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‘May have given wrong impression': Abhishek Singhvi seeks to withdraw realtor Roop Bansal's plea in Punjab & Haryana High Court

‘May have given wrong impression': Abhishek Singhvi seeks to withdraw realtor Roop Bansal's plea in Punjab & Haryana High Court

Indian Express27-05-2025
In a notable turn of events during a hearing in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on real estate developer Roop Bansal's plea to quash a corruption FIR, senior advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi sought to withdraw the petition before a special bench led by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu on Tuesday.
The petition by Roop Bansal, director of the real estate firm M3M, seeks to quash an FIR filed by Haryana's Anti-Corruption Bureau. As the hearing began, Singhvi opened with a pointed clarification, 'I understand why, My Lord, sometimes a wrong message is given, as if we are trying to delay or not have it heard… I just deprecate that.'
Singhvi acknowledged past adjournments and sought to dispel any notion of evasiveness. 'Yes, we may have given a wrong impression … I believe in being very candid with the court,' he said.
He proceeded to outline what he called 'seven or eight substantive points', foremost among them being the lack of sanction under section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which he termed a jurisdictional defect. 'The interesting point is that 17A is mandatory—this is not disputed. And 17A has factually not been taken—this too is not disputed,' he said.
The chief justice interjected to clarify that the judicial officer mentioned in the FIR was not before the court. 'The judge's case is not before us, so we are not dealing with his case,' Chief Justice Nagu said.
Singhvi responded: 'No, My Lord, I'm talking about the allegation against me. I'm M3M. The allegation is that I conspired with the judge to get benefits. If the judge never dealt with my cases, how can I be in a 120B with him?'
CJ Nagu reiterated: 'The judge concerned is not the petitioner.'
Singhvi then pivoted to challenge the evidentiary basis of the FIR, citing that WhatsApp screenshots and voice recordings had not been validated by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory's reports. 'Out of four recordings, three are not matched. One is a probable match—not a confirmed one,' he submitted.
Singhvi also raised objections to alleged illegal interceptions, pointing to violations of Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules: 'There is no averment of following the interception rules… and there's case law to that effect.'
The senior counsel also criticised the role of the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which had opposed the petition. 'The ED is intervening with no locus in a predicate offence case… My clients were foolish enough not to challenge their intervention,' Singhvi said.
Senior counsel Zoheb Hossain, appearing for the ED, said the agency's impleadment had not been objected to.
Singhvi then made a candid admission. 'I don't want to risk adverse findings on my ultimate trial… This is a very strange case. I'm not seeking any relief today. I wish to withdraw this petition.'
However, Chief Justice Nagu declined the request, stating: 'We are hearing you on merits… I would decline that request of yours.'
Insisting on the right of an accused to withdraw a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Singhvi said: 'Surely, My Lord, a criminal accused has a right to withdraw… Look, I want to satisfy the judge's conscience. There shouldn't be any catch to it. Today, opposing me is the ED—of all people—in a predicate offence 482.'
Singhvi asked the court to at least record his request, 'Kindly record my submission that I wish to withdraw it.'
When Singhvi expressed concern about adverse observations affecting his trial, Chief Justice Nagu reassured him, 'Even if we record some observations, we will always say that this will not influence the trial judge.'
The hearing continued with Chief Justice Nagu directing Singhvi to proceed with his arguments.
The case will now be heard at 9.30 am on Thursday.
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