Gaza war: Netanyahu says Israel, US consider ‘alternative' options after ceasefire talks collapse
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The remarks echoed statements made overnight by US envoy Steve Witkoff after Israel and the United States pulled their delegations out of the talks in Doha, mediated by Egypt and Qatar.
Witkoff said Hamas was to blame for an impasse. Netanyahu said Witkoff had got it right, and that Hamas was the obstacle to a deal.
reporters at the White House on Friday that the Palestinian militant group was unwilling to negotiate a ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza.
The proposed ceasefire would have lasted 60 days, during which additional aid would be allowed into Gaza, and some of the remaining 50 hostages held by militants there would be freed in return for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.
Benjamin Netanyahu said stalled Gaza ceasefire talks have prompted Israel and the US to eye 'alternative' options to free hostages and end Hamas rule. Photo: dpa
Meanwhile, Israel will allow foreign countries to parachute aid into Gaza starting on Friday, Israeli army radio quoted a military official as saying.
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AllAfrica
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South China Morning Post
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