Fighting for the margins: Climate diplomacy may be the only front to engage China

Euractiv

25-07-2025

Cecilia Trasi works at Bruegel as an Energy and Climate Research Analyst. Prior to joining Bruegel, she held positions at the European Commission and the OECD. She holds a BSc in Economics at Università Cattolica in Milan and a Master's in Public Policy at the Hertie School in Berlin.
With COP30 in Belém on the horizon, global climate diplomacy is drifting. The last climate conference confirmed that delivery of climate commitments is lagging just as ambition must rise.
So far, 173 countries – including China, India and the EU – have yet to submit their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with pledges for 2035. The United States, for its part, has again pulled out of the Paris Agreement, slashed international climate finance and embraced a 'fossil fuel first' agenda.
In this fragmented landscape, China stands out. It dominates clean technology supply chains, is scaling up renewables at home, and it is a force in climate diplomacy and finance to countries in the Global South. But this is not multilateral leadership in the traditional sense. China's climate engagement is strategic, domestically rooted, and tightly woven into its industrial and geopolitical ambitions.
At the same time, the recently enacted Energy Law explicitly recognises coal as a 'basic safeguard and system regulator' in the national energy system. Coal still dominates its fuel mix, accounting for more than 70% of the overall fuel combustion CO2 emissions, over half of which comes from its power sector.
This dual trajectory of expanding both renewables and coal is not an accident of policy: It is the policy. And it reflects a fundamental calculus: Climate policy in China must be consistent with domestic economic and political stability. Beijing expands green industries for competitiveness, scales fossil fuels for stability, and uses climate cooperation selectively to shape its external relationships.
Climate policy in China is about domestic continuity first – and the external message is clear: It will decarbonise at its own pace, on its own terms. In this context, the July 2025 EU–China High-Level Dialogue offered little in substance – but important signals nonetheless.
At a time of growing EU-China economic tension and sharp divergence in trade policy, both sides reaffirmed the value of structured climate engagement and the need to raise ambition ahead of COP30. Vice Premier Ding reiterated China's intention to submit a comprehensive NDC this fall, while EVP Ribera called for urgent progress from both sides.
This mutual recognition underscores that climate diplomacy remains one of the areas where dialogue is functioning: not to affirm shared values, but to shape outcomes where interests align. Instead of hoping for breakthroughs, the EU should target cooperation in areas where concrete progress is possible: carbon markets, methane reduction, and adaptation finance.
Continued technical dialogue on China's emissions trading system could enhance monitoring and verification, while laying groundwork for future interoperability. Methane mitigation (especially in coal and agriculture) offers quick, low-cost cuts, even without China joining the Global Methane Pledge.
But, above all, adaptation offers a less politicised and more promising path forward. China has called for joint support to developing countries in their green transitions. While the motivations are strategic, the opportunity is real.
Both sides are ramping up investments in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Aligning efforts, even loosely, on resilience infrastructure, early warning systems, and climate risk planning would allow the EU and China to deliver meaningful outcomes without requiring normative convergence. Structured coordination through platforms like the High-Level Dialogue can help ensure initiatives reinforce rather than duplicate each other.
Still, the EU must remain clear-eyed. Brussels has urged China to commit to a declining emissions pathway by 2035. But without yet a target of its own, and with persistent tensions over trade instruments like CBAM, the bloc's leverage is limited.
Instead of relying on moral authority, the EU should work through coalitions – with vulnerable states, emerging economies, and finance institutions. By raising the diplomatic cost of inaction while offering off-ramps for cooperation, the EU can help bend global ambition upwards.
Europe must engage with this reality, without any illusions. Structured dialogue with China will not erase tensions and it is not about shared principles. But it can influence choices on the margins. And in the fight against climate change, margins matter.