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News18
6 days ago
- Politics
- News18
'State Can't Tap Phones Just To Prevent Corruption In Violation Of Law': Madras High Court
Last Updated: The HC said phone tapping is permitted only under Section 5(2) of Telegraph Act when there is a clear public emergency or threat to public safety, backed by reasons and due process In a significant judgment that reiterates constitutional protections in the digital age, the Madras High Court has quashed a 2011 phone-tapping order issued by the union ministry of home affairs against a private company executive, holding that the interception lacked the mandatory threshold of 'public emergency" or 'public safety" as required under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act. The bench of Justice N Anand Venkatesh opined that the Centre's authorisation to intercept the phone conversations of P Kishore—then managing director of Everonn Education Ltd—was issued without sufficient justification and in violation of the constitutional right to privacy under Article 21. A bribery FIR was registered by the CBI in August 2011 involving an IRS officer (A1), who allegedly demanded Rs 50 lakh to shield the company from tax scrutiny. Kishore (A2) was accused of arranging the bribe, and a friend of the officer (A3) was intercepted carrying the cash. However, the CBI did not apprehend Kishore in possession of the bribe or at the scene. The Centre had authorised the interception on the grounds of 'public safety" and 'preventing incitement to the commission of an offence". However, the court noted that these terms cannot be used in a vague or routine manner. Citing the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in People's Union for Civil Liberties and KS Puttaswamy, the judge held that such surveillance must meet the constitutional tests of necessity, proportionality, and legality. 'Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor interest of public safety is a secretive condition… either would be apparent to a reasonable person," the court observed, referring to the SC precedents and added that no such justification was visible in the interception order, which appeared to be 'mechanical" and 'cyclostyled". Further, the high court held that procedural safeguards under Rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules, which require review by a committee and periodic oversight, were also not followed, thereby rendering the order illegal. Importantly, the court rejected the authorities' argument that even assuming that the order under Section 5(2) of the Act was without jurisdiction, the evidence so collected was admissible since it is a well-settled proposition of law that even illegally collected evidence is admissible provided it is relevant. The court opined that once the surveillance order was found to be unconstitutional, any material or evidence collected as a result of it would also be tainted. The HC also pointed out that in the case at hand, the petitioner was only accused of an offence; hence, the presumption of innocence still applied in his favour. Referring to the illegality of the interception, the bench held, 'Where the tapping of phones is found to have been done in violation of Section 5(2) of the Act, the order would be clearly unconstitutional. An unconstitutional order is void under Article 13 and no rights or liabilities can flow from it." First Published:
Hindustan Times
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Phone tapping violates privacy rights, says Madras HC
The Madras high court on Wednesday held that phone tapping, even to detect a crime, amounts to the violation of an individual's fundamental right to privacy, unless it is strictly justified under a procedure established by law. Phone tapping violates privacy rights, says HC The court said that the existing provisions of the Telegraph Act and Telegraph Rules do not permit covert interception of phone calls or messages of an individual merely to detect the commission of a crime. Such surveillance, the court said, is permissible only in cases of public emergency or in the interest of public safety. Justice N Anand Venkatesh, accordingly, quashed an authorisation issued by the Union ministry of home affairs (MHA) in 2011 for tapping the phone of a Chennai resident involved in an alleged case of bribery and for making the results of such interception available to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The judge emphasised that corruption cases must be investigated lawfully, and constitutional protections cannot be bypassed even in serious crimes. Justice Venkatesh said that a citizen's 'right to privacy is a fundamental right protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, as well as part of the broader freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution'. Citing the Supreme Court's judgments in cases such as Gobind vs the State of Madhya Pradesh, PUCL vs Union of India, and the landmark Puttaswamy judgement, the high court emphasised that privacy is an inherent and essential part of personal liberty, though it remains subject to reasonable restrictions under the Constitution. Justice Venkatesh also cited the observations made by former Supreme Court judge justice SK Kaul's concurring remarks in the Puttaswamy judgment and said the same underscored the need to recognize and adapt to evolving constitutional values, 'replacing outdated interpretations with a modern understanding of individual rights'. 'There can be no doubt that telephone tapping would infringe Article 21 unless such infringement has the sanction of a procedure established by law,' the high court said. The court quashed the phone tapping order against the petitioner, P Kishore, after noting that though the MHA had granted such permission saying it was for 'preventing incitement to the commission of an offence', any law enforcement agency was not empowered to 'resort to covert surveillance by tapping the mobile phones to obtain information regarding the commission of an alleged crime'. The MHA, in its affidavit filed before the court, had claimed that it had passed the phone tapping order 'in strict compliance' with section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act and rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules which grant the Centre or state governments the power to intercept or detain messages during a public emergency or in the interest of public safety. Since the petitioner was having a conversation about committing an offence, it was intercepted in the interest of public safety preventing further incitement to the commission of an offence, MHA had said. Justice Venkatesh however, noted that in previous judgments, the Supreme Court clarified that the occurrence of public emergency or the interest of public safety could never be a secretive condition or situation. 'Either of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable person. Covert surveillance of the type conducted in this case definitely cannot fall within the aforesaid two situations contemplated under section 5(2) of the Act,' Justice Venkatesh said. The court noted that in the present case, the order for phone tapping was linked to a CBI investigation based on a first information report (FIR) registered in August 2011, in which Kishore was named as an accused. The FIR alleged that IRS officer Andasu Ravinder, then additional commissioner of Income Tax, had demanded a ₹ 50 lakh bribe from Kishore to help his company evade taxes. The bribe was allegedly routed through Ravinder's friend Uttam Bohra. Acting on this information, CBI intercepted Ravinder and Bohra near Ravinder's residence and recovered a carton containing ₹ 50 lakh. Neither of the two could explain the source of the cash, but Kishore was not present at the scene, and no money was found in his possession. Challenging the surveillance order, Kishore argued that the interception violated his fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Time of India
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Telephone tapping constitutes a violation of right to privacy: Madras HC
The Madras High Court declared telephone tapping a privacy violation. Justice Venkatesh cited Article 21 of the Constitution. He referenced the Telegraph Act's Section 5(2). The court quashed a Union government order authorizing the tapping of P Kishore's phone. This case involved bribery allegations. The judge noted violations of Telegraph Rules. Intercepted conversations cannot be used as evidence. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads The Madras High Court on Wednesday held that telephone tapping constitutes a violation of the right to privacy unless justified by a procedure established by law. Justice N Anand Venkatesh also observed that the right to privacy is now an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the judge said section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act authorises interception of telephones on the occurrence of a public emergency or in the interests of public safety. Both these contingencies were not secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable laid down in paragraph 28 of the decision of the Apex court in People's Union for Civil Liberties, it was only when the above two situations exist that the authority may pass an order directing interception of messages after recording its satisfaction that it was necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, he a petition filed by P Kishore, Managing Director of Everonn Education Limited, the judge quashed an order of the union government, which authorised tapping of the mobile phone of the petitioner, in connection with a case relating to bribery and corruption, probed by the CBI, involving an Assistant Commissioner of Income judge said in the instant case, the impugned order dated August 12, 2011 does not fall either within the rubric of "public emergency" or "in the interests of public safety" as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties. The facts disclose that it was a covert operation/secretive situation for detection of crime, which would not be apparent to any reasonable the law presently stands, a situation of this nature does not fall within the four corners of Section 5(2) of the Act as expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties, which has been approved by the Constitution Bench of the SC in K S Puttaswamy case, the judge judge said the authorities have also contravened Rule 419-A(17) of the Telegraph Rules by failing to place the intercepted material before the Review Committee within the stipulated time to examine as to whether the interception was made in compliance with Section 5(2) of the a consequence, the impugned order must necessarily be set aside as unconstitutional and one without jurisdiction. Besides violating Article 21, it was also ultra vires Section 5(2) of the Act besides being in violation of the mandatory provisions of Rule 419-A of the Rules, the judge judge said it follows that the intercepted conversations collected pursuant to the impugned order in violation of Section 5(2) of the Act and Rule 419-A(17) of the Rules shall not be used for any purposes judge said it was, however, made clear that the above direction shall have no bearing on the other material that has been collected by the CBI subsequent to and independent of the intercepted call records, which shall be considered by the trial court on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made in this order.
Indian Express
27-05-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
‘May have given wrong impression': Abhishek Singhvi seeks to withdraw realtor Roop Bansal's plea in Punjab & Haryana High Court
In a notable turn of events during a hearing in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on real estate developer Roop Bansal's plea to quash a corruption FIR, senior advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi sought to withdraw the petition before a special bench led by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu on Tuesday. The petition by Roop Bansal, director of the real estate firm M3M, seeks to quash an FIR filed by Haryana's Anti-Corruption Bureau. As the hearing began, Singhvi opened with a pointed clarification, 'I understand why, My Lord, sometimes a wrong message is given, as if we are trying to delay or not have it heard… I just deprecate that.' Singhvi acknowledged past adjournments and sought to dispel any notion of evasiveness. 'Yes, we may have given a wrong impression … I believe in being very candid with the court,' he said. He proceeded to outline what he called 'seven or eight substantive points', foremost among them being the lack of sanction under section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which he termed a jurisdictional defect. 'The interesting point is that 17A is mandatory—this is not disputed. And 17A has factually not been taken—this too is not disputed,' he said. The chief justice interjected to clarify that the judicial officer mentioned in the FIR was not before the court. 'The judge's case is not before us, so we are not dealing with his case,' Chief Justice Nagu said. Singhvi responded: 'No, My Lord, I'm talking about the allegation against me. I'm M3M. The allegation is that I conspired with the judge to get benefits. If the judge never dealt with my cases, how can I be in a 120B with him?' CJ Nagu reiterated: 'The judge concerned is not the petitioner.' Singhvi then pivoted to challenge the evidentiary basis of the FIR, citing that WhatsApp screenshots and voice recordings had not been validated by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory's reports. 'Out of four recordings, three are not matched. One is a probable match—not a confirmed one,' he submitted. Singhvi also raised objections to alleged illegal interceptions, pointing to violations of Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules: 'There is no averment of following the interception rules… and there's case law to that effect.' The senior counsel also criticised the role of the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which had opposed the petition. 'The ED is intervening with no locus in a predicate offence case… My clients were foolish enough not to challenge their intervention,' Singhvi said. Senior counsel Zoheb Hossain, appearing for the ED, said the agency's impleadment had not been objected to. Singhvi then made a candid admission. 'I don't want to risk adverse findings on my ultimate trial… This is a very strange case. I'm not seeking any relief today. I wish to withdraw this petition.' However, Chief Justice Nagu declined the request, stating: 'We are hearing you on merits… I would decline that request of yours.' Insisting on the right of an accused to withdraw a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Singhvi said: 'Surely, My Lord, a criminal accused has a right to withdraw… Look, I want to satisfy the judge's conscience. There shouldn't be any catch to it. Today, opposing me is the ED—of all people—in a predicate offence 482.' Singhvi asked the court to at least record his request, 'Kindly record my submission that I wish to withdraw it.' When Singhvi expressed concern about adverse observations affecting his trial, Chief Justice Nagu reassured him, 'Even if we record some observations, we will always say that this will not influence the trial judge.' The hearing continued with Chief Justice Nagu directing Singhvi to proceed with his arguments. The case will now be heard at 9.30 am on Thursday.
