Wagner's final chapter in Africa

Hindustan Times

15-06-2025

On October 6, 2025, the Russian private military company Wagner officially declared its decision to withdraw its troops from Mali, thereby concluding more than three and a half years of engagement in the West African nation's protracted campaign against Islamic extremists and insurgents. Although Wagner's departure signifies the end of a contentious chapter, Russia's military presence in Mali is far from over. The Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary force, will continue operations, signalling a strategic realignment rather than a retreat.
Wagner's operation in Mali commenced in late 2021 following a military coup that ousted the civilian government. The coup leaders, frustrated by the inability of the Malian army to contain the violent insurgency in the country's north, sought assistance from Russia. With rapidly growing anti-western sentiments and the consequent withdrawal of Western security forces, including French troops and United Nations peacekeepers, the Wagner Group was deployed to fill the resulting vacuum. It was tasked with assisting the Malian armed forces in reasserting control over territories dominated by jihadist elements.
Despite early claims of battlefield successes, Wagner's operation in Mali fell short of its objectives. In its exit statement, the group claimed to have secured all regional capitals under Malian government control, expelled militants and eliminated key insurgent leaders. Yet, these declarations are starkly at odds with the prevailing reality. Violence continues to escalate, with jihadist groups like the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) inflicting heavy losses on both the Malian army and Wagner mercenaries.
In the months preceding Wagner's withdrawal, JNIM carried out a series of highly lethal attacks across the Sahel. On June 1, 2025, an assault on a military installation in central Mali resulted in the deaths of dozens of soldiers. In mid-May, the group claimed responsibility for attacks in neighbouring Burkina Faso that allegedly led to the deaths of approximately 200 military personnel. Similarly, in Niger, over 100 soldiers were reportedly killed in two separate incidents in late May. These successive setbacks underscored Wagner's limited effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations and further highlighted the precarious and deteriorating security landscape across the Sahel region.
Furthermore, both Wagner and the Malian army faced widespread accusations of human rights abuses. Reports from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch detailed extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and civilian targeting over several years. In December 2024, Human Rights Watch accused Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries of deliberately killing at least 32 civilians over eight months. Such accusations of violence have significantly eroded the credibility and legitimacy of Wagner's presence and operations in the region.
Mali's instability is part of a broader Sahel crisis, including Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are currently ruled by military juntas that assumed power between 2020 and 2023, each citing the inability of preceding civilian administrations to effectively address escalating insurgencies as justification for their coups. The West's retreat from the region, combined with growing anti-Western sentiment, opened space for Russia to deepen military ties using Wagner as a proxy.
Founded by Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner rose to prominence through its involvement in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria before expanding into Africa around 2014, beginning with Libya. The group provided military support and training in exchange for economic concessions, frequently involving access to mining rights and resource extraction contracts. Disillusioned with the conditionality and perceived self-interest underpinning western support, many African governments turned to Wagner as an alternative provider of security services. Consequently, the group rapidly expanded its presence across the continent, establishing operations in Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali.
However, Wagner's trajectory changed dramatically after Prigozhin's death in a 2023 plane crash. After his death, the Kremlin moved to consolidate control over its mercenary forces by creating the Africa Corps, incorporating the Wagner Group and other such PMCs within itself. Africa Corps is under the direct command of the Russian ministry of defence, marking a strategic transition from semi-autonomous mercenary activity to state-controlled deployment. Approximately 2,000 Russian mercenaries remain in Mali, comprising a combination of former Wagner personnel and newly integrated Africa Corps forces.
Despite its uneventful exit, Wagner's involvement in Mali may be regarded as a strategic success from the perspective of Moscow as it laid the groundwork for the Africa Corps to continue operations. Unlike its predecessor, the Africa Corps is expected to prioritise local security forces' training and logistical support rather than directly engaging in frontline combat operations. This more restrained approach is intended to preserve Russia's strategic depth in Africa while avoiding the international criticism associated with some of Wagner's conspicuous activities.
Yet, its overall legacy in Mali is deeply unsatisfactory as it failed to achieve its core objectives of stabilising the country and eradicating extremist insurgencies. On the contrary, it left behind a legacy of violence, human rights abuses, and political instability. The group's narrative of military success contrasts starkly with the ongoing security crises and civilian suffering in Mali and the broader Sahel.
Despite these evident shortcomings of Wagner's missions, its successor, Africa Corp, is likely to be received favourably by local regimes in urgent need of external security assistance, highlighting the intricate and often paradoxical dynamics of security and geopolitics in Africa. As Wagner recedes from the stage, the Africa Corps emerges as Russia's new face in the region, offering a continuation under a more state-controlled framework. Thus, Wagner's exit from Mali is less an end than a transformation, reflecting the evolving nature of mercenary warfare and geopolitical competition in Africa's turbulent Sahel region.
This article is authored by Samir Bhattacharya, associate fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.