slowdown is imminent.
So what, then, can the dysfunction of Russia's national rail system tell us about the health of the country's economy in 2025? And will Russian Railways be able to get itself back on track any time soon?
Tankers at a railway yard in Tobolsk, Tyumen region, Russia, 24 September 2012. Photo: Sergey Ilnitsky / EPA
Track record
The origins of the national rail service's current crisis can be traced back to February 2022. Within the first 12 months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, transport flows in two key categories of goods had collapsed. Raw materials, such as timber, ferrous metals, ores and minerals, came under sanction by the West, while international demand for fertilisers — despite being unsanctioned — also fell significantly after Russia's major banks were excluded from the SWIFT international payment system.
As the war entered its second year, Russian Railways appeared to be surviving financially, although clear signs of strain had begun to appear. The national rail service had seen total freight transports fall 4% in 2022, marking the worst-ever drop-off since the global financial crisis hit Russia's economy in 2008. However, transport flows stabilised in 2023 as export numbers for non-sanctioned goods recovered. In particular, fertiliser exports rose as global buyers moved quickly to hedge against possible sanctions, while a strong wheat harvest kept Russia's grain flowing steadily to foreign markets, where demand soared amid low prices.
All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating.
But in 2024, the downturn returned, with freight volumes plummeting by 4% once again, and the situation has only worsened so far this year. Grain transportation, one of the biggest drivers of growth in 2023, dropped sharply last year, as did ferrous metal — usually a reliable category of transport — for the first time. The decrease in traffic is partially due to the decline in both steel smelting and exports, which have fallen for 11 months prior to early 2025, primarily due to sanctions. But it also reflects the struggling Russian construction industry, which usually consumes large amounts of steel. In 2025, the number of new residential construction projects has already declined by a quarter, and the government expects the trend to worsen. That means Russian Railways is hauling fewer metals, construction materials, and cement, all of which hurts transport figures.
All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating. Last year, freight volumes dropped by just over 4%, matching a post-Soviet record. But they have continued to fall by more than 7% in the first five months of 2025 alone, nearly equalling the total decline since the war began, and painting a bleak picture for the future.
Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA
Freight to firepower
There is one transportation item, however, that grew steadily from 2022 to 2024. Labelled vaguely as 'Other goods, including in containers,' Russian Railways does not specify what this category actually entails in its official data, but transport analysts generally believe it refers to military cargo, from ammunition and equipment to materials used in arms production.
In fact, the prioritisation of military freight is likely one of the most important reasons for the decline in other categories of haulage. But, as the Russian macroeconomic analysis Telegram channel MMI put it, it is 'a factor that is not customarily spoken about'.
North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west.
Given the state's prioritisation of all things military, it's no surprise that civilian freight volumes have fallen, military expert Yury Fedorov told Novaya Gazeta Europe. 'Clearly, some of the 'other goods' very likely relate to military production — there may be ammunition in the containers. North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west. Trains with tanks and artillery are travelling from factories and repair plants to the front and from the front back to the enterprises that repair them.'
The exact volume of weapons and ammunition shipments, as well as raw materials for their manufacture to military factories, has, of course, not been disclosed by Russian Railways.
Haul or nothing
But Russian Railways' falling freight volumes cannot be explained by the uptick in 'other goods'; these figures have also fallen so far in 2025, despite the Russian military's widely anticipated summer offensive in Ukraine.
The problem would appear to lie deeper and likely stems from the structure of Russia's rail network, in which few sections operate independently, so when problems arise in one area, they quickly spread to the others.
The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022.
This can happen incrementally due to several factors. Freight traffic to the southern ports of Novorossiysk and Taman has declined, for example, partly because frequent bombings have led to their closure, resulting in fewer ships docking and a sharp drop in dry cargo shipments by rail. The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022.
Western Russia had continued to export coal, which accounts for one-third of Russian Railways' overall cargo volumes, but those exports have fallen since last year's coal price collapse and the recent appreciation of the ruble made it unprofitable for Russian Railways to transport the cargo. The same phenomenon has also occurred in Russia's Far East, according to Alexander Polikarpov, managing partner at Rollingstock Agency, a Russian consultancy specialising in rail logistics and infrastructure, which means that the company's three key corridors to the global market are now more or less closed to coal exports.
Russian servicemen and military equipment at a railway station in the Rostov region, Russia, 23 February 2022. Photo: EPA
Trains in vain
Two additional problems explain why less freight is being transported. First, Russian Railways lacks sufficient staff due to the war, which has left Russia's economy facing a significant personnel shortage. Some workers have been mobilised and many others have enlisted after being offered significant financial incentives, while many more have simply left the country. According to the company's own figures, Russian Railways currently has a shortfall of approximately 2,500 engineers and around 3,000 locomotive crews, resulting in it being unable to run some 200 trains each day.
Second, locomotives are in short supply as well. In fact, according to a survey conducted last year, one-third of Russian industrial enterprises with non-public tracks lack locomotive engines, although Russian Railways has denied that the problem exists. In January–April 2025, the production of mainline electric and diesel locomotives in Russia fell by 13% and 6%, respectively.
By contrast, there are plenty of carriages, but this could be causing more harm than good. Shortages of workers and locomotives are causing bottlenecks, as carriages remain stationary for weeks at a time, often blocking traffic. According to internal data collected by Russian Railways, 300,000 wagons had accumulated on the network as of March 2025, almost a fifth of the rail service's entire fleet.
Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA
Sky-high investment
According to estimates made by Russian Railways, the company will need to purchase approximately 1,000 electric and diesel locomotives annually until 2035, as half of its 20,000-strong fleet of locomotives will require replacement by then. At current prices, therefore, it needs to be spending at least 220 billion rubles every year (€2.4 billion) to meet this vital goal.
However, despite the fact that its basic tariff rate for transporting goods has been increased over one and a half times, and passenger transportation profits have continued to grow since the start of the war in Ukraine, the operator's net total profits fell threefold in 2024 compared to the previous year. The company's main problem is that it earns relatively little while simultaneously borrowing and spending a lot — though not on the infrastructural improvements it needs.
Last year, for example, of the 1.5 trillion rubles (€16.47 billion) Russian Railways allocated for investments, approximately 200 billion (€2.2 billion) was spent buying a skyscraper in the prestigious Moscow-City commercial development to house new office space.
Due to this purchase and a drop in profits from the transportation of freight and cargo, projections show that Russian Railways will have to cut 40% — some 600 billion rubles (€6.59 billion) — of its investment budget this year in order to stay afloat, despite its pressing need for more engineers and locomotives.
Rolling on empty
In some ways, Russian Railways is simply facing the consequences of economic stagnation, which began in late 2024 and is expected to continue until at least 2027. But even if the war in Ukraine ends, sanctions are lifted, and exports to the West resume, it would take years for the state rail monopoly to recover from its deepening crisis.
'Even in the most optimistic scenario of an improvement in the geopolitical situation and the prompt end to the [war in Ukraine], a real effect on rail transportation will still be noticeable for 1.5–2 years,' Rollingstock's Polikarpov writes.
This year, the downturn in construction materials is expected to be the most significant drag on overall freight volumes. Coal transport may recover following a disastrous 2024, which, along with fertiliser (which is still not subject to Western sanctions) and container shipments, will drive some growth. But that won't be enough to compensate for lost freight flows, especially not to the extent needed to keep the system afloat.
Russian Railways needs cash to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance.
To do that, Russian Railways needs cash — to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance. With profits dwindling and debt rising, the company may have only one option left: to persuade the government once again to raise tariffs above the rate of inflation, as it has done every year of the war so far.
Yet, even in this strategy there is a paradox. After raising its tariffs, Russian Railways often resorts to offering steep discounts to cargo customers to ensure its trains don't run empty, according to analysts from Russian Telegram channel N.Trans Lab, which covers the transport industry with a focus on logistics.
If this practice continues, the experts warn, Russian Railways could face an even worse scenario and find itself forced to dismantle parts of its rail network entirely — lines for which there is no longer sufficient demand, and which have become too costly to sustain, both for Russian Railways itself and for the economy as a whole.
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Novaya Gazeta Europe
a day ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Off the rails. Disused trains, record-low cargo and engine shortages: how the war has impacted Russian Railways — Novaya Gazeta Europe
State-owned monopoly Russian Railways is at a crisis point, the company's worst since the Great Recession almost two decades ago, with freight volumes at a record low due to the combined effects of Western sanctions and dwindling flows of agricultural goods and construction materials. Nevertheless, Russia's rail network is congested, not only with trains rushing to deliver military supplies urgently needed at the front, but with unused carriages. It also critically lacks both the personnel and locomotives required to keep the rail system running smoothly, and these problems only seem to be getting worse. This matters not only because Russian Railways is one of Russia's largest and richest state-owned enterprises, but because railway transport activity is also a bellwether for the wider economy — freight must be moved today in order for business to be done tomorrow. When rail traffic is disrupted, it usually signals that an industrial slowdown is imminent. So what, then, can the dysfunction of Russia's national rail system tell us about the health of the country's economy in 2025? And will Russian Railways be able to get itself back on track any time soon? Tankers at a railway yard in Tobolsk, Tyumen region, Russia, 24 September 2012. Photo: Sergey Ilnitsky / EPA Track record The origins of the national rail service's current crisis can be traced back to February 2022. Within the first 12 months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, transport flows in two key categories of goods had collapsed. Raw materials, such as timber, ferrous metals, ores and minerals, came under sanction by the West, while international demand for fertilisers — despite being unsanctioned — also fell significantly after Russia's major banks were excluded from the SWIFT international payment system. As the war entered its second year, Russian Railways appeared to be surviving financially, although clear signs of strain had begun to appear. The national rail service had seen total freight transports fall 4% in 2022, marking the worst-ever drop-off since the global financial crisis hit Russia's economy in 2008. However, transport flows stabilised in 2023 as export numbers for non-sanctioned goods recovered. In particular, fertiliser exports rose as global buyers moved quickly to hedge against possible sanctions, while a strong wheat harvest kept Russia's grain flowing steadily to foreign markets, where demand soared amid low prices. All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating. But in 2024, the downturn returned, with freight volumes plummeting by 4% once again, and the situation has only worsened so far this year. Grain transportation, one of the biggest drivers of growth in 2023, dropped sharply last year, as did ferrous metal — usually a reliable category of transport — for the first time. The decrease in traffic is partially due to the decline in both steel smelting and exports, which have fallen for 11 months prior to early 2025, primarily due to sanctions. But it also reflects the struggling Russian construction industry, which usually consumes large amounts of steel. In 2025, the number of new residential construction projects has already declined by a quarter, and the government expects the trend to worsen. That means Russian Railways is hauling fewer metals, construction materials, and cement, all of which hurts transport figures. All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating. Last year, freight volumes dropped by just over 4%, matching a post-Soviet record. But they have continued to fall by more than 7% in the first five months of 2025 alone, nearly equalling the total decline since the war began, and painting a bleak picture for the future. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA Freight to firepower There is one transportation item, however, that grew steadily from 2022 to 2024. Labelled vaguely as 'Other goods, including in containers,' Russian Railways does not specify what this category actually entails in its official data, but transport analysts generally believe it refers to military cargo, from ammunition and equipment to materials used in arms production. In fact, the prioritisation of military freight is likely one of the most important reasons for the decline in other categories of haulage. But, as the Russian macroeconomic analysis Telegram channel MMI put it, it is 'a factor that is not customarily spoken about'. North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west. Given the state's prioritisation of all things military, it's no surprise that civilian freight volumes have fallen, military expert Yury Fedorov told Novaya Gazeta Europe. 'Clearly, some of the 'other goods' very likely relate to military production — there may be ammunition in the containers. North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west. Trains with tanks and artillery are travelling from factories and repair plants to the front and from the front back to the enterprises that repair them.' The exact volume of weapons and ammunition shipments, as well as raw materials for their manufacture to military factories, has, of course, not been disclosed by Russian Railways. Haul or nothing But Russian Railways' falling freight volumes cannot be explained by the uptick in 'other goods'; these figures have also fallen so far in 2025, despite the Russian military's widely anticipated summer offensive in Ukraine. The problem would appear to lie deeper and likely stems from the structure of Russia's rail network, in which few sections operate independently, so when problems arise in one area, they quickly spread to the others. The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022. This can happen incrementally due to several factors. Freight traffic to the southern ports of Novorossiysk and Taman has declined, for example, partly because frequent bombings have led to their closure, resulting in fewer ships docking and a sharp drop in dry cargo shipments by rail. The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022. Western Russia had continued to export coal, which accounts for one-third of Russian Railways' overall cargo volumes, but those exports have fallen since last year's coal price collapse and the recent appreciation of the ruble made it unprofitable for Russian Railways to transport the cargo. The same phenomenon has also occurred in Russia's Far East, according to Alexander Polikarpov, managing partner at Rollingstock Agency, a Russian consultancy specialising in rail logistics and infrastructure, which means that the company's three key corridors to the global market are now more or less closed to coal exports. Russian servicemen and military equipment at a railway station in the Rostov region, Russia, 23 February 2022. Photo: EPA Trains in vain Two additional problems explain why less freight is being transported. First, Russian Railways lacks sufficient staff due to the war, which has left Russia's economy facing a significant personnel shortage. Some workers have been mobilised and many others have enlisted after being offered significant financial incentives, while many more have simply left the country. According to the company's own figures, Russian Railways currently has a shortfall of approximately 2,500 engineers and around 3,000 locomotive crews, resulting in it being unable to run some 200 trains each day. Second, locomotives are in short supply as well. In fact, according to a survey conducted last year, one-third of Russian industrial enterprises with non-public tracks lack locomotive engines, although Russian Railways has denied that the problem exists. In January–April 2025, the production of mainline electric and diesel locomotives in Russia fell by 13% and 6%, respectively. By contrast, there are plenty of carriages, but this could be causing more harm than good. Shortages of workers and locomotives are causing bottlenecks, as carriages remain stationary for weeks at a time, often blocking traffic. According to internal data collected by Russian Railways, 300,000 wagons had accumulated on the network as of March 2025, almost a fifth of the rail service's entire fleet. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA Sky-high investment According to estimates made by Russian Railways, the company will need to purchase approximately 1,000 electric and diesel locomotives annually until 2035, as half of its 20,000-strong fleet of locomotives will require replacement by then. At current prices, therefore, it needs to be spending at least 220 billion rubles every year (€2.4 billion) to meet this vital goal. However, despite the fact that its basic tariff rate for transporting goods has been increased over one and a half times, and passenger transportation profits have continued to grow since the start of the war in Ukraine, the operator's net total profits fell threefold in 2024 compared to the previous year. The company's main problem is that it earns relatively little while simultaneously borrowing and spending a lot — though not on the infrastructural improvements it needs. Last year, for example, of the 1.5 trillion rubles (€16.47 billion) Russian Railways allocated for investments, approximately 200 billion (€2.2 billion) was spent buying a skyscraper in the prestigious Moscow-City commercial development to house new office space. Due to this purchase and a drop in profits from the transportation of freight and cargo, projections show that Russian Railways will have to cut 40% — some 600 billion rubles (€6.59 billion) — of its investment budget this year in order to stay afloat, despite its pressing need for more engineers and locomotives. Rolling on empty In some ways, Russian Railways is simply facing the consequences of economic stagnation, which began in late 2024 and is expected to continue until at least 2027. But even if the war in Ukraine ends, sanctions are lifted, and exports to the West resume, it would take years for the state rail monopoly to recover from its deepening crisis. 'Even in the most optimistic scenario of an improvement in the geopolitical situation and the prompt end to the [war in Ukraine], a real effect on rail transportation will still be noticeable for 1.5–2 years,' Rollingstock's Polikarpov writes. This year, the downturn in construction materials is expected to be the most significant drag on overall freight volumes. Coal transport may recover following a disastrous 2024, which, along with fertiliser (which is still not subject to Western sanctions) and container shipments, will drive some growth. But that won't be enough to compensate for lost freight flows, especially not to the extent needed to keep the system afloat. Russian Railways needs cash to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance. To do that, Russian Railways needs cash — to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance. With profits dwindling and debt rising, the company may have only one option left: to persuade the government once again to raise tariffs above the rate of inflation, as it has done every year of the war so far. Yet, even in this strategy there is a paradox. After raising its tariffs, Russian Railways often resorts to offering steep discounts to cargo customers to ensure its trains don't run empty, according to analysts from Russian Telegram channel Lab, which covers the transport industry with a focus on logistics. If this practice continues, the experts warn, Russian Railways could face an even worse scenario and find itself forced to dismantle parts of its rail network entirely — lines for which there is no longer sufficient demand, and which have become too costly to sustain, both for Russian Railways itself and for the economy as a whole.
Novaya Gazeta Europe
2 days ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
North Korea plans to send up to 30,000 more troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, Kyiv says — Novaya Gazeta Europe
North Korean artists perform during a concert while a video shows soldiers holding Russian and North Korean flags, during a visit of Russian Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova to Pyongyang on 29 June 2025. Photo: EPA/KCNA North Korea is set to triple its troop presence alongside the Russian military by sending a further 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to the front line of the war with Ukraine, CNN reported on Wednesday, citing Ukrainian officials. According to the Ukrainian intelligence assessment seen by CNN, the new troops could arrive in Russia 'in the coming months' before being deployed to Russian-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine to 'strengthen the Russian contingent, including during the large-scale offensive operations'. The assessment noted signs that Russia was preparing to move large numbers of troops from North Korea, including refitting military aircraft to carry personnel, CNN said. Satellite imagery also showed the arrival of a ship previously used to transfer North Korean soldiers at a Russian port and cargo aircraft at Pyongyang Airport, the network added. An unnamed Western official who had seen 'information separate to the Ukrainian assessment' confirmed Kyiv's estimate of 30,000 troops being sent to Russia, CNN said. CNN's report follows a similar assessment last week by South Korea's National Intelligence Service, with officials in Seoul stating that Pyongyang had begun recruiting additional troops to send to Russia and could deploy them as early as July or August. Last year, Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive partnership agreement that reportedly contained a secret clause allowing Pyongyang to send military personnel to the war in Ukraine. Since then, South Korean and Western intelligence agencies have repeatedly documented the involvement of over 10,000 North Korean troops in battle against Ukrainian soldiers, with some 600 estimated to have been killed. On Tuesday, North Korean state media released images of dictator Kim Jong Un publicly mourning soldiers killed fighting for Russia during a gala concert in Pyongyang to mark the first anniversary of the partnership agreement between the two countries. Moscow and Pyongyang in April confirmed for the first time that North Korean troops had fought 'shoulder to shoulder' alongside Russian servicemen as they recaptured the country's southwestern Kursk region from Ukrainian forces. Then, Kim announced that a monument to the North Korean soldiers who fought in Kursk would be erected in Pyongyang to honour their 'heroism and bravery', with Russian Ambassador to Pyongyang Alexander Matsegora later saying that Russia would name streets and build 'beautiful monuments to the Korean heroes' in Kursk as a sign of its gratitude.
Novaya Gazeta Europe
3 days ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Tongue-tied in Tbilisi. Russian imperialism is casting a long linguistic shadow over the Georgian capital — Novaya Gazeta Europe
'It's better to speak Mandarin than Russian in Tbilisi,' says Nikoloz, our guide on a Soviet-themed tour of Tbilisi, as one member of our group, a native Mandarin speaker, attempts to place an order at a street food stand in stilted Russian. Given the repression suffered over the centuries by Georgians at the hands of Russians, Nikoloz's advice is understandable, and if speaking Mandarin doesn't appeal, he adds that just making the effort to say madloba, Georgian for thank you, will be highly appreciated by most locals. Language as a battleground Far from being isolated incidents, such linguistic considerations form part of the broader social and political fragmentation in a country where language has long been a point of contention, something that has become further heightened since Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the waves of Russian migrants who have since taken refuge in Georgia. By the end of 2022, 110,000 Russian nationals had entered the country, according to the Georgian Interior Ministry, and though some have since left, political tensions around the continued presence of those who haven't remain high. Feeling like strangers in their own city, many Georgians say that the prospect of encountering the unknown is enough to stop them going into Russian-owned establishments altogether. Many Georgians speak both Russian and English as well as their mother tongue, allowing them to choose what language to use in a variety of social situations. No longer a neutral lingua franca, Russian is a reminder to many of centuries of occupation and cultural erasure, and many Georgians now avoid speaking the language entirely as an act of political protest. Even when Georgians do choose to speak Russian, most expect there to be an acknowledgement on the part of their interlocutor of the damaging effects of Russian imperialism and an expression of some form of anti-Putin stance. The Bridge of Peace with Tbilisi's old town behind it, 3 June 2024. Photo: EPA-EFE/DAVID MDZINARISHVILI Another Tbilisi tour guide, Dato, describes going into a restaurant where he was handed a menu in Russian by staff who also addressed him in Russian. After Dato asked in Georgian for a Georgian menu, the staff switched to English and apologised for not speaking Georgian or having a menu in the national language. Dato's reaction was to get up and leave, resolving never to set foot in the place again. Feeling like strangers in their own city, many Georgians say that the prospect of encountering the unknown is enough to stop them going into Russian-owned establishments altogether, citing their uncertainty about what language they will be expected to speak, and what political views such choices might imply. The influx of relatively affluent Russians has transformed central Tbilisi in particular. Even ordering a coffee in Tbilisi today can be politically charged, requiring Georgians to cede an element of control to Russians, and several Georgians have described the situation to me as exhausting and as a linguistic tug-of-war that forces them onto the defensive. While avoidance often becomes the solution, there are also moments of solidarity in which Russians and Georgians living in the same neighbourhoods can form ties over shared acts such as dog walking, in which language becomes a tool of tentative trust that challenges the friend-foe binary. Economic realities The language issue is tightly bound up with the financial challenges faced by many Georgians. Makvala, a Georgian academic who says that many of her compatriots feel increasingly unwelcome in their own country, insists that far from being a purely 'Georgian-Russian thing', a 'nationalism thing' or an 'ethnicity-based thing', differing language use is rooted in class, 'because most of the Russians who arrive here are richer than local people'. The influx of relatively affluent Russians has transformed central Tbilisi in particular. New cafés, bars and restaurants catering to Russian tastes and budgets have popped up, driving up rents and living costs, and creating a rift between two communities whose spending habits differ significantly. Economic pressures on Georgians have forced many of them to change their lifestyles and move to the outskirts of Tbilisi. Many Georgians now find themselves having to work two jobs to make ends meet and some have even returned to their family homes. Georgian opposition party supporters attend a rally against the foreign agent law in downtown Tbilisi, 24 May 2024. Photo: EPA-EFE/DAVID MDZINARISHVILI Georgian tour guides are often expected to lead groups in Russian, and it's not unusual for Russian-speaking tourists to arrive in the country believing that Georgia remains much the same as it was in Soviet times. The burden of linguistic politics also weighs heavily on Georgians navigating academic and professional spheres dominated by Russian speakers. Tsisia, a university professor, describes being invited to a dinner in Paris where all her fellow guests spoke to her in Russian, despite her insisting she didn't speak the language and asking them to speak to her in English. 'I even had a heated conversation with a French scholar who was telling me that in the seventies and eighties everybody [in Georgia] spoke Russian. Then I told her … I'm here, and you see how I speak Russian. Why should you go ahead with your assumption that has no grounds?' Tsisia describes feeling laden with the responsibility of having to prove that she doesn't speak Russian, and also admits how demeaning she finds it that Russian scholars continue to dominate academic debate both in and of the South Caucasus. Such expectations are common in other professional spheres as well — Georgian tour guides are often expected to lead groups in Russian, and it's not unusual for Russian-speaking tourists to arrive in the country believing that Georgia remains much the same as it was in Soviet times, and assuming that they can and should speak to everybody in Russian. As a result, some guides, including Dato and Nikoloz, have decided only to lead tours in English on political grounds. Two women walk past graffiti of the Ukrainian, EU and NATO flags in Tbilisi's old town, 22 May 2023. Photo: EPA-EFE/ZURAB KURTSIKIDZE East and West The language question is also inseparable from Georgia's fraught geopolitical orientation, which has become a particularly contentious issue in the past year following the reorientation of the ruling Georgian Dream party towards Moscow. Choosing between East and West, between Russian influence and what was until recently the country's growing association with Europe, has become a polarising issue, with nightly protests in Tbilisi continuing amid accusations that Georgian Dream is mired in corruption and stole last year's parliamentary elections. For many Georgians, the future lies firmly with Europe. 'This country to me looks more European,' Nikoloz tells me, adding that he means that more in the sense of the national mindset rather than in purely geographical terms. 'We are tired of Russian politics. We are really tired. We didn't learn anything good from it,' Dato says, echoing the same sentiment. 'What we have, what we are proud of, we learned from Europe. And we feel more like Europeans than like Asians or Russians.' Most Georgians in Tbilisi I spoke to while researching this topic told me that they want to be able to control when they use Russian in their daily lives. Tbilisi's urban landscape bears witness to this ongoing conflict. Walls are covered with competing slogans, from pro-Russian to anti-Putin graffiti, in Russian, English and Georgian, while café windows and shop fronts have become canvases for political expression. Many establishments have signs defining the politics of those who may enter, with notes on the menu or even wifi names defining their clear anti-Putin and anti-Russian stances. Language, identity and nationality have complex intersections. Some café staff will ask Russian speakers to switch to English while on the premises — a request that can be tricky for some who have grown up in other post-Soviet countries for whom Russian is their first language. Maria, a Georgian academic, describes her experience of hearing Russian being spoken loudly in a Tbilisi café as 'very irritating', and relates how, after they began singing a song in Russian, her friend attempted to explain to them in Russian how it felt to hear such songs being sung in Tbilisi. Their reaction was to claim they were from Belarus rather than Russia itself. The future at stake Most Georgians in Tbilisi I spoke to while researching this topic told me that they want to be able to control when they use Russian in their daily lives, a key element of which is not having Russian imposed on them in their own city. Anti-Putin posters, Dedeana Bar, Tbilisi. Photo: Georgie Archer Encounters between Georgian natives and recently arrived Russian speakers in Tbilisi tend to involve a back-and-forth exchange until such a time that one interlocutor trusts the other enough to accommodate them linguistically to some extent. In some cases, Georgian speakers can still feel that they are being imposed upon and may decline to continue the interaction, feeling a lack of control over their everyday encounters. Russian imperialism, the war in Ukraine, historical memory and Georgia's contemporary political turbulence are all contributing factors to the decision made by most of my Georgian interviewees to avoid speaking Russian altogether. Most of those I spoke to said that in nearly all circumstances in which they might be expected to switch from their native Georgian, they felt imposed upon. Language choice in Tbilisi has become an emotional and political project, and one that remains nuanced, complex and easy to misinterpret.
