Involvement of Regional Actors Complicates the Insurgency in Balochistan

The Diplomat

12 hours ago

The insurgency in Balochistan, framed by local fighters as an anti-imperialist struggle against Pakistan and its Chinese sponsors, continues to escalate as regional powers and terror groups trade accusations about the conflict. Having lost the initiative in the conflict long ago, Pakistan is increasingly blaming its neighbors for its stale security strategy and failures on the battlefield. Not to be outdone, the Baloch insurgents claim the Islamabad is now using Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to target Baloch civilians to quell the insurgency.
Regardless of the veracity of these claims, all sides increasingly blame outside involvement for the ongoing escalation of violence in the province and will expand their target lists accordingly. The Baloch struggle for independence from Pakistan will likely involve a growing cast of characters (and victims).
February set the stage for this summer's violence. That month, the senior leadership of key Baloch and Sindhi insurgent groups, operating under the Baloch Raji Aoji Sangar (BRAS) umbrella, held a high-level meeting, which resulted in an overhaul of the coalition's military and diplomatic strategies. The groups agreed to shift their military strategy from 'scattered guerrilla attacks to an organized and coordinated resistance' as they would soon become a 'Baloch National Army.'
Since the meeting, the insurgents have conducted several large-scale attacks, notably the March 11 hijacking of the Jaffar Express. The train attack was followed by a complex assault on a military bus convoy in Noshki on March 16. The insurgents also routed local security forces and temporarily seized the towns of Manoghar on May 2 and Surab on May 31. Attacks against Pakistani security forces continued to soar throughout June as the insurgents showed increasing coordination and determination in their military operations.
In addition to Pakistan, China is involved too. China has a number of infrastructure and investment projects in the province as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Baloch insurgent groups have targeted Chinese projects as a political message. In response, China is struggling to find new ways to collaborate with Islamabad to shore up the province's security. But Beijing has also begun its own outreach to civic leaders in Balochistan to de-escalate the threats.
In late May, China's assistant minister of foreign affairs met with a delegation from the province to gain some support in the province. Unfortunately, China seems unable to meaningfully shape favorable outcomes for its CPEC investments and seems focused on echoing Islamabad's claims of foreign support to the insurgency.
While all of Balochistan's insurgent groups deny the claims, Pakistan has long blamed India for the violence in Balochistan. Direct evidence of Indian involvement remains limited, but security analysts on both sides of the border assess that New Delhi actively supports the Baloch insurgents.
On May 11, after a series of coordinated assaults across the province, the Balochistan Liberation Army issued a message to India claiming the attacks: 'We assure India that if it makes the final decision to eliminate the terrorist state of Pakistan, Baloch Liberation Army, along with the entire nation, is ready to attack from the western border. We will not only welcome the decision but will also become its practical and military arm. We are ready to surround Pakistan from both eastern and western fronts.' The message was a pointed one given its timing immediately after the India-Pakistan cross-border strikes of May 7-10.
The following week, on May 23, the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the messaging wing of Pakistan's military, claimed that the bombing of a bus near Khuzdar, the March Jaffar Express attack, and an October 2024 attack on the Chinese envoy were all directed by New Delhi. The ISPR is now regularly labeling insurgents as 'Indian sponsored' terrorists and 'Indian proxy' outfits.
Potential Indian support to the Baloch insurgency provides Islamabad with a poignant counterpoint to New Delhi's accusations about Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir. Further, should BRAS and its affiliates continue to build momentum on the battlefield, it may alter Pakistan's calculus about support to extremist groups in Kashmir.
Beyond just India and Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan are now involved in the narrative of the Baloch militias.
In January 2024, Pakistan and Iran came to blows over mutual accusations of support to separatist Baloch militias operating on the other side of the border. Pakistan has also increasingly blamed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for the violence in Balochistan. Islamabad has long claimed the Taliban supports Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in their campaign against the state. However, the severity of the Jaffar Express attack left Islamabad reeling and looking for answers.
The Pakistan Army spokesperson stated that the attack was planned and directed in Afghanistan. He also stated the militants were in contact with their facilitators and planners in Afghanistan via satellite phones during the operation. Meanwhile, the ISPR also noted that the BLA attackers used U.S.-origin weapons left in Afghanistan in the hijacking.
The Taliban denied the charges outright, while noting the strong presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province in Pakistani territory.
Indeed, ISKP presents a wild card in Balochistan's insurgency. Until recently, the group was largely content to use the province to train personnel and stage terror attacks like the March 2024 attack on the Crocus Concert Hall in Moscow. However, the group declared war against the Baloch insurgents in May. ISKP claimed Baloch insurgents attacked one of its training camps in the Mastung area. In a public announcement, ISKP threatened to attack protests by Baloch civilians against the forced disappearances of civilians by the Pakistani military. The threat has substantial credibility given ISKP's string of deadly bombings in the province during the 2024 Pakistani elections. Following the ISKP threat, Baloch political leaders were quick to claim that Pakistani security apparatus was using ISKP to threaten even non-violent Baloch political activities.
As the Baloch insurgency starts its third decade of violence, the security vacuum it has created presents substantial threats not only to Pakistan, but to its neighbors. Unable and unwilling to address the core political and security grievances of the Baloch population, Pakistan seems intent on continuing its existing approach, which relies on numerous, isolated checkpoints, intelligence-based operations, and rampant extrajudicial violence against the Baloch population.
Islamabad lacks a strategy to address the alleged foreign interference in its internal affairs. The continued trading of accusations of militant support with India, last year's tit-for-tat exchange with Iran, and periodic cross-border skirmishes with Afghanistan are a preview of what is to come. In the meantime, ISKP will continue to make its presence in the region felt. The once limited insurgency in Balochistan now threatens stability across the region.