«La Guerra Olvidada» : When the Moroccan Liberation Army nearly liberated the Sahara

Ya Biladi

05-02-2025

The Ifni War, also known as the Forgotten War (La Guerra Olvidada), is a significant but often overlooked chapter in Morocco's struggle for complete independence from colonial powers. As noted by the renowned Moroccan politician Mohammed Ben Said Ait Idder, a figurehead of the nationalist movement and the Moroccan Liberation Army in his seminal work « Ṣafaḥat min malḥamat jaysh Al-taḥrir bi-l-janub al-maġribi » (Pages from the epic of the Liberation Army in southern Morocco) just one year after gaining sovereignty from France and Spain in 1956, Morocco found itself embroiled in an undeclared war with Spain that lasted from November 1957 to April 1958.
The Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA), alongside Ait Baamrane tribes and other Sahrawi tribes, fought valiantly to liberate the Spanish-occupied territories of Ifni and Moroccan Sahara. Despite facing superior military might, the MLA managed to reclaim the northern part of «Moroccan Sahara, known as Cape Juby or the Tarfaya Strip, before the conflict ended. This article delves into the causes, key events, and aftermath of this pivotal war that shaped modern Moroccan history.
Origins and historical background
The roots of the Ifni War can be traced back to Spain's colonial presence in southwest Morocco during the 19th century. Spain had maintained control over the coastal enclave of Sidi Ifni since 1860 following the defeat of the Moroccan Sultanate in the Tétouan War (1859–1860), and gradually expanded into the Moroccan Sahara in the following decades. According to historian John Mercer in his book «Spanish Sahara», Spain's sovereignty over these territories gained European recognition at the Berlin Conference of 1884. In 1946, Spain consolidated its various coastal and interior colonies in the region under the banner of Spanish West Africa, as noted by Diego Aguirre in « La última guerra colonial de España: Ifni-Sahara (1957-1958) ».
Upon regaining independence in 1956, Morocco wanted to recover all the historical pre-colonial Moroccan territories that had been taken from it by the imperial powers during the colonial era. As Michel Catala writes in his chapter « La reprise en compte par le Maroc indépendant des anciennes revendications territoriales » from the book «Pouvoirs anciens, pouvoirs modernes de l'Afrique d'aujourd'hui» King Mohammed V actively encouraged efforts to reclaim these territories, going so far as to personally fund Moroccan Sahrawi rebels in their demand for the return of Sidi Ifni to Morocco.
After regaining its independence, Morocco sought to complete its territorial integrity and reclaim historical Moroccan lands. Bernabé López García, in his chapter « La descolonización de Ifni y el Sahara» from the book «España frente a la Independencia de Marruecos», notes that Allal el-Fassi (founder of the Istiqlal Party) argued that Morocco's independence was incomplete as long as «historically Moroccan» lands remained under foreign control, including Moroccan Sahara which had once been under Almoravid rule. This irredentist doctrine would become Morocco's official policy by 1958, adding to the urgency of the liberation struggle, as pointed out by Adolfo Gustavo Ordoño in his book «La guerra de Ifni».
The year 1957 saw a dramatic escalation of tensions between Morocco and Spain over Ifni and Moroccan Sahara, violent clashes erupted against Spanish rule in Ifni beginning April 10, 1957, followed by civil warfare and widespread killings of Spanish loyalists. Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco, in response, dispatched two battalions of the elite Spanish Legion to Laayoune in June, as noted by Gerardo Mariñas Romero in his article «La Legión española en la guerra de Ifni-Sahara». Morocco countered by mobilizing its newly formed Royal Armed Forces near the borders of Ifni.
Meanwhile, the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA), though at odds with the monarchy over fully integrating into the Royal Armed Forces, received covert funding from Morocco to sustain its fight against Spanish colonialism, as pointed out by Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi in her chapter « Les luttes politiques de l'indépendance » from the book «Partis politiques et protestations au Maroc (1934-2020)». The MLA had a complex composition, consisting of Moroccan army dissidents and Sahrawi tribes from across Moroccan Sahara and Mauritania.
According to Samia Mashat's edited volume « Coloniser, pacifier, administrer XIX-XX siècles », the MLA in the south was the only branch that refused to join the Royal Armed Forces in 1956, choosing instead to continue the armed struggle to recover pre-colonial Moroccan territory.
Outbreak of war
The Ifni War began in earnest on November 23, 1957, when MLA forces launched a surprise attack on Spanish positions. As documented by José Ramón Diego Aguirre in his book «La última guerra colonial de España: Ifni-Sahara, 1957-1958», the MLA cut communication lines, assaulted military posts and weapons depots in and around Ifni. Approximately 2,000 Moroccan fighters armed with automatic weapons laid siege to Sidi Ifni. The initial attacks inflicted heavy losses on the Spanish forces, with 55 dead, 128 wounded and 7 missing, as reported by Rafael Casas de la Vega in his book « La última guerra de Africa ». Although the Spanish managed to repel a direct assault on Sidi Ifni, they were forced to abandon several other towns in the region to Moroccan control, including the strategic settlement of Smara, as noted by Francesco Tamburini in his article « Ifni-Sahara, 1957-1958: una guerra coloniale dimenticata ».
The MLA's offensive marked the official start of the Ifni War, prompting Spain to urgently deploy two additional Legion battalions to Sahara. Morocco's assault proved largely successful in the early stages. Within two weeks, the MLA and allied tribes controlled most of Ifni, effectively isolating inland Spanish units from the capital, Sidi Ifni. Simultaneous attacks were launched throughout Moroccan Sahara against Spanish garrisons and patrols.
Battle of Edchera
A pivotal engagement occurred on January 12-13, 1958, when MLA forces attacked the Spanish stronghold of Laayoune, defended by the 13th battalion of the Spanish Legion. The MLA was initially unable to overcome the Spanish Legion so they preferred to retreat. However, they regrouped and set up an ambush for the pursuing of Spanish troops near the town of Edchera (north of the city of Laayoune), as detailed by José Ramón Diego Aguirre in his article «Ifni, la última guerra colonial española». In the ensuing battle, the Spanish captain leading the pursuit was mortally wounded early on. The Spanish suffered heavy casualties, with 37 dead and 50 wounded, before ultimately withdrawing under covering machine gun fire, as reported by Ramiro Santamaría in his book « Ifni-Sahara, la guerra ignorada ». It was this precarious military situation that compelled Spain to accept a joint operation with France, codenamed Operation Ecouvillon.
The siege of Sidi Ifni
Emboldened by their early victories, enlarged Moroccan units attempted to besiege Sidi Ifni in hopes of provoking a popular uprising against Spanish rule. However, they drastically underestimated the city's formidable defenses. As Spanish Colonel Miguel Simón Contreras points out in his article «Ifni y Sahara, hoy», by December 9, Sidi Ifni had proven impenetrable with its extensive network of trenches, forward outposts, and a garrison of 7,500 defenders supplied by the Spanish Navy. The siege, which lasted until June 1958, was relatively quiet and bloodless as both Spain and Morocco focused their resources on the vast open desert terrain.
Operation Ecouvillon : France intervenes
Unable to repel the Moroccan offensive, Spain appealed to France for a joint military intervention, which became known as Operation Ecouvillon or Ouragan. As Elsa Assidon argues in her article « De l'opération 'Écouvillon' à l'intervention en Mauritanie », France had its own strategic interests in preventing the spread of anti-colonial insurgency to its sub-Saharan territories. Equally important was safeguarding French access to the region's natural resources and securing its economic investments.
After months of covert planning, Operation Ecouvillon was officially launched on February 10, 1958. It involved an impressive coalition force of 9,000 Spanish troops and 60 planes fighting alongside 5,000 French personnel with 50 aircraft, all under the command of French General Bougraud, France justified its intervention by citing the pretext of an isolated skirmish between Mauritanian Goumiers and ALN rebels, according to Ana Torres García in her article «La negociación de la retrocesión de Ifni: contribución a su estudio».
The operation began with a massive aerial bombardment on February 9, as French bombers targeted MLA positions in Tan-Tan and Seguia el-Hamra. The strikes, which included the use of napalm, killed an estimated 150 Moroccan fighters, as noted by Mohammed Bensaïd in his book «Ṣafaḥat min malḥamat jaysh Al-taḥrir bi-l-janub al-maġribi». On the ground, Spanish forces swiftly retook the cities of Laayoune and Tarfaya.
The main offensive unfolded in two distinct phases:
Phase 1 (Feb 10-20): Joint Franco-Spanish paratroopers, in a daring action called Operation Huracan, recaptured the strategic city of Smara. Despite fierce resistance from the MLA fighters bolstered by strong local tribal support particularly from the Ait Baamrane Berber tribes, Spain managed to reassert control over Semara and Dcheira, as described by Manuel Juan González in his chapter « La retrocesión de Ifni: opinión pública y oposición política » from the book «La presencia española en África: del 'fecho de Allende' a la crisis de Perejil».
Phase 2 (Feb 20-24): The coalition forces dealt a crippling blow to the insurgents on February 21, eliminating some 300 fighters near the town of Aousserd. Faced with an overwhelming influx of superior troops and equipment, the battered MLA began to withdraw as clashes diminished in intensity, as recounted by Bernabé López García in « La descolonización de Ifni y el Sahara ». By February 24, 1958, Operation Ecouvillon was declared successfully concluded.
Aftermath and legacy
In the immediate aftermath of the Ifni War, Spain and Morocco signed the Cintra Agreement on April 1, 1958. As outlined by Ana Torres García in her article « La negociación de la retrocesión de Ifni: contribución a su estudio », the agreement stipulated that Spain would cede the Tarfaya Strip, located between the Draa River and Cape Juby, to Morocco. However, Spain retained control over Ifni until 1969, when it was finally returned to Morocco following UN pressure.
One of the most notable leaders to emerge after the Ifni War was Ahmed Dlimi, better known as Commandant «Che Guevara», who earned his nickname because of his tactical prowess, distinctive beret and resemblance to the famous Argentine revolutionary, as mentioned by Gilles Perrault in his book « Notre ami, le roi ». Dlimi would later go on to command Moroccan troops in the 1963 Sand War border conflict with Algeria after being incorporated into the Moroccan Royal Army.
The Ifni War also had significant political ramifications for the region. In Mauritania, those Reguibat tribesmen who rallied to the French cause during the conflict gained considerable influence, shaping the country's balance of power as it transitioned to independence in 1960. As Sophie Caratini argues in her book « La république des sables : anthropologie d'une révolution », many of the Mauritanian soldiers who fought in Ecouvillon would later form the core leadership of the new country's armed forces. In this sense, the Ifni War was a crucible that forged Mauritania's postcolonial military and political order.
Although Morocco achieved victories against Spain at the beginning of the Ifni War, even reclaiming some vital areas in the Sahara, such as Dcheira and Smara, the intervention of France quickly turned the tide of the war in Spain's favor. This war was a crucial first step in the country's long struggle to restore its precolonial borders and assert its sovereignty in defiance of European powers. The «Army of Liberation in the South» never regained its former strength after Operation Ecouvillon, but the issue of «recovering the Moroccan Saharan territories» and completing territorial integrity remained alive. A decade later, Morocco finally secured the return of Ifni in 1969, and Spain ultimately withdrew from Western Sahara in 1975-1976 under pressure from the Green March.