China's Steady Ascent to the Moon: How Beijing Is Rewriting Lunar Geopolitics

The Diplomat

02-07-2025

When the Chang'e 6 return capsule touched down in the dusty plains of Inner Mongolia in June 2024, it carried something no nation had ever retrieved: the first samples from the far side of the Moon. For China's space agency, this wasn't just a scientific achievement; it was a message. It marked a pivotal shift, signaling that China's lunar ambitions had evolved from symbolic flag planting to a systematic push for permanent space infrastructure.
Chang'e 6 was not a one off headline grabber, but rather part of a rapidly advancing sequence. Chang'e 7, scheduled for 2026, will scout the Moon's South Pole, an area of strategic interest due to potential water deposits. Chang'e 8, launching in 2028, aims to test technologies for using local lunar resources. And by 2035, Beijing plans to begin constructing a permanent International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), possibly powered through the freezing two-week lunar nights by a small nuclear reactor.
Meanwhile, officials say China remains 'on track' to land its first astronauts on the Moon by 2030. This spring's successful trials of the country's new two-part crewed spacecraft (Mengzhou and its lander, Lanyue) reinforced that timeline. And with the launch of Tianwen 2 in May, a mission to return samples from both an asteroid and a comet, China has made its intentions unmistakably clear. In space, China is not merely catching up anymore, but rather it is starting to lead.
Why the Moon, and Why Now?
China's accelerated push toward the Moon is not simply a scientific endeavor. It is guided by a strategic calculus shaped by the interlocking imperatives of accessing resources, having technological leverage, and establishing a long term political control.
First, the Lunar South Pole contains permanently shadowed craters believed to hold substantial reserves of water ice. For any country seeking a lasting presence on the Moon, that ice is of tremendous importance, as it can be converted into fuel, life support, and even infrastructure. Securing access to these polar deposits offer not only practical advantage but also immense geopolitical symbolism. In space, as on Earth, control of critical resources translates into influence.
China's lunar missions are not developing in isolation. Key technologies – such as the heavy lift Long March-10 rocket, high thrust propulsion systems, and robust cislunar communication networks – have direct military relevance. While Chinese officials maintain that the lunar program is peaceful, defense analysts see clear convergence with the People's Liberation Army's growing interest in space as a strategic domain. These dual use dividends are too significant to ignore.
Building a Coalition on Beijing's Terms
There is a clear geopolitical dynamic at play as China's space program advances. While the United States advertises its 55-member Artemis Accords as proof of international momentum, Beijing is quietly building a rival coalition. Thirteen countries have signed onto China's ILRS agreement so far, including Russia, Pakistan, Belarus, and South Africa. To expand its influence, China has rolled out an ambitious '5-5-5' campaign, under which it aims to add a total of 50 nations, 500 institutions, and 5,000 researchers to engage in lunar science by the early 2030s.
This division is stark and deliberate. With the exception of Thailand, not a single Artemis country has joined the ILRS, and none of China's partners has signed the Artemis Accords. Beijing is making its offer hard to refuse, as it offers low interest loans for ground stations, tech transfer guarantees, and slots for smaller payloads on Chinese missions. The result is a familiar dynamic, a quiet struggle for influence, echoing the divides seen in the race for 5G or the Belt and Road Initiative.
How the United States Is Reacting
Inside NASA, China's growing momentum is seen less as an external threat and more as a rallying cry. Administrators from both Republican and Democratic administrations have repeatedly cast the Artemis program as essential to winning the new space race with China, as recently stated by Administrator Bill Nelson. It is a message that resonates on Capitol Hill, where bipartisan support has helped secure funding for core elements like the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion, even as deadlines slip.
Few lawmakers want to be seen as soft on China, especially when space dominance is framed as a matter of national prestige and security. External rivals can unify an otherwise polarized Congress, and Artemis has proven no exception. The Biden administration quietly adopted all of the program's core goals from its predecessor, shifting the first crewed lunar landing from 2024 to 2027 or later, but keeping China at the center of its justification.
Still, the U.S. political system remains a structural weakness in this long term competition. Artemis has already suffered multiple delays, and a December 2023 audit put the odds of a 2028 landing at just 70 percent. Additionally, the White House fiscal year 2026 budget proposal for NASA included a 25 percent reduction in NASA's funding and plans to phase out the SLS and Orion spacecraft after Artemis III. This raises significant concerns about the viability of the current lunar return strategy.
China, by contrast, can redirect funding or extend timelines without public debate or political backlash, potentially giving it an advantage in the lunar exploration race. Unlike democratic systems where space funding often fluctuates with political shifts, Beijing can sustain multidecade programs with centralized coordination.
At a deeper level, the two programs reflect diverging philosophies. The United States leans on the private sector (outsourcing key components to firms like SpaceX and Blue Origin) in hopes of gaining speed and reducing costs. Whether that gamble pays off remains one of the defining questions in this unfolding lunar rivalry.
Implications for the Indo-Pacific
The prospect of rival, partially overlapping communication and navigation networks in cislunar space is causing concern among Asian defense planners. A radio quiet zone on the Moon's far side (prized by astronomers for its shielded environment) could easily conceal surveillance infrastructure. Meanwhile, proposals for lunar 'gas stations' to refuel spacecraft raise uncomfortable legal questions about territorial control in a domain still governed by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, drafted long before GPS or commercial satellites ever existed.
Japan and India, both signatories to the Artemis Accords, have expressed public support for U.S. leadership. But behind the scenes, Japan's SLIM precision lander and India's upcoming Chandrayaam 4 sample return mission may position them to share data or cooperate with both blocs, keeping diplomatic options open.
For smaller Southeast Asian countries, the calculus feels familiar, much like debates over maritime codes of conduct. The goal is to avoid choosing sides outright while maximizing technology transfer and strategic flexibility both from Washington and Beijing.
To many ASEAN capitals, lunar engineering might still seem like science fiction. But the stakes are very real. Whichever bloc secures early access to polar ice on the Moon could gain a commanding position in the emerging cislunar economy, powering Earth Moon cargo transport and satellite relays.
The intellectual property, industrial standards, and logistics infrastructure built in space won't stay in space. They will shape value chains back on Earth, from robotics to additive manufacturing. Australia's nascent Moon to Mars supply chain initiatives, South Korea's KPLO orbiter study and Singapore's interest in cislunar cybersecurity all suggest the region understands what is at stake. Participation choices will increasingly interconnect with terrestrial trade and security partnerships.
A Contest of Rule Making, Not Just Rockets
Framing today's lunar competition as a 'new Cold War' misses the point. China and the United States are not simply racing to plant flags; they are maneuvering to shape the rules of the game. Technological standards, legal norms, and commercial protocols established now will define who sets the pace in space for decades to come.
Beijing's centrally planned path toward its ILRS promises long-term stability, but offers little in the way of transparency. Washington's Artemis program, by contrast, is built around a decentralized, commercial led coalition, bringing openness and broad participation, but also slower timelines and political volatility.
For policymakers across the Indo-Pacific, the challenge is to engage without becoming dependent. That means pushing for interoperable standards, avoiding exclusivity in launch or communications deals, and investing in domestic lunar science capabilities to remain credible at the negotiating table.
The Moon is no longer just a silent presence in the night sky. It is quickly becoming the region's newest strategic frontier.