Afrikaner leaders meet USA officials
WATCH: SA delegation remains calm in 'genocide ambush' by Trump
The group said it had a series of engagement with White House officials and other key stakeholders.
The delegation was led by FF Plus leader, Dr Corne Mulder, Dr Theo de Jager of the Southern African Agri Initiative, and Gerhard Papenfus from the National Employers' Association of South Africa that represents small and medium sized employers and aids them with lobbying and labour relations. Papenfus discussed the trip and its outcomes with eNCA.
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The Citizen
an hour ago
- The Citizen
FF Plus claims White House officials want ANC to publicly denounce ‘Kill the Boer' chant
The FF Plus met officials in the US and claimed Ramaphosa's meeting with Trump was a failure. US President Donald Trump meets with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, on 21 May 2025 amid tensions over Washington's resettlement of white Afrikaners that the US president claims are the victims of 'genocide'. Photo: AFP Freedom Front (FF) Plus leader Corne Mulder says President Cyril Ramaphosa and his team were unable to reset relations with the United States (US) government. Ramaphosa met US President Donald Trump in May, accompanied by businessman Johann Rupert, some Cabinet ministers and South African golfers Ernie Els and Retief Goosen. However, Mulder told reporters at the OR Tambo International Airport on Wednesday that Ramaphosa's meeting with Trump was a failure. He had just returned from a trip to the US, where he met with US government officials and businesspeople. 'We all took notice of the events in the Oval Office, and we saw that it did not look like a success. Our delegation came back to South Africa and said everything went well, the problem is that no one we met, including the appointments, told us that the meeting was a success. 'On the contrary, they are concerned about what happened and they desperately want to reset relations between South Africa and the US, but there are certain problems that need to be solved,' he said. Four conditions given to FF Plus Mulder said he was told that there are four conditions that must be met for South Africa's relationship with the US to be reset. The four conditions are: To classify farm attacks and crime in rural areas as priority crimes; The ANC should publicly denounce the 'Kill the Boer' chant; Government must ensure that land expropriation happens with fair market compensation; and American companies and organisations must be exempt from race-based policies, such as BEE. 'Anyone who thinks that these conditions are a figment of our imagination or that we went and stood outside the White House, no you do that at your own peril. It should be noted that these things are set as preconditions for the normalisation of the relationship between South Africa and the US, the country's second largest trading partner,' he said. Who did the FF Plus meet at the White House? Mulder said his delegation had not gone to Washington to 'complain'. 'We met with people from the office of the Vice President; we met people in charge of the National Security Council as well as the Homeland Security Council. 'The current situation is that the current administration has reached out by name to the Afrikaner people, we would be foolish not to act on that,' he said. Mulder also said he did not view Trump's involvement with South Africa's policies as 'interference'. 'I do not think the US is interfering with South Africa. If South Africa prefers the US to have nothing to do with South Africa, we should just ignore these four preconditions and it will happen automatically,' he said. He said he would brief Ramaphosa about his party's trip to the US. The Citizen also understands that the FF Plus had a meeting at the US consulate in Sandton after their media briefing at OR Tambo. Presidency dismisses 'personal ambitions' of FF Plus Meanwhile, Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya told The Citizen on Wednesday that the FF Plus had gone to the US as non-state actors. 'Our experience is that state actors do not use non-state actors as intermediaries; therefore, the FF Plus visit and subsequent pronouncements will be viewed as nothing more than their personal ambitions,' he said. Political analyst Ntsikeleo Breakfast told The Citizen that he believes that FF Plus did not go to Washington DC with good intentions. 'I do not believe what they are saying, that the relationship has not been fixed. From my understanding, that issue was fixed,' he said. More strain in the GNU? Breakfast said the FF Plus visit to the US further complicates matters for Ramaphosa, who just fired a DA minister for going to the US without permission. The FF Plus is a partner in the government of national unity (GNU). 'This complicates matters for the GNU. These political parties, they need to work together as a united force and as a team of the GNU. You can't want to be a member of the GNU and still take a step back and draw swords with another member,' he said. The Citizen had reached out to both the DA and the ANC, the two biggest partners in the GNU, about claims made by the FF Plus. Their comments will be added once they are received. NOW READ: Ramaphosa acted 'justifiably' in removing Whitfield, says SACP
IOL News
2 hours ago
- IOL News
NATO's Defence Spending: Washington's Political Will Trumps Brussels' Consensus Diplomacy
US President Donald Trump (C) flanked by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth (L) and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a press conference during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague on June 25, 2025. Image: AFP Clyde N.S. Ramalaine The June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague produced a landmark decision: member states, except for Spain, agreed to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This bold move, which marks a significant departure from the long-standing 2% benchmark agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, represents more than a fiscal adjustment; it signals a seismic shift in the alliance's strategic orientation. At the heart of this recalibration is the reasserted influence of U.S. President Donald Trump, whose longstanding critiques of NATO burden-sharing have now crystallised into formal policy. This article explores the rationale, implications, and geopolitical consequences of NATO's spending leap, assessing whether this shift reflects authentic alliance consensus or a recalibration driven by American political will. When NATO's 32 member states gathered in The Hague for the June 2025 summit, few anticipated the alliance would break with over a decade of precedent. But they did, agreeing to a bold, controversial, and for some, economically staggering commitment: to spend 5% of their national GDP on defence by 2035. However, NATO did not shift this policy direction out of its own conviction or internal consensus; rather, it was compelled to do so, with U.S. President Donald Trump standing at the heart of this strategic pivot, having since his first stint advocated for greater burden-sharing among member states. Trump's framing was blunt: 'Why should the U.S. keep subsidising European security when Europe can afford to pay?' In many ways, this new 5% target represents the realisation of Trump's foreign policy worldview: as it relates to NATO, a five tenet blend of transactional diplomacy, fiscal pressure, nationalist recalibration, readiness and modernisation, and geopolitical deterrence. Trump's foreign policy is often described as transactional, meaning it treats international alliances less as values-based partnerships and more as quid pro quo arrangements. NATO, in this view, is not a sacred pillar of post-WWII order but a cost-benefit enterprise. Applied politically, fiscal pressure can describe the tactic of urging or coercing other member states to increase their defence budgets to meet alliance commitments, such as Trump urging NATO allies to spend 5% of GDP. The implicit threat: fail to meet spending demands, and U.S. protection may no longer be guaranteed. Under this logic, NATO is only worthwhile if the U.S. is not carrying a disproportionate share of the financial burden. Trump repeatedly framed the alliance as an economic deal, where allies were "delinquent" in their obligations. He demanded that U.S. support be conditional on financial commitments, reducing mutual defence to a pay-to-play system. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ This further aligns with Trump's broader nationalist recalibration "America First" doctrine. This interpretation is reinforced by Trump's domestic base, which is increasingly wary of foreign entanglements. According to analysis from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the U.S. accounted for roughly 68.7% of total NATO military spending in 2023, meaning that nearly seven in ten dollars spent by NATO members were American. With the U.S. contributing nearly 70% of NATO's total defence spending, Trump argued the arrangement was fiscally unjust. Requiring allies to spend more would redistribute responsibility and ease pressure on U.S. taxpayers. By pushing for the 2% target, and now 5%, Trump used fiscal pressure to compel policy alignment. His administration hinted that failure to meet the spending floor could lead to reduced U.S. commitment, threatening the alliance's coherence. Another component of Trump's rationale lies in readiness and modernisation. Higher spending is linked to greater military capability. Trump's advisers highlighted ageing equipment, low deployability, and interoperability challenges as evidence that current budgets were insufficient. NATO states lacked modern infrastructure, weaponry, and rapid deployment capacity. Chronic incompatibility in systems and doctrines undermined joint operations. The 5% target is not merely a financial benchmark but a demand for measurable improvements: mobile, modern, integrated forces ready for cyber warfare, space militarisation, and asymmetric threats. Trump saw increased spending as essential to transforming NATO into a technologically dominant and operationally agile force. The 5% target also serves a function of geopolitical deterrence. Trump argued that a wealthier, well-armed NATO would send a strong message to adversaries like Russia and China about the alliance's resolve. Defence spending becomes a litmus test of political will. Trump emphasised that deterrence is achieved not through communiqués but through visible military capability. By urging allies to raise spending, he sought to eliminate ambiguity that adversaries might exploit, especially in light of Russian aggression and China's assertiveness. The outcome of the Hague Summit marks an undeniable strategic win for Trump, validating his ideology for a reshaped NATO. What was once dismissed as provocative rhetoric is now policy. The agreement to move toward 5% signals not just a funding shift, but a transformation in the alliance's operational ethos. Trump hailed it as a "monumental win for the United States and the free world." This also underscores a broader realignment: NATO's direction is now synchronised with Washington's political will rather than Brussels' consensus-building. The U.S. model is assertive and top-down, driven by strategic imperatives. Brussels, by contrast, has favoured inclusive, deliberative processes. The Hague Summit reflects a power shift, where American momentum overrides European caution, reconfiguring NATO into a more hierarchical, pressure-sensitive alliance. Trump's assertiveness demonstrated that America is not only NATO's military backbone but also its ideological compass. The 5% target reflects Trump's insistence on fairness and strategic necessity. Under his leadership, burden-sharing has become a requirement, not a polite suggestion. In this context, Trump is not merely influencing NATO; he is directing it. He has repositioned the U.S. as the alliance's strategic lodestar, with the 5% threshold symbolising his imprint on NATO's long-term trajectory. Why then did the majority of NATO states agree to such an ambitious spending goal? A plausible argument is that European powers accepted the 5% benchmark not out of ideological alignment with Trump, but to ensure continued U.S. commitment to NATO—and, crucially, to Ukraine and their security. Given Trump's scepticism towards multilateral institutions and his past threats to withdraw from NATO, European leaders may have regarded the target as a calculated concession to keep the U.S. engaged. It constitutes a form of strategic appeasement: if meeting Trump's demands secures American support, then it is a price worth paying. Compounding this urgency is the perception, real or manufactured, of a renewed Russian threat. Remarks by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who recently referred to EU leaders as 'Brusselian cockroaches,' signal rhetorical escalation and reinforce NATO's view of Russia as an enduring adversary. Whether grounded in imminent threat assessments or strategic messaging, this antagonism sustains European anxiety and justifies increased military expenditure as a deterrent and necessity. By meeting Trump's demands, European leaders also give him political cover to maintain U.S. support for Ukraine's war effort. In this light, the 5% commitment becomes a tool to secure U.S. leadership for Europe's collective security. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's effusive praise of Trump reinforces this reading. His remarks lauding Trump's 'decisive action in Iran' and describing him as a 'man of peace' who is also willing to use force appeared more choreographed than spontaneous. Given NATO's growing reliance on U.S. leadership, Rutte's comments may have been a tactical gesture—an effort to affirm Trump's primacy while ensuring his continued commitment without conceding institutional authority. This shift could also enable strategic rebalancing. As Europe assumes more of the defence burden, the U.S. can reallocate resources to the Indo-Pacific, where China's rise poses a growing challenge. A more self-sufficient Europe gives Washington the bandwidth to pursue its global agenda while challenging perceptions of NATO as U.S.-dependent. With more skin in the game, Europe may gain strategic credibility and a stronger voice within the alliance. Nonetheless, challenges remain. Public sentiment in Europe remains cautious about large-scale military expansion. Polls in Germany, France, and Spain indicate a preference for diplomacy over deterrence. The political cost of sustaining 5% defence spending may prove substantial. If NATO states deliver, the Hague Summit may be remembered as the dawn of a fortified, globally relevant alliance. If not, it risks becoming another episode in summit theatre—where leaders agree in principle, delay in practice, and dilute in execution. For Trump, however, the optics are already favourable. He has altered how NATO operates, and with the 5% pledge, he has inscribed his foreign policy legacy into the alliance's future.
The South African
2 hours ago
- The South African
Deal or no deal: What happens with Donald Trump's July tariff deadline?
A week before US President Donald Trump reimposes steep tariffs on dozens of economies, including the EU and Japan, many are still scrambling to reach a deal that would protect them from the worst. The tariffs taking effect July 9 are part of a package Trump imposed in April citing a lack of 'reciprocity' in trading ties. He slapped a 10 percent levy on most partners, with higher customised rates to kick in later in countries the United States has major trade deficits with. But these were halted until July to allow room for negotiations. Analysts expect countries will encounter one of three outcomes: They could reach a framework for an agreement; receive an extended pause on higher tariffs; or see levies surge. 'There will be a group of deals that we will land before July 9,' said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent last Friday on CNBC. Policymakers have not named countries in this group, although Bessent maintains that Washington has been focused on striking deals with about 18 key partners. 'Vietnam, India and Taiwan remain promising candidates for a deal,' Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) vice president Wendy Cutler told AFP. Without a deal, Vietnam's 'reciprocal tariff' rises from the baseline of 10 percent to 46 percent, India's to 26 percent and Taiwan's to 32 percent. Josh Lipsky, international economics chair at the Atlantic Council, cited Indian negotiators' extension of their US trip recently in noting that it 'seems like a frontrunner.' 'Japan was in that category, but things have set back a little,' Lipsky said, referring to Donald Trump's criticism on Monday over what the president called Japan's reluctance to accept US rice exports. The deals, however, will unlikely be full-fledged trade pacts, analysts said, citing complexities in negotiating such agreements. Since April, Washington has only announced a pact with Britain and a deal to temporarily lower tit-for-tat duties with China. Bessent has also said that countries 'negotiating in good faith' can have their tariffs remain at the 10 percent baseline. But extensions of the pause on higher rates would depend on Trump, he added. 'With a new government, (South) Korea looks well positioned to secure an extension,' Cutler of ASPI said. Lipsky expects many countries to fall into this bucket, receiving an extended halt on higher tariffs that could last until Labor Day, which falls on September 1. Bessent earlier said that Washington could wrap up its agenda for trade deals by Labor Day, a signal that more agreements could be concluded but with talks likely to extend past July. For countries that the United States finds 'recalcitrant,' however, tariffs could spring back to the higher levels Trump previously announced, Bessent has warned. These range from 11 percent to 50 percent. Cutler warned that 'Japan's refusal to open its rice market, coupled with the US resistance to lowering automotive tariffs, may lead to the reimposition of Japan's 24 percent reciprocal tariff.' Trump himself said on Tuesday that a trade deal was unlikely with Japan and the country could pay a tariff of '30 percent, 35 percent, or whatever the number is that we determine.' Lipsky believes the European Union is at risk of having tariffs snap back to steeper levels too – to the 20 percent unveiled in April or the 50 percent Trump more recently threatened. An area of tension could be Europe's approach to digital regulation. Donald Trump recently said he would terminate trade talks with Canada – which is not impacted by the July 9 deadline – in retaliation for the country's digital services tax, which Ottawa eventually said it would rescind. This week, EU trade chief Maros Sefcovic is in Washington in a push to seal a trade deal, with the EU commission having received early drafts of proposals that officials are working on. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1 Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news. By Garrin Lambley © Agence France-Presse
