US weapons to Taiwan at risk from weak supply chains but Ukraine ‘not to blame'
Ukraine has not slowed the provision of American weapons to
Taiwan or
Israel , but there are supply chain problems that need 'prudent reforms and substantial new investments', according to a Washington-based think tank.
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'Arsenal of Democracy: Arming Taiwan, Ukraine and Israel While Strengthening the US Industrial Base', published this month by the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, tracked the production capacity and delivery timelines of 25 items.
All of the items studied were provided to Taiwan and Ukraine, while 12 were also ordered by Israel. Only seven had a strong defence industrial base in the United States, while supply chains for the remaining 18 were either weak or required attention.
The report's authors, Ryan Brobst and Bradley Bowman, warned that US defence industrial bases had been damaged by insufficient spending and that Washington might not be able to sustain the supply of weapons to its partners without a major shift.
They cited the National Defence Strategy Commission's finding that 'consolidation and underinvestment had led to too few companies, gaps in the workforce, insufficient production infrastructure, and fragile supply chains'.
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The Donald Trump administration has pledged a record US$1 trillion in defence spending for next year.
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