Sri Lanka's Shifting Stance on Foreign Research Vessels Risks Its Blue Economy Future
Sri Lanka is again caught in a controversy surrounding a foreign research vessel. Its media has reported that the U.N.-flagged research vessel Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, operated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which had been scheduled to dock in Sri Lanka, was redeployed to Madagascar due to delays in securing the necessary approval.
Local media reported that the Dr. Fridtjof Nansen was to collect data in Sri Lankan waters, which would not only support domestic fisheries management but also improve the country's chances of tapping into international climate funding, such as from the Green Climate Fund.
According to reports, the United Nations had informed Sri Lanka about the research vessel in advance. However, Sri Lankan authorities delayed approval, saying that Sri Lanka has still not implemented standard operating procedures (SOPs) for foreign research vessels. By the time President Anura Kumara Dissanayake personally intervened to facilitate the ship's docking, the FAO had reportedly redeployed the vessel elsewhere. Neither the U.N. nor the Sri Lankan government has formally confirmed this claim. Local media also estimated that the country has lost a million dollars in research and programming due to this development. According to the FAO, the vessel is unlikely to return to the region before 2030.
This debacle is not just about one vessel. For the past few years, Sri Lanka has been pressured by India and the United States to block Chinese research vessels from docking and replenishing in the country. Unable to deal with Indo-U.S. pressure, Sri Lanka imposed a blanket ban on research vessels for a year in December 2023. This decision kneecapped the country's marine studies initiatives.
When the moratorium was imposed in 2023, the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration said that the year would be used to develop clear, transparent, and science-based SOPs for foreign research ships. However, distracted by domestic electoral politics, the administration failed to finalize these guidelines. This blanket ban expired in December 2024, but the SOPs are still not in place.
In January 2025, the Sri Lankan government pledged to review the work that has been done and develop comprehensive SOPs, even appointing a new committee led by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath to oversee the process. Yet, as of July 2025, these SOPs have yet to materialize.
In the case of the U.N. ship, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Fisheries are left in bureaucratic limbo, unable to guarantee approvals or even communicate a clear timeline to international partners. Director General of the MFA's Public Diplomacy Division, Thushara Rodrigo, told journalists that he doesn't know when the SOPs will be finalized. 'The decision rests entirely with the committee making the SOPs, its discussions, and its reviews.' His view was that Sri Lanka should not allow any research vessel in without established SOPs: 'If we proceed informally now, it could set a precedent for future similar situations. We are more concerned with safeguarding Sri Lanka's best interests in the long term, not just for this single case.'
Sri Lanka's institutional caution is understandable given the geopolitical context. In the highly contested Indian Ocean, India considers Sri Lankan waters as within its sphere of influence. Each foreign research vessel is scrutinized for its strategic intent rather than its scientific mission.
A section of the Sri Lankan media and academics have been insisting over the past few years that Sri Lanka must draft and adopt comprehensive SOPs for foreign research vessels. These protocols, developed collaboratively by marine scientists, legal experts, security officials, and fisheries stakeholders, could reinforce Sri Lanka's sovereignty. They insist that well-crafted SOPs for foreign research vessels can be a critical line of defense for Sri Lanka's sovereignty. By requiring prior notifications, setting strict clearance protocols, or even denying access outright, the country can assert its rights under international law and set boundaries on great-power behavior.
However, Sri Lanka must understand that they are not foolproof shields. Those who believe that the country is facing pressure from India and the U.S. because it lacks an SOP must understand that even with an SOP that adheres to the best international standards, India and the U.S. will continue to pressure Sri Lanka to ban Chinese research vessels from docking in Sri Lanka. And China, which becomes more powerful with each passing year, will push back harder against Indian and U.S. attempts to hinder its operations in the Indian Ocean. The strategic dynamics of the Indian Ocean region ensure ongoing interference, irrespective of administrative safeguards like SOPs.
Sri Lanka's long-term maritime strategy, therefore, must extend beyond SOPs, incorporating diplomatic agility, regional alliances, and proactive international engagement to safeguard its blue economy future.
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