Lebanon's Moment of Truth

Ya Libnan

a day ago

A person holds a sign with the Arabic slogan 'we will not relinquish arms' as Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah supporters take part in a ceremony during the peak of Ashura, in Beirut's southern suburbs on 6 July 2025. Photo by ANWAR AMRO/AFP via Getty Images.
The Lebanese government must stop shirking its responsibilities and push Hezbollah to disarm – taking advantage of the historic momentum in the region.
By
Bilal Y. Saab
. Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program
On 19 June, President Donald Trump's Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack delivered a
US proposal
to Lebanese officials, calling for the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah. Until last year, such a goal was unthinkable. But with Hezbollah badly mauled following its war with Israel, which destroyed much of its military infrastructure and decapitated its leadership, the United States sees an opportunity to work with Lebanon's government to remove a long-standing threat to Lebanon's internal stability.
The deal is simple: in return for Hezbollah's disarmament, Israel would end its periodic attacks against the group, withdraw from the five Lebanese hilltops it occupied after the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, and release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. In addition, Washington would help reconstruct southern Lebanon and reboot the country's debt-stricken economy.
The Lebanese government emphasized
in its response
that the Lebanese state is committed to regaining its monopoly over the use of force (a clause that has been in the Lebanese constitution for decades). But the government also said that further progress on Hezbollah's disarmament requires Israel first to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and halt what it calls violations of Lebanese sovereignty.
Surprisingly, Barrack said he was
'unbelievably satisfied'
with this response. Lebanese officials were expecting an uncompromising US position, believing that the Trump administration was
losing patience with Beirut
for its slow progress on disarming Hezbollah.
Barrak was criticized by several White House officials for making such a statement
Despite this positive US feedback, there is still a considerable gap between the Lebanese and US positions. Although Lebanese officials are almost certainly relieved, they have hardly any reason to celebrate or think that the Trump administration has suddenly softened its position as evident from comments made by the White officials which triggered Barrak to warn Lebanon over the urgency of resolving the issue of Hezbollah arms when he stated today in an interview that Lebanon faces an existential threat if the issue is not quickly resolved
The gap between Washington and Beirut's positions is also not limited to sequencing. The more fundamental problem is Hezbollah's rigid attitude towards its weapons. Even though the Iran-backed group relinquished some of its weapons to the Lebanese army in the area south of the Litani River, it refuses to give up the rest. And its
remaining arsenal is considerable
, including armed drones and long-range precision-guided missiles stored north of the Litani, in the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
Hezbollah's game plan is to cooperate minimally on disarmament to contain what it hopes is temporary international pressure, while gradually rebounding and staying deliberately vague about the future of its weapons.
Naim Qassem, Hezbollah leader since only October 2024 and who fled to Tehran reiterated the group's position in a
video speech
last weekend before thousands of supporters gathered in Beirut's southern suburbs. He also rejected any notion of potential Lebanese normalization with Israel, implying that his group, not the Lebanese state, still calls the shots on issues of war and peace.
Weapons have been integral to Hezbollah's existence since it emerged in the early 1980s. To give them up would be tantamount to throwing in the towel, which is foreign to the group's philosophy of struggle and martyrdom. Hezbollah would rather fight to the end than declare it is surrendering to Israel and the
United States
, its eternal enemies. It knows that without its guns – which it has directed
several times
against fellow Lebanese – it would lose most, if not all, its political clout and its appeal among its Shia base.
It is highly unlikely to transition to a 'normal' political party. Although it held much of its ground in
May's municipal elections
, this was under the banner of armed resistance. There are also indications its support may be
failing in southern Lebanon
. It is therefore unclear whether an unarmed Hezbollah could compete effectively in free elections, within Lebanon's complex political system.
Hezbollah's game plan is to cooperate minimally on disarmament to contain what it hopes is temporary international pressure, while gradually rebounding and staying deliberately vague about the future of its weapons. Qassem, like his predecessor Hassan Nasrallah whom Israel killed in September of last year, has tied the weapons issue to a national dialogue, which has been
tried before
but gone nowhere (a negotiation cannot take place with one side pointing a gun at the other's head).
Hezbollah's stance is the reason why the Lebanese government's response to the US proposal lacks any formal or legal commitment to fully disarm the group or a timetable for doing so.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, both reformist leaders with the best of intentions, have voiced two main concerns. First, forcing Hezbollah to completely disarm, especially before Israel stops its attacks and withdraws completely from southern Lebanon, could lead to domestic sectarian conflict. Second, until there is strategic clarity on the unstable relationship between Iran and the United States, making a move on Hezbollah without top cover from Washington is fraught with risks.
The first concern is overstated and short-sighted. Aoun and Salam must recognize that the chances of sectarian tensions are higher with the status quo unchanged. Indeed, if nothing is done to seriously address the issue of Hezbollah's arms, Israel will likely strike again and cause more physical damage and human casualties. If that happens, war-weary and economically dispossessed Lebanese could blame Hezbollah for causing even more death and destruction. This would in turn increase the risk of sectarian violence and people taking up arms against Hezbollah and its supporters.
What Aoun and Salam should worry about is…the risk that the US loses interest in Lebanon and the country misses the train of peace and prosperity in the region.
The second concern is irrelevant. Whether the United States goes to war with
Iran
to fully destroy its nuclear program or reaches a diplomatic settlement, it does not change Lebanon's own obligations to disarm Hezbollah. For decades, Lebanese officials have linked issues of holistic domestic reform with changes in the international environment. This shirking of responsibilities has led to nothing but national ruin. Taking full responsibility is the only way forward.
What Aoun and Salam should worry about is not US backroom dealing or fighting with Tehran but rather the risk that the US loses interest in Lebanon and the country misses the train of peace and prosperity in the region. 'If you don't want change, it's no problem',
Barrack said bluntly
. 'The rest of the region is moving at high speed'. For Lebanon, the choice should be clear.
CHATAM HOUSE