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Myanmar's 'my way' vs Asean norms

Myanmar's 'my way' vs Asean norms

Bangkok Post16 hours ago
It appeared to be a done deal. During their summit on May 26, Asean leaders agreed to admit Timor-Leste as the 11th member of the regional bloc. Since then, Nay Pyi Taw has raised an unexpected objection, with the junta issuing an official statement that could potentially embarrass Asean and its current chair, Malaysia.
Myanmar threatened to derail Timor-Leste's accession if Dili continues to engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), which opposes the State Administration Council (SAC) regime in Myanmar. Timor-Leste is among a dozen countries, mainly in the West, that have allowed the NUG to establish representative offices, both formally and informally.
This move shows Myanmar's preference for a unilateralist approach, let's call it "my way" policy, challenging the long-standing Asean Way, which has underpinned the bloc's consensus-based diplomacy for nearly six decades. At the upcoming three-day Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur beginning tomorrow, the looming question is how to reconcile these divergent demeanours within the bloc that prides itself on unity and non-interference.
At the May summit, during the retreat, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong strongly supported Timor-Leste and proposed admitting the world's youngest democracy in October. Myanmar's representative, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Aung Kyaw Moe, who also attended the previous 44th and 45th summits, was mute. That silence was interpreted as consent, enabling Prime Minister Ibrahim Anwar to conclude that consensus had been reached.
The chairman's statement of the 46th Asean Summit, in particular paragraphs 124-126, confirmed that ministers and senior officials were tasked with finalising the procedural steps for Timor-Leste's admission at the 47th Asean Summit, while expediting key economic negotiations. The leaders encouraged all partners to assist Dili in fulfilling the criteria outlined in the roadmap. The upcoming Asean summit is scheduled for Oct 24-26.
But on June 14, a letter signed by Han Win Aung, Director General and alternate Asean Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) leader, urged Timor-Leste to "refrain from engaging with entities that are explicitly opposed or contrary to the positions of Asean member states". The letter warned that if Timor-Leste "persists in its blatant violation of the principle of non-interference", Asean should reject its membership and suspend all procedural steps until Dili "rectifies its approach".
The tough stance demonstrates how the SAC's "my way" clashes with the Asean Way, which emphasises consensus, restraint, and mutual respect. Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has half-heartedly cooperated with Asean's Five-Point Consensus, failing to fully implement the bloc's peace plan. Instead, Nay Pyi Taw is pursuing its own five-point roadmap, which shares some common goals, especially in the holding of elections. However, the SAC lacks credibility and inclusiveness to conduct "free and fair" polls that few believe in.
If Myanmar wants to return to Asean's embrace after the election, it must adopt the Asean Way, both in principle and in practice. Obviously, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is using the elections as an exit strategy, but Asean has leverage. The bloc's eventual recognition of the outcome will be crucial to lend any legitimacy.
Without Asean endorsement, the polls could deepen Myanmar's isolation and further deepen its fragmentation. After the coup and the more recent earthquake, public services have deteriorated and alienated potential voters. Throughout the past four years, the regional bloc has insisted that humanitarian aid and peace must come first to create an atmosphere conducive to allowing Myanmar's people to take part in an inclusive election that is free and fair.
The confrontation between the Asean Way and "my way" is not confined to Myanmar. The recent tensions between Thailand and Cambodia over boundary demarcation and the reopening of border checkpoints have added complexity to Malaysia's chairmanship. Both sides have invoked the principle of non-interference not to seek help from Asean's High Council, under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
Instead, Cambodia has resorted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Phnom Penh's request to internationalise the bilateral issue could break a precedent if raised within the framework of the Asean annual meeting. Thailand has reiterated that the current dispute should best be settled through established bilateral mechanisms.
This episode is reminiscent of 2006, when the Thaksin administration threatened to boycott the Asean Summit under the Laos chair if Malaysia brought up the Tak Bai incident. Fortunately, diplomacy prevailed. The incident shows how deeply ingrained the Asean Way is. Whenever members have deep disagreements, they avoid internationalising bilateral issues to preserve harmony within the bloc.
Yet, much to the chagrin of Asean watchers, the bloc has also tolerated selective applications of the "my way" approach, especially in economic diplomacy amid the great geopolitical shifts. Most recently, as the bloc collectively responds to US tariff hikes and broader global trade disruptions, Asean leaders have allowed their colleagues to pursue individual negotiations, provided they align with the bloc's broader consensus.
Vietnam's bilateral negotiations with the US over tariffs are a case in point, demonstrating whether national interest and Asean solidarity can coexist. Like the rest of Asean, Hanoi reaffirms its support for a predictable, transparent, free, fair, inclusive, sustainable, and rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its core. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia are also taking similar routes.
The Asean Way has long been criticised for relying on the "lowest common denominator" to reach consensus, but has allowed flexibility in practice. Member states quietly pursue their own paths without fracturing the bloc. This dual-track approach allows them to protect national interests without undermining regional unity. The challenge is ensuring that "my way" policies, like Myanmar's obstruction of Timor-Leste's entry, do not sabotage Asean's integrity.
The clash between "my way" and the Asean Way may sound contradictory to some, absurd to others. It is not a zero-sum gambit. With the Asean Way, all members respect shared principles while carving out space for individual agency. Malaysia's chairmanship has an important task to steer this balance.
At the upcoming post-ministerial conferences following the Asean annual conference, the Asean foreign ministers are scheduled to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has confirmed his attendance on Thursday and Friday, following the July 9 deadline of reciprocal tariffs. Asean wants to ensure Washington's long-term commitment to the region. Recently, several flagship US-Asean initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, were axed.
On a happier note, Asean's non-binding yet inclusive approach continues to win new converts. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), now has 59 signatories, including all major powers. Algeria and Uruguay will accede to the TAC at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. The Asean model is not perfect, but it is gaining global traction due to its voluntary cooperation, mutual respect, and incremental progress.
For the Asean Way to stay relevant, it must be modernised to counter growing "my way" tendencies with assertive national interests. It must refine its consensus mechanism to accommodate diversity, preventing any single member from holding the entire bloc hostage. Myanmar's obstruction of Timor-Leste's membership is a litmus test.
This week, the world will find out whether the Asean Way can be a driving force in managing internal dissent or torn apart by conflicting "my way" tactics. After all, it has endured for the past 58 years, and it will continue to live on. The challenge is to turn the apparent contradiction between the Asean Way and "my way" into a strength, not a liability.
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Myanmar's 'my way' vs Asean norms
Myanmar's 'my way' vs Asean norms

Bangkok Post

time16 hours ago

  • Bangkok Post

Myanmar's 'my way' vs Asean norms

It appeared to be a done deal. During their summit on May 26, Asean leaders agreed to admit Timor-Leste as the 11th member of the regional bloc. Since then, Nay Pyi Taw has raised an unexpected objection, with the junta issuing an official statement that could potentially embarrass Asean and its current chair, Malaysia. Myanmar threatened to derail Timor-Leste's accession if Dili continues to engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), which opposes the State Administration Council (SAC) regime in Myanmar. Timor-Leste is among a dozen countries, mainly in the West, that have allowed the NUG to establish representative offices, both formally and informally. This move shows Myanmar's preference for a unilateralist approach, let's call it "my way" policy, challenging the long-standing Asean Way, which has underpinned the bloc's consensus-based diplomacy for nearly six decades. At the upcoming three-day Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur beginning tomorrow, the looming question is how to reconcile these divergent demeanours within the bloc that prides itself on unity and non-interference. At the May summit, during the retreat, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong strongly supported Timor-Leste and proposed admitting the world's youngest democracy in October. Myanmar's representative, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Aung Kyaw Moe, who also attended the previous 44th and 45th summits, was mute. That silence was interpreted as consent, enabling Prime Minister Ibrahim Anwar to conclude that consensus had been reached. The chairman's statement of the 46th Asean Summit, in particular paragraphs 124-126, confirmed that ministers and senior officials were tasked with finalising the procedural steps for Timor-Leste's admission at the 47th Asean Summit, while expediting key economic negotiations. The leaders encouraged all partners to assist Dili in fulfilling the criteria outlined in the roadmap. The upcoming Asean summit is scheduled for Oct 24-26. But on June 14, a letter signed by Han Win Aung, Director General and alternate Asean Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) leader, urged Timor-Leste to "refrain from engaging with entities that are explicitly opposed or contrary to the positions of Asean member states". The letter warned that if Timor-Leste "persists in its blatant violation of the principle of non-interference", Asean should reject its membership and suspend all procedural steps until Dili "rectifies its approach". The tough stance demonstrates how the SAC's "my way" clashes with the Asean Way, which emphasises consensus, restraint, and mutual respect. Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar has half-heartedly cooperated with Asean's Five-Point Consensus, failing to fully implement the bloc's peace plan. Instead, Nay Pyi Taw is pursuing its own five-point roadmap, which shares some common goals, especially in the holding of elections. However, the SAC lacks credibility and inclusiveness to conduct "free and fair" polls that few believe in. If Myanmar wants to return to Asean's embrace after the election, it must adopt the Asean Way, both in principle and in practice. Obviously, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is using the elections as an exit strategy, but Asean has leverage. The bloc's eventual recognition of the outcome will be crucial to lend any legitimacy. Without Asean endorsement, the polls could deepen Myanmar's isolation and further deepen its fragmentation. After the coup and the more recent earthquake, public services have deteriorated and alienated potential voters. Throughout the past four years, the regional bloc has insisted that humanitarian aid and peace must come first to create an atmosphere conducive to allowing Myanmar's people to take part in an inclusive election that is free and fair. The confrontation between the Asean Way and "my way" is not confined to Myanmar. The recent tensions between Thailand and Cambodia over boundary demarcation and the reopening of border checkpoints have added complexity to Malaysia's chairmanship. Both sides have invoked the principle of non-interference not to seek help from Asean's High Council, under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Instead, Cambodia has resorted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Phnom Penh's request to internationalise the bilateral issue could break a precedent if raised within the framework of the Asean annual meeting. Thailand has reiterated that the current dispute should best be settled through established bilateral mechanisms. This episode is reminiscent of 2006, when the Thaksin administration threatened to boycott the Asean Summit under the Laos chair if Malaysia brought up the Tak Bai incident. Fortunately, diplomacy prevailed. The incident shows how deeply ingrained the Asean Way is. Whenever members have deep disagreements, they avoid internationalising bilateral issues to preserve harmony within the bloc. Yet, much to the chagrin of Asean watchers, the bloc has also tolerated selective applications of the "my way" approach, especially in economic diplomacy amid the great geopolitical shifts. Most recently, as the bloc collectively responds to US tariff hikes and broader global trade disruptions, Asean leaders have allowed their colleagues to pursue individual negotiations, provided they align with the bloc's broader consensus. Vietnam's bilateral negotiations with the US over tariffs are a case in point, demonstrating whether national interest and Asean solidarity can coexist. Like the rest of Asean, Hanoi reaffirms its support for a predictable, transparent, free, fair, inclusive, sustainable, and rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its core. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia are also taking similar routes. The Asean Way has long been criticised for relying on the "lowest common denominator" to reach consensus, but has allowed flexibility in practice. Member states quietly pursue their own paths without fracturing the bloc. This dual-track approach allows them to protect national interests without undermining regional unity. The challenge is ensuring that "my way" policies, like Myanmar's obstruction of Timor-Leste's entry, do not sabotage Asean's integrity. The clash between "my way" and the Asean Way may sound contradictory to some, absurd to others. It is not a zero-sum gambit. With the Asean Way, all members respect shared principles while carving out space for individual agency. Malaysia's chairmanship has an important task to steer this balance. At the upcoming post-ministerial conferences following the Asean annual conference, the Asean foreign ministers are scheduled to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has confirmed his attendance on Thursday and Friday, following the July 9 deadline of reciprocal tariffs. Asean wants to ensure Washington's long-term commitment to the region. Recently, several flagship US-Asean initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, were axed. On a happier note, Asean's non-binding yet inclusive approach continues to win new converts. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), now has 59 signatories, including all major powers. Algeria and Uruguay will accede to the TAC at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. The Asean model is not perfect, but it is gaining global traction due to its voluntary cooperation, mutual respect, and incremental progress. For the Asean Way to stay relevant, it must be modernised to counter growing "my way" tendencies with assertive national interests. It must refine its consensus mechanism to accommodate diversity, preventing any single member from holding the entire bloc hostage. Myanmar's obstruction of Timor-Leste's membership is a litmus test. This week, the world will find out whether the Asean Way can be a driving force in managing internal dissent or torn apart by conflicting "my way" tactics. After all, it has endured for the past 58 years, and it will continue to live on. The challenge is to turn the apparent contradiction between the Asean Way and "my way" into a strength, not a liability.

Rubio to make first visit to Indo-Pacific region for Asean meeting
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Rubio to make first visit to Indo-Pacific region for Asean meeting

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