
Washington Discusses the Future of Central Asia-US Relations, While Beijing Takes Concrete Action
The Atlantic Council, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, held its inaugural U.S.-Central Asia Forum on June 5 to discuss the future of Washington's strategy toward the region.
The discussion, organized by the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center, comes at an opportune time as Central Asia engages extraregional states to cement relationships and attract new partners and investors. In the past two months, several high-profile meetings have taken place, including the first Central Asia-European Union summit, the first Central Asia-Italy summit (which took place during Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Miloni's visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), and an informal summit of heads of states of the Organization of Turkic States. Moreover, the second China-Central Asia summit occurred in mid-June.
Meanwhile, Washington has lagged behind regarding high-profile engagement with Central Asia in the first months of the second Trump administration.
Speakers at the event included Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the U.S. Yerzhan Ashikbayev; Alisher Akhmedov, the deputy chief of mission of Uzbekistan in Washington; and former officials like Lisa Curtis, currently a senior fellow and director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and former U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan (2008 to 2011) Tatiana Gfoeller.
Mining was a significant topic for the conference. Ashikbayev, for example, highlighted that Kazakhstan produces '20 critical minerals;' regarding uranium, 'we have a gargantuan share of the global production, 40 percent.' Investment in infrastructure remains a priority for the country, which would help with the transportation of critical minerals to international markets, like the U.S. and Europe. Current projects include expanding Kazakhstan's railroad system 'We are planning to construct 5,000 kilometers of railroads [by] 2030,' the ambassador said. Moreover, Astana plans to expand the size of its Caspian fleet 'from 17 to 34 [transport] vessels.' The Caspian Sea is a critical artery of the Middle Corridor, connecting Kazakhstan's Aktau and Kuryk ports with Azerbaijan's Baku port, hence additional vessels and tankers are mandatory to increase the volume of transportation.
Meanwhile, Akhmedov highlighted an April visit to the U.S. capital by an Uzbek government delegation led by Foreign Affairs Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, which included meetings with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. A memorandum on critical minerals was reportedly signed during Saidov's visit. 'We are now moving forward' via this document, Akhemdov said at the forum, as the 'critical mineral focus is a strategic realignment' of bilateral relations.
Figuring out how to capitalize on the second Trump administration's focus on critical minerals and energy-related supply chains in general to attract U.S. interest and engagement with the Central Asian countries is the primary challenge for Astana and Tashkent. Ashikbayev highlighted Astana's membership in the Mineral Security Partnership, the country being a 'strong supporter and participant in the critical minerals dialogue,' and noted how Kazakhstan is the 'driver' of the C5+1 format. Similarly, Akhmedov noted that Uzbekistan aims to use the country's mineral resources not only for extraction and mining-related profit but also to 'become a trusted and highly valued partner in global supply chains.'
It is worth noting that, during the recent China-Central Asia summit, the presidents of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan discussed expanded cooperation on natural gas and minerals, and the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. Central Asian countries are engaging with Beijing on critical topics like energy and minerals, and pursuing concrete projects in these areas, while Washington remains stuck in conversation.
The forum attempted to game out how Washington, once again under Donald Trump's leadership, will engage Central Asia.
Curtis, a former National Security Council senior director for South and Central Asia (2017-2021), explained that the new Trump administration is still in its early days, and 'we haven't heard about Central Asia' in the U.S. capital yet. She argued that 'the China angle will dictate' U.S. engagement in Central Asia, with a focus on 'mostly economic but also political, and maybe security' issues. Gfoeller was more pessimistic, hypothesizing that Washington won't fully engage Central Asia 'unless President Trump sees that there is a specific reason to engage with a particular country.'
The terms 'transactional' and 'realistic' were used often to describe how Washington may engage Central Asia for the next four years. For comparison's sake, Xi talked about 'mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual benefit' at the recent summit in Astana.
The Biden administration maintained momentum in Central Asia-U.S. engagement with highlights including a historic presidential 5+1 meeting in 2023, a business-oriented B5+1 in Almaty and the launch of the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in 2024. (I have proposed a Green 5+1 to promote engagement on environmental issues.)
During his confirmation hearing, Rubio noted the need to repeal the Jackson Vanik amendment – a topic mentioned by Ashikbayev at the forum – however, that requires Congressional legislation and previous efforts have stalled in committee. In spite of this promising statement, we have yet to see the formulation of a strategy or even direct interest in Central Asia on the part of the administration.
Another topic discussed were potential trips by senior U.S. officials to Central Asia. Miras Zhiyenbayev, advisor to the chairman of the board for international affairs and initiatives at Kazakhstan's Maqsut Narikbayev University, noted that 'high-level visits are political acts that demonstrate a country's willingness to work with the region and engage with the region.' As noted above, in recent weeks, there were several high-level visits and meetings by European officials and China's president to Central Asia. A visit by Rubio to Astana for a ministerial 5+1 would help jumpstart the new administration's momentum in the region, but so far no such meeting has been announced.
Overall, the speakers at the forum agreed on the importance of increased U.S. engagement with Central Asia. 'The United States has a great opportunity to engage more in Central Asia. The Central Asians want the U.S. there,' Curtis argued.
Gfoeller said, 'I recently met with a high-level Central Asian official who told me that he welcomed what he thought would be a more transactional approach from the Trump administration. She added that the official 'said that during the Biden administration, we were lectured to about climate change, about human rights, and it was just lecturing and never was anything concrete done to benefit our country.'
Former U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Daniel Rosenblum, moderating the panel, pushed back on that assessment, illustrating a diversity of perspectives on the tone and perception of U.S. engagement.
Respecting the will and well-being of the people of Central Asia was a topic that the Atlantic Council's forum did not discuss in great detail. Navbahor Imamova, a longtime journalist with Voice of America, said on social media that the region's 'nontransparent and nepotistic regimes, marked by a lack of rule of law and media freedom,' should have been addressed. That label certainly applies to authoritarian Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and increasingly Kyrgyzstan.
Finally, it is vital to acknowledge that the five Central Asian states differ regarding their foreign policy objectives, engagement styles, and domestic governance.
Indeed, of the five states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are clearly very interested in increasing engagement and cooperation with Washington, and have the capacity to do so. Two days before the forum, Kazakhstan's Ashikbayev spoke at the Future Resilience Forum about Kazakhstan as a middle power, an event also held in the U.S. capital.
'The more partnerships we have, the better it will be for our own development,' the Kazakhstani diplomat summarized at the Atlantic Council event. Similarly, Uzbekistan routinely sends delegations to Washington. However, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's footprint in Washington is much more limited, with Turkmenistan's engagement in the U.S. capital almost non-existent.
A lack of a strategy with short-, medium- and long-term goals and projects toward Central Asia continues to be Washington's loss, and Beijing's gain.
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