Damascus between the Druze, Alawites, and Kurds

Al Arabiya

5 days ago

It's true that Bashar al-Assad left the palace on the evening of Saturday, December 7, and that Ahmad al-Shara entered it the next day without a single shot being fired in the capital. It's a rare occurrence in history. Even so, the road ahead for the new leadership is neither paved nor smooth.
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The road to change from Idlib to Damascus was open because most Syrians – as well as regional and global actors – truly wanted change.
But the actual uprooting of the al-Assad regime was a long and bloody process – perhaps one of the most complex transitions in the region. From this standpoint, we must interpret the current events within this context, rather than as a mere 'moment of victory.'
Optimism, enthusiasm, and widespread support did not prevent political unrest: Confrontations on the coast with Alawites, the bombing of a Christian church in Damascus, disputes with the Druze of Sweida, and with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa. The crises that have already occurred – and those that may still come – are expected. The domestic consensus to remove al-Assad means the alternative system will need time to build trust. There's also a troubled regional environment with actors harmed by the transition who will need time to test the waters, accept the new reality, and choose to cooperate.
Amid these local confrontations, two dangerous factions threaten the new order. The first is overtly hostile – such as remnants of the old regime, forces in Iran, and local gangs like drug cartels.
These groups will repeatedly try to create a confrontational climate that escalates over time. They aim to shrink Syria, entangle Damascus in a prolonged battle, and encourage the emergence of independent regions.
The second faction comes from within the system – or considers itself part of it – and plays a role in fueling crises. It has its own views on how the country should be governed and how it should engage with the world. Though loyal, this faction is no less dangerous than the hostile one, because it ignites conflicts and deepens divisions. Its threat lies in dragging the Syrian authority into a confrontation with the regional order and inviting foreign powers to invest in a local civil war.
These traps require wisdom in handling so that they don't distract the government from its most difficult task: building a new state that most Syrians are waiting for – one that improves living standards and transitions into a modern nation.
Al-Sharaa has domestic popularity that he must strengthen, lest it erode under the weight of looming challenges – most notably, bread shortages, inflation, low wages, and delays in foreign aid. These are challenges unrelated to Iran or regime remnants. They're compounded by the need to extinguish growing social strife, which risks becoming a civil war. Those engaged in this strife – whether in the name of freedoms or defending (or opposing) the regime – are stoking tensions among Syria's deeply anxious and mistrustful communities.
The international community wants a civil state that manages a disciplined security and military apparatus. The new Damascus regime needs time to organize itself and win over Syria's diverse groups. Let us remember that Hafez al-Assad, while presenting himself as a protector of minorities, placed Abdel Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlass at his right and left.
There are also forces in the region that have failed to establish extremist regimes – and now want Syria to become another Gaza or Afghanistan.
Upon entering the capital, al-Sharaa immediately announced his openness to all, stressing that his concern is Syrian – not international. He displayed a moderation that surprised many, and he has managed his relationships pragmatically, consistent with his promises.
That's why Syria will not become the Iranian model – which is now nearing its end – nor should it fight on behalf of others, whether against Israel or Iran. Nor should it allow others to bring their wars onto Syrian soil.
Amid these ethnic, sectarian, and regional tensions, the road will remain difficult. The regime has inherited a devastated country violated by both domestic and foreign forces. Fixing it will require political skill – not brute force – and a sixth sense that can anticipate crises and contain them.