Russia welcomes US suspension of weapons shipments to Ukraine
The administration of President Donald Trump confirmed on Tuesday that the US has halted some weapons shipments to Ukraine.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov welcomed the move. He said on Wednesday, "the fewer weapons are supplied to Ukraine, the sooner the special military operation ends."
Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed that his country has started negotiations with the United States.
He said in a social media post on Wednesday that the two countries are "clarifying all the details of defense support, including air defense" at the working level. The continued provision of the air defense system is critical for the country.
A US think tank, the Institute for the Study of War, said in its analysis on Wednesday that the "suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory" on winning the war of attrition.
Russian forces are intensifying attacks across Ukraine. In June alone, they fired 5,438 long-range drones at Ukrainian cities and elsewhere, more than in any month since Russia's invasion. Ukraine is keenly watching whether the US will continue its military assistance to the country.
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The Diplomat
4 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Why South Korea Needs a Trade Deal With the United States
Without a new deal or an extension to the talks, South Korea will face a series of new tariffs from the United States that will significantly impact its economy. With the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) in place, there are virtually no tariffs on trade between the two countries – and there should be no need for a new trade deal. The Trump administration, however, believes that U.S. trade partners have treated the United States unfairly and that new trading arrangements are necessary. Reaching a deal with the Trump administration is complicated by the significant uncertainty the administration has created with its series of tariffs and a shifting approach to negotiations. However, despite these challenges and being in office less than a month, the new Lee Jae-myung administration needs to secure a new trade deal or extension with the United States by July 8 negotiating deadline. Without a new deal or an extension to the talks, South Korea will face a series of new tariffs from the United States that will significantly impact its economy. As one of the world's leading trading nations, South Korea is both directly and indirectly impacted by the new tariffs being implemented by the Trump administration. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the country rebuilt its economy and became one of the world's economic development success stories in part because of international trade. Even today, trade is a key component of the Korean economy. In 2024, exports and imports accounted for 77.6 percent of South Korea's GDP. Exports alone were equivalent to 39.1 percent of GDP. While China remains South Korea's largest trading partner, the margin has been decreasing in recent years. The United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner and a critical partner for technological cooperation and economic growth. Last year, South Korea exported $128.4 billion in goods to the United States, according to United Nations trade data, only about $4 billion less than it exported to China. Because of the global nature of supply chains, even tariffs that do not directly target South Korea can impact the supply chains of Korean companies either through parts that are produced in third countries for final assembly in the United States or finished goods that are built in third countries for export to the U.S. market. In this context, Korean firms face the impact of the full array of the Trump administration's tariffs including the reciprocal tariffs, sectoral tariffs on steel, automobiles, semiconductors, and other products, as well as tariffs on China and potentially Canada and Mexico. How the Reciprocal Tariffs Impact South Korea In the April 2 executive order announcing the so-called reciprocal tariffs, the White House argued that 'Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships.' In the case of South Korea, the United States has maintained a persistent trade deficit that reached $55.9 billion in 2024. The trade deficit has grown significantly since the implementation of the KORUS FTA and was a point of contention during the first Trump administration. In announcing the reciprocal tariffs, the Trump administration placed a tariff of 25 percent on imports from South Korea. Automobiles, steel, and other products are subject to subject to separate Section 232 national security tariffs; the reciprocal tariffs impact all other trade. They include two parts – a 10 percent universal tariff and a set of country-specific reciprocal tariffs (in South Korea's case, set at 25 percent). While the reciprocal tariff portion is theoretically open to negotiation, under a 90-day 'pause' that expires next week, the universal tariff may be a new baseline under the Trump administration. For the moment, many electronics products such as smartphones and computers will be exempted from the reciprocal tariffs, but those are expected to be covered to some extent by new tariffs once an ongoing Section 232 investigation into semiconductors is finished. According to a study by the Korea International Trade Association, around 50 percent of all Korean exports to the United States are intermediate goods used in production in the United States. These include semiconductors, auto parts, and steel. The high level of Korean exports of intermediate goods to the United States limits the impact of the reciprocal tariffs on South Korea to an extent but also means that the country is more exposed to the sectoral tariffs. When combined with automobile exports, this means that a significant portion of Korean exports will be hit by Section 232 tariffs. However, some significant exports will be subject to the reciprocal tariffs. These include $5.5 billion in exports of petrochemical products, $4.5 billion in plastics, $2.4 billion in optical and related equipment, and nearly $2 billion each in organic chemicals and cosmetics. To give one specific example, global exports of K-beauty products last year surpassed $10 billion for the first time. The United States is the second largest market for K-beauty products. If the full 25 percent tariff remains in place, exports of K-beauty products would likely see a decrease in demand in the United States and producers may need to grow alternative markets such as China and Japan, the number 1 and 3 export destinations for K-beauty. Tariffs on the Automobile Industry Automotive tariffs are the most significant challenge. Exports of automobiles and automotive parts accounted for a third of Korean exports to the United States in 2024. The U.S. is the most important market for the Hyundai Motor Group. Last year, the conglomerate sold 4.1 million vehicles globally; more than 1.6 million of those sales were in the United States, with Hyundai selling 836,802 vehicles and Kia an additional 796,488 vehicles. While the new Metaplant America facility in Georgia will help with U.S. production, slightly more than 50 percent of all vehicles sold by Hyundai Motor Group in the United States are imported. Hyundai Motor Group is not the only automotive producer impacted by the tariffs. GM Korea produces around 500,000 vehicles annually in plants in South Korea, with 90 percent of the production exported to the United States. GM estimates that the tariffs on its Korean production could reduce its overall profit by $2 billion. Without tariff relief, there are concerns in South Korea that the increased costs faced by GM Korea will further a reduction of GM Korea's operations that has been taking place over the last decade. The complete closure of GM Korea is not out of the question. Beyond the impact on Hyundai Motor Group and GM Korea's sales and profits, there will likely be an impact on employment in South Korea, where the automotive industry employs around 335,600 people. If GM Korea were to shutter its facilities completely, it would result in approximately 12,000 job losses. Without an agreement to reduce the Section 232 auto tariffs, imports of Korean autos and auto parts will continue to face a 25 percent tariff – separate from the reciprocal tariffs. The tariff on auto parts was adjusted to provide some relief for parts used to assemble vehicles in the United States, and the steel tariffs will also not apply for imports of steel used in automotive production. Other Section 232 Tariffs: Steel, Semiconductors, and Pharmaceuticals Ordinarily, being subjected to a 50 percent tariff would not be a positive outcome. However, the Trump administration's decision to initially place a 25 percent tariff on all steel imports, later raised to 50 percent, and cancel prior quota agreements on steel did have one silver lining – it eliminated the quota that had been limiting Korean exports to the United States since the first Trump administration. That may be the only positive for South Korea on the steel tariffs. The significant increase in the U.S. tariff on steel comes at an inopportune time for Korean producers. The United States is only the fourth largest export market for Korean steel, but South Korea's domestic steel producers are under pressure from a global glut of steel production, cheap Chinese products, and now the U.S. tariffs. This has forced Korean steel producers to suspend some production and close some facilities. Because the U.S. tariff will not just apply to exports of steel to the United States, but also steel used in large consumer goods such as refrigerators, washers, and dryers, the tariffs are also creating a pressure for exporters of large consumer goods to shift away from Korean steel in production. One estimate by Allianz Research suggests that the tariffs could result in a $600 million loss for Korean steel exports to the United States. Efforts to conclude a deal with the United States are further complicated by additional Section 232 national security cases that the administration is undertaking in areas such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. Last year, South Korea exported $10.7 billion worth of semiconductors to the United States. Samsung and SK Hynix account for around 70 percent of global production of DRAM memory chips and are the top two producers of NAND flash memory. The industry is critical to the Korean economy. The $10.7 billion in exports to the United States, however, understates the potential impact of a new semiconductor tariff on South Korea. Both Samsung and SK Hynix have significant production in China, from which they exported an additional $1 billion to the United States. Pharmaceuticals are another area that will be potentially impacted by a Section 232 investigation. South Korea had seen the industry as a potential area of growth and exported $1.4 billion worth of pharmaceuticals to the United States in 2024. Tariffs on Supply Chains in Vietnam, China, and Mexico Because of the nature of global supply chains Korean firms will also face tariffs on goods produced by suppliers or their own firms in other countries. Samsung, for example, produces 60 percent of its smartphones in Vietnam, many of which are then shipped to the United States. Trump announced that Vietnam has agreed to a 20 percent tariff rate; if that eventually includes consumer electronics, Samsung smartphones would face a 20 percent tariff when shipped from Vietnam rather than the current 0 percent tariff. If the White House maintains an exclusion for consumer electronics but places a tariff on the semiconductors inside the smartphone, the origin of the semiconductor will impact the tariff unless South Korea can gain an exemption for any semiconductor produced by a Korean firm regardless of the production facilities' location. The potential semiconductor tariff also could impact production in other ways. Both Samsung and SK Hynix have significant production in China that provides chips to U.S. and foreign firms that assemble consumer electronics in China for export to the United States. Both firms could face pressure to relocate that production as the partners they supply look for ways to avoid tariffs on their final goods. In the automotive sector, the long-term status of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) will also be significant. The Trump administration has for the moment suspended tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with USMCA rules. If that exemption is changed, Korean firms could face tariffs on goods produced in Mexico or Canada for the U.S. market. Korean firms exported 271,000 vehicles from Mexico to the U.S. in 2024, such as the Kia Forte, which is exclusively made in Mexico for the U.S. market. Under normal circumstances, South Korea would be well placed to compete in the U.S. market with the KORUS FTA in place. However, with the Trump administration utilizing national security exemptions to override that agreement, South Korea will need to reach a new understanding on trade to minimize the damage to key sectors such as automobiles and semiconductors. Due to the global nature of supply chains, South Korea will be unable to completely avoid all the new U.S. tariffs, but a new deal that avoids tariffs to the extent possible on goods produced in South Korea is necessary.
Japan Times
4 hours ago
- Japan Times
NATO's Donald Trump dilemma
NATO's just-completed summit in The Hague came at a time of extraordinary tension. Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has repeatedly accused Europe of free riding on U.S. defense spending, raising serious concerns about the health of the Atlantic alliance. His decision to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities just three days before the summit — in coordination with Israel and without informing America's NATO allies — has only intensified those fears. Trump's strikes against Iran evoked memories of the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, when NATO expanded its role beyond addressing conventional military threats to include counter-terrorism operations. While the alliance supported the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was far more divisive, owing to the lack of convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the absence of an explicit United Nations Security Council mandate. The resulting rift prompted then-U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to draw a controversial distinction between 'Old Europe' and 'New Europe.' But the current situation is even more alarming. Unlike in 2003, when the United States at least made an effort to consult its allies, Trump now keeps them in the dark. He provided no credible evidence to justify the attack on Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi contradicted his claims of an imminent nuclear threat, stating just days earlier that there was no proof of a 'systematic' Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons. Strikingly, many NATO leaders were informed of the attack only after it had been carried out. By sidelining NATO, Trump has effectively reduced the alliance to a passive observer, undermining its core principles and signaling a dangerous shift in global diplomacy. Imagine if Iran had retaliated by targeting U.S. bases in Turkey, potentially dragging my country into war. And if a nuclear leak had occurred, endangering Turkish civilians, who would have borne responsibility? Although Israel and Iran accepted Trump's announcement of a ceasefire, NATO members had been thrust into a dangerous situation without warning. This was particularly worrisome for Turkey, which shares a border with Iran and is highly vulnerable to the consequences of regional escalation. Trump's behavior has jeopardized NATO's collective security. After all, there is no guarantee that Israel will not violate the ceasefire, as it did in Gaza in March. NATO members must now confront a fundamental question: Can the alliance survive if member states may launch unilateral military action that puts others at risk? The U.S. may have legitimate evidence that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty or was just about to do so. But if that were the case, the proper course would have been to present the evidence to the IAEA and pursue a coordinated response through the U.N. Security Council. Alternatively, the U.S. may have assumed that Iran would not retaliate and saw the attack as a way to force the Iranians back to the negotiating table. But talks between the two countries were already set to resume before Israel's intervention derailed them. A third explanation is more cynical but may be true: the attack was meant to divert attention from Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Whichever explanation proves true, Trump's actions could have far-reaching consequences for NATO and the alliance's future could depend on how its leaders respond. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, must clearly outline the risks that regional instability poses to NATO's collective defense posture — especially given Turkey's proximity to Iran. As leaders of countries with permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, French President Emmanuel Macron and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer could play a vital role in strengthening coordination between NATO and the U.N. Likewise, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will be instrumental in shaping NATO-EU relations, while Norwegian President Jonas Gahr Store and his Finnish counterpart, Alexander Stubb, could help reinvigorate diplomacy and restore the alliance's moral compass. Ultimately, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte's effectiveness will largely depend on leaders' commitment to pursuing rational, law-abiding security policies. Even beyond the immediate Iran crisis, NATO finds itself at a crossroads. The Hague summit may ultimately be seen as a defining moment — one that will determine whether the alliance can remain the world's most powerful defense organization, grounded in its members' shared concerns and contributions, or is destined to become a mere instrument of U.S.-Israeli strategic interests. If I were in office today, I would use the summit to highlight Israel's growing aggression and the security risks facing Turkey as the only NATO member in the region. I would ask Trump whether, in his 'America First' hierarchy, NATO allies now rank below nonmember Israel. Any leader willing to pose that question would take a principled stand against reckless military adventurism — and might just help save the alliance itself. Before the Iraq War, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder were dismissed as representatives of 'Old Europe' for opposing U.S. intervention. Had their warnings been heeded, the catastrophic costs of the war might have been avoided and Iran's regional influence would likely not be as significant as it is now. History has shown that wars launched before exhausting every diplomatic avenue lead to ruin for all involved. Russia's miscalculations in Ukraine serve as a grim reminder that while starting a war is easy, ending one is far more difficult. Today, as Trump's actions threaten further erosion of hard-won international laws, European leaders must push back. If NATO fails to uphold the rule of law, it risks forfeiting its role as the cornerstone of global security. The alliance's fate — and the future of global stability — will hinge on whether its leaders insist on pursuing peace rather than confrontation. Ahmet Davutoglu is a former prime minister (2014-2016) and foreign minister (2009-2014) of Turkey. © Project Syndicate, 2025
The Mainichi
5 hours ago
- The Mainichi
Japan seeks 8th round of tariffs talks in U.S. amid Trump impasse
TOKYO (Kyodo) -- The Japanese government has informed the United States that its chief negotiator intends to conduct an eighth round of ministerial-level talks in Washington early next week, a source close to the matter said Thursday. With President Donald Trump appearing to harden his stance ahead of next Wednesday's deadline for his administration's 90-day pause on country-specific tariffs, Japan's last-ditch effort will hinge on whether Ryosei Akazawa can secure a deal that includes a reduced tariff rate on cars, the source said. In rounds of talks since April, the United States has been reluctant to accept Tokyo's request to withdraw or reduce the additional 25 percent tariff on cars. Amid the stalemate, Japan is seeking an extension of the tariff suspension deadline to allow talks to continue. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Thursday expressed confidence that bilateral tariff negotiations with the United States are making steady progress. "We need to cover a wide range of areas, including nontariff barriers. But we are steadily and certainly making progress on each of them," Ishiba told a program on public broadcaster NHK. "Japan is the largest investor in the United States and the biggest contributor in terms of creating jobs. Our hope is that this will be taken into consideration," he said, underscoring the need for Washington to focus on investment rather than tariffs. His remarks came as Trump on Tuesday floated the idea of raising tariffs on imports from Japan to as high as 30 percent or 35 percent, while complaining about Japan's purchases of American rice and cars. "I'm not sure we're going to make a deal. I doubt it," Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, calling Japan "very tough" and "very spoiled." The dispute over auto tariffs has been a key obstacle to a deal, with Washington also pressuring its Asian security ally to boost imports of U.S. farm products, including rice, cars and oil, to help reduce its large trade deficit. In return, Japan has highlighted its contributions to the U.S. economy and proposed a package deal that includes increased investment in the United States and cooperation on economic security, the source said. Without an extension to the 90-day pause on part of the so-called reciprocal tariffs, Japan will face an additional 14 percent country-specific tariff on top of the 10 percent baseline duty the United States has imposed on imports from all countries. The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that the United States warned Japanese officials during talks in late May that it might demand a cap on the number of vehicles Japan could export to the United States -- a policy known as a voluntary export restriction, citing people familiar with the matter. But Japanese officials held firm, telling their U.S. counterparts they would not accept any deal that preserves Trump's 25 percent automotive tariff, resulting in a deadlock in the negotiations, the U.S. newspaper said.
